

THE  
PUNJAB AND DELHI  
IN 1857

BEING A NARRATIVE OF THE MEASURES BY WHICH THE  
PUNJAB WAS SAVED AND DELHI RECOVERED  
DURING THE INDIAN MUTINY

BY THE  
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CHAPLAIN OF THE PUNJAB MOVEABLE COLUMN IN 1857

VOL. I.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS  
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TO

ALL

WHO NOBLY, AND UNDER HEAVEN SUCCESSFULLY,

IN COUNCIL AND IN CAMP,

FOUGHT THE BATTLE OF THEIR COUNTRY IN THE PUNJAB

AND BEFORE DELHI IN 1857,

THE FOLLOWING

HUMBLE RECORD OF THAT MEMORABLE STRUGGLE

IS INSCRIBED,

WITH FEELINGS OF HEARTY ADMIRATION.





## P R E F A C E.

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Few of us who passed through those memorable months, from May to September 1857, in the Punjab—who escaped in that crisis—will fail to carry to our graves the remembrance of that signal mercy.

Reader, if you yourself shared in that escape, you will sympathise in the feelings that prompted the following pages—feelings of humble gratitude to Heaven; for “if the Lord himself had not been on our side when men rose up against us, they had swallowed us up quick;” and feelings of admiration for the wisdom, the devotion, and the heroism by which, humanly, our preservation was achieved.

If not—if it was your favoured lot to spend those months of suspense and peril in peaceful

England—and if even, which can scarcely be, you had not a kinsman or a friend involved in that momentous struggle for life—yet let us hope you will dwell with somewhat of national pride on the record, imperfect though it be, of the sage counsels and noble deeds by which so many of England's sons covered themselves with glory, and saved an empire.

With regard to the work itself, a few words will suffice. It originated in a journal kept by the Author while in camp for the private information of his own family, and was subsequently expanded into chapters, which appeared, under the auspices of *Blackwood's Magazine*, in the beginning of 1858, under the title of the "Poorbeah Mutiny." These were so favourably received in England (as well as in India, where their general accuracy was frequently noticed), that the Author was at length induced, at the solicitation of friends whose opinions he valued, to amplify them into a continuous narrative, confining himself to the operations in the Punjab. And when this intention became

generally known, he received help on every side ; information came in from all quarters, and in all shapes ; letters, literally in hundreds, from friends, and even strangers ; pencilled notes from the very scenes of blood, and after-recollections in calmer moments ;—anything which could throw light on the subject, or give interest to the narrative, was afforded for his perusal — and the following pages are the result. The completion of the work has been unfortunately, but unavoidably, retarded from ill health, clerical duties, and various other causes ; and the only consolation the Author can offer, either to himself or to his readers, for this delay in its appearance, is, that he hopes that, though it may have lost in freshness of interest, it has gained in fulness and accuracy.

In committing to the press a work in which occur the names of so many who nobly bore their part, and which necessarily embraces so wide a tract of country, the Author cannot but fear that, notwithstanding all his endeavours, he may have done, or seemed to have

done, less than justice to some of the brave men to whom England owes so much. Again, he feels that the narration of their gallantry and prowess may lack that glowing interest with which the mind of the reader, vaguely familiar with the glorious results, has already encircled them, and that expectant imagination may outrun the slow recital of the facts themselves, and turn away disappointed and dissatisfied at the dryness of the details. Yet it should be borne in mind that the events of which the Punjab was the scene, noble as they were, seem in their very success less thrilling, less appalling in their character, than those which marked the course of the mutiny in other parts of India. Even the fires of Meerut and the bloodshed of Delhi in the month of May dwindle into comparative insignificance beside the flames of Cawnpore and the massacre in its "slaughter-house" two months later. The siege of Delhi, too, with all its noble toil and struggle and endurance, and its assault of unparalleled boldness, lacked somewhat of the deep absorbing human inte-

rest which will ever centre in the beleaguered garrison of Lucknow. Nor had the Column, which swept the Punjab from the Indus to the Jumna, the opportunity of vieing in glorious deeds with the Army with which Sir Hugh Rose so gallantly recovered Central India.

Not that the Punjab was without her heroes—though it had not a Neill, the bold saviour of Allahabad and avenger of Cawnpore, nor an Outram, the soul of chivalry, who with Havelock effected the heroic relief of Lucknow—yet it had a John Nicholson, *without whom Delhi had not fallen*; \* a John Lawrence, who, in the wisdom of his counsel, his iron will, and energy, proved himself the worthy brother of the martyr of Lucknow, for “*through him* Delhi fell, and the Punjab, no longer a weakness, became a source of strength;” † it had a Robert Montgomery, in fearless faith wielding the sword of justice at Lahore, and imparting vigour and calm confidence on every side—“not inferior

\* The Chief Commissioner does not hesitate to affirm that, without John Nicholson, Delhi could not have fallen.—*Punjab Mutiny Report*, par. 52.

† Governor-General's Minute on the Mutiny, par. 34.

position required them to take a leading part in the stirring events of the time.

In addition to the many real defects of his work, the Author is quite prepared to find it charged against him that he has allowed his sympathies with the Punjab to carry him beyond bounds; and that, in the praise he has bestowed on the administration of that province, he has wronged others. To this charge he does not plead guilty. He is ready to admit that he felt as a *Punjabee*, and has written as one; and he remains strong in his conviction that, if sometimes its policy has been misrepresented and depreciated, *history*—calm, impartial history—will ever point to that province as the one in which, during that year of blood and danger, England has had the least to deplore, and the most to glory in.

One claim at least he would put forth in behalf of his narrative—he believes it to be *truthful*. In search for *truth*, he has spared neither himself nor others; and wherever he believes he has attained it he has not feared to speak it.

Of the view he has taken of this struggle for life or death, he still retains the opinion which he advanced from the first—it was *Mohammed* or *CHRIST* for India's future—the former represented by the Mussulmans of Hindostan, with their Hindoo dupes, and the latter by their Christian rulers. The word *Poorbeah*, which he has used throughout (literally meaning the people from *the East*\*), exactly expresses the portion of India in which the spirit of rebellion found its readiest tools. It was a term in common use in the more central provinces of Hindostan to designate the people living *to the East* of the sacred river, the Ganges (in Oude and Behar), the recruiting ground of the Bengal army, and was adopted in the army of Runjeet Singh to designate the *Hindostanee soldier* who found his way into the Sikh ranks, and whom, many of them discharged men or deserters from the Company's Service, the *Khalsa* held in supreme contempt; and there was at least policy in reviving the term at this juncture, for it revived the contempt and

\* From the Hindostanee word *Poorüb*, signifying *East*.

hatred with which the class had ever been regarded ; it widened the breach between the Punjabee and the Hindostanee, and rendered any coalition the more difficult.

One word on the extent of country travelled over in the following pages. Before the mutiny, both Meerut and Delhi formed part of the government of the North-west Provinces,—to which Meerut still belongs. Delhi, as soon as it had been recovered, was transferred to the government of the Punjab. Both places are necessarily included in this narrative,—though the former only slightly and incidentally—for the flame which threatened the Punjab broke out at the one and was extinguished at the other.

To his many kind friends—the Right Hon. Sir John Lawrence, Bart., G.C.B. ; Sir R. Montgomery, K.C.B., Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab ; D. F. M'Leod, Esquire, C.B., Financial Commissioner ; Sir Herbert B. Edwardes, K.C.B., Commissioner of Peshawur ; George C. Barnes, Esquire, C.B., of Umballa ; Major E. Lake, of Jullundhur ; E. Thornton,



Esquire, C.B. ; A. A. Roberts, Esquire, C.B., of Lahore ; Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain, C.B., commanding the Punjab Moveable Column, and afterwards officiating Adjutant-General of the Army ; Brigadier Graves, of Delhi ; Brigadier P. Innes, of Ferozepore ; Brigadier Showers, C.B. ; Major Crawford Chamberlain, C.B., officiating Brigadier of Mooltan ; Major Hill, Paymaster, Jullundhur ; John Scarlet Campbell, Esquire, of Jhujjur ; T. D. Forsyth, Esquire, of Umballa ; H. B. Henderson, Esquire ; Major H. Olpherts, Artillery ; Captain H. O. Farrington, Jullundhur ; Captain J. Chambers, Sealkote ; Lieutenant Mercer, Ferozepore ; Captain H. Lewis, Commissary of Ordnance, Ferozepore ; Captain J. Griffith, Commissary of Ordnance, Philour, and in Camp at Delhi ; Captain de Teissier, Artillery ; Captain Hyde, Peshawur ; Captain C. Fitzroy Mundy, commanding Kelat-i-Ghilzie Regiment ; Captain G. Noble Cave, commanding 16th Punjab Infantry ; Captain Lind, commanding Mooltanee Horse ; Captain Trench, 35th N. I. ; Captain Cumine, 4th N. I. ; Captain Hockin, 17th Irre-

gular Cavalry; Lieutenant Battye, Jhelum; Lieutenant Williams, 4th Sikhs:—to these, and to many others too—to all who have, more or less, helped with information,\* cheered on with encouragement—the Author's best thanks are now most heartily tendered, with a sincere hope that their deeds, and those of their brethren in arms, may yet find a more able and worthy Chronicler, in some future Historian of the Indian Mutiny.

\* The Author has not thought it necessary to specify, in each particular event, the private sources from which his information was obtained. It would have needlessly burdened his pages with foot-notes; for there is scarcely a single incident for which he had not the authority of several independent witnesses. But, wherever he is indebted for any fact solely to any already published account, he has scrupulously acknowledged his obligation.

LONDON, *February* 1861.

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# THE PUNJAB AND DELHI IN 1857.

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## CHAPTER I.

THE ORIGIN OF THE MUTINY—THE CHUPATTEES—SEDITIONS PROCLAMATIONS IN PERSIA AND AT DELHI—THE GREASED CART-RIDGE—THE ANNEXATION OF OUDE.

THE year 1857 (*annus flebilis*!) was but a few weeks old when the first mutterings of the approaching storm were heard in different parts of India.

In the North-west Provinces, it was discovered that *chupattees* \* were being circulated throughout the country in a somewhat mysterious manner.†

\* *Chupattees* are a preparation of flour and water made in the form of pancakes, and constitute the chief food of the natives.

† One district officer, who saw a chupattee-laden messenger arrive in a village, and observed him breaking his cake into pieces, and distributing them among the men of the village, asked what it meant; he was told that there was an old custom in Hindostan, that when their *malik*, or chief, required any service from his people, he adopted this mode to prepare them for receiving his orders, and every one who partook of the chupattee was held pledged to obey the order, whenever it might come, and whatever it might be. "What was the nature of the order in the present case?" he asked; the answer, accompanied by a suspicious smile, was, "We don't know yet."

The fact was duly reported from various quarters ; inquiries were ordered to be set on foot, but nothing definite could be traced either as to their origin or object, and they were suffered to travel on from village to village with little let or hindrance.

Some fifty years before, a similar appearance in Central India had perplexed the authorities,\* but no solution of the mystery had been gained ; and as nothing had then resulted from it, the hope was grasped at that, in the present instance also, if not meaningless, it might prove equally harmless : it might be some superstitious spell against disease, for cholera had ravaged several districts during the previous autumn—or against some impending calamity, for the whole country teemed with forebodings of coming trouble. At all events, the idea was scouted of its having any political meaning ; and far-seeing old Indians, who dared to look gravely on the “chupattee mystery,” were denounced as croakers.† How little was it thought that therein was really hidden an Eastern symbol of portentous meaning ! Five centuries before (A.D. 1368), the Chinese had, by a somewhat similar plan, organised and carried out a conspiracy by which the dynasty of

\* KAYE's *Life of Lord Metcalfe*.

† Sir Henry Lawrence, on his way through Agra to assume charge of Oude at this time, openly avowed his belief that it foreboded “mischiefs.” “We shall have you,” he said to Mr Colvin, “and the Sudder Judges, seized and shut up in the fort by the seppys, and kept as hostages while they dictate terms to Government, and, as usual, obtain some further concessions. So you must be on the look-out.” This the author had from an eminent civilian, who heard it from Sir Henry's own lips.

their Mongol invaders was overthrown;\* and it now imported no less than the annihilation of the English race in India, and a restoration of the sovereignty of Hindostan to the effete house of Timour.

Nor were other indications wanting that there was some disturbing power at work on the native mind. One or two of the "signs" may be noticed. In the tent of the Shahzada commander, after the rout of the Persians at Mohumrah, was found a royal proclamation, a sort of politico-religious encyclical letter, from the Shah-in-Shah, the recognised head of the Faithful in the East. It was addressed "to all the people of Heran;" but it also called on "the Afghan tribes, and the inhabitants of that country who are co-religionists of the Persians, and who possess the same Quran, and Kibla, and laws of the Prophet, to take part in the *jahād*;" and it purported, moreover, to be published "for the information of *all true believers*; and (please God) the follower of Islam in *Indiu* and Scinde will also unite and take vengeance on that tribe (the British) for all the injuries which the Holy Faith has suffered from them," "and will not withhold any sacrifice in the holy cause." What form their vengeance was to assume, and to what extent their zeal was to be carried, the Shah-in-Shah shall himself explain: "Let the old and the young, the small and the great, the wise and the ignorant, the ryot and the sepoy, all

\* HUC and GABET'S *Travels in Tartary, &c. in 1814*, vol. i. p. 54. The Chinese to this day celebrate this event under the name of the "Festival of the Moon Leaves."

without exception, arise in defence of the orthodox faith of the Prophet; and having girt up the waist of valour, adorn their persons with arms and weapons; and let the *ullema* and preachers call on the people in the mosques, and public assemblies, and in the pulpits, to join in a *jahād* in the cause of God; and thus shall the *ghazis* (martyrs) in the cause of the faith have a just title to the promises contained in the words of the Prophet, 'Verily we are of those who fought in the cause of God.'"\*

Soon there appeared placards on the gateway of the Jumma Musjid at Delhi, the Caaba of India Mohammedans, and in other places; some ambiguously hinting at general rebellion, others openly calling on the "followers of the Prophet" to exterminate the unbelievers. And although all such placards were promptly removed by the civil authorities, they had been probably read by thousands, and the poison was not slow to work.†

In the Persian proclamation, which possibly received its inspiration still further north, may be detected the origin of this rebellion. It was a political and religious struggle (for with the Moslem the two are so

\* The entire proclamation will be found in Appendix A.

† It is a remarkable fact, only brought to light some months after, that a Mohammedan resident at Delhi had written to Mr Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, warning him that mischief was brewing in that city, and that a deep conspiracy, in which the King and the royal family were actively engaged, was threatening the peace of the country. So little importance does Mr Colvin seem to have attached to this communication, although the writer gave his name, that the letter was consigned to his waste-paper basket, where it was discovered, after his death, in the fort at Agra. It was read at the trial of the King of Delhi. See Appendix B.



inseparable as to be virtually identical). It was to be a *jahād*, a war of extermination to the Christian, and for it the chupattee gave the signal for preparation, and the placard sounded the warning note. How closely the injunctions of the head of the *faithful*, and his lessons of vengeance, were followed, let the blood-stained streets and houses of Meerut and Delhi, Cawnpore and Lucknow, testify!

But in the Bengal army were Hindoos as well as Mohammedans, and the former greatly preponderated. In the native infantry regiments, the Mohammedans formed a very small minority, and even in the cavalry they scarcely outnumbered the Hindoos.

Yet the Hindoo sepoy had also to be won over to insure success to the conspiracy, while its real ulterior object must be kept secret. That could not be safely confided to men who, doubtless, knew enough of the past history of their race and country to remember that the most ruthless tyranny and injustice had marked the days of former Mohammedan supremacy. To attain this end it was necessary to find some *common grievance* which might plausibly unite Hindoo and Mohammedan in a joint resistance to their British rulers.

Most unfortunately Government furnished them with one admirably suited to their purpose. In spite of warnings from various quarters, the Enfield rifle was to be put into the hands of the native troops, as well as the European portion of our army. With the Enfield rifle came of necessity the *new cartridge*.

Here was at once the *grievance* needed. The shining and greased end and offensive smell of the cartridge was certainly open to suspicion, and it needed little persuasion on the part of crafty designing men to make the ignorant, superstitious, caste-ridden sepoy believe that some forbidden fat was used in its manufacture. The cow, sacred to the Hindoo, and the pig, unclean and loathsome to the Mohammedan, must *both*, it was insinuated, have contributed *their* share to the grease used in the obnoxious paper.\* Thus, under the idea that an attack was being meditated on their religion, the great body of the Hindoo sepoys, mere tools in the hands of their Pundits, who had been first won over, were caught in the trap laid for them by the wily Mohammedan, who himself also pretended to find in the same unhappy cartridge, with its fancied odour of hateful pig's fat, a religious motive for rebellion.

The cry once raised soon became general; the greased cartridge was regarded in the light of a Government missionary, and the Governor-General was currently reported to have pledged himself to a wholesale conversion of all classes of natives to Christianity. Such was the lever by which the great mass of the native army was so successfully set in motion. Can there

\* Among the hundreds of sepoys' letters intercepted in the post-offices of the Punjab, the greased cartridge was almost universally *the burden of their tale*. Here and there some writer, more deeply versed in the character of the conspiracy, hinted at the real motive, the downfall of British power; but it is probable that the correspondence of the leaders in the rebellion was not intrusted to the post, but conveyed by private hands, such as *jaqirs* and pretended beggars, who were really disguised traitors and emissaries of treason.

any longer be a doubt that such was the real history of this universal disaffection? Neither the greased cartridge nor the annexation of Oude was the *real* cause of the mutiny, though each in its own province gave a vast impetus to the movement: they furnished the fuel from within to feed the flame which was brought from without.

The greased cartridge no more originated this mutiny than the new head-dress with the *leather poke*, and the prohibition of *caste mark* on parade, had instigated that of Vellore in 1806. The restoration of the house of Tippoo Sultan to the throne of Mysore was the real object then, as it now was to revive the grandeur of the Mogul empire in the person of the *Roi Fainéant*,\* whom we had "allowed to play at being a sovereign" at Delhi. There was, however, this difference—the Vellore prisoners were of a race of yesterday, the grandsons of an unscrupulous free-booter, for such was Hyder Ali; whereas around the head of the imbecile puppet who, in pensioned pomp, was permitted to occupy the *Musnud* at Delhi, centred the glory of ages, the traditional splendour of Timour and Baber and Akbar.

So, too, with regard to the annexation of Oude; it did not originate, though it mightily subserved, the mutiny. The last semblance of Mohammedan royalty swept away by that most impolitic measure, created a grievance which, under the sway of a most crafty and unscrupulous leader, Ali Nuckee Khan, furnished

\* Macaulay's speech on the Government of India, July 1833.

a rallying-point for the disaffected, while it carried with it the sympathy of a large portion of the native army. True, the recent elevation of the house of Lucknow as the nominees of the British Government presented little to insure a welcome for the King of Oude, or to give him weight in the councils of the representative of the Great Mogul ; yet the being the king of that tract of country from which the great body of our sepoys came, the vast recruiting-ground of the Indan army, gave him an importance, and made him worth attaching to the confederacy ; and he could easily be won over with the promise that his pension and state of surveillance should be exchanged for the revised *Soubah* of Oude, under the re-established empire of Hindostan.

Probably, too, a similar bribe was, held out to the other richly-pensioned representative of a fallen house, the Nawab of Bengal, the descendant of Surajah Dowlah, who has been immortalised by the pen of Macaulay as the hero of the "Black Hole," and the victim of Plassey ; but he seems to have lacked either the courage or the time for action.

Such then, notwithstanding the greater prominence subsequently and incidentally given to the "cartridge question" and the "annexation of Oude," may be regarded as the real origin and character of a rebellion which shook India to its centre, and for a time imperilled the very existence of British rule in the East !

## CHAPTER II.

THE PROGRESS OF THE MUTINY—DUM-DUM, BERRHAMPORE,  
BARRACKPORE, LUCKNOW.

THE train of treason was craftily laid. It was first fired at Dum-Dum.\* Early in February a *classie* belonging to the Dum-Dum dépôt casually asked a sepoy sentry of the 2d N. I. (Grenadiers) for a draught of water from his *lota*, or brass drinking-vessel. The sepoy, who was a Brahmin, demurred on the score of the *classie's* caste. This worthy, whose duty it was, among other things, to make up cartridges, replied, with a sneer, that the sepoy need not be so tenacious of *his* caste, for that would soon be gone, as the new cartridges were greased with bullock's fat, and that, in biting them for loading, every sepoy's caste would be broken. The horrified sepoy quickly carried this report to his comrades at Barrackpore; among them it spread like wildfire; great excitement prevailed; nightly meetings were held; and a spirit of disaffection began to show itself, which it required all the

\* The contents of this and the following chapter may appear to be but the repetition of an oft-told tale, the events here recorded having been already described by others; but they formed the natural starting-point of the history, and were necessary to carry on the reader to the fuller development of the mutiny at Meerut and Delhi.

tact, and almost lifelong knowledge of the native character, with a perfect command of the language, for which General Harsey is famed, to allay. Argument and persuasion at length prevailed; and the sepoys appeared satisfied with the General's assurance that the report was groundless, and that no attack was meditated on their caste or religion. Further, to remove all doubts and fears on the subject, the system of drill was changed; the sepoy was to tear the cartridge in loading, instead of biting it. There was a seeming return to peace and order; but, as after-events soon showed, it was a cry of "peace where there was no peace." Disaffection was not the less active that it was for the time silent.

In the meanwhile, the story of the *classie* became the subject of official investigation. The result is conceived to have been that the contractor for manufacturing the cartridge paper had actually substituted bullock's fat for the mutton fat ordered in its preparation; but whether he had done so on economical principles only, or as the unconscious tool of the traitorous Mohammedans, or even as *particeps criminis*, has not been publicly avowed.\*

\* This silence was no doubt prejudicial to Government. If the report was false, a plain denial would probably have satisfied the more reasonable among the sepoys; if true, and any blame attached to the authorities at the magazine where the cartridges were manufactured, a public comment on it would, at least, have shown that the Government repudiated and condemned the act; whereas its being unnoticed, led, however wrongly and absurdly, to the inference that Government really had connived at the deception. Months after, it was all published by order of the House of Commons.

This spirit of disaffection, thus quelled for a time, or rather prevented from breaking out into overt mutiny at his headquarters, was, however, destined to show itself ere long within the limits of General Hearsey's division, though beyond the reach of his personal influence. The retired and usually peaceful station of Berhampore\* was the first to feel the impending convulsion. Here were quartered the 19th N. I., the 11th Irregular Cavalry, and two guns of a native battery. The rumour of the obnoxious bullets' fat was not long in travelling so far; and there were apparently in the 19th N. I. men prepared to make good use of it for their traitorous ends. In the middle of February the regiment avowed its determination not to touch the suspected cartridge. In vain did the officer commanding (Colonel Mitchell) offer the assembled native officers the most solemn assurances that no new cartridges had been sent there; that those in daily use had been left them by the 7th N. I., whom they had relieved; and that nothing was further from the wishes of Government than to coerce their religion. When he found them still determined, he warned them that on the following morning the usual cartridges would be served out, and any man refusing to take them would be tried by court-martial, and punished. This occurred on the afternoon of February 26th. In the dead of night the men rose, rushed

\* Berhampore lies on the east bank of the Bhagerathi, the most sacred of the tributaries to the Ganges. It is about 120 miles due north of Calcutta, and was once, as its noble quadrangle of barracks bears witness, an important station.

measured steps ; accustomed to prompt rewards, and punishments as prompt, under their native rulers, they attribute the opposite system to weakness. Thus the disbandment of the 19th, five weeks after their mutiny, lost half its force.

The sentence was carried out with due solemnity on the morning of March 31st, every precaution having been taken to insure order. Here were H. M. 84th Regiment brought up from Burmah, a wing of H. M. 53d from Fort-William, one troop of horse-artillery from Dum-Dum, one troop of Madras horse-artillery stopped on its way down the river, and the Governor-General's Body-Guard. In the presence of this formidable array were drawn up the native corps composing the Barrackpore brigade, the 2d Grenadiers, 34th, 43d, and 70th Regiments N. I. The doomed 19th N. I. was drawn up in front in columns of companies, to await their sentence.

The general order for their disbandment was then read.\* After citing all the circumstances of the mutiny at length, it went to show the heinousness of the crime of which the regiment had been guilty. It concluded by ordering that the regiment should be deprived of arms and accoutrements, and, having been paid up all arrears, should be marched out of the station.

At its close, Colonel Mitchell brought forward a petition, which he had been asked to present from the native officers and men of the regiment, but General Hearsey declined to receive it at that time.

\* See Appendix C.



The order was then given for the 19th N. I. to "order" and "pile arms," and lastly, to "take off cross-belts and hang them on the bayonets." Thus disarmed, they were marched off between the files of muskets and belts they might no longer carry : having gone about one hundred and fifty paces, they were halted for the purpose of receiving their pay.

The General now rode up, and addressed them to the following effect :—" Native officers and men,—The Government you have served is just. I am now ready to receive your petition, and lay it before the Governor-General. I cannot give you any hope, but I will make known that you are penitent. I have always been your friend as well as your commander. In consequence of your good behaviour since the night of the 26th February, when you were misled by your enemies and committed mutiny, . . . the just Government has been merciful ; you have been punished ; no vindictiveness has been shown ; you are permitted to leave this parade with your uniform, and thus your honour as soldiers is left you, though this awful calamity has befallen you."

He then told them that, in return for their peaceful orderly conduct on their march from Berhampore, Government would pay all the expenses they had incurred in carriage, &c., as well as all arrears of pay ; that medical officers should accompany them, and medicines should be supplied (especially as the cholera had broken out among them), until they reached Chin-surah ; there they would be dismissed. " You will

there," said the General, in conclusion, "be permitted to go to your homes to *worship* at the temples where your fathers worshipped before you; and those Brahmins or other Hindoos who wish to do so can visit the Thakoor at Juggernaut, Gyah, or any temples deemed holy by them. It is thus I give the lie to the infamous reports that the Government wishes to interfere with your castes or your religion."

The unhappy misguided men were much affected at the touching address, and with tears in their eyes blessed General Hearsey and the Government they had been seduced into rebelling against; but bitterly did they inveigh against the 34th N. I., vowing vengeance against them as the cause of their ruin.\* The brave old General, who had wellnigh completed half a century of active service, having taken part in many a hard-fought field, from the gallant cavalry charge at Seetahbuldee to the glorious victory of Goojerat, could not stand unmoved, as he saw a whole regiment, of that army which he had so long trusted, forfeiting the benefits of years of faithful service, and passing away degraded and pensionless.

While the 19th N. I. were receiving their pay, he returned to the ground where the other native corps were still standing, and with a loud clear voice addressed them as follows:—"Native officers and sepoy of the brigade, listen; hear what I am about to say to you. You have now witnessed the just punishment inflicted on the

\* The 19th and 34th N. I. had been cantoned together at Lucknow at the time of the annexation.

19th N. I. by the Government for mutiny. The men of that regiment at midnight seized their arms, assembled on the parade, defied their officers, and disobeyed the orders given to them. You all know this was *mutiny*."

He reminded them how the oaths they had taken under their colours, and the regulations of the Government under which they had enlisted, and by which they had bound themselves, doomed the rebel and traitor to *death*, and that Government, though merciful, was just, and would put down mutiny with a high hand. As for the report that their religion or caste was in danger, he said:—

"You have heard lies without number regarding the wish of Government and of your officers to take away your caste—to force *you, the Hindoos of this army, to be Christians*; and you have been so foolish as to give credit to this vile calumny. See now, and, having seen, believe. Has the 19th N. I.—have the 400 Brahmins, 250 Rajpoots, 150 Mohammedans, and other Hindoos of inferior castes, who served in that regiment—have they had their religious opinions in any way meddled with? No; the British Government has never interfered with your *caste* notions, has never *forced the Hindoo* to turn from the religion of his forefathers. The Mohammedan sovereigns of Delhi used to do so in former times. They served Brahmins and Rajpoots thus; they forced them to drink broths made from cow's flesh; nay, forced cow's flesh down their throats! Some of the finest soldiers who ever served under me

(and even now there are some in the 2d Irregular Cavalry) are returned on the rolls of that regiment as Mussulman Rajpoots, whose ancestors had been served in this manner by order of the former kings of Delhi."

Then pointing out how *compulsory proselytism* was contrary to the spirit of Christianity, he concluded,—

"You see before you the 19th Regiment, now disbanded, taking their pay ; and I have told the high-caste Brahmins and Rajpoots they will be at liberty to go to the shrine of Juggernaut, Gyah, or any other temples they please, unmolested ; that those who return to their homes will find the temples and places where their forefathers worshipped (*i.e.*, have made their *poojah*), and the statues of Ram, Vishna, Sotah, Kalee, and Parbuttee untouched, and can prostrate themselves there whenever and however they please."

"Will this not convince you that the Government is free from any intention to destroy or interfere with your religious opinions? Having now heard these words from your General, who has served with your fathers and yourselves for the last fifty years, and who has fought and bled with them, and witnessed and shared in their deeds of valour—who never deceived them, who has studiously avoided interfering with their caste or religious opinions, and reprimanded those who, from ignorance, had unfortunately done so — believe him ; let his words be engraven on your hearts : obey orders as you have sworn to do ; and the State—the just, kind, considerate Government you serve under, that pensions you when you are old, that supports your

parents, and the widows of your deceased companions who fall in action or die on foreign service, and your orphans—will continue to do so to you, and those of your relatives who survive you.”

The parade was then dismissed; the 19th N. I. were disbanded and sent off to their homes, and the seeds of sedition thrown broadcast over Hindostan. Thus ended the first scene of that drama which was to have so tragic a close.

Already, however, two days before the disbandment of the 19th N. I., an incident had occurred on the parade-ground of the 34th N. I., which showed that the leaven of sedition was working actively in that regiment also. On Sunday morning (March 29) a report was brought to Lieutenant Baugh, the adjutant, that a sepoy named Mungul Pandey was pacing up and down in front of the regimental quarter-guard, armed with his musket and bayonet, and was frantically calling on his comrades to rise in defence of their religion. Lieutenant Baugh having at once sent off to inform Colonel Wheeler, commanding the regiment, of what was going on, galloped down to the lines. The fanatic saw him coming, and allowed him to approach within one hundred yards, when he raised his musket and fired; the horse was wounded and fell, and his rider with him. Baugh, however, was on his legs again in a moment, and, snatching one (unfortunately *only one*) of his pistols out of the holster, went towards the sepoy, accompanied by Sergeant-major Hewson, who had also come up. When within forty yards, Baugh

fired, but missed; he then drew his sword and attempted to close with Mungul Pandy; the fanatic drew out a *tulwar* (native sword) he had concealed on his person, and gave Baugh a severe cut on the head which brought him to the ground, where he received two more severe cuts on the head, and one on the left hand. Sergeant-major Hewson rushed in to the rescue, but was also severely wounded; when a Musulman sepoy, named Sheik Pultoo, who was standing near, sprang forward, and throwing his arms round Mungul Pandy's body succeeded in pinioning him, but not before he had himself received a very severe wound in the hand. The whole regiment had turned out, and stood looking on, hooting and yelling; and some of them were heard crying out, "Kill the Ferin-gees." \* The guard, close at hand, never came to the protection of their officers. †

The whole station was now in commotion; other officers galloped down to see what had happened; and there still stood Mungul Pandy with his musket in his hand, parading up and down. Colonel Wheler arrived and ordered the guard to seize him, but not a man moved; the Brigadier then tried his authority, but to no purpose. At length General Hearsey came gallop-

\* Afterwards, when poor Baugh, wounded and bleeding, was passing down the lines of the regiment on his way home, and reproached the men for allowing one of their officers to be cut down before their eyes without making any attempt to rescue him, they made no reply, but turned away, some with an insolent smile, others in sullen doggedness.

† It is said that some of the guard even struck Lieutenant Baugh and the sergeant-major, while on the ground, with the butt-ends of their muskets, and that one of them actually fired at Baugh.

ing down, revolver in hand, and asked why the mad-man was not seized or shot down ; he was told the guard refused to advance. "We'll see that," said he, and, dashing up in front of the guard, called out, "Not obey orders ? Listen to me ; the first man that refuses to march when I give the word, is a dead man. Quick, march !" The spell was broken ; the guard obeyed. In the meanwhile Mungul Pandy had contrived to reload his musket, and, seeing the game lost, tried to shoot himself: he fell, frightfully wounded. The wound, however, was only superficial, and he was carried off to the hospital, and recovered sufficiently to be brought to trial ; and on the 8th April—the first example of what would be the rebel's end—he closed his fanatic career on the gallows, that death most abhorrent to the sepoy, having his Brahmin sanctity polluted by the hands of a common sweeper. He was followed to the gallows, a fortnight after—on the 21st April—by Issuree Pandy, the jemadar of the guard, who had refused to seize him.

This man appears to have been one of the most desperate characters in the regiment, and a chief instigator of the mutiny. However, when brought to the foot of the gallows, his delusion would seem to have passed away, if there was any sincerity in the following address to his comrades, who were paraded round to witness his execution :—

"Sepoys !" said he, "listen to me. I have been a traitor to a good Government. I am about to be punished for my great sins. I am about to be hanged,

and I deserve my punishment. Sepoys! obey your officers, for they are your rightful and just rulers, or else you will, like me, be brought to the gallows. Sepoys! obey your officers. Listen to them, and not to evil advisers. I listened to evil advisers, and you see what I am come to. I call upon God to bless the Governor-General, all the great gentlemen (*burra sahibs*), the General, and all the *sahib log* here present. Seeta Ram! Seeta Ram! Seeta Ram!”

The seven companies\* who, to use the words of the Governor-General's order, had been “silent spectators of a long-continued act of insolent mutiny” without an attempt to suppress it, could no longer be trusted, and were disbanded† The Governor-General took this opportunity of repudiating most emphatically the imputation that Government had any intention or desire to interfere with the religion of its sepoys; thus confirming the assurances already given by their officers, which had left them without excuse.

“If, after receiving these assurances, the sepoys of the 34th Regiment, or of any other regiment, still refuse to place trust in their officers and in the Government, and still allow suspicions to take root in their minds, and to grow into disaffection, insubordination, and mutiny, the fault is their own, and their punishment will be on their own heads. The Governor-General

\* Three companies were on detachment-duty at Chittagong, and, unfortunately, were allowed to retain their arms, which, at a later period, they used with murderous effect.

† This order was carried out on the 6th May, in a manner very similar to that already described in the case of the 19th N. I.



in Council warns them that it will be sharp and certain."

Thus, for a second time, was the 34th N. I. disgraced and disbanded. The present regiment had only been re-embodied in 1846 out of the Bundelcund Legion, to take the place of the original 34th N. I., which had been disbanded two years previously for refusing to march into Scinde.

It was now thought by many—doubtless "the wish was father to that thought"—that the disaffection was chiefly confined to these two regiments, which had a few months before been cantoned together at Lucknow; and that the punishment of summary disbanding, at that time considered so severe, would intimidate other corps from following the example. Other men, however, there were, and among them General Hearsey himself, who, from a deeper knowledge of the native character, were led to take a less hopeful view of the present state of things.

Many suspicious proceedings were brought to light. Among others, a *punchayat*, or native meeting, was held in Barrackpore, where the organisation of a general rising of the sepoys against Government, the seizure of Fort-William, and other equally desperate schemes, were discussed. Such projects might be laughed at as visionary and impossible. Still they furnished an index of the state of the native mind; they disclosed the fact that other corps besides the 19th and 34th were tainted, and led to the by no means groundless impression that the contamination had spread over a great portion of

the Bengal army, and that under its influence they *might* be tempted to test the truth of the proverb, "Whatever men dare, they can do."

To that keen perception of the danger, and the system of precaution adopted in consequence, it is mainly to be attributed that Barrackpore did not become, like so many other stations even more strongly garrisoned with Europeans, a scene of bloodshed and plunder.

But we must hasten on to trace the progress of the mutiny towards the North-west.

LUCKNOW, the capital of Oude—one of the fairest districts of Hindostan, the last remaining of the old Soubahs which *held* under the once imperial Delhi, after years of vain endeavour to secure the administration of justice from weak profligate Mohammedan princes, supported on the throne by British contingents—had been annexed in the beginning of 1856. A country so long the centre of intrigue, debauchery, and crime, could not but take an early part in the rebellion, which, if truth were told, its own people had so actively promoted.

How far the royal house of Oude was implicated, originally or subsequently, in this outbreak—whether the king did tamper with the native corps at Lucknow—whether he received from several regiments (as Major Bird, of Oude notoriety, has publicly declared in England) offers to reinstate him on the throne—whether he did apply to the King of Delhi for support, suggesting a general massacre of all Christians and the revival of the Mohammedan rule,—are questions which

the future historian of this mutiny may be enabled to elucidate : we leave them to be dealt with by others abler and better informed, having expressed our own opinion.

We may, however, be allowed to offer a few remarks on the probable feeling of the *people* of Oude before passing on to speak of the first event which occurred there, involving the troops in the general suspicion of mutiny. The annexation of this province was effected even more peacefully than the most sanguine had dared to anticipate. No attempt was made at resistance : in fact, the population seemed thankful to escape from the state of misrule, injustice, and oppression under which they had so long groaned ; and the transfer of power from the imbecile sensualist who bore the name of King, and his rapacious court, to the *Sirkar* (East India Company), was hailed with joy as the dawn of a brighter day ; for a province which, with a natural fertility that might yet again make it “the garden of India,” had, by gross misgovernment and neglect, become a wilderness. Here and there a petty chief who, under the weak native administration, had withheld revenues and defied the court, foresaw the approach of a stronger arm which he could not so easily resist, and grieved over the days of independence. The chief of some banditti band, like Fyzl Alli, might make an effort to carry on his marauding schemes as heretofore, but only to find himself obliged to succumb after a shortlived and fatal struggle. As for the mass of the people, it was believed that they regarded with pleasure, or at least without regret, the exchange from a govern-

ment powerless and unjust, to one hitherto proverbial for its strength and justice.

But one class soon began to experience an evil in this change, which they had never foreseen. A very large and influential portion of the population of Oude were Brahmins and Rajpoots, and from among these the strength of the Bengal army was drawn. Of the 120,000 men composing the regular cavalry and infantry regiments, probably 70,000 to 80,000 came from Oude. For service under *the Company* brought with it many great advantages ; not only did it furnish the best field for retaining the hereditary occupation (and the safest outlet for the zeal) of the military class, with pay liberal and regular, and unequalled pensions, but also it carried with it exemption from many burdensome taxes, imposed by the caprice or avarice of the native government. It gave, moreover, a social *status* of still greater value. So general had the misrule and oppression become in Oude, that as an additional encouragement to her manly and martial sons to swell the ranks of our army, it had been promised that if the family of any sepoy, during his absence on service, should suffer injustice, a representation from him would insure attention and redress. The sepoy's *urzee*, or petition, thus became a most potent spell—more so than even the bribe, without which otherwise the portals of law, so called, would not open in Oude. The Lucknow Residency was constantly deluged with *urzees*. The sepoy had become virtually in every family the channel of communication with the Government. Every

home, therefore, secured for itself its "friend at court," by sending one or more of its sons to enlist. This state of things had gone on for years; son had succeeded father in the service for generations. Oude was at that time contributing scarcely less than two-thirds of the whole regular Bengal army, and had received back above 30,000 pensioners scattered over her villages.

To this class, hitherto so favoured, the annexation of the country could not but be prejudicial. The taxes now levied were far lighter and more just than under the late *regime*, but they were *general*; the home of the sepoy and the garden-plot of the pensioner were no longer exempted; justice, too, was no longer partial; no longer extorted by the sepoy's *urzee*, and only to be bid for and bought by others; it was, as far as could be, the law of the land. Thus the sepoy, when he returned on leave, found that a change had come over his home; he was no longer greeted by crowds of kith and kin as the hero of his house; the *charpoy* (bed) of honour was no longer prepared and set out for him, for he had ceased to be the great man. Not that he had been *wronged*; it was not so much that he had been lowered from his pinnacle of favour, as that all others had been raised to the same level of justice. However, his social pre-eminence was no more; and, indignant at the Company, which resolved, as far as it could, to administer justice to all alike, he had vowed vengeance; and his time soon came. As with the Roman legions of old, it was not their strength, merely, but the knowledge of that strength, which

proved fatal to the empire. And so with the Hindostanee sepoys ; it was only when they began to measure their strength with Government that they became dangerous. The spirit of disaffection, once evoked, found hundreds and thousands of ready votaries. Many seemingly trifling changes had been taking place—changes in the invalid establishment, enlistments for “ general service,” and other military reforms ; Punjabees, Sikhs, and frontier Mohammedans were also crowding into the Bengal army, thus interfering with the old monopoly, and weakening the paramount influence of the Poorbeah.

Then, to crown all, came the cry of the “ *greased cartridge*.” The Hindoo sepoy, however peacefully disposed he might be, however desirous to remain true to his salt, here saw a new grievance—his very home arrayed against him ; for the touch of that obnoxious cartridge would cut him off from father, brother, wife ; all intercourse would cease, and he become an outcast, himself disgraced, and entailing disgrace on his children. He looked on himself no longer as the mere redresser of family wrongs, but as the vindicator of social privileges and the champion of his caste. Every home in Oude thus had its hold on the ranks of the army. By these secret cords every regiment in India would be moved ; every station swarmed with her children, armed and disciplined soldiers ; and they, now excited against their European masters by supposed social and religious grievances, were only too ready to answer her call. Hence has it been that while Delhi became the rallying-

point for a *political* mutiny, in the fanatic hope of restoring Mohammedan supremacy, Oude has been the focus of a *rebellion*, deeper and more desperate because essentially *popular*, of men taught to believe that their faith was in danger, called on to defend their *lares* and *penates*, their very hearths and homes.

With the month of May came the warning note of danger for Oude. The force of Lucknow then consisted of H. M. 32d Foot, under Colonel Inglis, one light field-battery, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 13th and 48th Regiments of N.I., with some Irregular Horse under Captain Gall; while the 7th Oude Irregular Infantry, under Captain Watson, were quartered at Moosah Bagh, about seven miles off. In the end of April some young recruits of the latter corps had given signs of disaffection by refusing to bite the cartridges (not any new ones, but the same sort as the native army had used for years); they were at once reasoned with, and, as it was thought, their scruples removed, by their officers. On the 1st of May, however, the same objections were revived by these "youngsters," as they were contemptuously called by the older sepoys and native officers, who for themselves vehemently denounced such scruples as groundless, and avowed themselves ready to a man to use the cartridges whenever called upon. It was resolved, therefore, to give them an early opportunity of evincing so laudable a spirit, and showing so loyal an example. At three o'clock on the afternoon of the 2d, a parade was ordered for the purpose; when, lo! the very men who a few hours before had asked to be allowed to give

this proof of their loyalty, refused to touch a cartridge, on the ground that they would be murdered by their comrades if they did. The parade was dismissed, and the men went off to their lines with a yell of triumph.

The poison now began to work actively ; every hour added to the number of the malcontents. On the following day they seized their arms, threatened their officers, and sent off letters and emissaries to the sepoys of the 13th and 48th N. I., calling on them to join. That evening, Sunday, May 3d, during divine service, the cantonment was thrown into commotion ; a general call to arms was sounded. With the characteristic energy of a Lawrence, Sir Henry no sooner heard of the defiant attitude the 7th Irregular Infantry had assumed, than he resolved to anticipate an outbreak, and if possible prevent bloodshed, by disarming the whole regiment. An order was sent through Brigadier Gray that the regiment should be on parade by half-past eight that evening. Scarcely had they formed up, when in the dim twilight was seen a body of men moving down towards them. As they neared, the neigh of horses, the clank of chains, and the rattle of wheels, with that dull steady tread as of a marching mass, disclosed to them their position : the whole Lucknow force, of all arms, were upon them—European infantry and artillery in front, the 7th Light Cavalry and Gall's Irregulars on flank : the would-be rebels had no choice. Awed by the sudden appearance of such an array, dropped as it were from the clouds, some few bolted, but were pursued ; the rest passively laid down their



arms, and all were taken prisoners. Guards were placed over the magazine, stores, &c., and before day-break the force had marched back again into cantonments.

On the 12th of May, Sir Henry Lawrence, ready to reward as he was swift to punish, arranged to hold a *darbar*, that he might with all due "pomp and circumstance" confer marks of favour on some sepoys of the 13th and 48th N. I. who had not only withstood the seditious attempts of the Moosah Bagh traitors, but had with noble loyalty given up to their officers the emissaries of treason, as well as the letters they had received. The *darbar* was convened by the following brigade order, issued by Brigadier Handscomb on the preceding day :—

"LUCKNOW, BRIGADE OFFICE, 11th May 1857.

"Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.B., the Chief Commissioner, having intimated his intention of holding a *darbar* to-morrow evening at six o'clock, at the Residency House, in cantonments, for the purpose of publicly showing his approbation of the conduct of a native commissioned officer, a non-commissioned officer, and two sepoys of the 13th and 48th Regiments N.I.—in furtherance of this object, Brigadier Handscomb, commanding, requests that all officers off duty, European and native, will attend in full-dress uniform at the hour and place named.

"2. Commanding officers will have the goodness to select two non-commissioned officers and six sepoys from their respective regiments to witness the ceremony.

"3. The officer commanding the artillery will make a similar selection in due proportion.

"By order,

(Signed) "C. A. BARWELL, Lieutenant,  
"Officiating Major of Brigade."

Reader, picture to yourself the lawn of the Lucknow Residency, and the verandah behind, thronged with officers and civilians of all ranks, breathless with interest ; in the midst of that goodly array, surrounded with the costly presents he was about to distribute, see the form of that great and good man, Sir Henry Lawrence ; grief has made him grey and worn, but it becomes him like the scars of battle ;\* his form assumes a more than wonted dignity under the deep, almost prophetic, sense of the momentous responsibility now laid upon him ; hear his manly voice pouring forth its mingled tones of gentleness and fire, and think that that voice is never more to be heard in council or in camp—himself within two short months doomed to fall, the noblest victim of the mutiny, honoured and beloved, mourned scarcely more by a nation he so nobly served, than by the faithful and true of the people he so ably ruled—

“ Multis ille bonis flebilis occidit.”

Of that address we would not willingly omit one word.

“Soldiers!” said he—“Soldiers! some persons are abroad spreading reports that the Government desire to interfere with the religion of their soldiers ; *you* all know this to be a transparent falsehood ; you, and your forefathers before you, well know and knew that for more than a hundred years the religion of your countrymen has never been interfered with. And those amongst you who have perused the records of the past, who have searched the annals of your country, and those who are familiar with the traditionary lore which has been carefully transmitted from generation to generation, must well

\* So wrote a friend who saw him a few weeks before.

know that Alungeer in former times, and Hyder Ali in later days, forcibly converted thousands and thousands of Hindoos, desecrated their fanes, demolished their temples, and carried ruthless devastation amongst their household gods. Come to our times. Many here present well know that Runjeet Sing never permitted his Mohammedan subjects to call the pious to prayer—never allowed the muezzin to sound from the lofty minarets which adorn Lahore, and remain to this day a monument of their magnificent founders. The year before last a Hindoo could not have dared to build a temple in Lucknow. All this is changed. *Now*, who is there who would dare to interfere with our Mohammedan or Hindoo subjects? You see all this—you know it well—you need not my testimony to this notorious fact; you know also that there is no government in the whole world to be compared with that of the British Government in power, in wealth, in resources, in money, in dominions; there is no sea on which its numerous navy does not float, no clime in which its soldiers do not abound. You have all heard what occurred during the Russian campaign—how in that distant region our gallant soldiers and seamen, opposed to one of the most powerful military nations of the world, decimated by disease, struggling against the horror and severities of inclement seasons, outnumbered by foes, and thousands of miles from their native land, did nevertheless trample down every obstacle, crush all opposition, and emerge from the conflict victorious, radiant with glory, and astonishing their powerful foe by the spectacle of an army, equipped, provisioned, disciplined, and inured to war, such as no nation in the world could hope to compete with, and none could defeat!

“If necessary, in a few brief months one hundred thousand European soldiers might be collected in *any* spot in India.”

“A Government such as ours does not require to deal in deceit; what it does, it enacts openly before God and man; and is at all times prepared to encounter, and capable of destroying,

foreign invasion or domestic factions. Our Government will always persevere in its well-known steps; will ever permit its subjects and soldiers to follow their own religion, and to worship as their forefathers were in the habit of doing. No other government in the wide world treats its soldiers as the Company does—every village, every community, proclaims this fact.

“Everywhere you see the veterans of our army enjoying in peace the handsome pensions which have been justly bestowed for fidelity, for wounds, for heroism: surrounded by their friends, their relatives, their comrades, respected by their neighbours, and honoured by our Government, those gallant soldiers pass their declining years in comfort, prosperity, and honour. In what other country could you ever witness such gratifying scenes? Beware, then, lest through any folly such inestimable benefits should be lost.

“In India there is no dearth of soldiers—of any caste or province; wherever our Government requires one soldier, fifty step forward for service. Only last week, in this very city, 300 men were called for, and 3000, clamorous for service, eagerly rushed forward to partake of the bounty of Government.

“All governments employ and cherish the faithful and the zealous, and punish the lukewarm and ungrateful. No army in the world has done better service than that of Bengal. I am a witness to this fact; so are these gallant officers, Brigadiers Handscomb and Gray, Colonels Halford and Palmer, and many, many officers now present, who have led you to victory, fought at your head, and bled in your ranks—whose well-earned decorations attest your bravery, and which are the proud records of many a well-contested field won by your valour, your discipline, your intrepidity. Many, like myself, have grown grey in your company; have been associated with you from our boyhood; have shared in your campaigns; have participated in all your dangers, privations, and triumphs, in

camp and in quarters—from the swamps of Burmah to the snows of Bamean. We are all your friends—our interests are inseparable: if your faces are blackened, so are ours; if any dishonour befalls you, do we not suffer? Let there be no lukewarmness. Let none be deceived by the crafty machinations of a few despicable knaves. Much has been done during the past month to ruin the character of the Bengal army—of that splendid army which, by its glorious services of more than a century, has now a reputation second to that of none—which has fought and conquered in every region, from the Irrawaddy to the Indus; and at Java, in China, and on the Nile, has elicited the applause of all who have witnessed its discipline, its exemplary conduct, its heroic actions. And now, at this very moment, when the Bombay army has been covering itself with glory in Persia—to our shame it must be acknowledged—some regiments of the Bengal army have proved that they are not worthy to serve our Government! The 19th has been disbanded—seven companies of the 34th have been disbanded. The guilt of many has been that they simply looked on at the vile wickedness of a few. Take warning! Now turn to these good and faithful soldiers—Subahdar Sewak Tewary, Havildar Heera Lall Doobee, Ramnath Doobee, Sepahee of the 48th N. I., and to Hosein Buksh, of the 13th Regiment, who have set to you all a good example. The three first at once arrested the bearer of a seditious letter, and brought the whole circumstance to the notice of superior authority. You know well what the consequences were: and what has befallen the 7th O. I. Infantry? More than fifty of its sirdars and soldiers are now in confinement, and the whole regiment awaits the fiat of Government. Look at Hosein Buksh of the 13th, fine fellow as he is. Is he not a good and faithful soldier?—did he not seize three villains, who are now in confinement, and awaiting their doom? It is to reward such fidelity, such acts and deeds as I have mentioned, and of which you are all well aware, that I have called you all toge-

ther this day, to assure you that those who are faithful and true to their salt will always be amply rewarded and well cared for; that the great Government which we all serve is prompt to reward, swift to punish, vigilant, anxious, eager to protect its faithful subjects; but firm, determined, resolute, to crush all who may have the temerity to rouse its vengeance. Think well of what I have said; reflect on what has passed; listen to your elders and seniors, who have served the Government for nearly half a century, and you must be satisfied that the Government which you serve has never attempted to influence in any way, underhand or otherwise, the religious convictions of its subjects or soldiers; that it freely permits all to worship at the altar before which their forefathers have bowed—but that, whilst allowing the fullest, freest, religious liberty to all, it will vigorously exact that legitimate duty from its army, without which discipline cannot exist; that under no circumstances whatever will it listen to, or reason with, mutineers or armed mobs; and should—which God forbid!—any misguided men, dupes of fools and knaves, attempt to follow in the footsteps of the 19th and 34th, rest assured that Government, all-powerful and irresistible, is not only prepared and capable, but will lose no time in inflicting such punishment as shall not easily pass away from the recollection of man. And now, soldiers! it is my pleasing duty to reward, in the name of Government, those who have served it so well and so honourably.” \*

At the close of this address Sir Henry said—

“Advance, Subahdar Sewak Tewaree; come forward, Havildar and soldiers, and receive these splendid gifts from the Government which is proud to number you among its soldiers; accept these honorary sabres—you have won them well, long may you live to wear them in honour. Take these sums of

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\* For this speech the Author is indebted to the *Central Star* of May 13th.

money for your families and relatives; wear these robes of honour at your homes and at your festivals; and may the bright example which you have so conspicuously set, find, as it doubtless will, followers in every regiment and company in the army!"

Then with his own hands he distributed to the subahdar and to the havildar a magnificent sabre, a pair of handsome shawls, a cloak, and four pieces of embroidered cloth. To each of the sepoy—Ramnath Dobee, 48th Regiment, and Sheikh Hosein of the 18th, now a naik—he gave a handsome sword, turban, pieces of cloth, and 300 rupées.

Thus on the 12th of May was the tide of rebellion for a while stemmed in Oude; but all too late for India! Meerut was ALREADY "a desolation," and Delhi a "tombless cemetery."

## CHAPTER III.

THE MILITARY STATE OF THE PUNJAB—THE 86TH N. I. AND THE  
UMBALLA DEPOT—THE MEERUT OUTBREAK.

LEAVING Bengal and Oude, the progress of events hurries us on towards the Punjab, the scene of that noble struggle which it is the special object of the following pages to describe, and of which the preceding chapters may be regarded as only an introduction.

To understand the real position of the Punjab at this crisis, its strength and its weakness, it will be necessary to take at the outset a brief survey of the distribution of troops, European and native, over this province.

In the most southern district, lying between the Jumna and the Sutlej, generally known as the Cis-Sutlej States, were the following :—

At Umballa, H. M. 9th Lancers, 2 troops of horse-artillery, with the 4th (Native) Light Cavalry, and 5th and 60th Regiments N. I. ;

At Kussowlee, H. M. 75th Regiment ;

At Dugshai, the Hon. Company's 1st Bengal Fusiliers ;

At Subathoo, Hon. Company's 2d Bengal Fusiliers ;

At Jutogh, near Simla, the Nusseree Battalion of Goorkhas ;

And at Ferozepore, H. M. 61st Regiment, and 2 com-



panies of foot-artillery, with the 10th (Native) Light Cavalry, and the 45th and 57th Regiments N. I.

Crossing the Sutlej, between that river and the Beas, in the *Bist*, as it is called by the natives, or the Trans-Sutlej States, in official parlance, were—

At Philour, the 3d Regiment N. I. ;

At Jullundhur, H. M. 8th (King's), 1 troop and 1 company of artillery, with the 6th (Native) Light Cavalry, and the 36th and 61st Regiments N. I. ;

At Hosheyarpore, the 9th (Native) Light Cavalry, and 33d Regiment N. I. ;

At Noorpore and Kangra, the 4th N. I., in wings, and a (Native) troop of horse-artillery.

Between the Beas and the Ravee, called the *Baree Doab*, were stationed—

At Umritsur, 1 company of foot-artillery in the fort of Govindgur, and the 59th N. I. in cantonments ;

And at Lahore (Mean-Meer), H. M. 81st Regiment, 2 troops and 4 reserve companies of artillery, with the 8th (Native) Light Cavalry, and the 16th, 26th, and 49th Regiments N. I.

In the *Rechna Doab*, between the Ravee and Chenab rivers, were—

At Sealkote, H. M. 52d L. I., and 1 troop and 1 company of artillery, with the 9th (Native) Light Cavalry, and 35th and 46th Regiments N. I. ;

And Goordaspore, the 2d (Native) Irregular Cavalry.

Between the Chenab and the Indus, including the *Jeteh* and the *Sind Sagur* Doabs, there were—

At Jhelum, 1 company of Native H. Artillery, and the 14th and 39th Regiments N. I. ;

At Rawul Pindie, H. M. 24th Regiment, and 1 troop and 1 company of artillery, with the 16th (Native) Irregular Cavalry, and 58th Regiment N. I. ;

At Shumshabad, the 17th (Native) Irregular Cavalry ;

And at Attock, a (Native) company of artillery.

Crossing the Indus, in the Peshawur Valley, there were—

At Nowshera, H. M. 27th (Inniskillings), with a Mountain-Train battery (Native), the 10th (Native) Irregular Cavalry, and the 55th Regiment N. I. ;

And at Peshawur itself, H. M. 70th and 87th Regiments, and 2 troops and 2 companies (with light field-batteries) and 3 reserve companies of artillery, with 5th (Native) Light Cavalry, 7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry, and 21st, 24th, 27th, 51st, and 64th Regiments N. I. ;

At Hotee Murdan, the Guide Corps ;

And at the Shubkurddur and Michnee forts, the regiment of Khilat-i-ghilzie.

While among the frontier outposts of Abbottabad, Kohat, Bunnoo, Dehra Ismail Khan, Dehra Ghazee Khan, and Asnee, forming a cordon from Hazara to Mittunkote, were distributed the whole of the Punjab Irregular Force, comprising 5 cavalry and 6 infantry regiments, and the 4 Sikh infantry regiments.

Then at Mooltan, were—

1 Company (European) artillery, 1 troop (Native) of artillery, with the 1st Irregular Cavalry, and the 62d and 69th Regiments N. I.

Thus the entire force in the Punjab consisted of 12 European regiments (including 1 of cavalry) ; and of these 7 were massed at the extreme ends, 4 at and

near Umballa, and 3 in the Peshawur Valley; with European artillery, horse and foot, in all scarcely 1500 strong; while the native force comprised 2 troops and 3 companies of artillery, 6 light cavalry, and 26 infantry regiments of "regulars," and 8 of irregular cavalry, besides the entire local force, Sikh and Punjabee.

The component parts of the whole may be thus stated in rough numbers—

Europeans, . . . . .	10,500
Hindustanees (chiefly regulars), . . .	36,000
Punjabees (chiefly irregulars), . . .	13,500

Making a total of about 60,000 men, of whom the Europeans were little more than one-sixth.

Such was the state of the Punjab when the storm burst. That the disaffection which had disclosed itself in Bengal and Oude had also extended among the native troops in this province, there could be little doubt. The disease had not yet broken out, but it had shown premonitory symptoms; and unhappily here, as elsewhere, these were at first ignored, and afterwards misinterpreted.

In addition to the troops which constituted its regular garrison, Umballa contained at this time "the Depot for instruction in musketry," which comprised details from all the native infantry regiments at the neighbouring stations. Among these was a detail of non-commissioned officers and sepoy from the 36th N. I., the regiment itself (under orders from Meerut to Jullundhur) forming part of the escort of the Com-

mander-in-Chief, the Hon. General Anson, who was on a tour of inspection in the North-west Provinces. This corps was soon to attain an unhappy notoriety, and to add another to the many warnings which Government had already received of impending danger.\*

General Anson arrived at Umballa in the middle of March, and in his escort the 36th N. I. Two non-commissioned native officers of this corps, a havildar named Kasse Ram, Tewaree, and a naik, named Jeeololl Doobee, hastened out to the camping-ground to meet their old comrades. What was their amazement at finding themselves taunted with having become Christians, and that by a subahdar, a native commissioned officer of their corps! They had looked for the wonted greeting, "Ram! Ram!" after a separation of some weeks, but instead of this they were branded as out-castes; the *lotah* and *hookah*, the water-vessel and the pipe, those love-tokens of Hindoo brotherhood, were withheld from them; they had touched the greased† cartridge, and become impure. Now these men were Brahmins; the higher their caste the greater had been their imagined fall. Back they hurried to the depot, indignant and alarmed, and told their friends there what had happened. It was at once accepted as an earnest of the reception which was in store for each and all of them on returning to their respective corps. The insult was regarded as a

\* See Appendix D.

† To show the utter falseness of such an insinuation, it is only necessary to state that the cartridges had from the first been given in an *ungreased* state to the sepoys at the depot.

general one, and the affair at once became serious. The havildar and naik went to the house of Captain E. M. Martineau, the "Instructor" at the depot, and with bursting hearts, and tears in their eyes, told their tale of grief. This officer, from an experience of some fifteen years with a very distinguished and well-regulated regiment, the 10th N. I., could fully appreciate the danger. His knowledge of the native mind enabled him to see that a crisis was impending, which this incident might hasten. He had also gained the confidence of the natives, and was therefore the more readily made the repository of their doubts and fears.\* On the very next day (March 20th) he made a full representation of the case in a semi-official form to Captain S. Becher, the Assistant Adjutant-General.

"The affair," he said, "is lamentable, as it discloses the actual feelings of the whole of the native army; and I hasten to put you in possession of the information I have subsequently received on the subject, as it is no longer possible to close our eyes to the present state of our Hindostanee regiments.

"The rumour has been industriously propagated (how it first originated no native knows) that the rifle-cartridges were purposely smeared with the mixture of cows' and pigs' fat, with the express object of destroying caste; in fact, the weapon

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\* "I could have brought forward forty native officers who would have told me all they knew, which was nothing very definite after all, as they, no more than myself, could point out mutiny as likely to break forth here or there, when we all agreed in seeing it everywhere." "Information was freely offered me by the sepoys themselves. They placed in my hands letters from various regiments, which convinced me that a widespread 'passive' conspiracy was matured; and which, in the then inflammable state of the native mind, a spark would at once blow into an active flame."—*Extracts from private letters to the Author.*

itself is nothing more nor less than a *Government missionary to convert the whole army to Christianity.*

"That so absurd a rumour should meet with ready credence, indicates anything but a sound state of feeling on the part of our native soldiers. It is, however, generally credited, and 'punchayuts' have been formed in every corps, who have placed themselves in communication from Calcutta to Peshawar, and the army at large have come to the determination to regard as outcasts, and to expel from all communion, any men who, at any of the depots, use the cartridges at all. I find also, that in many of the detachments here all intercourse with their corps is suspended; the men write from this, but receive no answers; their comrades won't deign to notice them. They justly remark, with evident alarm, 'If a subahdar in the Commander-in-Chief's camp, and on duty as his personal escort, can taunt us with loss of caste, what kind of reception shall we meet with on our return to our own corps? No reward that Government can offer us is any equivalent to being regarded as outcasts by our comrades.'"

Such was the representation of Captain Martineau. The immediate result was, that on the 22d March, General Anson inspected the musketry depot, and addressed the sepoys, Captain Martineau acting as interpreter, and assuring them that the rumour of the new cartridge having any ulterior object in view as affecting their religion, was utterly false. The musketry practice of the sepoys was also suspended at that depot until further orders.

The Commander-in-Chief requested Captain Martineau to ascertain and report officially the effect his address had produced on the minds of the men. The following was that officer's statement:—

“UMBALLA, 23d March 1857.

*“To the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army.*

“Sir,—In obedience to your verbal orders of to-day, I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, as follows :—

“The native officers of this depot have expressed to me, through the medium of three of their number, their sense of the high honour done them by his Excellency, who condescended himself to-day to personally address them, for the purpose of quieting both their minds and those of their comrades in the army at large on the subject of rifle-cartridges.

“They respectfully beg to urge that they do not attribute any of the evil intentions to the Government of this country, as described in his Excellency's address. They know that the rumour is false ; but they equally know, that for one man in Hindostan who disbelieves it, ten thousand believe it, and that it is universally credited, not only in their regiment, but in their villages and their homes.

“They are all ready to a man to fire when ordered, but they would wish to represent, for the paternal consideration of his Excellency, the social consequence of military obedience to themselves. They become outcasts for ever, unacknowledged, not only in their corps but also in their families and their homes. Their devotion to the service, and submission to the military authority, will inflict on them the direst and most terrible punishment they can undergo in this world.

“Their being selected as men of intelligence and fidelity\* thus becomes to them the most fatal curse. They will obey the orders of their military superiors, and socially perish through their instinct of obedience.

“That their views are not exaggerated, some knowledge of native character and of the temper of the native mind (non-military as well as military), at this present moment, tends to

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\* The qualifications for admission into the musketry depot.

convince me. The Asiatic mind is periodically prone to fits of religious panic ; in this state, reasoning that would satisfy us is utterly thrown away upon them ; their imaginations run riot on preconceived views, and often the more absurd they are, the more tenaciously do they cling to them.

"We are now passing through one of these paroxysms, which we might safely disregard, were not unfortunately the military element mixed up in it.

"What the exciting causes are that are at this present moment operating on the native mind to an universal extent throughout these provinces, I cannot discover ; no native can or will offer any explanation ; but I am disposed to regard the greased cartridges, alleged to be smeared with cows' and pigs' fat, more as the medium than the original cause of this widespread feeling of distrust that is spreading dissatisfaction to our rule, and tending to alienate the fidelity of our native army. I would most respectfully venture to solicit of his Excellency, General Anson, to permit a European court of inquiry to be held at this station, to investigate the charges brought by Havildar Kasse Ram, 36th N. I., against Drigpaul Singh, subahdar of that corps, as to the taunt said to have been thrown out by that native officer ; and the refusal of certain of the sepoys of that corps to eat with their brethren at this depot (if substantiated), affords a very sure index to the real sentiments of the native mind.

"In conclusion, I trust his Excellency will not deem my language to be stronger than the urgency of the occasion would seem to warrant, but will give me credit for recording what I sincerely believe to be the actual truth.

"My opinions are, I know, shared in by officers of standing and experience at this depot ; and Captain Robertson, the senior officer doing duty at present, will accompany me for the purpose of presenting this report to you.

"I have the honour, &c. &c.,

"E. M. MARTINEAU, *Lieut., Instr. R. Dep.*"



Clear and convincing as these arguments were, supported too, unhappily, by fires in the buildings connected with the musketry depot,\* they were of no avail, and the suggestion that an official investigation should at once be made was disregarded. The only effect produced by this frank representation, was the further suspension of the use of cartridge by the natives until the final decision of the Commander-in-Chief on the whole case.

That decision was not given till the 16th of April. It was to the following effect:—The conduct of the subahdar, who had taunted and insulted the havildar and naik, was pronounced “unbecoming and unsoldierlike;” but the two men who had been the subjects of that insult—because they saw in it but too clearly the reception which awaited all who had been at the depot, on their return to their respective corps, and because, in the freshness of their indignation and wounded Brahminical pride, they had reported the insult to their comrades, and to the officer of the depot—these men were told publicly, on a brigade parade specially assembled, that their conduct in creating so much excitement at the depot, and inducing the men of other regiments to entertain apprehensions of being similarly taunted upon returning to their corps, “was very reprehensible,” and they were to be “*severely censured*,” and the havildar was privately told that “his

\* This was nearly always the case. The very first fire, on March 26th, of the house of a subahdar of 30th N. I. attached to the musketry depot, who had openly avowed his readiness to use the new cartridge, disclosed the animus existing against Government.

promotion was stopped " for having brought discredit on his own regiment !

What might not a little consideration and sympathy at that moment have effected ? It might have won the confidence of many a well-disposed sepoy, and have thus elicited disclosures tending to avert or mitigate the impending crisis. But their mouths were stopped by this public rebuke on the first comrade who had dared to speak out ; and all were driven to make common cause with the disaffected, or, at least, to be passive and silent spectators of the approaching outbreak.

Nor was this all ; it was resolved that, *coute que coute*, the sepoys should be compelled to fire the cartridges in defiance of their prejudices and their fears. Accordingly, on the morning of April 17th, the sepoys used the cartridge—and that night some thirty thousand rupees' worth of Government property was destroyed by fire !

This was but the prelude to many such scenes. Fires became an almost nightly occurrence ; suddenly, in the dead of night, flames would burst out in various parts of cantonments ; bungalows, or stables of officers attached to the musketry depot, Government buildings containing stores for European soldiers, were fired. Courts of inquiry were now instituted, but with no result. *Grâmées* (thatchers) were by some believed to be the incendiaries, indulging in a more than ordinary degree their propensity of making work for themselves by burning thatched roofs, which would require to be rethatched ; but others there were, of course,

cried down by the authorities as *croakers* and *alarmists*, who saw in these nightly fires a "running accompaniment to the resumed target-practice, and recognised in them signs of increasing disaffection among the sepoys. And this suspicion gradually gained strength. Picquets of sepoys were placed over their own lines and public buildings; and yet fires *would break out* where grâmes could never have lighted them without detection; and the question then became general, "Who but the sepoys could be the culprits?"

In the end of April an important clue was obtained to the mystery of these fires. A Sikh sepoy, named Sham Singh, of the 5th Regiment N. I., disclosed to Mr Forsyth, the Deputy Commissioner, that the great body of the sepoys were in a highly indignant and excited state, under the apprehension that they were all to be compelled to use the offensive cartridge; and that they had resolved that, whenever such an order should be issued, every bungalow in the station should be in flames! The details of the conspiracy were further discovered—that the two N. I. corps were to seize the magazines, &c.; the 4th Light Cavalry to seize the guns; the heel-ropes of H. M. 9th Lancer horses were to be cut, and the horses let loose, and a general rise and massacre to ensue. The Bazâr *Kotwal* (or head bailiff) also reported that a Pundit had told him that, according to Hindoo astrological calculations, it was certain "blood would be shed" within a week, either in Delhi, Meerut, or Umballa.

These disclosures were reported to the local military

authorities; and to the Commander-in-Chief, but were *discredited*, and no notice was taken of them. Sir J. Lawrence, to whom they were also reported, regarded them in a very different light; he attached much value to them, and promised that the faithful Sikh should be cared for. Thus closed the month of April at Umballa.

Nor did the aspect of affairs brighten with the month of May. Fires were more frequent; the bearing of the sepoys more disrespectful and insubordinate. The officers at the depot renewed their remonstrances, but they were denounced as alarmists, and even taunted with a wish to avoid the depot-duty, and to get away to the hills, or back to their homes or regimental messes. Louder and deeper the while grew the rumblings that portended the approaching convulsion.

Yet Umballa was not to be the scene of the explosion itself.

MEERUT, the largest station in India, the strongest in European troops of all arms—scarcely excepting Peshawur—and, consequently, the least likely to be the scene of any native *emeute*, was destined to witness an outbreak without parallel in the past history of India. Meerut was to be the crater from which, with lava-force, the long-gathering and pent-up stream of mutiny was to burst forth and desolate the North-west. The troops at this station were the 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers), under Colonel H. Richmond Jones; the 1st battalion of H. M. 60th Rifles, under Colonel John

#### DISAFFECTION IN THE 3D CAVALRY.

Jones ; a troop of horse-artillery, under Major Tombs ; a company of foot-artillery and light field-battery, under Major Scott ; with three native corps, the 3d Light Cavalry, under Colonel Carmichael Smith, the 11th N. I., under Colonel J. Finnis, and the 20th N. I., under Major Taylor, during the temporary absence on leave of Colonel Halkett. The brigade was commanded by Colonel Archdale Wilson of the Artillery, and Major-General W. H. Hewitt commanded the division.

To understand the particulars of the Meerut outbreak, the form of the cantonment must be borne in mind. It may be briefly described as forming two sides of a square, the centre comprising a perfect forest, or rather wilderness, of bazaars, some occupied, and others in ruins, stretching up to the walls of the city. The north side, something like three miles in length, contained the European troops—the artillery on the extreme right, and the cavalry on the left, with the infantry intervening. At right angles with these, in a very interrupted and broken line, between three and four miles in length, lay the native corps, separated from the rest of the station by a large vacant space, covered with the ruins of abandoned barracks and deserted native lines ; so that the whole may be not improperly described as forming two stations, the European and native, so entirely was the one part separated from the other.

The first indications of disaffection were observed in the 3d Cavalry. It has been noticed that in the middle of March, Government, in the vain hope of undoing

the mischief already done, and of removing all scruples and fears respecting the cartridges, had issued an order changing the mode of loading the rifle, requiring the natives to break off with their fingers, instead of biting, the end of the cartridge. On the 23d of April, Colonel Carmichael Smith, commanding the 3d Light Cavalry, ordered a parade of a portion of his regiment, for the purpose of explaining this change in the drill. In the course of the day, the havildar-major and an orderly at the Colonel's quarters had loaded and fired off their pieces, according to the new plan, without the slightest demur. That night a rumour reached the Colonel that, notwithstanding the concession on the part of Government, the men were resolved *not to touch* the cartridges. Some of the officers went so far as to suggest that the parade should be counter-ordered ; but Colonel C. Smith was determined that, as the men had now no fair ground of objection, he would enforce obedience. The parade took place ; but of the ninety men present, only five, among whom was the havildar-major, would touch the cartridge ! All the rest resolutely refused. The Colonel explained to them how groundless was their objection ; the cartridges were not new ones, but exactly the same as they had been using all the season, and the change in the manner of loading was introduced purely out of consideration for their scruples ; he, moreover, warned them to reflect in what further refusal would involve them. They still persisted ; the parade was dismissed, and the whole matter reported to the brigadier.

The eighty-five men were then placed in arrest ; and

## THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DISAFFECTED.

eventually tried by a *native* court-martial, by which they were all found guilty, and sentenced to various periods of imprisonment. On the morning of Saturday, May the 9th, a general parade of the whole brigade, European and native, was held to witness the carrying this sentence into effect. The eighty-five men were placed in irons in the presence of the whole force, and marched off to the jail. It was hoped that a punishment so prompt and summary, and apparently with the approval of their comrades on the court, would have checked the rising spirit of disaffection ; but instead of being awed, the native troops were maddened and infuriated at the degradation to which their comrades were subjected ; and within six-and-thirty hours many a peaceful happy home in Meerut was blood-stained and desolate.

The morning of the 9th of May had seen the eighty-five troopers of the 3d Cavalry put in irons and marched off to jail. During that day the rest of the native troops did not betray any signs of excitement ; they were orderly in their conduct, and respectful in manner ; and the day passed over without anything occurring to indicate that an outbreak was at hand. That night there was *no fire* (the only unusual circumstance), and the next day passed over quietly. Yet was treason abroad that night and the next day, working not the less surely and desperately for its secrecy.

On the Sunday evening, soon after six o'clock, while the church-going portion of the community were pre-

paring for service, a large body of the 3d Cavalry turned out without orders, mounted, and galloped off to the jail; here they met with no resistance, and having liberated all the prisoners, some fourteen hundred in number, they brought off their comrades, fetters and all, in triumph to their own lines, where a blacksmith was soon busy filing off their irons. The other troopers of the 3d had not been idle; hastening to the bungalows of their own officers and others, they were soon engaged in the work of bloodshed and plunder. Meeting the surgeon of the regiment, Dr Christie, and Mr Philips, the veterinary surgeon, driving in a buggy, they attacked them; the latter was at once shot down, and the former only escaped with great difficulty, and not before he had been much mutilated and injured. In the meanwhile, the two native infantry corps had also turned out on their parade-grounds. Several of the 11th N. I. at once hurried off to the bungalow of their Colonel, and, reporting the uproar, begged permission to have their arms, which they declared themselves ready to use against the rioters. This Colonel Finnis refused: but hastened down to the lines, where he was soon joined by the other officers; and all endeavoured to restrain and pacify their men. The 11th stood comparatively quiet, listening to the assurances of Colonel Finnis; but the parade-ground of the 20th N. I., close by, presented a very different scene. While the sepoy of that corps were standing in a highly-excited state, a trooper of the 3d Cavalry galloped into the lines and told them the Europeans were coming down, and



that, "if they were soldiers and meant to do anything, now was the time to do it." They then made a desperate rush at the regimental magazine, forced the bells of arms, and seized their muskets. Colonel Finnis, perceiving their excitement, advanced towards them with the hope of helping to bring them to order, but they at once shot him down, and then turned on their own officers. Captain Macdonald\* was the first to fall. The others, unarmed as they were, with the utmost gallantry resisted the assaults of their men, and continued their efforts to restrain them, but were at last compelled to fly. The escape of Lieutenant Humphrey was most wonderful. His horse was shot down and riddled with balls, and he himself, while on the ground, became the mark for a dozen muskets; yet he escaped untouched, and contrived to conceal himself in an outhouse of the hospital. Captain Taylor and Lieutenants Henderson and Pattle also effected their escape from the parade-ground, but were subsequently attacked and literally "cut to pieces" by the mob. Nothing could more strikingly contrast with the murderous conduct of the 20th than that of the 11th N. I. Their gallant and beloved Colonel had been shot down before their eyes, but their hands were clear of his blood. Not a musket did they raise against one of their officers, and they even protected several of the ladies and children of the regiment, and escorted them out of danger.

But the flood-gates of order had been forced, and the

\* Happily spared all knowledge of the indignities and agonies to which his poor wife was to be subjected.

torrent swept on in overwhelming flood over the doomed station. The liberated prisoners poured in from the jail; the city and the bazaars had already belched forth their bloodthirsty butchers and vagabonds, who, as by preconcerted arrangement, were at hand to take up the work of conflagration and massacre. The whole of the southern part of the cantonments was in their hands, and here they revelled in the most ruffianly cruelty, and glutted themselves in the death-throes of their victims.\* From that part of the station volumes of smoke were seen rolling up, while flames, flaring and flickering along the roof of some blazing bungalow, shed a ghastly gloom over that darkening twilight, as though nature sought to shed a pall over the agonies of those helpless unoffending victims. Long did the human fiends hold their orgies unrestrained.

*And why unrestrained?* Where were the Carabineers—the Rifles—the Artillery? Far away from the scene; and precious time was lost before permission could be obtained from the authorities that they might be moved down upon the rioters; and when a portion of them did at length reach, night had closed in, and friend could scarcely be distinguished from foe; vacillation and doubt increased the disorder, and, eventually, after a few volleys and rounds of grape had been wasted on the empty sepoy lines, the Europeans were withdrawn again to their own end of cantonments. There, nearly two thousand strong, they took measures

\* The atrocities perpetrated on defenceless ladies, men speak of even now in suppressed whispers, and shudder at the recollection.

to defend themselves against the possible attack of a riotous rabble. The 3d Cavalry (with the exception of some seventy or eighty men), and the 20th N. I. *en masse*, having scoured the lower part of cantonments, trying to murder every European, man, woman, and child, that came in their way, marched out beyond the cavalry lines in the direction of Delhi, and left the budmashes of the bazaars and city, who now swarmed in to complete the work of massacre and plunder.

Of the 11th N. I. it is believed that very few went to Delhi. The mass of them dispersed quietly over the neighbourhood, and a few days after one hundred and twenty of them—and others subsequently—came and gave themselves up. These were all pardoned.

The only possible apology which can be offered for the lamentable mismanagement of that night, be the blame where it may, is that they were all taken by surprise. No attempt was made to put down the outbreak till too late—no attempt to pursue and prevent the mutineers reaching Delhi, or to anticipate their arrival there, and to put the authorities on their guard.

The condition of Meerut on that night is thus concisely described in the message sent to the Commander-in-Chief:—"Native troops in open mutiny—cantonment south of nullah burnt—several European officers killed—European troops defending barracks."

## CHAPTER IV.

DELHI, MAY 11TH, 1857—THE ARRIVAL OF THE MEERUT MUTINEERS  
—THE TREACHERY OF THE SEPOYS FROM THE CANTONMENTS—  
THE MASSACRE AT THE PALACE AND MAIN GUARD—THE FLAG-  
STAFF TOWER—THE MAGAZINE—THE HEROISM OF LIEUTENANT  
WILLOUGHBY—THE ABANDONMENT OF THE MAIN GUARD—THE  
RETREAT FROM THE FLAG-STAFF TOWER.

ON the morning of May 11th, the sun rose in all its wonted glare and glitter over the gorgeous domes and minarets of Delhi, to set on a scene worthy to take its place in the annals of a city whose streets had flowed in blood before the invading swords of a Jenghis Khan, a Tamerlane, and a Nadir Shah.

On that eventful morning all seemed as usual. The daily morning service of the church was over, and the little congregation had dispersed to their homes or their duties. The weekly guards had been relieved at the main guard, the treasury, and the palace; the civil surgeon, Dr Balfour, had gone his round of dispensary and jail; the hum of native litigation had begun in the various *kutcherees*, and the hum of native barter and bargain in the *Chandree Chouk* and the smaller bazaars of the city. Yet all bespoke peace; there was no unusual bustle that morning; no appearance of ex-




# DELHI

Shewing the relative positions  
of

The City and Cantonnments

in Explanation of  
the Events of  
MAY 11<sup>th</sup> 1857.

W. & A. Johnston Edinburgh



citement among the natives ; no prognostic of a coming storm ; nothing to give warning of an approaching tempest, which in a few hours should sweep down half a century's growth of civilisation, and saturate the ground with the blood of murdered Christians !

About nine o'clock in the day there were observed from the river-wall of the magazine some horsemen, apparently cavalry troopers, galloping along the "trunk road" from Meerut towards the bridge of boats which crosses the Jumna ; while in their rear were clouds of dust along the road, showing that these were only the forerunners of a larger force.

So unusual a sight was at once noticed, and reported to the authorities in their several courts. Mr Hutchinson, the magistrate, in the *kutcheree* inside the Water Bastion, was the first to receive it ; then Mr Le Bas, the judge, at the old Customhouse, close to the city walls ; Mr Simon Fraser, the Commissioner, at "Ludlow Castle ;" and lastly, Sir Thomas Metcalfe, at his own house, where, having given over charge to Mr Hutchinson, he was in the act of packing up to start for Mussooni that evening on account of his health. All were at once astir.

Mr Hutchinson galloped out to the cantonments, three miles off, to apprise Brigadier Graves, and to ask for a small detachment of troops to prevent the possibility of these strange visitors creating a disturbance in the city. The force at that time cantoned there were three regiments—the 38th N. I., under Colonel Knyvett ; the 54th N. I., under Colonel Ripley ;

and the 74th N. I., under Major Abbott—with a native battery under Captain H. P. de Teissier. That morning there had been a brigade parade, but nothing unusual had been observed in the bearing of the men to indicate a consciousness of the coming struggle. On hearing Mr Hutchinson's account of cavalry troopers having ridden into the city, the Brigadier's first thought was to telegraph to Meerut, to know what it meant. But when he was told that "the *wire* was broken," he at once augured that there was something far more serious at hand than a mere city row, and ordered off the 54th N. I., being the nearest at hand, and two guns from De Teissier's battery, under Lieutenant Wilson. The regiment marched off in seeming glee, leaving two companies to bring up the guns.

Mr Hutchinson now returned to the city: at the Cashmere Gate he found Mr Le Bas, from whom he learned that Mr Fraser and Sir T. Metcalfe had both passed in; and disregarding the entreaties of Mr Le Bas and Lieutenant Proctor of the 38th N. I., the officer on duty at the main guard, he resolved to follow them. "I am the magistrate," he said, "and I must go."

Mr Fraser, on receiving the tidings, had hastened down in his buggy, with an escort of sowars, through the Cashmere Gate to the palace, to consult with Captain Douglas, the commandant of the palace-guard: but finding that that officer had already been apprised of the arrival of the troopers, and gone into the palace to seek an interview with the King, he at once pro-



ceeded to the Calcutta Gate, leaving a request that Captain Douglas would follow him there.

Here Sir Thomas Metcalfe soon arrived, having on his way gone in to the magazine to put Lieutenant G. Willoughby, the officer in charge, on his guard, and to beg that a couple of guns might be moved out and planted on the causeway which connects the Calcutta Gate with the bridge of boats, so as to sweep the bridge, and prevent the mutineers from crossing.

Captain Douglas, after a fruitless effort to move the King, and to reason with some troopers who had, by a private entrance, gained access to the King's private gardens, now joined them ; as also did Mr Hutchinson, who had made his way through the gathering crowds in the streets.

The value of the Calcutta Gate was evident ; it was the only gate of any importance on the river side of the city, the point for which the mutineers would naturally make to gain an entrance into the city, and the only one at which anything like effective resistance could be offered ; hence it was the rallying-point of the authorities. But it was soon found that they had arrived too late ; the bridge was crossed, and the gate already in the hands of the troopers : the sergeant in charge of the bridge of boats on the opposite bank had been overpowered and cut down, and the police guard at the gate had offered no resistance. Fraser and Metcalfe at first attempted to reason with the troopers ; but in vain. One of them fired his pistol at Mr Fraser, but missed him ; another wounded Mr Hutchinson in the

arm. Mr Nixon, the Commissioner's confidential clerk, who had also arrived here, was killed, and the struggle had begun in earnest. Mr Fraser called on his sowars to attack the troopers, but not a man moved.\* He then seized a gun from the hand of one of the police standing by, and shot down the foremost trooper. But finding how hopeless it was to hold his ground with mutiny in front and treachery at his side, he sprang into his buggy and drove off towards the palace gate. Captain Douglas and Mr Hutchinson, finding the crowd closing in upon them and increasing in insolence, jumped down into the dry ditch which surrounds the palace, and walked along in the same direction. Sir T. Metcalfe had also retired from the Calcutta Gate when he saw the serious turn that matters had taken, and rode off to the *kotwall* (the native police-court), in the Chandree Chouk, and ordered out the police to guard the other gates of the city. But treason had been busy here too. That name which had, with little intermission, been associated with the city for above fifty years,† had now lost its power; the nephew of Sir Charles Metcalfe was no longer recognised in Delhi. The *kotwal* received the order, and "spat upon the ground;" the police heard it, and smiled.

We must now trace the progress of the mutineers. The advanced body had carried their point—they had

\* These sowars, or mounted orderlies, formed part of a contingent supplied to the civil authorities by the *Jhajjur* Nawab, and their treachery at the outset showed what might be expected, and was so soon experienced, from their traitor chief.

† Sir Charles Metcalfe was first appointed to Delhi in 1806.

seized the Calcutta Gate, and the city was at their mercy. The main body soon arrived. Of these a small party forded the river a little below the city, the water being low at that season, and made for the jail, where, without any show of resistance from the guards, they forced the gates, and let loose the whole body of convicts. The rest crossed the bridge of boats, and joined their comrades at the Calcutta Gate, and these broke up into small bodies and distributed themselves over the city, dealing death wherever they went.

One party of troopers, who have already been alluded to as having obtained entrance to the King's private gardens, must be specially noticed.

Outside the palace, on the river-side, stands a strong fortification called the *Selim guruh* (Selim's fort). This outwork is connected with the palace by a small bridge which spans the fort ditch, with a small postern in the massive walls of the fort and palace on either side. The main entrance to this fort is a gateway of some pretensions, close to the bridge of boats. Until a few years ago, this was a close gate; the successive kings of Delhi had frequently solicited from the English Government that ingress and egress through *Selim guruh* might be granted to them, as saving them the inconvenience of passing through the crowded streets of the city, whenever they wished to enjoy a little country air. The request had long been steadily refused; but a few years ago it was conceded, it being thought that no possible evil could result from so trifling a privilege.

However, it proved otherwise. It was by means of this very gate through Selim guruh that a few of the foremost troopers obtained an entrance into the palace, and, to the old King's surprise and indignation, presented themselves under the windows of the private female apartments, vociferously demanding of him to take his place at their head. Here it was that Captain Douglas had found them on his visit to the King, and had vainly endeavoured to pacify them.

Now, while the events we have described were passing at the Calcutta Gate, these troopers had been at work in the palace, rallying with their war-cry, "Deen ! Deen !" the fanatics with which it swarmed, and who were evidently expecting them ;\* so that by the time Mr Fraser and Mr Hutchinson, with Captain Douglas (who had been so severely injured in leaping down into the ditch, and was so faint from pain as to be scarcely able to crawl along), had reached the main gateway, they found the whole palace in commotion ; the sepoy sentries and the King's own guard were in open

\* "The arrival of the soldiery from Meerut was expected in the palace. Letters came in from Meerut on Sunday, bringing intelligence that eighty-two soldiers had been imprisoned, and that a serious disturbance was to take place in consequence. Owing to this the guards at the gate of the palace made no secret of their intentions, but spoke openly of what they expected to occur, which was, that some of the troops, after mutinying at Meerut, would come over to Delhi."—*Evidence of Jat Mull, News-writer, given at the Trial of the King of Delhi.*

"A trooper rode up and called to the subahdar to open the gate. He asked, 'Who are you ?' and on his replying, 'We are troopers from Meerut,' the subahdar observed, 'Where are the other troopers ?' The man replied, 'In the Ungoorie Bagh,' when the subahdar desired to bring them all, that he would open the gate ; and on their arrival he did so."—*Statement made by a servant of Mr J. Skinner, published in the Lahore Chronicle.*

mutiny ; and the swarms of pensioned yet penniless hangers-on of that most profligate, pauperised court, crowded around, in utter defiance of all order or respect.

Captain Douglas, having been lifted out of the fort ditch, was carried up to his own apartments over the gateway, accompanied by Mr Hutchinson, and was there tended by his friend and companion of years, the Rev. M. J. Jennings, the chaplain of Delhi, who, with his daughter and a friend (Miss Clifford), occupied adjoining apartments. Mr Simon Fraser remained below, still endeavouring to bring back the troops to order, and to repress the clamour of the rabble. But the tide of rebellion had set in, and no human power could force it back. One of the menials of the palace rushed at him, tulwar in hand, as he stood at the foot of the stairs, and cut him down.\* The Rubicon was now crossed ; three Mohammedan retainers in the palace sprang forward and wreaked their frenzy in gashes on his fallen body, then rushed up the stairs to seek the other objects of their hate. They found Captain Douglas, Mr Jennings, and the two ladies, in one room, and Mr Hutchinson in an adjoining one, and murdered them all. Escape was impossible ; and perhaps mercifully so, for the escape for a time might have been worse than the death-blow. Jennings, Fraser, and Douglas were bound together by ties of the firmest, purest friendship, their names indissol-

\* Some months after, the author himself saw the mark left by the word on the wall as the fiend dealt his death-blow.

ubly connected with the noble "Delhi Mission," "and in their death they were not divided." \*

Four months after, when the blood-stained city was once more in our hands, in that very room, so well remembered as the scene of happy social intercourse by many who took part in that crowning assault, were still to be traced the stains of blood, which, while they told their tale of horror, spoke too the comforting hope, which the general testimony of natives has since confirmed, that those more than brothers, Jennings and Douglas, had fallen side by side, and that those Christian maidens had known no indignities to embitter and aggravate their end.

More troopers had by this time reached the palace gate, and, finding how matters had progressed here, rode on to that part of the city called *Dariao Gunge*. This had originally formed the artillery lines, but was at this time occupied by conductors and others attached to the magazine, clerks in Government offices, and pensioners, with their families, forming in all a considerable Christian community. This most quiet part of the city was soon to become a *charnel-house*. In rode the troopers, and soon were their sabres running red with the blood of old men, women, and children. The budmashes of the city, the scum of the

\* Such, after a most careful inquiry and examination of the many conflicting statements, the author believes to have been the real circumstances of this tragedy, in which he lost a highly-valued friend—one to whom he, in common with very many others, looked up with affectionate respect; one in whom was to be found that happy but rare combination, the practical experience of a Chaplain with the heart of a Missionary.

bazaar, followed on their heels; an indiscriminate and cold-blooded slaughter ensued; the few who for a time were able to escape, rushed down to the sands on the river-side, others concealed themselves in the larger houses, but were eventually mastered or betrayed to swell the list of victims.\*

Another party of troopers appear to have turned off to the right, making for the portion of the city between the magazine and the Cashmere Gate, where lay the chief public buildings and private houses. Here was the Government College; Mr F. Taylor, the Principal, Mr Roberts and Mr Stewart the assistant-teachers (the latter the well-known church-clerk), were cut down in the midst of their work. At the Delhi Bank fell Mr Beresford, the manager, with all his family, after a gallant and desperate resistance. The young assistant at the telegraph office, who had taken Mr Todd's place, and whose last message electrified and warned the Punjab, was cut down with his hand on the signalling apparatus. The "Delhi Mission," too, was there, of which the Bishop of Madras, in his late visitation, had written in such high praise. But all was now quenched in blood. The Rev. A. Hubbard, the missionary, Mr Sandys, Louis Koch, all fell. *Ram Chundur*, the intelligent, fervent convert,

\* Several of them took shelter in the Kishnagurh Rajah's house, where they actually defended themselves for two days. At length they surrendered on condition of their lives being preserved, and were carried off to the palace under charge of the heir-apparent. Here they were kept for five days; but on the 18th were all massacred in cold blood at the Tank, under the eye of some of the *Shazadas*, if not of the King himself.

whose position in the Government College gave such importance and weight to the mission, alone escaped—his life given to him for a prey. The no less earnest *Chimmum Lall*, the S. A. Surgeon, who about five years before had stood side by side with Ram Chundur to receive baptism at the font in the church close by, at the hands of Mr Jennings, was almost simultaneously, with his beloved pastor, called on to suffer for the truth's sake, and seal his faith in Christ by dying for His name.

Succours were in the mean time hastening in from cantonments: destined, however, as it proved, to increase rather than suppress the tumult already raised in the city. As the 54th N. I., sent off at once by Brigadier Graves, reached the Cashmere Gate, they were met by a sepoy sent by Lieutenant Willoughby to report that the mob was beginning to get restless and turbulent, and that the magazine was threatened. Colonel Ripley gave the order to push on to the rescue. He had scarcely passed through the inner wooden gate of the main guard, and entered the open square beyond, when he was met by a party of the troopers, who dashed down at once upon him. So little prepared for such an emergency were the Colonel and the other officers, that they appear to have been marching together at the head of the regiment. The Colonel ordered his men to load, but they paid no heed. They at once joined and fraternised with the mutineers, who fired off their pistols with fatal effect on the officers of the 54th N. I. Captains Smith and



Burrows, Lieutenants Edwards and Waterfield, Dr Dopping, and the quartermaster-sergeant, were killed. Colonel Ripley, too, was left for dead: but though wounded in seventeen places (some from the bayonets of his own men), he contrived, as the troops now in open mutiny dispersed for promiscuous carnage and plunder, to drag himself to the wooden gate inside the main guard: here he was found by Dr Stewart, the garrison surgeon, who had him carried outside the Cashmere Gate, placed in Mr Le Bas' carriage, which was standing there, and took him at once up to cantonments. The remaining two companies of the 54th N. I., under Major Patterson, and the two guns under Lieutenant Wilson, had in the mean time reached the Cashmere Gate. These men appeared much less mutinous than the others, and for a time refused to join their traitorous comrades, and remained peaceable and orderly.

We now turn to cantonments. The Brigadier, on despatching the 54th N. I. to the city, made such arrangements as were possible for the safety of the station. Picquets were thrown out to guard against surprise, the ammunition of the remaining guns packed up ready for use, and the horses ordered to be kept harnessed. The guard of the powder-magazine\* was strengthened from its usual complement of twenty men under a native officer, to a subaltern's guard of a hundred men.

\* This, the MAIN POWDER-MAGAZINE, must not be confounded with *Expense Magazine*, inside the city walls, which was subsequently

Firing was soon heard in the city; then came rolling up that humming sound, like distant thunder, which told of a multitude in commotion; and flames were soon seen rising up from different parts of the city, especially in the quarter where Government offices and private houses stood. An hour had scarcely elapsed since Colonel Ripley had marched off at the head of his regiment, when he was brought back by Dr Stewart, mortally wounded, telling the tale of treason, and reporting that every other officer of the regiment was killed.\* This disclosed to the brigadier the nature and extent of the danger. The "assembly" was sounded for the 38th and 74th, and the remaining artillery; for these, whether true or false, were his only stay. To show mistrust at such a moment would have been, to say the least, impolitic, if not fatal. The call was obeyed slowly, and with seeming reluctance; in time, however, artillery and infantry turned out, and the

blown up. This magazine was above two miles outside the city walls, on the river bank to the rear of cantonments, and contained at that time considerably more than 1000 barrels of powder; whereas in the Expense Magazine there were not above fifty barrels—just enough for current use in making up ammunition.

It is interesting to notice the almost prophetic warning of that great Indian general, Sir Charles Napier, regarding the city magazine, which, at the time he visited Delhi, in 1849, was the only one. Among other objections to such an arrangement he urged—"It is without defence, beyond what a guard of fifty men offers; and its gates are so weak that a mob could push them in. I therefore think a powder-magazine should be built in a safe place, . . . in a suitable position near the city."—*Indian Misgovernment*, p. 40. To that suggestion the MAIN MAGAZINE on the river bank owed its existence.

\* Happily this was not quite true; Lieutenants Butler and Osborn, and Ensign Angelo, escaped, the former, however, not without a severe wound in the head.

parade was formed. The brigadier went down the lines with his brigade-major, Captain Nicoll, and, addressing the men, pointed out to them the enormity of their crime — sepoys proving *false to their salt* ! By some his address was received in sullen silence, by others with loud professions of loyalty and devotion. While he was in the act of addressing them, Captain Wallace, officer of the week on station duty, arrived from the city with a request for reinforcements. Now was the moment to test the men and try their mettle. “ *Who would volunteer ?* ” Of the 38th not a man moved ; the 74th came forward *en masse* ! They were only about 240 strong, the rest having been distributed in detachments over cantonments : however, Major Abbott at once put himself at their head and marched down, taking with him two more guns under Lieutenant Aislabie.

It now became evident that a great crisis was at hand. While throwing what troops he could spare into the city, it became necessary for the brigadier to provide still further against the possibility of an attack on cantonments. Every one at all acquainted with Delhi knows well the round castellated building crowning the ridge that separates the cantonments from the city ; this FLAG-STAFF TOWER, as it was called, was fixed on as the only post at all capable of defence. Here it might be possible to hold out for a few hours at least, provided no guns were brought against them ; still, with no supply of water, no provisions at hand, nor any means of cooking, it would be a *forlorn* hope.

Here, however, it was decided that all the ladies and families of the station, with the many fugitives who were already flocking in from the civil lines and the city, should collect together; for weak and exposed as the position was, there was every reason to hope that, with so strong a European force near at hand at Meerut, only a few hours could elapse before they would be extricated. Here, therefore, they took up their position.

Among the first who had arrived was Mr Le Bas, the judge; he had gone down from Sir T. Metcalfe's house, where he lived, to the Cashmere Gate immediately on hearing of the disturbance; but finding it impossible to work his way through the riotous crowd, had passed out through the postern-gate adjoining the kutcheree at the Water Bastion, walked up along the sand to Metcalfe's house, and, after making a few arrangements, joined the cantonment party at the Flag-staff Tower. Dr Balfour, the civil surgeon, with his sister-in-law, Miss Smith, and a sick friend, Mr M'Whirter, of the civil service; Mr Wagentrieber, with his wife and children; Lieutenant Thomason, of the settlement survey; Mr Marshall, the merchant, and many others, had also made this their rallying-point. In that small circular building, scarcely seventeen feet in diameter, with a spiral staircase in the centre leading up to the roof, were all these, and many more, huddled together, in the middle of May, each new arrival adding to the general dismay with a new tale of horror, until, as one of the sufferers said, "it became a Black Hole in mini-

ature, without its final catastrophe." "I shall never forget that scene," says Mr Le Bas : "officers, ladies, children, ayahs, and other servants, were crowded in and about the tower. Carriages and horses were standing close by; the heat was very great. Most of the children were crying; and no wonder, for they were hungry, thirsty, uncomfortable, and frightened. Many of the ladies were in a state of great despondency; some, however, were as cool and collected as possible, never shedding a tear or uttering a complaint. Here an officer was haranguing the sepoy, and endeavouring to persuade them to do their duty; there, an anxious group was gathering round the brigadier, consulting and discussing."

There now only remained two guns at De Teissier's Battery, and the 38th N. I., with a few of the 74th N. I. The two guns had been placed in front of the Flag-staff Tower so as to sweep the road, which, branching off the main road, comes straight up the ascent, and also taking in flank the main road itself into cantonments. On the ridge along the right flank, about a couple of hundred of the 38th N. I., and some of the 74th N. I., were placed, and the Christian band-boys of the native corps were collected together close around the tower, with spare arms and ammunition brought from the regimental magazines placed in their hands; while a further supply was stored inside the building ready for use. It was noticed that about thirty or forty of the rifle company of the 38th were constantly mixing themselves up among the gunners to prevent

the guns being worked. As a watch upon these worthies, two or three of the gentlemen inside placed themselves on the top of the tower, and, braving the scorching rays of the sun, stood, musket in hand, ready to shoot down the first man who interfered with the gunners, or made any attack upon the officers. Inside the tower might be seen ladies, whose fair fingers a few hours before were employed in the peaceful avocations of domestic life, now busy unfastening cartridges ! One lady, Miss Smith, the sister-in-law of Dr Balfour, who had but lately left a bed of sickness, and was still partially disabled by a fractured arm, nobly forgot her weakness and the immunities of her sex in those trying hours, and was foremost in this work of preparation.

As the day advanced, anxiety increased ; all thoughts were turned towards Meerut, for the bearing of the sepoys was perceptibly changing. It was becoming too clear that in any attack they would join their brethren against their European masters, even if they did not commence the attack themselves. A fine brave young fellow, a nephew of Mr Marshall the merchant, offered to ride to Meerut for succour. Brigadier Graves at once mounted him, and gave him a letter to General Hewitt ; but he only got as far as the *nullah* by the side of the powder-magazine, when the 38th men on guard there shot him down when in the act of fording. Dr Batson, the surgeon of the 74th N. I., then offered to go on the same errand, disguised as a native ; and with his face and hands stained he started on

this desperate, but as it proved equally fruitless venture.

And what was passing all this time at the magazine? The European staff of the magazine comprised only the following:—Lieutenant George Willoughby of the artillery, in command; Lieutenants G. Forrest and W. Raynor, assistant-commissaries of ordnance; Conductors Buckley, Shaw, and Scully; Sub-Conductor Crow, and Sergeants Edwards and Stewart. Such were the gallant little band that now prepared itself to defend the magazine by every means which, on the spur of the moment, it was possible to devise, in the firm hope that succour would soon come from Meerut; or, failing that, prepared to sell it with their lives. Sir Thomas Metcalfe's suggestion of moving out the two guns towards the bridge was at once found impracticable. There were neither cattle to draw them nor gunners to work them.\* Lieutenant Willoughby, as soon as he found the crowd gathering round and becoming tumultuous, had sent off a messenger for succour from the cantonments. This man met Colonel Ripley and the 38th passing in at the main guard. Their fate we already know. The condition of the magazine was in the meanwhile becoming more perilous. The crowd was increasing; messengers were arriving from the palace, demanding admission; a small body of the King's own soldiers marched down to the main gateway, and, relieving the sepoy guard outside, took possession. Nor were matters progressing more

\* Evidence of Captain Forrest at the King of Delhi's trial.

favourably within. The native subordinates were evidently traitors, and were communicating with the multitude outside. So it became necessary to prepare for the worst. Those preparations are thus described by Lieutenant Forrest himself: "Inside the gate leading to the park we placed two 6-pounders double charged with grape, one under Acting Sub-Conductor Crow and Sergeant Stewart, with the lighted matches in their hands, and with orders that, if any attempt was made to force the gate, both guns were to be fired at once, and they were to fall back on that part of the magazine in which Lieutenant Willoughby and I were posted. The principal gate of the magazine was similarly defended by two guns, with the *chevaux de frize* laid down on the inside. For the further defence of this gate and the magazine in its vicinity, there were two 6-pounders so placed as both to command the gate and a small bastion in its vicinity. Within sixty yards of the gate, and in front of the office, and commanding two cross-roads, were three 6-pounders and one 24-pounder howitzer which could be so managed as to act upon any part of the magazine in that neighbourhood. After all these guns and howitzers had been placed in the several positions above named, they were loaded with double charges of grape."

Next followed preparations for that *dernier ressort*—that act which will give to the name of the shy, reserved, modest, unpretending\* subaltern of artillery,

\* The *Mutiny of the Bengal Army*, better known as "The Red Pamphlet," p. 41.



George Willoughby, a place in the roll of England's heroes. If he might not hold the magazine, with all its stores, at least they should not fall into the hands of the mutineers. From the main powder-store was laid a train to the foot of a large lime-tree standing alone in the yard.\* At the trunk of this tree was stationed Conductor Scully, with orders that when he saw Conductor Buckley raise his hat the train was to be fired.

For some time matters remained thus, in a state of awful suspense. The little garrison within watched and wondered at the seeming hesitation of the multitude without. Of that hesitation a solution may now be given. The King had at first been taken by surprise; the spirit of insurrection which he had evoked had broken out before the preconcerted time. The thought of the strong European garrison of Meerut, and of the dire retribution which might come from that quarter, made him cautious. He hesitated before compromising himself. Messengers were despatched on camels along the Meerut road, to give immediate intimation of the advance of any European force. About the middle of the day they returned to the palace, and reported that not a soldier was within twenty miles. The old King now took courage.† Another and a stronger guard was sent down, under

\* The charred trunk was still standing when the author visited Delhi in 1858.

† Mr Rotton, in his *Siege of Delhi*, p. 20, also mentions this circumstance.

a son and a grandson of the King, to demand the immediate surrender of the magazine in the King's name. On this being refused, scaling-ladders were sent out from the palace and planted against the walls along the main road. Danger threatened also from another quarter. Under the south wall of the magazine stood the old Christian burial-ground, with its wonted array of unchristian monuments, stoic porches, broken shafts, and obelisks, towering up even above the level of the magazine walls. The sepoy and King's guard, baffled in their attempts to effect an entrance at the gates, climbed up to the tops of these tombs, and from thence fired in upon the little garrison as they stood at their guns, and were unable to defend themselves against this new enemy. Then, the scaling-ladders once fairly planted, up swarmed the rebels. On reaching the tops of the walls they were greeted with volleys of grape, and swept off; but more crowded up. Nobly were the guns worked by the few Englishmen, but it was all in vain. As a last hope, Willoughby rushed to the small bastion on the river face: one more look—a long, anxious look—towards Meerut, but not a sign of coming succour. It was clear that Meerut had failed them. Willoughby returned to his guns. For above five hours had that noble little band defended their fortress. Buckley had been wounded in the arm; Forrest had two shots in the hand. Further defence was hopeless. Willoughby passed the fatal word to Buckley, Buckley raised his hat, Scully fired the train: the whole building seemed

to be hurled into the air, and hundreds of the rebels were buried in the ruins !

That a single European should have escaped was indeed wonderful. Poor Scully was so dreadfully wounded that escape for him was impossible. Sub-conductor Crow and Sergeant Edwards fell at their gun ; Raynor and Buckley scrambled over the debris of the wall, and eventually reached Meerut ; Willoughby, accompanied by Forrest and his family, rushed down through the sally-port in the waterside bastion, and made for the main guard. Of the former, said one who saw him rush past, that morning had stamped years of age and care on his fair boyish face.\*

At the Cashmere Gate and the main guard little had occurred since the massacre of the 54th officers. That regiment appears to have disappeared, and have joined in the general looting and plundering of the city. The men of the 74th, under Major Abbott, who had arrived about mid-day, remained quiet, and indeed a portion of them actually defended the passage to the Treasury against some of the cavalry troopers and men of the 54th. The detachment of the 38th, however, which was on duty at the main guard, were very mutinous and insolent. An order came from

\* India rang with his praise, and England echoed back the applause ; but he was not to hear, or to receive the reward of his heroism. Two or three days after, he was brutally murdered in a village on his way to Meerut. Each of the survivors—however, Forrest, Raynor, Shaw, Buckley, and Stewart—received a nobly-earned promotion and a Victoria Cross.

Brigadier Graves that the two guns sent with the 74th, under Lieutenant Aislabie, should return to cantonments ; and soon after the 74th were also recalled. Mr De Gruyther, the deputy-collector, entreated that they might not be withdrawn, as it was evident the 38th men were not to be trusted. Major Abbott, however, had no alternative, and gave the order ; only about 120 obeyed. Major Paterson, of the 54th, had remained here with his two companies all the day, and was now *pushed out by his men* through the gate, as the 74th were passing out. Scarcely were they clear of the bridge when the 38th men inside closed the gate, and began to fire upon the officers who remained. Captain Gordon, of the 74th, was the first to fall, and then Lieutenant Reveley and Lieutenant Smith ; the remaining officers and ladies who had fled there rushed up to the guard-room on the bastion. Ensign Elton, seeing the case hopeless, saved himself by a desperate leap. "Running up to the ramp on the parapet of the main guard, and jumping down into the ditch, he scrambled up the counterscarp, and made across country towards cantonments." Lieutenant Osborn also, who had remained at the main guard, escaped by jumping down into the ditch, but not without a severe wound in the leg. "Others," says another of the survivors who witnessed it, "were going to follow, when they heard the cries of ladies in the guard-room. Regardless of the storm of bullets, the officers went back and brought them away, and tying handkerchiefs, &c., together, let them down one by

one into the ditch; and then, having got them up on the other side, the whole proceeded towards the river, expecting at every step to be followed and shot down." \* Major Abbott was escorted safely to the regimental quarter-guard, and then left by his men, who, having provided for the safety of their commanding officer, hastened back to the city to get their share of the plunder !

To recount the deeds of blood which had all this time been perpetrated in the *recesses* of the city itself, would be impossible. The carnage was general. There were some 1500 mutinous soldiery, as many liberated convicts, the scum of the palace population, and the budmashes of the bazaar, all revelling in every form of vindictive and licentious cruelty. To be a Christian, or to have the appearance of one, was a fatal distinction. Neither age nor sex were spared ; nay, unoffending women and helpless babes seemed to be the special objects of their lust and hate. From one end of Delhi to the other did these fiends in human form hold their orgies, and glut themselves with Christian blood.

Thankfully do we turn away from the recital of such deeds.

The main guard, the last rallying-point in the city,

\* They crossed the river in safety, and after seven days of great privation and danger, reached a village twelve miles only from Delhi, when the head man offered to send a letter into Meerut ; this was done, and the day after some troops came out, and escorted the party into that station.

was now abandoned ; and with the few survivors who effected their escape, the reader must retrace his steps once more to cantonments, and learn what has been passing there, since we left the brigadier, with the remaining troops and fugitives, about mid-day in the Flag-staff Tower.

For some time matters had undergone little change, when an accident occurred which disclosed still more the disaffected state of the sepoys. A rumour came up that the cavalry troopers had left the city, and were enjoying their *siesta*, or cooking their dinner, under the shade of the trees along the canal bank, just outside the Lahore Gate, after the fatigue of their murderous revel. It at once occurred to Brigadier Graves and others that now would be the time to come down on them unawares. Captain Tytler, of the 38th, thought he could persuade his men to make the attempt. He went among them, and found some 200 who declared themselves ready to go with him and the brigadier ; but on the order being given for them to fall in, they wavered, and then refused to move, saying " that they were ready to fight against any of our enemies, but not a shot would they fire against their own *bhai-bunds*." It was now clear that in any assault on the position, not a man among them was to be trusted.

The day wore on—its hottest hours were passed—the energies of the little band had begun to flag under the influence of the increased heat and the protracted suspense, when they were startled into still more painful anxiety by the event already described. " A puff of

white smoke," to use the words of one who was an eye-witness, "followed by a magnificent coronal of red dust, rose above the walls, and told us that the magazine in the city had exploded!" At the sight of this the sepoys on the ridge became greatly excited; they made a rush to their arms, which were piled, but gradually subsided into their former sullen passiveness, without attempting any act of violence. A further trial now awaited them: a cart was driven up containing the mangled corpses of the murdered officers.\* However, a scornful smile or a taunt was all that the ghastly spectacle elicited from them. Clouds were now gathering fast. The two guns which the brigadier had recalled were on their way back, when the advanced picquet of the 38th on the left, placed at the gorge of Suddur Bazaar, rushed forward, fired at Lieutenant Aislabie, seized the guns, wheeled them round, and with fixed bayonets compelled the drivers to take them back towards the city. Captain De Teissier, who was at the Flag-staff Tower, no sooner saw this than he galloped down the hill, and called out to his men to return. He was met by a volley of fifteen or sixteen shots from the 38th sepoys, and, although he escaped himself untouched, his charger was mortally wounded, and had barely strength enough to carry him back in safety to the Tower. †

\* They had been collected by Major Abbott, and sent up for the purpose of interment. When the army under General Barnard encamped here on the 8th June, the cart was still here, with its load of bleached bones.

† Lieutenant Aislabie, in charge of those guns, galloped on through

This was a most critical moment! An officer had been shot at by their comrades, before their very eyes; and dark and lowering grew the look of many a sepoy of the 38th as they now crowded round: a movement, too, was made by some of the officers towards the two remaining guns; the 38th men saw this, closed in, and began to hustle the native gunners. Had the order been then given to fire on the party who were carrying off the other guns, *it could not have been obeyed*. Its effect would probably have been, that the guns would have been swung round and fired on the officers themselves, and then not a European could have escaped to tell the tale. This catastrophe, however, was mercifully averted, and the crisis passed over.

"At last," says Mr Le Bas, "one of the officers suggested that we should get away while we could. At first the brigadier would not hear of such a thing. He said that he could not abandon his post—that we should soon have aid from Meerut; but the question was agitated, and the idea of a retreat gradually became familiar to men's minds."\* Matters were fast going from bad to worse. There was no sign of the avenging force from Meerut: to hold out in that small tower, crowded as it was with ladies and children, hampered at every point, was impossible. Flight

the gorge, hoping to reach the Tower through the bazaar on the rear of the lines; but the sepoys who had been placed here on guard opened fire on him as he approached, and he was obliged to give up the attempt and make for Meerut.

\* *Fraser's Magazine*, Feb. 1858.



alone was in their power, and that might soon be lost. So it was at length decided by the Brigadier, Mr Le Bas, Captains Nicoll, De Teissier, Tytler, Wallace, and others, that all should retire as best they could; a resolve that was still more confirmed and hastened by the arrival of Ensign Elton of the 74th, who had escaped from the city, and reported that all was over there—Captain Gordon and Lieutenants Reveley and Smith, the last remaining officers, had been shot down by their men, and the main guard was abandoned.

The retreat now became general. Captain De Teissier drew off his two guns: urging the drivers into a sharp trot, he succeeded in evading a rush made by some of the scoundrels of the 38th to intercept them, and for three or four miles he kept the guns and tumbrils together; but gradually they fell behind, the sudden and dense darkness of an Indian night (especially before the rising of the moon when just past the full) came on, and they positively refused to advance. De Teissier, having lost his charger, was driving his carriage, in which were his wife and some friends; he endeavoured in vain to bring the guns on, and was at length compelled to abandon them. Ensign Glubb, of the 38th, was riding on one of the gun-carriages, and urged the men to advance; they only laughed at an order they would not recognise, and he was compelled to take refuge in a carriage passing by, in which he escaped to Kurnaul. Other parties of fugitives also met them as they were going back, and endeavoured to rally

the drivers and bring off the guns, but it was in vain.\*

The sepoy of the 38th made no attempt to oppose the retreat; their manner was more and more defiant, and their language grew more insolent, but they committed no act of violence. Indeed, many of them crowded round the brigadier, and his brigade-major, who still remained behind, and urged them, in terms more earnest than respectful, to be off—"this was no longer a place for them."†

\* It was nearly dark when these guns got back to cantonments, and the mutineers were holding high revel. The sudden tramp of the horses, rattling of the chains, and rumbling of the heavy carriage-wheels, arrested them in the midst of their plunder. Their one thought was, "The Meerut troops are on us!" and *they took to their heels!* Goaded on by conscience, which made greater cowards of them than they are by constitution, they never stopped till they were safe within the city walls; flying, as it turned out, at the sound of their own fellow-traitors.

Another anecdote may be here added, as illustrating the native opinion of the English character. One of the Delhi officers, on returning there with the army, was surprised to see his old *moorghee wallah* (fowl-man) walk into his tent, and still more so to hear him say he had come to give him an account of his poultry, which were all safe; he had taken care of them and fed them regularly, because, he said, "he was sure his master would come back."

† The different treatment received by Brigadier Graves from that which fell to the lot of most commanding officers during the crisis, is worthy of notice, the more so as it admits of explanation. In the middle of April, several sepoy of the 16th N. I. (grenadiers), who were passing through Delhi on leave from Meerut to their homes in Oude, called to pay their respects to the brigadier, who had risen in their regiment from ensign to commandant. In the course of conversation (as he afterwards remembered), some of them almost with importunity urged him to go to England or the hills—at any rate, to *leave Delhi*, as being very hot and unhealthy. Finding that he paid no heed to their remarks, they appear to have warned their brethren of the 38th that, whatever might occur, the brigadier was not to be touched; he was their old officer, and they would hold the 38th responsible for his life. We have the statement from an *authentic source*, and

Before leaving, however, one more effort was made to blow up the powder-magazine. The importance of such a step was apparent as soon as ever the real nature of the crisis began to be understood ; but unfortunately the brigadier's first precaution of strengthening the guard, now presented an insurmountable obstacle. Every attempt to get inside was in vain ; the guard at once suspected the object, and had now too deep a personal interest in securing its contents to give a chance of destroying them. And so the magazine, with its vast stores of powder, was of necessity left in their hands. All the ammunition, however, which had been collected in the Flag-staff Tower was drenched with water, and thus rendered useless.

It was now nearly sunset. All had dispersed, in carriages and buggies, on horseback and on foot, some hoping to reach Meerut, others Kurnaul. The Brigadier, Captain Nicoll, and Dr Stewart alone remained, and they now resolved to follow : all hope of holding the place was gone, and every moment's delay needlessly hazarded their lives. Rumours too were coming up that the troopers, having completed their repast and refreshed themselves, meditated a visit to cantonments ; indeed, two or three were seen entering the Suddur Bazaar. Some of the sepoys still crowded round, and said they would retire with the brigadier : he determined on one more effort to rally them, and sounded "the assembly : " but it was to no purpose ; *only one*

mention it as explaining the otherwise unaccountable conduct of the men of the 38th on this occasion.

*man*\* of the 74th N.I. came forward, and he never left them. Poor Colonel Ripley, who still lay there, lingering on in hopeless agony, was placed in a *doolee* and consigned to some bearers† to be carried to Kurnaul,‡ and then nothing more remained to be done. Brigadier Graves, Captain Nicoll, and Dr Stewart mounted their horses and turned their backs on Delhi.

Night closed in quickly on the short Indian twilight; and, alas! how many a cold mutilated corpse, a few hours before all life and energy—how many an aching agonised heart, that morning bright with happiness and hope, did it cover with its dark shroud!

What scenes were enacted during the dread hours of that night, with all their harrowing details of woe and suspense, who can attempt to describe? Each survivor has his tale of horrors, of mental trials worse than bodily suffering, to haunt him with ever-recurring vividness to the hour of his death. Some there were, struggling away, footsore and weary, hoping to find

\* Besides this man, the six men of the 74th, who had been at the musketry depot at Umballa, were marching from Kurnaul towards Delhi with Captain Martineau, who had been the depot "instructor:" when they were met by the Delhi fugitives, they turned back and remained as a body-guard to Captain Martineau, and have remained with him throughout!

† Of his fate nothing certain is known; so severe, and indeed mortal, were his wounds, that he could only have survived at most a few hours, even if some murderous hand did not anticipate the more tardy approach of death.

shelter in some quiet lurking-place, or protection from villagers around ; but many of them doomed to prove that the village demons were more fiendish than the monsters they had left behind in Delhi. Here a party, driven from the suspected shelter of false or timid friendship of a native chief, was hurrying on, wounded and faint, through gangs of maurauding Goojurs. Another group, dragging themselves along, with buggy broken and horse exhausted, over fields and ditches, through brooks and morasses—at one time scarcely eluding a party of vagrants greedy for plunder, at another skirting some village bounds, fearing to ask for shelter, dreading lest every step might betray their presence and seal their fate ; others again, heartbroken and famished, throwing themselves down on the roadside in despair, courting their doom, praying that they might die and be released from their misery ! Others there were, still penned up within the city walls, unable to escape, sheltered by faithful domestics—or even by strangers moved to sympathy—passing those hours in agonising fear within hearing of the devilish orgies ; a few, a very few, enabled to escape, and through perils and trials brought at length to safety and rest. Such were some of the scenes on which the moon rose that night !

But *what of the dead ?* Enough to know that such deeds were permitted by an inscrutable but ever-wise Providence ; enough to know that they who fell died because they bore the name of Christ ; enough to hope

that many a soul, through that *baptism of blood*, passed away to wear a martyr's crown ; and to hope, too, that the blood of saints there shed, may there be the seed of the future Church ! In that hope be we content to bow with un murmuring, unrepining faith, to the will of a merciful, a just, and an avenging God.

## CHAPTER V.

[MAY 1857.—PART I.]

THE PUNJAB BETWEEN THE SUTLEJ AND THE RAVIE—LAHORE,  
UMRITSUR, AND FEROZEPORE, JULLUNDHUR AND PHILOUR—  
MOOLTAN, KANGRA, AND THE CIVIL STATIONS.

“THE SEPOYS HAVE COME IN FROM MEERUT, AND ARE  
BURNING EVERYTHING—MR TODD IS DEAD, AND, WE  
HEAR, SEVERAL EUROPEANS—WE MUST SHUT UP”  
—was the last message flashed from Delhi on the  
fateful 11th of May. It electrified the Punjab. At  
Umballa, Lahore, Rawul Pindie, and Peshawur, the  
authorities received it and kept silence. A few hours  
would either prove it false or confirm it—and a few  
hours did more than confirm it. A runner from Meerut  
brought in tidings of the outbreak there; fugitives  
soon reached Kurnaul, and reported the horrors of the  
Delhi massacre.

“NEWS FROM DELHI VERY BAD—BLOOD SHED—  
CANTONMENTS IN A STATE OF SIEGE.”

“NEWS JUST COME FROM MEERUT THAT NATIVE  
REGIMENTS HAVE ALL MUTINIED—SEVERAL LIVES  
LOST—EUROPEAN TROOPS DEFENDING BARRACKS.”

“A GENERAL MASSACRE OF ALL CHRISTIAN POPULA-  
TION HAS TAKEN PLACE AT DELHI—ALL COM-  
MUNICATION CUT OFF BETWEEN THIS AND DELHI

—TELEGRAPH CUT—THE MAGAZINE TAKEN POSSESSION OF BY THE MUTINEERS—NAMES : SIMON FRASER, DOUGLAS, JENNINGS, MISS JENNINGS, BERESFORD, COLONEL RIPLEY, NIXON, WITH MANY, MANY NAMES, MURDERED”—

were the messages which followed each other in rapid succession along the wire from Umballa to the north on the morning of the 12th. Whatever there might have been of vagueness in the first, whatever room for hope, disappeared before the later ones.

Such tidings might well appal the stoutest hearts in the strongest and least-exposed stations of India ; but on LAHORE, where we will first follow them, they fell with portentous meaning. This vast city—the political capital of the Punjab, peopled by hereditary soldiers, Sikh and Mohammedan, from the former of whom the spirit of their *Singh Gooroo*, and the “baptism of the sword,” had not wholly passed away ; while of the latter class, rising up under British protection and favour from the degradation and thralldom to which the Sikh rule had reduced them, and waiting only the opportunity to change their present state of seeming content and quiet into a more gènial course of marauding and bloodshed ;—this city, with its 90,000 inhabitants, could at a word give forth hundreds who would be only too ready to emulate the atrocities of Meerut and Delhi. Nor was it from the city alone that danger was to be apprehended. At the military cantonment of Mean-Meer, six miles off, were quartered four native regiments—three of infantry, and one of cavalry



—and who could say they were less traitors than their bhaibunds?—while there was but comparatively a small force of Europeans, consisting of the Queen's 81st, with two troops of horse-artillery and four reserve companies of foot-artillery. Such was Lahore.

Sir John Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, was absent at Rawul Pindee ; on Mr Montgomery, the Judicial Commissioner, consequently devolved the duty of meeting the danger. He at once saw its urgency ; and assembled in conclave his colleague, Mr D. F. M'Leod, the Financial Commissioner, with Colonel Macpherson, the Military Secretary to the Chief Commissioner ; Mr A. A. Roberts, Commissioner of the Lahore Division ; Colonel R. Lawrence, Commandant of the Punjab Police ; Major Ommaney, Chief Engineer of the Punjab, and his assistant, Captain Hutchinson of the Engineers. Mr Montgomery's own opinion, in which all concurred, was that nothing but a prompt, vigorous course could save the city and prevent an *emeute* among the Mean-Meer sepoys. Accompanied by Colonel Macpherson, he drove over to the cantonments to consult Brigadier Corbett, who, on learning the nature of the telegraphic messages, saw that decisive steps would alone avail. The plan at once formed was to deprive the native troops of their ammunition and gun-caps, and to throw additional Europeans into the fort. As the day, however, advanced, intelligence was received that gave to the impending danger a still more formidable character. An intelligent Sikh, a non-commissioned officer in the police corps, had discovered that a deep-laid conspiracy

had been formed by the Mean-Meer native troops, which involved the safety of the Lahore fort, and the lives of all the European residents in the cantonments and the civil station of Anarkullee.

To make the character of the conspiracy intelligible, a few explanatory remarks are necessary. The fort, which is situated within the walls of the city of Lahore, is ordinarily garrisoned by one company of the European regiment, one company of foot-artillery, and a wing of one of the native infantry regiments from Mean-Meer; the chief object of this force in the citadel being to keep a check on the city, and to guard the Government Treasury. During the former half of May, the 26th L. I. had furnished the wing on guard, which was in due course to be relieved on the 15th of the month by a wing of the 49th N. I. The plan of the conspiracy was, that while the wings of both regiments were in the fort together, in the act of relief, amounting to some 1100 men,\* they were to rush on their officers, seize the gates, take possession of the citadel, the magazine, and the treasury; to overpower the small body of Europeans, some 80 men of H. M. 81st, and 70 of the artillery—not above 150 in all; and to fire an empty hospital in the deserted lines at Anarkullee, close by, as a signal to their comrades at Mean-Meer that their plot had succeeded. The rise was then to become general in cantonments, the guns to be seized, the central jail forced, its 2000 prisoners liberated, and a promiscuous massacre of the Euro-

\* All detachments sent on guard are made up to their full strength.

peans to crown their triumph! Such was the nature of the conspiracy, then partially disclosed, and subsequently discovered in its fuller details.

To what extent this well-planned scheme might have succeeded, God be thanked, it is not necessary now to conjecture. His mercy in permitting its timely discovery alone saved hundreds from the snare thus laid for them, for the seizure of the fort and magazine, the co-operation of the budmashes of the city, and the massacre of the great body of Christian residents in the unprotected civil station of Anarkullee, would most probably have been effected; and the only hope for the force in cantonments lay in the possibility of the 81st Queen's and the artillery being able to intrench and fortify themselves in some part of the station until the arrival of succours from without. Nor, as has been subsequently discovered, was this conspiracy confined to Lahore. It was as wide-spread as it was deep-laid. Ferozepore, Philour, Jullundhur, Umritsur, were included, as it is now confidently believed. The 45th and 57th N. I. at Ferozepore were to effect the seizure of that magazine, with its munitions of war; Philour fort, with its not inconsiderable magazine, and, what was of even more importance, a position on the banks of the Sutlej of such strategical value as to entitle it fully to the description of it by Sir Charles Napier, that it was "the key to the Punjab," was to be taken possession of by the 3d N. I. Thus was it planned, that the morning of the 15th May was to see the chief British strongholds from the

Ravee to the Sutlej in the hands of a mutinous army, and the life of every Englishman at their mercy. But we have anticipated. The danger, even to the extent then discovered, was imminent, for on the issue of the struggle between order and mutiny at Lahore it was felt that the peace of the whole Punjab probably depended; and only a few hours remained in which it would be possible to counteract the plot and avert the catastrophe. In this emergency the original qualified measures agreed on in the morning appeared to Brigadier Corbett to be wholly ineffectual; and in spite of the jealousy for the good name of their regiments, which, not unnaturally perhaps, led their respective commandants to doubt the truth of the rumoured conspiracy, or to repudiate for their own men the charge of complicity, the brigadier resolved on the bold, almost desperate, and unprecedented step of *disarming the whole of the native troops* of the station. To arrange for this *coup d'état* with the strictest secrecy, lest a whisper of the plan should betray and ruin all, was the anxious work of that afternoon.

It so happened that the gay world of Mean-Meer, in the enjoyment of a fancied security, had selected that evening (12th May) for a large ball, which was to be given by the station to the officers of H. M. 81st Regiment, in acknowledgment of their proverbial hospitality. The discovery of this conspiracy made some of the authorities suggest the postponement of the ball; but it was wisely overruled, as any such change might have led the sepoys to infer the detection of their plot.

So the ball took place ; but it could scarcely be said of it, as of the far-famed ball at Brussels which preceded the battle of Waterloo, that

“ All went merry as a marriage-bell ; ”

for, not to mention an air of anxiety and gloom which the most devoted and lightest-hearted of the votaries of Terpsichore could not altogether shake off, the room itself betrayed signs of preparation,—

“ For in each corner  
The eye on stranger objects fell ;  
There arms were piled ! ”

and every officer knew where to find his weapon in case of need. The evening, however, passed over undisturbed, and dancing was kept up till two in the morning—when the scene changed, with short interval, from the ball-room to the parade-ground.

Never had such a parade been held before. The whole brigade of all arms, European and native, were turned out, *avowedly* to hear the general order for disbanding the seven companies of the 34th N. I. at Barrackpore, *really* to enact a drama, which for originality and boldness of design was without precedent in the annals of Indian history. Anarkullee sent forth all her leading civilians to witness it ; and their eager faces betokened the keen anxiety with which they watched its issue. The troops were thus drawn up : on the right were the two troops of horse-artillery, next to them came six companies of H. M. 81st, then the native infantry regiments in their order—the 16th, 26th, and 49th, with the 8th Native

Cavalry on the left. The general order was read at the head of each native regiment ; the word was then passed for the native regiments to change front to the rear. While they were occupied in this manoeuvre, H. M. 81st also changed front and marched round, left shoulders forward, so as to present a line along the new face of the native corps, the artillery beyond and behind them also moving round, and *loading as they went*, unobservedly by the sepoys. Then came the critical moment. Lieutenant Mocatta, adjutant of the 26th Light Infantry, advanced and read an address, explaining to the sepoys that the mutinous spirit which pervaded so many regiments down country had rendered it necessary to adopt measures, not so much for the peace of the country, which the British could maintain, as for the sake of preserving untarnished the names of regiments\* whose colours told of so many glorious battle-fields ; and that it had been therefore determined by the brigadier to take from them the opportunity of ruining their own characters, should designing malcontents attempt to involve them in mutiny and its ruinous consequences. The order was then given to "pile arms." A slight hesitation and delay were perceptible among the 16th Grenadiers, to whom the order was first given : but it having been previously arranged that, while the address was being read to the sepoys, the 81st should form into

\* The 16th Grenadiers especially. They were among General Nott's "noble sepoys" at Candahar and Ghuznee. The 26th Light Infantry and 49th had also done good service.

subdivisions and fall back between the guns, the 16th found themselves confronted, not by a thin line of European soldiers, but by twelve guns loaded with grape, and port-fires lighted. The clear voice of Colonel Renny, "*Eighty-first, load!*" and the ominous ring of each ramrod as it drove home its ball-cartridge, carried conviction to the heart of the waverers—they sullenly piled arms; the 49th N.I. and the portion of the 26th Light Infantry followed the example, while the 8th Cavalry unbuckled and dropped their sabres.

A company of the 81st now advanced, collected the arms, piled them in carts brought for the purpose, and escorted them to barracks. Thus were some 2500 native soldiers disarmed in the presence of scarcely 600 Europeans, and marched off to their lines comparatively harmless!

Nor was this all that had been passing that morning. The fort, with its traitorous sepoy guard and the handful of Europeans, had not been forgotten; and there simultaneously were equally decisive measures being taken, and with the same happy results. The day before, Major Spencer, commanding the wing of the 26th N. I. in the fort, had received private intimation that his wing would be relieved on the morning of the 13th instead of the 15th; a hint, too, was given to the officers on duty at the fort, that, however reluctantly, their presence must be dispensed with at the ball in cantonments. By daylight three additional companies of the 81st under Colonel Smith marched into the fort. The sepoys, to their utter dismay, were

relieved of their guards, and then ordered to lay down their arms. Outplotted, outmatched, and conscience-stricken, they obeyed; and were marched off to their lines in Mean-Meer, there to find their comrades in similar plight.

Thus had the immediate danger been averted; but the future had also to be provided for. Strong picquets of Europeans were posted in different parts of the station—one in the 81st lines, a second on the artillery parade-ground, and a third, the strongest of all, in an open space in the centre of cantonments, where the brigadier and his staff slept every night. The ladies and children were accommodated with quarters in the barracks, where, in the event of any rise, they might be in greater security; and the officers of the several regiments were required to sleep in particular houses in their respective lines, which admitted of more ready defence against attack.

That night also messengers and troops were on their way to other points where danger might threaten. A company of H. M. 81st, under Captain Chichester, were posting off in *ekkas*\* to strengthen the fort of Govindgurh at Umritsur; and a company of foot-artillery, under Lieutenant Hildebrand, to occupy the fort at Philour; while a messenger was hastening to Ferozepore to apprise Brigadier Innes of the danger, another to Mooltan to put Major Hamilton, the Commissioner, on his guard, and a third to Major Lake to secure Kangra.

\* Native carts.



But the die was cast at Lahore; the disarming there was the first move in the game which saved the Punjab—if not India. With Lahore seized, the fort mastered, the European troops surrounded and powerless, the whole Punjab *must have gone*, and perhaps all India, for a time; but with the sepoys disarmed, the fort safe, and the Europeans free, Government had the mastery, which from that hour it was never to lose.

Most providential was it that the Lahore brigade was at this crisis under the command of such an officer as Colonel Stuart Corbett. Seven-and-thirty years of active life in India had given him such an insight into the native character as to enable him to estimate rightly the impending danger, without having robbed him of that vigour of body and energy of mind which were needed to cope with such a difficulty. Happy, too, was he in possessing that rarest of gifts in India, a courage, not so much to face an enemy in the field, as to brave the censure of some secretarial pen twelve hundred miles off—a contempt for that bugbear of so many Indian officials, *the fear of responsibility*; for thus only was Brigadier Corbett enabled to meet the emergency, and to rise with the crisis. Happily also he had in the chief civil authority at hand, one every way fitted to counsel, and prepared to share the consequences of prompt, vigorous measures. In Mr Montgomery he found no “timorous counsels;” none of that perplexing interference for which some politicals have obtained an unenviable notoriety at the pen of many a

gallant soldier; but one ready to play his part in that struggle as became an Englishman and a Christian.

Scarcely less important than the fort at Lahore was that of *Govindgurh* at UMRITSUR. Its real value did not consist in its occupying any commanding position in a military point of view, or in containing any arsenal like Philour and Ferozepore, nor in its strength of construction, though that has obtained for it a European reputation—but in its *national religious character*. The possession of it, like the possession of the famed *Koh-i-noor*, carried with it the talismanic pledge of power. If this fort, sacred from its proximity to their holy city, named after their warrior Gooroo (Govind Singh), and rich in traditions and relics of their race and faith, had once been wrested from our hands, the prestige of the English name would have been imperilled in the eyes of the whole Sikh people; our *ikbal* (good fortune) would have been dimmed; and in the belief that our rule was really passing away, “the *khalsa*”\* *might* have risen to make common cause with the “Poorbeah,” whether hated Mohammedan or despised Hindoo, in expelling a common enemy who had humbled them all, but whom Heaven itself now seemed to be deserting. All this was involved in the safety of Govindgurh.

The force in the fort and the adjacent cantonment was but small. One company of European artillery, under Captain Macleod, occupied the fort, the guards

\* The *Khalsa* literally means the *elect* or *chosen*, a title of honour assumed by the Sikhs when they conquered the Punjab.

being supplied by a detachment of the 59th N. I. from the station, where also was a company of foot-artillery (native), and a light field-battery. It has been mentioned already that the Lahore authorities included the strengthening of Govindgurh in the measures so promptly decided upon on the memorable 12th of May. The company of H. M. 81st, despatched by the brigadier in ekkas under Captain Chichester, entered the fort before daylight, accomplishing the intervening thirty miles in a single night; and for its greater security, the company of European artillery destined for Philour was detained by the Umritsur authorities, while Captain Waddy's battery was moved from cantonments within the fort walls; and Govindgurh was safe.\*

But the city of Umritsur, with its vast population, continued, and not without cause, to be for some time an object of great anxiety. Here the Sikhs greatly preponderated; and the Mohammedans, though form-

\* The 59th Regiment N. I. has, perhaps, less than any other regiment in the Punjab, excepting the noble 21st N. I. at Peshawur, fallen under suspicion; and their conduct then and subsequently, as we shall have occasion to show, proves that, however much they might have been tampered with by emissaries of sedition, the spirit of disaffection had spread but little in their ranks. The cartridge grievance having been explained to them by their officers, and its falseness exposed before their eyes by a committee of their own men appointed to examine and test the suspected cartridges, their fears and doubts were, as they said, wholly removed; and their conduct generally was decorous and quiet. On the night of the 14th there was an alarm that the disarmed sepoys at Lahore had risen, and were marching down on Umritsur. A small force, consisting of a detachment of the 59th N. I., with some civil *sowars* (troopers) and police, was sent out on the Lahore road to oppose them, and the ladies and children retired for the night into the fort. The alarm, however, proved to be false, and the station resumed its usual quiet.

ing a powerful body, could without much difficulty be kept under by their more numerous rivals. In such a population the embers of religious animosity were continually smouldering ; and the true policy at such a crisis was to prevent their being entirely extinguished, and at the same time to guard against their bursting out into open flame. In their jealous rivalry lay our security. To keep the two classes thus in mutual check—to counterbalance race by race, and creed by creed—was the great aim of the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr F. Cooper, on whom the duty devolved. His tact and energy commanded the success they deserved. His great personal influence and unremitting exertions secured the co-operation of the leaders of both classes without shaking the confidence of either ; and thus the peace of the city of Umritsur was undisturbed.


FEROZEPORE, the largest arsenal in Upper India, had not been overlooked in the Lahore Council. An express had been at once sent off to apprise Brigadier Innes of the tidings from Delhi, and to put him on his guard.

Before describing the events of which Ferozepore was to be the scene, it may be well to point out here the relative positions of the different corps quartered there.

Supposing the station to form two sides of a parallelogram, the barracks of the European infantry regiment occupy the south end ; at right angles with these, on the west, stretch the other lines—first, those occupied by the officers of the European corps, then



*W. L. A. H. T. van den Broek*



the lines of the staff, comprising also the public buildings of the station ; next to these, the lines of the two N. I. corps, with a vacant space, formerly occupied by a third N. I. corps, and beyond this the artillery lines ; while still further on, comparatively separated from the rest of the station, were the native cavalry. To the south, opposite the artillery lines, lay the Sudder Bazaar, with the intrenchment containing the magazine and arsenal lying between the bazaar and the European barracks.

The brigade was constituted as follows :—Two companies of foot-artillery and a light field-battery under Captain Woodcock ; H. M. 61st Regiment under Colonel W. Jones, C.B., with the 10th N. Cavalry under Colonel R. M'Donnell ; the 45th N. I., under Colonel J. Liptrap ; and the 57th N. I., under Colonel E. Darvall. Of the two regiments of native infantry, the 57th were regarded with the most suspicion. There had been unmistakable signs of disaffection among them. A placard had been posted up in cantonments, threatening the life of their commandant. A native officer had openly declared at a court of inquiry that not a man of the corps would touch a cartridge. It was known also that meetings were held night after night, at which seditious language was used. Of the 45th N. I. a more favourable opinion was entertained. Nothing had been brought to light implicating them ; indeed, a feeling of mutual hostility between them and the 57th seemed in some sort a guarantee that they were not confederate in treason. The 10th Cavalry, again, were looked on with some confidence.

Nothing had occurred among them to indicate the slightest sympathy with the existing disaffection.

Unfortunately, the whole station was in a state of transition. Brigadier P. Innes had only arrived on the 11th from Mooltan, to take command of the brigade; Major Marsden, the deputy-commissioner, was on the point of leaving for England on account of his health, and was making over civil charge to General Van Courtland, an old Sikh general, who had been in civil employ ever since the annexation of the Punjab.

It was late at night on the 12th when the first messenger from Lahore arrived; about mid-day on the 13th a second brought the Meerut telegraph, with a note from Mr M'Leod, announcing the measures which were in contemplation at Lahore. In the interval, on the morning of the 13th, the brigadier had paraded all the troops, in order to judge for himself of their temper; the result was not encouraging; there appeared to his practised eye a haughty indifference among the sepoys, which betokened danger. On the arrival of the second messenger, a council of war was held, consisting of the brigadier, the commanding officers, with Major Marsden, Van Courtland, and Captain Lewis, the Commissary of Ordnance.

Brigadier Innes avowed his own unfavourable opinion of the native troops, but was met by vehement remonstrances and protests from their commanding officers. Labouring under the peculiar difficulties of being a perfect stranger in the station, he found it impossible to carry out the plan to which



he himself inclined, that of summarily disarming the whole native force, and consented to a compromise of placing the two N. I. corps apart that afternoon, thus rendering combination the less easy, with the secret resolve to disarm both separately on the following morning.

The first care was for the magazine, to hold that at all hazards, which was at present in the hands of a guard of the 57th N. I. A hundred men of the 61st, under Major Redmond, were to be thrown into the intrenchment, with one of the companies of artillery; and it was privately intimated throughout the station that all ladies and families should be prepared, in the event of any disturbance arising, to hasten at once to the intrenchment, or to the European barracks. Captain Lewis, the meanwhile, was making all secure within the magazine itself.

At five o'clock P.M. the native corps were on their parade-grounds. Two companies of the 61st, with sentries doubled, guarded their own barracks, while the main body of the regiment stood under arms on the main road leading from the native lines, to cover the magazine in the event of a rush. Six artillery post-guns were placed in a masked position in the empty N. I. lines, to sweep, if necessary, the parade-grounds of the native corps in flank; while the 10th Cavalry were thrown out to defend the new magazine beyond their own lines. Brigadier Innes addressed each of the N. I. corps on their parade-grounds. The order was given for them to march off to their re-

spective camping-grounds—the 57th to an open space beyond the European barracks, and the 45th to the *maïdan* behind the Sudder Bazaar—thus placed above two miles apart. The suspected 57th reached their allotted ground, and bivouacked quietly for the night. But not so the 45th. Instead of taking a main cantonment road to the position allotted them, they were marched by a straight cut through the Sudder Bazaar. Here they could see the European soldiers and the artillery in the act of filing into the gateway of the intrenchment. This sight aroused their suspicion. Fanatic moulvies and disaffected bunneahs were at hand to incite them. “*Dugha hai!*” (There is treachery!) became the cry. Some two hundred of the sepoy broke off, loaded their muskets, and made a rush for the ramparts: while the rest marched on quietly under their officers to their camping-ground.

The intrenchment had been long condemned; with dilapidated walls and ramparts, and its ditch filled up with rubbish, it presented no obstacle to the sepoy: on they rushed; crossed the ditch, mounted the parapet, and were within the intrenchment. The magazine itself, however, which contained the powder and the munitions of war, was happily in a somewhat better condition. A wall nine feet high separates this from the rest of the intrenchment; and a guard of the 61st had already occupied the only gate which leads into it. One body of sepoy made a rush at this gate, while the rest thought to

scale the walls, aided by ladders supplied by fellow-traitors within.

The advance on the gateway was soon checked by a volley from the six files of the 61st, which brought down several of the leaders; the mutineers, after firing a few shots, by one of which Major Redmond was wounded, quickly beat a retreat, and were followed by their friends of the scaling-party. The traitorous guards of the 57th were speedily seized and disarmed, and also the native officials of the magazine; and to make surety doubly sure, three more companies of the 61st were thrown in under Captain Alexander Gordon.

But in the anxiety to save the magazine, the cantonments became necessarily a secondary consideration; for the paucity of Europeans rendered it impossible to guard both. Then the very disposition of the two native corps helped to increase the difficulty. With the 45th N. I. in open mutiny in front, and the 57th N. I. believed to be mutinous in the rear, to have advanced in force on either would have been to abandon to the other the barracks, now crowded with ladies and children, in addition to the families of the soldiers. So as night closed in, the work of conflagration in the cantonment began. The 61st, threatened behind and before, could not stir, and were compelled to look on in inglorious inactivity, at the spread of the flames, they enveloped building after building; first the "Memorial Church," then the Roman Catholic chapel closed by, the mess-houses, hospitals, and private buildings.

amid the shouts of the cowardly rebels as they *looted* and destroyed.

Here, as elsewhere, the bazaars supplied the chief incendiaries. There could not have been above 200 sepoys of the 45th, and not one (it is believed) of the 57th, engaged in the work of destruction; and so cowardly were they, that few of them ventured into the gardens, lest the occupant of the house should defend his property with fowling-piece or revolver; but they were seen skulking along under cover of the walls and hedges, with flambeaux (*musāls*) tied on to long bamboos, by which they could set fire to the thatched roofs without exposing their own precious persons. Some twenty of the most important buildings were thus destroyed.

During the night, the 57th remained perfectly quiet and orderly at their camp; scarcely a man deserted; and on the following morning Brigadier Innes sent out to tell Colonel Darvall that he was willing to receive all the men of the regiment who would come in and lay down their arms. The light company almost to a man, under Captain Salmon, and through his exertion and influence, marched into the European lines and gave up their arms, and were then permitted to return to their lines. Here they found some stragglers of the 45th N.I., who taunted them with cowardice, and threatened to attack them. A company of the 61st were now ordered out to clear the lines. The other companies of the 57th, seeing from the distance the Europeans marching into their lines, concluded

that their light company had been made prisoners ; a panic seized them, and instead of marching in as they were prepared to do, to lay down their arms, they rose *en masse*, and bolted, arms in hand, over the *maïdan*. After a time order and partial confidence were restored, and several parties returned to the camp ; and in the course of the evening Colonel Darvall marched them all into the European barracks, where they gave up their regimental colours and arms, in an orderly manner, though with evident haughtiness of bearing.

Very different was the conduct of the 45th N. I. A few only remained through the night at their camping-ground ; and on the morning of the 14th it reached the ears of Colonel Liptrap that they intended to seize the regimental magazine. When this was reported to Brigadier Innes, he at once resolved to forestall them. To remove the ammunition was impossible, there was no carriage available ; so he gave the order to have both the magazines of the 57th, as well as the 45th, blown up. This act so enraged the 45th that they seized their regimental colours and started off in the direction of Furreed-kote, only about 130 remaining ; these were marched by Colonel Liptrap to the barracks of the 61st and relieved of their arms. A pursuit of the fugitive mutineers was now ordered. The state of things had greatly changed : the magazine was secured, the ladies and families safe in the barracks, the native corps disarmed, and therefore the 61st were free to act, with daylight too before them. These, with a couple of guns, cleared out the

cantonments; and then two squadrons of the 10th Light Cavalry took up the chase under Major Marsden, the Deputy-Commissioner, who was as effective in the saddle as in *kutcheree*. A pursuit of twelve miles sufficed; the mutineers broke, scattered over the country, or hid themselves in the jungle, and the cavalry returned, bringing in a few prisoners; numbers of them were caught by the villagers and brought in. Several were seized in the Puttiala territory and imprisoned; but unfortunately, what with misunderstanding of orders, and delays, and sympathy of native officials, many of them escaped punishment, and reached their more fortunate fellow-traitors at Delhi, where the armoury soon re-equipped them.

The conduct of the 10th Cavalry was greatly praised, and they received the formal thanks of the Commander-in-Chief for their stanchness in so trying a period.

There had been in the new magazine, beyond the cavalry lines, a vast store of powder. Captain Lewis's first care, after having secured the intrenchment, was to bring in all this under the European guard; and by the night of the 15th it was all, 700,000 barrels, stowed away in the powder-pits.

Thus, although the cantonment had to some extent been sacrificed, there was the consolation of knowing the magazine was saved. Had it fallen into the hands of the mutineers, with its piles of shot and shell, its pits of gunpowder, and its well-stored armoury, Delhi had not been re-won under four times four months!

We now pass on to the next station, JULLUNDHUR ; which was the centre of operations scarcely less prompt and vigorous than those initiated at Lahore.

On the evening of the eventful 11th May the first message reporting the massacre at Delhi, telegraphed through Jullundhur to Lahore, was communicated by the signaller, as of grave importance, to Colonel Hartley of H. M. 8th (King's), who commanded the station during the temporary absence of Brigadier Johnstone. The following morning brought the fuller tidings, and a consultation was at once held, consisting of Colonel Hartley and his staff, Captain Farrington, the Deputy-Commissioner,\* with the officers commanding the several regiments. The first thought was for *Philour*, with its arsenal, on the banks of the Sutlej, some twenty-four miles off, in the hands of a small guard of sepoys. To march off a detachment of Europeans secretly, and obtain possession of the fort without having excited suspicion, was the immediate resolve, and arrangements were made for effecting this during the night. To establish telegraphic communication with the fort was the next care, and Mr Brown, the superintendent of telegraphs, at once started off in an express mail-cart, carrying with him complete apparatus for opening a signalling-office inside the fort. A messenger was also despatched to Loodiana to apprise Mr G. Ricketts, the Deputy-Commissioner, and to warn him to guard the bridge

\* Major E. Lake, the commissioner of the division, being absent in the neighbourhood of Kangra.

of boats across the Sutlej with some of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, in case the sepoys attempted to seize or destroy it. The result of these measures will be noted presently.

The cantonment at that time contained one troop (1st troop of 1st brigade) of horse-artillery, under Major Olpherts (Major J. Brind commanding the artillery division) ; H. M. 8th Foot, under Colonel Longfield, Colonel Hartley acting as brigadier ; the 6th Light Cavalry, under Major N. D. Barton ; the 36th N. I., under Captain S. B. Faddy ; and the 61st N. I., under Major J. C. Innes.

The antecedents of these two N. I. corps were singularly unfavourable. The 36th N. I. had only recently arrived from Meerut, and had shown on their way through Umballa that they had not escaped the contamination of their late station. Then the 61st N. I. had only a year or two before been quartered at Lucknow, in company with the 19th and 34th N. I., who had won for themselves such notoriety at Berhampore and Barrackpore, and it was natural to expect that the infection had found its way into their ranks. With so suspicious a native force, the question instantly suggests itself, why were they not *disarmed* ? In defence it may be urged that in this district there were peculiar difficulties in the way. Here were four out-stations, Hosheyarpore, Noorpoor, Kangra, and Philour, all held by Poorbeah regiments, *without a European soldier*, and with only a very small body of Punjab police. Now, had the native troops at Jul-



lundhur been disarmed, although Jullundhur itself had been safe, every out-station must have been sacrificed. The sepoy would no doubt have avenged themselves on their defenceless officers for the dishonour done to their *bhaibunds*. In such a condition it was not safe to resort to so summary a step, and therefore the only course open to the Jullundhur authorities was to adopt precautionary measures.

These will be understood by a reference to the position of cantonments. The cavalry lines were at the extreme right of cantonments; next to them came the artillery, with the 36th N. I. completing the line; and the European barracks at right angles, forming the left flank, while the lines of the 61st N. I. were on the opposite side of the station. The first step was to send one hundred men of H. M. 8th to the artillery lines for the greater protection of the guns. The office of the electric telegraph was removed from the 61st N. I. lines, and carried into one of the artillery barracks. The guns were disposed in perfect readiness at a moment's notice; two of them were pointed so as to command the cavalry parade, two more to sweep that of the 36th N. I., while the rest remained in position on their own ground.\* A party of mounted artillerymen patrolled the station at night. Major J. Brind, who undertook to act as permanent station field-officer, was

\* Against this arrangement of the guns an appeal was made by the sepoy, through their officers, as reflecting on their stanchness; but Major Olpherts parried the charge, by observing that some of the guns pointed also to the artillery barracks, and so their position remained unaltered.

indefatigable, visiting the different parts of the station at all hours of the day and night ; Major Olpherts and his subalterns passed the night at their guns, and during the day one officer and half the men were always on duty ; Colonel Hartley and his staff slept at the artillery orderly-room ; the ladies and families belonging to H. M. Sth moved down for the night to one of the barracks vacated for them, and the other ladies and families of the station were accommodated in the artillery school-room and library. One other precaution, perhaps not generally known, may be here noticed. The cavalry lines are, as has been mentioned, on the extreme right, with the artillery lines next to them, separated from each other by a broad roadway, which runs across the station, leading to the civil lines. It was felt to be by no means an improbable manœuvre that the cavalry, when they might rise, would charge the guns in flank. To prevent this was a great object. One suggestion was to cut a deep trench alongside the road, another to set up *chevaux-de-frise* ; but either of these, while shutting out the cavalry, would also have shut in the guns on that side. The following simple plan was adopted : heaps of *kunkur* (small stones of lime formation used for metalling roads in India) were laid at irregular distances on either side the road ; between these heaps the guns could very easily move about, whereas they presented a formidable obstacle to a charge of cavalry. Such were the chief measures by which the peace of the station was secured — enough to show the

sepoys how little they were trusted, and what awaited them if they rose.

The care of the civil lines, with the public buildings, and the peace of the town, devolved on Captain Farrington. His first hope lay in the Rajah of Kuppoorthulla, Rundheer Sing, Alloowalla, whose territory lies between Jullundhur and the river Beas. The rajah had that very day arrived at Philour, on his return from a pilgrimage to Hurdwar. Scarcely had he got to camp on the bank of the Sutlej, when emissaries from the 3d N. I., cantoned at Philour, found their way among his men, and tried to tamper with them. Simultaneously his *vakeel* arrived from Jullundhur with the tidings which had reached that station, and the application for aid from Captain Farrington. The rajah saw the danger, broke up his camp, and marched straight for Jullundhur. The vakeel, who had, in the rajah's absence, offered every assurance of co-operation, had in the meanwhile sent in two guns and some 500 men from Kuppoorthulla, who were at once placed in charge of the civil buildings, treasury, jail, kutcheree, &c., ready to act in any emergency. The rajah himself, on reaching Jullundhur, made over to Captain Farrington the whole of the troops that had formed his escort, and threw himself, heart and soul, into the work. To his influence over his own people, so unreservedly and heartily exerted in the cause of Government, was mainly due the peace of the town and district.

It remains to tell what was passing at PHILOUR, and

how its safety was insured. Neither at Lahore nor Jullundhur had the importance of this fort been lost sight of; but the succours from the former place had, as we have seen, been stopped at Govindgurh. The real importance of Philour consisted not so much in any vast supply of munitions of war, being only a *second-class* arsenal, but in its military position, standing on the right bank of the Sutlej, commanding the grand trunk road between the Punjab and Delhi. Its loss at this crisis would have been a heavy blow indeed : and its danger was imminent. Not a European ever slept within its walls. When the magazine officer and his subordinates, at the close of their day's work, passed out to their homes in the adjoining cantonments, the fort was left wholly in the hands of the sepoy guard, who could at any moment make themselves masters of it ; and many a life must have been sacrificed in its recovery. Mr Brown, from Jullundhur, with his telegraph apparatus, brought the first intimation of the danger. Colonel Butler, commanding the 3d N. I., took what precautions he could for the peace of the cantonment ; and Lieutenant Griffith, the Commissary of Ordnance, applied himself right vigorously to insure the safety of the fort. The first point was to establish telegraphic communication ; the wire which ran outside the fort was at once brought into Mr Griffith's private office ; and within four hours of Mr Brown's arrival, the whole apparatus was in working order. The first message brought the welcome tidings that a strong European force was hastening from Jullundhur

to their assistance. To keep the fort safe only for that night was the great object. With the dawn succour would arrive, and then they could defy any number of traitors. At sunset the fort gate was closed; not a native was permitted to pass out, lest the rumour of unusual preparation within should reach the sepoy's in their lines, and arouse suspicion. A light field-piece (a 6-pounder) was brought down and planted so as to command the gateway, loaded with grape, and the port-fire kept burning. During the whole night did Lieutenant Griffith, with his little staff of Europeans, only eight in number, relieve each other at the gun, and also keep watch on the rampart, lest there should be any sign of commotion in the cantonment. Thus passed those anxious hours. The day had not yet dawned when the looked-for succour arrived; quickly was the gate thrown open to welcome them; in they marched, 150 of H. M. 8th, under Major Baines; two horse-artillery guns, with spare men and horses, under Lieutenants Sankey and Dobbin; and a small detachment of Punjabee cavalry, under Lieutenant Probyn.\* To the utter dismay of the sepoy guard, the European soldiers relieved the sentries, and the fort was safe. † Within eight-and-forty hours of that time (as has been since

\* Lieutenant Probyn chanced to be with a small detachment of his corps on his way through Jullundhur to purchase horses in the neighbourhood of Neemuch, and advantage was taken of his presence to strengthen the escort.

† The two guns and Probyn's cavalry, sent as escort on the road, and to be used for the recovery of the fort in the event of its being seized by the sepoy's, with fifty of H. M. 8th, returned to Jullundhur, while 100 remained to garrison the fort. Lieutenant Dobbin also re-

discovered)—on the morning of the 15th May—the fort *was to have been* quietly taken possession of by the 3d N. L<sup>y</sup> and to become the *rendezvous* for all the mutinous regiments of the Punjab.

The morning of the 13th May thus saw the forts of Lahore, Ferozepore, Umritsur, and Philour rescued out of the hands of the Poorbeah traitors. Their mine of treason was not to be fired till the 15th—our counter-mine was sprung *two days before*.

We now turn to MOOLTAN. The evening of the 13th had not yet closed in when the express messenger arrived from Lahore, and delivered to Major Hamilton, the Commissioner, Mr Montgomery's letter conveying the appalling tidings from Delhi and Meerut. But here coming events had already cast their shadows before. Symptoms of disaffection and insubordination had appeared on every side. "Cartridge meetings" were known to be secretly held; the sepoys had openly talked in the Suddur Bazaar of murdering their officers if they attempted to make them use the impure cartridges. The post-office was constantly beset with sepoys, whose insolent impatience for the arrival of each dāk implied a knowledge that any mail might bring them the signal for an outbreak. The senior *ressaldar* (native captain), and the *woordie-major* (native adjutant) of the 1st Irregular Cavalry, re-

mained, with the spare gunners and horses, to work a couple of guns "in the open," if necessary; while four 6-pounders were taken out of the arsenal and sent back to Jullundhur, to strengthen cantonments.

ported to their commandant, Major Crawford Chamberlain, that the sepoys of the N. I. regiments were trying to tamper with his men. On the night of the 11th, a man muffled up to the eyes came to the senior rissaldar\* of the 1st Irregulars, and put the question point-blank as to the intentions of the regiment. Other symptoms, too, had showed themselves: the sepoys began to prefer native agencies for the transmission of money to the ordinary Government remittances. Gold *mohurs*† were at a premium, and the demand for them daily increasing. All these more or less suspicious circumstances, at a time when so much excitement prevailed, acted as feathers to show which way the wind blew.

A few words are here necessary as to the position of Mooltan, and its importance. Lying on the left bank of the Chenab, it had been for years the great emporium of trade between Cabul and Cashmere to the north, and Scinde, the Persian Gulf, and Arabia to the south; it now commanded the only outlet from the Punjab—in fact, the only route connecting the Punjab with the rest of the world. Then, too, it had valuable munitions of war stowed away in its old fort. Such were its advantages. Its dangers were inconceivable. In olden time, Mooltan had been the capital of a powerful Pathan

\* The rissaldar's answer deserves to be recorded. "He would bite *anything* he was *ordered*, for the fact of so doing would not break his caste. He knew he should never be asked to do anything which could offend his religion or feelings."

† The gold *mohur* is ordinarily equivalent to sixteen rupees. The object of the sepoys is clear: an Englishman obliged to carry a sum of money in his pocket, say twenty or thirty pounds, would prefer taking it in sovereigns to being burdened with it in shillings.

province, alternately under the Douranee and Moghul emperors. In the city were still to be found some few remains of its old nobility, under the proud title of *Mooltanee Pathans*, and the descendants of Mohammedan *peers* (saints), now the poor pensioned guardians of the dilapidated shrines and ruined places of pilgrimage, on the offerings at which their forefathers had fattened; and who could say how they would act? In the district around were numerous Mohammedan tribes of *Jut* origin, at present degenerated into cattle-feeders and cattle-stealers, who nevertheless retained somewhat of their ancestral love of war and plunder; hundreds and thousands of whom wanted only the opportunity and encouragement to spring up armed—for though nominally *disarmed*, what Punjabee does not know where to lay hands on his weapon in time of need?—and at the first sound of the war-cry, “*Deen! deen!*” (religion), in Moslem fanaticism, they would have made Mooltan their rallying-point. Then again, a few miles to the south, across the Sutlej, lay the Mohammedan kingdom of Bahawulpore, an ally certainly, yet one mistrusted as dangerous and false.\* Thousands of soldiers, armed and disciplined, would have sprung forth at his call, crossed the Sutlej, and, with more speed than when forming Lake’s contingent in 1848, would have carried the whole country with them, in

\* This worthy did actually one night, in a carouse, order his troops to seize Asnee and Dehra Ghazee Khan, and then attack Mooltan; fortunately his vizier, a wiser if not a *truer* man, took no notice of the order, and with the following morning came sober repentance or forgetfulness.



the hope of extirpating the *Feringhee*. Such were the dangers which threatened Mooltan. To have lost it would have been to close the last remaining communication with the world without, and the only route by which succour could arrive from Bombay or England. Our difficulties and our perils, already wellnigh overpowering, would have been increased a hundredfold by the loss of Mooltan.

And what was our strength to combat such dangers? The troops at Mooltan at that time consisted of one company of European artillery, under Lieutenant Smallpage; one native troop of horse-artillery, under charge of Lieutenant F. R. de Bude; the 62d and 69th regiments of N. I., respectively under Captains Maunsell and Nisbett; the 1st Irregular Cavalry, better known as "Skinner's Horse," under Major Crawford Chamberlain, with the headquarters of the 3d battalion of *Katar Mookhees*,\* some 250 strong, under Captain Tronson, and about 100 mounted police. Captain Spencer was the Commissary of Ordnance; Colonel Hicks commanded the station.

The little world of Mooltan was "at the band"† on the evening of the 13th. Among the rest were Colonel Hicks and Major Crawford Chamberlain, deep in conversation on the signs of the times. Colonel Hicks,

\* The title *Katar Mookhee* literally means "dagger-faced." They were an old Sikh regiment raised by Runjeet Singh, and taken over by Government at the annexation, and retained in our service in the slightly-changed character of a "police corps."

† The evening amusement of an Indian station, and the general rendezvous of the whole community.

strong in that *esprit de corps* which so wonderfully clung to men in this mutiny under the most staggering circumstances, listened with probably no little incredulity to the statements of sepoy disaffection which Major Chamberlain was making, on the strength of disclosures he had received from his native officers. They were thus engaged when Major Hamilton, the Commissioner, joined them, with Mr Montgomery's letter in his hand. Clearly no time was to be lost. The three thus opportunely brought together at once formed themselves into "a council of war." Here, as elsewhere, the sepoy had his champion. Before they parted, however, a compromise was happily effected which threw all the executive into the hands of Major Chamberlain. To disarm the sepoys was out of the question. Here were sixty Europeans against about 3500 natives. Of these, the sepoys of the native infantry regiments, some 2000 in number, were known to be traitors; as for the rest of the cavalry and artillery, about 1000 in all, the best indeed was hoped; but the *katar mookhees* and police alone were confidently pronounced "safe." Such odds were too great. The game was too desperate; failure would have lost Mooltan. To keep all quiet was the utmost they dared to hope.

To effect this it was arranged that Major Chamberlain should have three or four native officers of each corps at his bungalow the next day, with whom he might talk over the whole matter; a task for which he was peculiarly fitted, from his quick insight into the

native character, and his tact and influence with them. Accordingly, at mid-day (May 14th) they were all assembled; Major Chamberlain harangued them on the enormity of a soldier being *nimuk harâm* (false to his salt). The native officers, especially the subahdar-major of the 69th N. I., vehemently denied any knowledge of disaffection among the men; they had never heard a word about any "greased cartridges." At length *Burkut Ali*, the woordee-major of the Irregulars, proposed, "Let all of us native officers set our seals to a declaration that we will be responsible for the fidelity of our respective corps. If your hearts are clean there is no fear." Nearly every one refused, the subahdar-major of the 69th trying to back out under the plea that whatever they might wish, their men would not obey them. One of them, however, said, as that was "a closed court" there was no use in concealing the fact that there was a rumour among the men that two boxes of greased cartridges had come up from Bombay, and were in the magazine. Others then half admitted that they also had heard as much. Here was something tangible, and Chamberlain resolved to grasp it. He ordered a parade of the 69th for that afternoon, had the suspected boxes brought out, and opened, and examined by the men themselves. He offered to destroy them at once; but the men declared they were satisfied, the cartridges were perfectly good, and they were ready to use them then and there.\*

\* These cartridges were different from any the sepoys had ever seen. They were of a different shape, and were differently tied. The

Major Chamberlain then urged them to dispossess their minds of these groundless suspicions, instigated by evil and designing men, and to recall to mind instead the glorious tales their fathers had told them of the Company's *raj*; and then dismissed them. The good effects of that meeting were incalculable. In it the first blow was struck for the safety of Mooltan. A feeling of reciprocal mistrust and ill-will was established between the native infantry regiments and the cavalry; the sepoys were *checkmated*, and the irregulars, an intensely Mohammedan corps,\* pledged to stand firm. From that moment they became the hope and stay of the station; and their example promised well for the native artillery, among whom they had much influence.

In the station nothing more could be done. To secure the fort, and make it a defensible rallying-point in the event of an outbreak, was the next point. Here, unfortunately, the work of demolition had been going on apace; time and the executive engineer had worked a wondrous change. None of those brave fellows who, nine years before, had endured the scorching heats of a Mooltan sun† during those long weary months of

truth is, they were *Bombay pattern*, and in those days not unnaturally caused suspicion.

\* Of the 586 men, of which the first Irregulars was composed, there were only twenty-five Hindoos.

† The heat is thus accounted for. Once upon a time there lived at Mooltan a holy man, called Peer Shumsh. His thoughts were in heaven, so he kept no kitchen; but when he happened to be hungry, he, in all simplicity, begged a dinner. One day he was seized with hunger in the city, very near a butcher's; he begged and received a chop, for the butcher was a good Mohammedan. Peer Shumsh went on to a cook-

1848, would now have recognised the fort that so long defied them. In the fancied peace and security of the country, the *glacis and fausse braye* which Sawun Mull\* had so carefully raised had been fast dissolving into the enormous ditch out of which they had risen. Gates had disappeared; bastion and curtain had crumbled away under the united influence of weather and the crowbar; and in the once wellnigh impregnable rampart many a breach now gaped, through which cavalry could ride with ease! But happily the inner wall, the *enceinte*, had been little touched; and raised as it was on the highest part of the vast artificial mound on which the whole was built, presented still a formidable barrier, and admitted of being strongly fortified. Being nearly three miles from the cantonments, and having the civil lines and public offices close to it in the Eedgah,† the fort was now made over to the Commissioner. Major Voyle, the Deputy-Commissioner, and Captain Spencer, the Com-

shop, and, laying his chop on the girdle, said, in an absent way, "Cook that for the love of Mohammed!" The cook was a bad man, and did not care a sheep's tail for Mohammed, so he took up the chop and threw it into Shumsh's face! There is no doubt, if the outraged Shumsh had prayed for the whole city of Mooltan to be swallowed up by an earthquake, it should have happened; but to his everlasting honour he did not. He mildly picked up the chop, and, turning his eyes towards the sun, implored that luminary to supply what man denied. The sun, to the consternation of all Mooltan, descended three degrees, and cooked the chop for Peer Shumsh to a turn; after which, as an everlasting punishment to the city, the sun never went back; but continues to the present day, a burning example to all young Mohammedans, three degrees nearer to Mooltan than to any other city in Asia!—COLONEL EDWARDES' *Twelve Months on the Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii.

\* See EDWARDES' *Punjab Frontier*, vol. ii. p. 37.

† The scene of the murder of poor Vans Agnew and Anderson.

missary of Ordance, at once took it in hand. Its weak points were strengthened; heavy guns made their appearance in commanding positions on the walls; a couple of field-pieces, manned by subordinates of the magazine, stood ready for use. The sepoy guard was moved out, and replaced by a party of *katar mookhees*; Captain Tronson brought in his police; the treasure was stowed away safely; provisions, too, were laid in for six months; and, altogether, the old fort of Mooltan began to look as if it could stand another siege.

Nor were other precautions overlooked. Strong guards and pickets were posted between the city and cantonments. All sepoys' letters were stopped. The district around, too, was cared for. To keep under the predatory tribes of the Barr,\* the chief men of the most influential clans were summoned into Mooltan, and detained by Major Hamilton as hostages for the good conduct of their clans. All ferries, too, were closed or guarded; all *faqirs* and suspicious characters arrested and confined. The neighbouring outposts of Asnee and Dehra Ghazee Khan were ordered to be in readiness,† and every measure that foresight could suggest was promptly adopted. Thus was the

\* The desert tracts which fill up the centres of these doabs are so called.

† At the former station, Captain Hughes, commanding the 1st Punjab Cavalry, within four hours of receiving the intimation of the Delhi massacre, without waiting for further orders, had struck his camp, and was pushing on a wing of his regiment for Mooltan, leaving the other wing to follow as soon as local levies could be raised for the protection of the station.

safety of the station, so far as it was possible, and the peace of the city and district, secured.

One more messenger from Mr Montgomery remains to be accounted for—one more point of danger to be secured.

The fort of KANGRA has for many centuries been a point of the greatest importance, not only from its position—though it is by no means contemptible as a fortification, crowning one of the most precipitous heights on the lower range of the Himalayas—but even more from its political prestige. “He who holds Kangra holds the hills,” is a local tradition which has survived the changes of dynasties, and received its confirmation in each. Rajpoot, Mohammedan, Sikh, and English alike attested its truth. The Mohammedan, when he lorded it over Northern India, though giving to the Rajpoot chiefs around a semi-independent power, ever held Kangra in his own hands. Runjeet Singh inaugurated his aggressive policy over his mountain neighbours by first seizing this fort in 1809;\* and the English, when they (in 1846) annexed the Jullundhur Doab with the hill-ranges beyond, found the capture of Kangra carried with it the undisputed possession of the neighbouring district; for though the old Sikh khilladar who held it resolved on not yielding his fortress, the sight of English guns dragged by elephants over roads and up declivities hitherto deemed impassable for artillery, soon disheartened him out of his con-

\* CUNNINGHAM'S *History of the Sikhs*, p. 156.

templated resistance ; he opened his gates to the gallant Wheeler, and with the Kangra fort followed, as a matter of course, the almost unresisted occupation of the whole range.

At the present crisis the safety of this fort was clearly of paramount importance, as the pivot on which the loyalty of all the Rajpoot clans would turn. Not only would it have formed a most troublesome rallying-point for the mutineers of the surrounding stations, but, like Umritsur to the Sikhs, its loss would have raised every Rajpoot state against us.\*

The fort was at this time held by a wing of the 4th N. I.† under Major Patterson. Major Lake, the Commissioner on the Trans-Sutlej States, was marching in the neighbourhood when the tidings of the Meerut and Delhi disasters reached him. This was on the 15th of May. He at once wrote to Captain Younghusband, commanding the 2d battalion of Punjab police (better known by the soubriquet of "Shere Dils"), to arrange for throwing a small body of them into the fort. He himself rode over with Major Reynell Taylor, the Deputy-Commissioner of Kangra, apparently to make a casual call on some of the officers in the fort ; but after-events showed that visit had really a far deeper object, the secret of which was only disclosed to Major Patterson.

\* Subsequent events showed that many among them were by no means unwilling to take advantage of our troubles, had any opening offered.

† The 4th N. I. were regarded with fear ; they had once mutinied already about Scindo allowances.



By daylight on the following morning the stillness of the Kangra fort was suddenly broken by the joyous notes of "The British Grenadiers," played by the band of the "Shere Dils," who, with their commandant at their head, were marching in at the gate. They quietly took up their quarters in the citadel, which commands the sepoy lines in the fort and the city of Kangra outside, as well as the road to Hasheyarpore; and at once relieved the magazine guards, the other guards being divided between them and the 4th N. I.\*

The men of the 4th N. I. had been taken wholly by surprise. They declared that their "hearts were small," especially at having the magazine guards taken away from them. Their conduct, however, was throughout most orderly, and apparently loyal. Half a company of native artillery were also in the fort, but they were got out of the way a few days after, a summons coming from Lahore for them to proceed to Philour, on the plea that they would be required to accompany the siege-train.†

Thus within four-and-twenty hours of the first tidings of danger, the fort of Kangra was safe. Nor was the rest of the district neglected. At the town of Dhurm-sala, a place of considerable sanctity, due precautions were taken by Major Reynell Taylor; the kotwallee (or

\* A few days after, on the 18th, a brass 24-pounder howitzer which chanced to be in the magazine, and a good supply of ammunition, were brought up into the citadel to be ready in case of need.

† They went with it as far as Umballa, where they were detained as not being more trustworthy than their brethren, and their 9-pounder guns made over to Captain Money.

native police station) was enclosed with gates and the walls loopholed, and made defensible in the event of attack. Every ferry on the Sutlej, Beas, and Ravee (all three of which rivers run through this district), was guarded by police and local levies; the boats were all drawn up high and dry, and planks taken out of their bottoms, so as to render them useless. The hill-passes were all watched; every person was examined; and if any disreputable or doubtful character made his appearance, he was carried off to the magistrate, and either imprisoned or turned out of the district. Proclamations also were issued warning the inhabitants that vagrancy would not be tolerated, that their pilgrim zeal must be for a time in abeyance; and every mosque, temple, and shrine, with which this district abounds, had its guards, in order to seize any suspected visitors. The post-offices, too, were duly cared for. Every native letter was opened, and, if found at all seditious or even suspicious in tone, never reached its destination. By these admirable arrangements, so promptly and vigorously enforced by Major Lake and Major Taylor, the atmosphere of Kangra was kept clear.

Thus have we followed to their respective destinations the messengers despatched from Lahore on the morning of the 12th, to Ferozepore, Mooltan, and Kangra, and the detachment that left that night for Govindgarh. We have seen how the warning-note that pealed forth from Delhi to Lahore was echoed round on every side. To the combined energy of Mr

Montgomery and Brigadier Corbett was thus due, under Providence, the safety of the Punjab from the Ravee to the Sutlej.

Nor was it only, or indeed chiefly, in concurrence with the brigadier that the Judicial Commissioner distinguished himself: the mantle of Sir John Lawrence rested indeed for the time on one worthy to take his place—one whose every act bore testimony to his English energy and his Christian courage. He saw that it was not merely in the larger military cantonments that danger threatened, but that the peace of the whole country was at stake. Dotted over the face of the Punjab were small civil stations, with perhaps little more than a handful of Punjabee police to check the Poorbeah detachments on guard. Close by the native city, crowded with a population whose innate lawlessness and disquiet can hardly in the time of peace be kept under by the strong arm of English law, there was the treasury, almost unprotected (so entire was the feeling of security), to tempt the *loot-loving* Hindostani; there was the jail teeming with its convicts, ready at a moment's notice to burst forth and join in the work of plunder and massacre; and in the midst of these were the civil officers with their wives and children, from whom only a merciful Providence could avert the fate which had overwhelmed the defenceless residents of Delhi. The cry once raised, the tocsin of rebellion once sounded, one single station sacrificed, and station after station must have gone! All this Mr Montgomery foresaw. While the

messengers were hastening to the east and the west to put the cantonments and forts on their guard, other messengers were speeding to the civil stations, with instructions as wise as they were peremptory :—" Send in all the treasure to the nearest military station, under escort of Punjabee police ;" " Don't trust your Hindostani guards—stop all sepoys' letters passing through your post-offices ;" and he summed up all with the following advice :—" Whilst acting vigorously, and being alive to the great importance of this crisis, I would earnestly suggest calmness and quietness ; *there should be no signs of alarm or excitement* ; but BE PREPARED TO ACT, and have the best information from every source at your disposal ;"—advice which his own example so admirably enforced, eliciting from the Chief Commissioner, in an official form, the following well-merited testimony :—" Mr Montgomery, neglecting no precaution, admits of no alarm, and inspires all with confidence and zeal."

## CHAPTER VI.

[MAY 1857.—PART II.]

SIR J. LAWRENCE—PESHAWUR—THE MOVEABLE COLUMN—THE  
FRONTIER—NOWSHERA—HOTEE MURDAN.

“On, on it sped, that signal dread!”

LAHORE received it, and “flashed” it on. It was late at night on the 11th May, when the first message announcing that morning’s outbreak at Delhi reached Rawul Pindee. Here Sir John Lawrence had arrived only a few hours before on his way to the hill sanatorium of Murree. From these cool heights he had for the last three or four years administered the affairs of the Punjab during the hot months, when a residence at Lahore, his usual seat of government, would, so his medical men declared, have proved most prejudicial if not fatal to him. Thither he was again bound, already suffering from the advanced heat, hoping, perhaps against hope, for a few months of escape from the withering heat of the plains, which told so seriously on his overworked constitution. That India was in a precarious state, that the excited state of the native mind foreboded mischief, he was well aware. But these were points which concerned the Commander-

in-Chief and the supreme Government, and did not come directly within his province—so thought the Chief Commissioner. Little did he imagine that a few days would see him virtually Commander-in-Chief, and Governor-General also, of all that remained of India to England north of Allahabad.

He was on the eve of starting with his family to Murree when the appalling tidings reached him. His resolve was made on the instant. Danger was at hand; he must remain and grapple with it, betide what might. Perhaps few men in India were less taken by surprise than the Chief Commissioner. Carefully and anxiously had he marked the progress of events during the last few months. They were "signs of the times," and he read them accordingly. The conduct of troops in Bengal, the fires in the several stations in the North-west and Punjab, all told of a wide spread spirit of disaffection in the Hindostani army; they sounded in his ears as the ominous mutterings of a coming storm, and he looked forward to a struggle in which Government must act with vigour and with tact if the army was to be saved. And though, when the storm descended in blood upon Hindostan, he was not prepared for so calamitous an outburst, still he never "lost his head," or lost heart. He stood calm, collected—strong in his own resources—stronger still in the power that was from above.

What were his resources? Every point of danger was held by men of mark—men singled out by his discriminating brother, Sir Henry, and by himself—men

in whom he could rely, and who nobly requited that reliance. Of them he wrote at the outset—"All officers, civil and military, are displaying that calmness and energy which is sufficient guarantee that all that is practicable will be effected by them ;" and whose services he at the close thus officially recognised: "No functionary has ever been better served, or owes more to his officers." \*

It has been said, and perhaps with some truth, that civilians form very imperfect estimates of military difficulties ; but this mutiny has brought out some noble exceptions. Mr Montgomery, on whom devolved the chief control of the lower districts of the Punjab, may be pointed to as one ; and one scarcely inferior to Sir John Lawrence himself, who, while specially arranging for the safety of the northern districts, was really the centre of administrative action throughout, and the main-spring of every movement of troops from Peshawur to Delhi. Those who held the subordinate posts have also added many names to the list of such exceptions. There seemed to be everywhere a noble emulation in courage and wisdom, reflected from the two chiefs ; and if the narration of the various acts become tedious in detail, even in *seemingly* trifling instances, it must be remembered that nothing was really trifling where a single oversight or false step might have brought disaster, and perhaps destruction.

With this renewed apology for prolixity, we proceed

\* *Chief Commissioner's Punjab Mutiny Report*, par. 62.

to follow the course of the telegram. It was midnight on the 11th when it reached PESHAWUR. This was the point of the greatest danger. Any delay, vacillation, timorous counsels, half-measures *here*, Peshawur would have gone, and with Peshawur *the Punjab*. Never since Peshawur fell into our hands had its value or its danger been so great as now. It was the keystone of the arch. A shaft here, or a column there, might be broken or displaced, and the fabric still stand; but the keystone gone, the arch would collapse, and all become a wreck.

To estimate this danger aright, the reader must be content to pause and take a brief review of the position of Peshawur and the frontier. The Peshawur valley, at the extreme north-west of which stand the city and cantonments, runs up into an amphitheatre of hills, with the Khyber Pass, of sad and bloody memories, for its outlet. Around swarmed tribes of Mohammedans, Affreedees, Mohmunds, Khuttucks, Eusofzaies, whose *keyls* or clans were all more or less hostile to us. Some indeed in the valley itself, and along the nearer ranges, had gradually settled down into a state of quiet and seeming contentment, and might be said to be "on good terms" with their Feringhee neighbours. A light revenue, regularly though rigorously exacted, had had an effect on these simple and manly races unknown under the former capricious and oppressive taxation, irregularly collected, under the terrors of fire and sword. But, beyond these, the state of things was singularly unfavourable—indeed, could scarcely have been worse.



The Mohmunds, stretching along the north-west, maintained an implacable hatred towards us, which manifested itself in every opportunity of robbery, and even murder. To the south-west the Affreedees, a still more powerful race, were scarcely less avowedly our foes.\* The Eusofzaies, again, to the north, and the Khuttucks to the south, had indeed, as a body, assumed a less defiant attitude, but individual tribes had been guilty of gross acts of aggression; while, beyond the Eusofzai hills, further north, lay the Swat valley, teeming with fanatics, and furnishing a ready sanctuary to refugees and outlaws.

In the month of May 1857, the aspect of all these tribes was singularly unfavourable. Never, perhaps, had the political horizon looked darker or more threatening along the whole frontier. There was hardly one tribe that was not what is technically called *in a state of blockade*; some crime or other had brought nearly every one of them under a ban scarcely less potent than the dread interdict of mediæval Rome. One had murdered an English officer;† another had assassinated one of our native police; a third was giving asylum to noted outlaws; others had been guilty of raids in the district, or of robberies in cantonments; and each was suffering its *blockade*. All intercourse with Peshawur,

\* *Punjab Report for 1849-51*, p. 24. Such they were six years ago, and do not seem to have improved upon acquaintance.

† Lieutenant Hand of the 51st N. I., who, a few days after the interview between the Chief Commissioner and Dost Mohammed, had ventured beyond bounds towards the Khyber, and was basely cut down and murdered.

all traffic with the city, all trading through the valley—the very privilege of *entering the valley*—was forbidden; the luckless member of any such interdicted tribe, who dared to force this blockade, was instantly captured and confined, and kept close prisoner till the submission of his clan.

Strange must it seem to an Englishman that such a state of things could exist; yet such it was. Here were tribes, any one of which could have called to arms a force of clansmen numerically stronger than the whole garrison of Peshawur—tribes whose collected strength could have brought ten times that number into the field—yet there they were, irritable, excited, yet providentially inactive. Had they once formed a combination, the valley was theirs. Had they closed in on it, scarce, a man would have escaped to tell the tale. Yet there stood Peshawur, girt in on either side by these Mohammedan fanatics, like Corinth of old between “her double tide”—they

“chafed to meet,

Yet paused and crouched beneath her feet.”

And what was the actual strength of Peshawur? Here were two European regiments, H. M. 70th, mustering only 715; H. M. 87th, 879 strong; with two troops of horse-artillery, two light field-batteries, and three reserve companies, numbering about 480 men. Thus the whole European force in Peshawur itself was barely over 2000. Of native troops there were five regular infantry regiments—the 21st, 24th, 27th, 51st, and 64th—with a detail of sappers, about 100 men;

the 5th Regular Light Cavalry, and the 7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry; while the "Kelat-i-Gilzies" were distributed among the neighbouring forts of Shubkuder, Aboozaie, and Michnee, making a total native force of 7600.\* At Nowshera, twenty-four miles off, at the east end of the valley, lay H.M. 27th Inniskillings, under Colonel W. Kyle, mustering 956, with the 55th N. I. under Colonel H. Spotteswoode; the 10th Irregular Cavalry under Major J. E. Vernon; and a mountain-train battery (Brougham's), mounting eight guns. In Hotee Murdan, some sixteen miles to the north of Nowshera, on the lower range of the Eusofzai hills, lay the *Guide Corps*, numbering 500 infantry and 320 cavalry. Thus it will be seen that the Peshawur brigade across the Indus mustered in all barely 3000 Europeans, while the native force amounted to above 10,000, of whom some 9000 at least were actually *Poorbeahs*. Such a force was ample for all ordinary circumstances: it could at any time spare a column to bring to order any refractory neighbouring tribe, without at all risking its own safety; or, had need required, it could present a powerful barrier against any invading force from the west. But what was it worth *now*?

The eventful 11th of May had not quite passed away when the Delhi tidings reached the authorities here, and with the next morning came the fuller tale of woe. It came to men who read it aright; to plan, to act,

\* Calculating each infantry regiment at its full strength of 1000, and each cavalry regiment at 500, as hot-weather leave is not allowed across the Indus.

and be silent, was their policy. The first thought—the praise of which is wholly due to one now no longer among us to reap the reward of a grateful country—one as vigorous and sage in council as he was heroic in the field—Lieutenant-Colonel John Nicholson, Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawur—was *the formation of a moveable column* “which should be ready to move on every point in the Punjab where open mutiny required to be put down.” Colonel Edwardes approved, Brigadier Cotton concurred, and General Reid resolved to adopt it. No time was lost. The order was soon issued—the 55th N. I. to march by daylight the next morning out of Nowshera, and relieve the Guide Corps at Hotee Murdan; the Guides then to hasten into Nowshera, and with H. M. 27th Regiment to form the NUCLEUS of the proposed column. The same night the 64th N. I., believed to be the most disaffected of the Peshawur troops, were ordered out of cantonments to the three forts, under the pleasing pretext of strengthening them, and resisting an expected *raid* from the Mohmunds; but in reality to cut them up into detachments so as to disconcert and cripple their mutinous designs, and keep them quiet under the guns of the forts.

That night, too, a messenger was speeding to Kohat with a hasty note from Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson to Lieutenant-Colonel Neville Chamberlain, the brigadier commanding the Punjab Irregular Force, who had just arrived there from Bunnoo, entreating him to come in; and by sunrise on the following morning he

was among them. At eleven o'clock \* sat "the council of war," comprising, under General Reid, Brigadier Sydney Cotton, Colonels Herbert Edwardes, Neville Chamberlain, and John Nicholson. The Chief Commissioner, too, though at Rawul Pindee, might be said to be in the midst of that conclave, for the telegraphic wire carried to and fro each plan and project.

Here was a goodly array. India might have added to their number, but could scarcely have increased their strength.

To be united in purpose was felt to be only half effective; they must also be prompt, and free to act promptly. To secure this required a bold stroke—it was necessary to get free of those drags on the wheels of government, which in time of peace are well enough to keep all straight and in its course, but in emergencies like this would prove the most fatal bar to its progress and safety. To be dependent on the telegraphic wire, or the post, which might be cut off any hour; to be kept waiting for Army Headquarters' sanction for every act and move; to be, moreover, at the mercy of the military authorities, who had really, though of course unintentionally, accelerated the outbreak by indifference, and contempt for feelings which they had tended to excite—a delay of hours, perhaps days, when minutes only remained for successful action, with the uncertainty how far the strong vigor-

\* Half an hour before, the telegraph had flashed up the cheering tidings of the master-stroke at Lahore—the disarming of every Poor-beah sepoy in the station.

ous measures, which alone could insure safety, might be approved or condemned,—such delay and such uncertainty would have rendered even that Council, in all its intrinsic strength, worse than powerless. The iron will and strong arm of the Chief Commissioner cut this Gordian knot. At his suggestion General Reid, as the senior officer in the Punjab, assumed the chief command; and it was resolved that he should hasten down to join the Chief Commissioner at Rawul Pindee, leaving Brigadier Sydney Cotton in command at Peshawur, thus effecting a concentration of the chief civil and military authority, and insuring vigorous independent action for the Punjab. This was the first point carried in that council. Then came the more complete organisation of the Moveable Column. Its original strength\* was as follows:—H. M. 24th from Rawul Pindee; H. M. 27th from Nowshera; one troop of horse-artillery from Peshawur; one light field-battery from Jhelum; the Guide Corps from Hotee Murdan; the 16th Irregular Cavalry from Rawul Pindee; the 1st Punjab Infantry from Bunnoo; the Kumaon Battalion (Goorkhas) from Murree; a wing of the 2d Punjab Cavalry from Kohat; half a company of sappers and miners from Attock; with Jhelum for the rendezvous.†

Then came the determination to draw in from the

\* Events, however, were daily occurring to change the character of this column, which will be duly noticed. By the time the column reached Lahore, on the 3d of June, there remained in it scarcely a single corps of those which had originally composed it.

† To impart confidence throughout the Punjab, the following brief

frontier outposts all available local irregular corps, whether Sikh or Punjabee,\* as being composed of men not likely to sympathise with the mutinous Poorbeahs; while the more suspected Hindostanee regiments were removed as far as possible out of harm's way to themselves or others, withdrawn from the main current of sedition, and placed among races who despised them, and who, however ready themselves to molest and attack the "Feringhees," would scarcely make com-

summary of the proceedings of the council was telegraphed and published in every station:—

"TELEGRAPH OFFICE, 13th May 1857.

"From GENERAL REID, Peshawur.

"To Sir JOHN LAWRENCE, Rawul Pindie, the Commander-in-Chief, Simla, and Officers commanding all Stations in the Punjab respectively; to be forwarded by the assistant in charge of telegraph office, or post, as the case may be.

"The senior military officer in the Punjab, Major-General Reid, having this morning received news of the disarming of the troops at Mean-Meer, a council of war was held, consisting of General Reid, Brigadier Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, Colonel Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson, and the following measures were resolved on, subject to the confirmation of the Commander-in-Chief.

"General Reid assumes the chief military command in the Punjab; his headquarters will be with the headquarters of the Punjab Civil Government, and a moveable column will be formed at Jhelum at once, consisting of, &c. &c., as given above.

"The necessary orders for this column have been issued. The column will move on every point in the Punjab where open mutiny requires to be put down by force, and officers commanding at all stations in the Punjab will co-operate with this column."

\* As such frequent mention will be made of "Irregulars," the reader will find the narrative more intelligible if he bears in mind that there were then *eighteen* regiments of *Irregular Cavalry*, and that, quite independent of these, there was the "*Punjab Irregular Force*," consisting of five regiments of cavalry and six of infantry (including the Scinde Rifle Corps); these are always distinguished as the *Punjab Irregulars*: besides these are four regiments of *Sikh* infantry, called 1st, 2d, 3d, or 4th *Sikhs*.

mon cause with the disaffected mercenaries of Hindostan.\*

Within a few hours messengers were hastening to every part, carrying orders for moving troops at a moment's notice; a few hours more, and scarcely a station above the Jhelum but was "astir." The 64th were already at the forts, the 55th at Hotee Murdan, and the 39th N. I. were moved out of that most picturesque of Punjab stations, Jhelum, for the lonely dreary Dehra Ismael Khan.†

From the frontier troops were pouring in. "The Guides"—the glory of the Bengal Irregular Force—were no sooner relieved at Hotee Murdan by the 55th N. I., than they were hastening into Nowshera, where the order met them to push on for Umballa. Of the Punjab Infantry, the 1st (Coke's Rifles) from Bunnoo, the 2d (Green's) from Dehra Ghazee Khan, and the 4th (Wilde's) from Bunnoo also, were moving to join the Moveable Column; but the latter had only reached the Indus when it was counter-ordered to Peshawur, and the 4th Sikhs (Rothney's) were summoned from Abbottabad to take its place.

\* The Sikh despises the Hindostanee, and the Mohammedan of the Punjab and frontier disowns his degenerate (often uncircumcised) Poorbeah namesake.

† Of these three corps, little more than a week after, the 64th were disarmed, and the 55th almost annihilated; whilst the 39th, known to be so mutinous that it was thought the poor officers were sent out to certain death, were *saved* from mutiny by their march. They for some time retained their arms, and eventually laid them down, when ordered, in the presence of a small body of the new frontier levies; yet one of the very Punjabee corps who guarded the disarmed 39th was found to be itself partially disaffected in July 1858, while the 39th remained quiet.



The 5th Punjab Infantry (Vaughan's) were on their way from Kohat to occupy the fort at Attock, then held by two companies of the 58th N. I., from Rawul Pindee; the Kumaon battalion (Goorkhas) under Captain Ramsay, coming down from Murree; a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry (under Captain P. R. Hockin) moving from Shumshabad to Rawul Pindee, to supply the place of the 16th Irregular Cavalry under Major Davidson, ordered to join the Moveable Column; a wing of the 2d Punjab Cavalry, under Captain Charles Nicholson, was also hastening from Kohat to take its place in the Column on its reaching Lahore; and the Mooltanee Horse were brought in from Dehra Ismael Khan.

Nor in the midst of these must Futteh Khan, Khut-tuck, be forgotten. This man, a tried soldier and true, had formerly been a *ressaldar* in the "Guides," and at one time a *vakeel* to the Cabul court, and was now living quietly at Peshawur. At the request of Edwardes and Nicholson he at once raised 100 Pathans, and hastened off with his little band to Kyrabad to hold the right bank of the Attock ferry, a post of paramount importance, as commanding the only direct line of communication with the Punjab.

An attempt, too, was made to influence for good any of the Poorbeah regiments of sepoys who might be wavering and undecided in their disaffection. A circular, in the ordinary character of native correspondence, drawn up by Captain Bartlett of the 21st N. I., then Cantonment Magistrate of Peshawur, appealing to their loyalty, went out into every station of the Punjab. The wis-

dom of such a step was doubted by some ; its object was, beyond question, a kindly desire of English officers to save their men from ruin, like safety-ropes thrown out from rocks to rescue a shipwrecked crew in a surf—though, as the result proved, few tried to save themselves : they who did were indeed

“*Rari nantes in gurgite vasto.*”

Such were the precautionary measures of wider range. Nor was the safety of Peshawur itself overlooked in the pressing demands of the Punjab. The cantonment was at once placed, as it were, in a state of siege. At each end was a European regiment with a troop of artillery ; and the rest of the artillery were so distributed over the station as to guard against being carried by any sudden rush, and also to command all the different native lines ; for although as yet nothing was known of the extent to which the native corps here might be infected by the epidemic of disaffection which raged below, yet it was felt (and acted on throughout), that “prevention was better than cure.”

In the centre of cantonments is the old “Residency,” a large *barra durree*, or native summer-house, formerly occupied under Sikh rule by the famed Avitabile, now the residence of the Commissioner. It is a large native two-storied house, with high enclosure, and was easily capable of defence. Here the brigadier moved in, from his house which lay on the outskirts ; and here, it was arranged, should be the rallying-point for all the ladies and families of the station—a general rendezvous in

case of any disturbance. About a mile outside stands a small fort, originally built by the Sikhs, but greatly repaired and strengthened by us, and converted into a magazine, ordinarily under a native guard: the sepoys were quickly marched out, and replaced by a strong European garrison, and all the treasure (some 24 lacs), with all the spare ammunition and stores, were brought into it. These measures, promptly and quietly taken, imparted general confidence, and for some days nothing occurred to disturb the peace of the station.

General Reid had joined the Chief Commissioner at Rawul Pindée; Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, appointed by the Commander-in-Chief to command the Moveable Column,\* had also gone there; and on the night of the 16th, Colonel Edwardes, the Commissioner, was summoned down by telegraph to join them in consultation, while Colonel Nicholson remained in the chief civil command on the frontier. Reports were

\* The selection of this officer was made in the following manner:—Three names, Brigadier Sydney Cotton, Brigadier Neville Chamberlain, and Colonel J. Nicholson, were submitted by Sir John Lawrence and General Reid for the consideration of General Anson, as men, any of whom would be well fitted to take command of the Moveable Column. General Anson telegraphed back that he appointed Brigadier Chamberlain (subject to the confirmation of Government), and the rank of brigadier-general was given him, to insure for him, and the column under him, an independence of movement, as exigencies might arise. Without this, being in army rank junior to the officers commanding the several stations through which the column might pass, his movements were likely to be perpetually hampered; for not a station could the column have entered without permission of the brigadier commanding; and once having entered it, the column would have fallen under his command, and thus every plan of Chamberlain's might have been thwarted, and the very object for which the column was formed frustrated. It was to avoid such a dilemma that the superior rank of brigadier-general was conferred on Colonel Chamberlain.

daily and hourly coming in. The storm that had burst with such fury on Meerut and Delhi had not spent its whole force on those doomed cities; the clouds were rolling upwards, and as they spread out on every side, threatened to envelop the whole Punjab.

Colonel Edwardes had asked permission of the Chief Commissioner to raise some Mooltanee horse from among his old friends of the Dhera-Jat, and before he left for Rawul Pindiee a joint appeal to the *khans* from Colonel Edwardes and Colonel Nicholson (whose friends they were no less), went off to raise 1000 men, and two days after the permission was extended to 2000. Still matters grew darker; the Pathans held aloof, the frontier tribes were quiet, but were evidently looking on in no apathetic silence, and a gloom was settling around.

We have said that the Peshawur brigade was ample for all *ordinary* circumstances. While it remained true to itself, it could cope with any foe from without; but now it was to be tested *against itself*. The withdrawal of H. M. 27th to the Moveable Column had reduced the European force to little more than 2000; the "Guide Corps," the best and most reliable of the native troops, had crossed the Indus; so that there were about 9000 Poorbeahs, probably all more or less disaffected, against a mere handful of Europeans. Then not a couple of miles from cantonments was the city of Peshawur, with its 100,000 inhabitants; and though the vast variety of race and creed, of language and interest, prevented any general combination in time of peace,

they only needed the cry of *loot* (plunder) or *deen* (re-ligion) to call up hundreds of ruffians. Then again beyond, the whole line of hills swarmed, as we have said, with a restless, warlike, fanatic population, of whom the four nearest tribes alone, the Affreedees, Mohmunds, Eusofzaies, and Khuttucks could, at a few hours' notice, have mustered 70,000 armed men; and they only needed to see our own sepoys once gain a mastery, however temporary, or even see them holding our European force at bay, and all their rival feuds and international jealousies would have been suspended, and their Moslem fanaticism and long-suppressed hatred of the "Nazarenes," whom they feared as well as hated, would have brought them down from their mountain-fastnesses with a force no power of ours then at command could have withstood.

Beyond the Khyber too, still lingered Dost Mohammed, the notorious ruler of Cabul, successively the open foe, the prisoner, and the ally of the English. Although the recent treaty with the English had seemingly healed up the old wounds and effaced all remembrance of the Cabul massacre and its retribution—although he was so lately supplied with arms, and a monthly subsidy of a lakh of rupees was still pouring in to the Cabul treasury, nominally in support of the Herat expedition—still it was impossible to foresee into what course the Dost might be driven by the fanaticism of his followers. Whatever, too, might have been his own personal feelings and convictions, in his *darbar*, and still more in his own family, were

troublesome spirits, ever striving to goad him on to a course of treachery and ingratitude—which in the eyes of an Afghan was neither treacherous nor ungrateful—and its turpitude would be forgotten in its success. At such a time the Khyber Pass would have presented no obstacle to his progress; he might have recovered Peshawur almost without a struggle, and thus have won back the province which had been the glory of the old Douranee empire, the loss of which had ever been a national grief and reproach.

Nicholson, with his ripe frontier experience, scarcely second to that of Colonel Edwardes himself, saw all this. He saw that Peshawur was being unduly weakened, and flashed down to the council at Rawul Pindee for a wing of the 27th to be recalled to hold the Attock fort and ferry. They had only reached Hussan Abdal when the order met them, and they fell back on the Indus.

Such was the position of affairs at Peshawur on the morning of the 21st. The first shock had passed over there; a lull had followed the excitement caused by the news of the 11th. Yet was that lull full of suspicion. It gave breathing time, but it foreboded further mischief; and truly, for another storm was gathering, which, while concentrating its force on Peshawur, threatened to involve the whole country in a desolation even perhaps greater than that which had for a time been so providentially averted.

This danger, and the importance attaching to Peshawur at that crisis in the native mind, cannot be better illustrated than by the following anecdote, in advance

of our narrative. It was the middle of June; the Moveable Column was at Umritsur.\* News had come in that General Wilson, after his two glorious victories on the Hindon, had effected a junction with the Umballa troops, and that the united forces had driven the rebels out of their intrenched position at Budlee Serai, and carried the heights which commanded the city of Delhi. That very morning, one of the most influential of the Sikh sirdars was paying his usual visit of courtesy to the head civilian of the station. In the course of conversation, the latest news from camp was exultingly mentioned, when the Sikh, seeming to pay little heed to what was generally received with so much joy, asked, "What news from Peshawur?" "Excellent; all quiet there," he was told. "That," said he, "is the best news you can give me." "Why do you always ask so anxiously about Peshawur?" the civilian said. The sirdar did not at once reply, but, with much significance of manner, took up the end of his scarf, and began rolling it up from the corner between his finger and thumb. "If Peshawur goes, the whole Punjab will be *rolled up* in rebellion, *like this*." The Sikh was right. Had the sepoys once made a successful *emeute* there, and the European force even for a while been overpowered, the fate of the Punjab would have been sealed. The city of Peshawur would have risen; Eusofzai, Affreedee, Mohmund, Khuttuck, Swattee, and Afghan would have rushed down. The European force, strong as it was, and ably headed, would have

\* The author was with the Column at Umritsur when this occurred.

sunk beneath the united attack of the traitor within and the foe without. That flood-gate once forced, the torrent of rebellion would have flowed on with resistless force, gathering strength at each station as it passed, until it had swept through the length of the Punjab, up to the walls of Delhi itself !

Reader, all this was possible ; nay, at one time so *probable* that it only wanted eight-and-forty hours to convert *the probable* into an *appalling reality* !

The discovery of the danger was thus made. All sepoy letters had from the outset been stopped : from these it seemed as if the whole country was enveloped in a network of sedition. Thaneysur Brahmins and Patna Mohammedans, Hindostanee fanatics in the Swat valley, and turbulent outlaws in Sitanah, were calling upon the sepoys to *declare themselves* ; letters from below, reciting with a bloodthirsty zest the atrocities of Meerut and Delhi, called upon them to emulate the example of their brethren ; the whole disclosing such a picture of fanatic zeal and base treachery as made the very name of a *Poorbeah sepoy* suspected and loathed. In came a letter from the officer of the 64th N. I. detachment at Shubkuddar, which revealed to the Peshawur authorities that the danger was close at hand ; that the mine of treason was laid at their own door, and a few hours were to see it fired, and every Christian beyond the Indus sacrificed. But that Providence which had so signally wrought for England already, willed it otherwise. Verily, "man proposes, but GOD disposes."

The letter referred to was addressed by the 51st



N. I. to their comrades of the 64th at Shubkuddar. It ran as follows :—"This letter is sent from the Peshawur cantonment to the whole *Heriot* \* regiment—to all, the whole *Heriot* regiment—may it reach the subahdar bahadoor. This letter is written to convey from the whole camp at Peshawur obeisance (to Brahmins) and benediction (from Brahmins), and salutation and service from Mussulman to Mussulman, to the whole regiments of *Heriot* and 'Khelat-i-Ghilzie.' Further, the state of affairs is thus—that on the 22d day of this month the cartridges will be given to the 'Duberne' † regiment, so do whatever seems to you proper. Again (it is repeated) the cartridge will have to be bitten on the 22d inst. ! Of this you are hereby informed. On reading this whole letter, whatever your opinion is, so reply ; for considering you as our own, we have let you know beforehand : therefore do as you think right. This is addressed to you by the whole regiment. Oh, brothers ! the religion of Hindoos and Mussulmans is all one ; therefore all you soldiers should know this. Here all the sepoys are at the bidding of the jemadar, subahdar-major, and havildar-major. All are discontented with this business, whether small or great ! What more need be written ? Do as you think best. High and low send their obeisance, benediction, salutation, and service." (Postscript by another hand)—"The above is the state of affairs here. In whatever way you can manage it, come into Peshawur on the 21st inst. Thoroughly understand that point ! In fact, eat

\* The 64th N. I.

† The 51st N. I.

*there and drink here !*" \* This letter was delivered at Shubkuddar on the evening of the 18th, to a sepoy of the 64th N. I. ; and, strange to say, it was given over to the officer commanding the detachment ! The motives are inexplicable †—known perhaps only to Him in whose hands are the hearts of men, and who turneth them as seemeth Him best.

About the same time, Mr Wakefield, extra assistant-commissioner at Peshawur, chanced to see a *faqir* sitting under a tree near his house ; he arrested him, searched him, but could find nothing on him except a small bag with about fifty new rupees in it, which the *faqir* declared he had just got by begging in the lines of the 24th N. I. Mr Wakefield, however, was not satisfied ; he searched the man a second time, and now a small bag or "housewife" was detected *in the hollow of the armpit*, avowedly for the purpose of carrying antimony for the eyes, but on a more close examination a small Persian note was detected in it, of which the following is a translation :—" My beloved Moollah ; Salâm ! Salutation to you !—after salutation and good wishes, this is the point, that instantly on receiving this, on the 2d day of the festival of the Eed, you must—yes,

\* A native phrase, expressive of the greatest possible haste ; no obstacle was to delay them.

† Whether the individual sepoy who received the letter was a happy exception, and was really faithful, or whether the broken-up condition of the corps had so thoroughly disconcerted their plans, and rendered unity of plan and action impossible, without which a thousand difficulties would thwart a successful issue, and therefore, in despair of success, and hoping to turn to good account the disclosure of their treachery, and thus get the credit of loyalty, we have no means of saying.

must—come here; and if it be easy, bring a few pounds of fruit with you. Now is the time! Admit no fear into your heart! Such an opportunity will not occur again. Set out, I enjoin you. — (Signed) **FAKEER MOOLLAH NAEEM.**”\* The letter was in a few hours in the hands of Brigadier Cotton. It was clear that there needed no “pressure from without,” there was treason enough within the garrison itself; and no time was to be lost in counteracting it, if Peshawur was yet to be saved.

Colonel Edwardes returned to Peshawur at mid-day on the 21st, to find matters in so critical a state. Despite the ill-success of the first appeal, he wrote off to Captain Henderson, the Deputy-Commissioner at Kohat, to send off instantly as many trusty men as could be spared; about 100 started under

\* For the translation, and for permission to insert this most important letter, and for very valuable information throughout, the author desires to acknowledge his special obligations to Colonel Edwardes; as also for the following incident most obligingly communicated to him.

“The names of the writer and the addressed,” says Colonel Edwardes, “were probably fictitious, adapted for secret correspondence. The fakeer accounted for the paper by saying it was an old one, which he had picked up accidentally a long time ago, and kept to wrap snuff in; but there was no sign of either age or snuff: moreover, the festival of the ‘Eed’ alluded to was at hand (the 25th and 26th inst.), and a rumour was abroad that the Mohammedans of the city and valley proposed celebrating this great religious festival by a general rise. The fakeer admitted that he frequently visited the sepoy lines; and though sepoys do give cowries and pice to beggars freely enough, they don’t give a number of bright new rupees for *nothing*. Neither do fakeers conceal to the last under their armpit a housewife with nothing in it but antimony and snuff. There was no doubt therefore on Colonel Nicholson’s mind that the letter was from Mohammedan conspirators in the garrison to Mohammedan conspirators at the outposts, inviting them to come with *a few pounds of fruit* (i.e., English officers’ heads), and join them in a rising. The fakeer was tried and hanged.”

Buhadoor Shere Khan, who picked up some 50 Affreede volunteers in the Kohat Pass! That pass, where Mrs G. Lawrence was a prisoner in 1848—where Sir Charles Napier and Sir Colin Campbell had to fight their way in 1851,\*—where the Affreedees had levied black-mail from all time, and defied alike Afghan, Sikh, and English—was a strange place to pick up volunteers from a tribe then under blockade, in support of a Government apparently tottering to its fall. Yet so it was!

But the train of mutiny had already been fired at another point. At midnight tidings came in that the 55th N. I. were in open mutiny at Nowshera. A few hours, and it would be known among the troops, and the fate of Peshawur sealed. By daylight the commanding officers of the station were at the Residency in full conclave, Colonels Edwardes and Nicholson demanding that the sepoy should be disarmed, the officers of the native corps defending them. Among them, in the vindication of his own corps, was the colonel of the 27th N. I.; while, confronting him, sat a captain of his own regiment, whose regimental inferiority was happily merged in his independent civil appointment, and the voice of Captain, Brevet Lieut.-Colonel John Nicholson prevailed over that of the colonel. Brigadier Cotton listened to all; he heard some of the commanding officers avow implicit confidence in their men, while one declared that his men would attack the guns if any attempt was made to dis-

\* SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S *Indian Misgovernment*, chap. viii.





arm them ; and his determination was made. Prompt, energetic, and firm, as Brigadier Cotton showed himself throughout that troublous time, he perhaps never showed himself more worthy to fill his post at Peshawur than on that morning. He heard all, and then decided : three of the native infantry regiments, the 24th, 27th, and 51st N. I., to be at once disarmed ; and the 5th Light Cavalry deprived of their sabres and horses.\* The council separated ; the officers of the 70th and 87th went to their barrack-squares at either end of the station, and those commanding the native corps to their respective parade-grounds. The morning's work was before them—a morning which might behold the Europeans still paramount, and with an iron arm closing up the floodgate of rebellion ; or the traitor sepoys lords of Peshawur, and every Englishman swept off before them.

The two European regiments were soon under arms, each supported by a battery of guns and a troop of horse-artillery to act as cavalry, forming a compact little European brigade at either end of cantonments. With one brigade, under General Cotton, stood Colonel Edwardes, and Colonel Nicholson with the other, under Brigadier Galloway. The rest of the artillery were

\* The 21st N. I. were believed to be, if not actually loyal, at any rate less mutinously disposed than the others ; no suspicion as yet rested upon them, and it was hoped that this confidence might carry them through under so able a commander as Major Mylne. So too with the two irregular corps. They indeed were looked on with grave suspicion ; but it was as yet hoped that the irregulars, *as a body*, would prove true, and to disgrace a single corps would probably have carried all the others into the vortex of rebellion ; so they escaped the degradation for a time.

drawn up in their own square. The four doomed corps were in the meanwhile being formed on their own parades, from which they were just enabled to distinguish the heads of the European columns in front, while, at no great distance along their rear, the new Mooltanee levies and Kohat volunteers, a most opportune arrival, were suddenly seen moving up. The sepoy taken by surprise, the regiments separated from each other, no one willing to commit itself, each perhaps distrustful of its neighbour, and fearing betrayal, conscience-stricken and cowed, received the order to "pile arms." It was no compulsion, but "you must"—and they did. A small European guard at once moved down on their parades, swept up muskets and sabres, stowed them in carts ready at hand, and escorted them off to the fort. Thus were three thousand mutinous sepoy and five hundred troopers disarmed without a shot being fired, while another thousand sepoy (21st N. I.), and as many irregular troopers (5th and 18th), were looking on amazed, but passive. Great was the indignation of the officers, and loudly did they condemn a step which brought disgrace on their corps,\* though they subsequently found, and readily acknowledged, it saved their own heads.

The unusual movements of the troops, though so quietly and silently effected as to be scarcely noticed by the sepoy till the fatal order was given, had not

\* Some officers' swords were found among those of the men! but General Cotton, with great consideration for the feelings which prompted so Quixotic an act, passed it over without notice.



failed to attract notice in other quarters. A sprinkling of chiefs from the neighbouring tribes might be seen standing aloof, clearly awaiting the issue, ready to side with the gaining party ; but no sooner was the feat accomplished than the rumour spread like wild-fire ; their countenances changed, the clouds of doubt and uncertainty disappeared in that sunshine of success. They had watched the tide, they saw it turn, took it at the flow, and now sprang forward, eager with their congratulations and proffers of help ; others also flocked in, and where four-and-twenty hours before hardly a man could be enlisted, they now poured in from every mountain-home, seeking service under a Government once more in the ascendant.

Such had been the achievement of that morning, and its effect ; but the day's work was not yet over. The news from Nowshera demanded attention. Brigadier Cotton resolved to show the sepoy that if he could not always prevent them from mutinying, he would punish them condignly if they did. No sooner had the disarming been effected at Peshawur, than a column was at once organised to hasten to the rescue of Hotee Murdan. In the course of the day, however, rumours came in that the 64th N. I. threatened an advance from the forts on Peshawur. The column was therefore held back for a time. The night, however, passed over quietly ; and that night, which was to have seen the "faithful" sepoy masters of Peshawur over the lifeless corpses of their too-confiding murdered officers, saw them skulking away detected and crestfallen

traitors. Their very lines betrayed the reality and depth of their treason: preparing for the death-struggle, they had moved out all their wives and children into the city; and now the desolation of their homes rose up to mock them in their detection and defeat. That night some 250 of the 51st N. I. slunk away, hoping to find sympathy and shelter among the neighbour tribes, even in the Khyber itself. But the sepoy, a detected, degraded, and disarmed traitor, was no longer the sepoy whose friendship it was worth while to encourage as a tool for wreaking vengeance on the Feringhee whom they obeyed, yet feared and hated. Out went an order from Colonel Edwardes—"A price on every deserter!" and the following morning saw many a wretched fugitive brought in alive, and the Affreedee and Mohmund whom he had trusted carrying off to his home the "head-money," and all the spoil, sometimes no inconsiderable sum, that he found on the person of his luckless captive—which acted as a "special retainer" for him and his clan. Thus was established a spirit of antagonism between the Poorbeah sepoy and his mountain neighbours; and desertion became at a discount.

At 11 o'clock on the night of the 23d, as matters seemed quiet at Peshawur, the column started for Hotee Murdan, of the following strength—350 of H. M. 70th, 250 of the 18th Irregular Cavalry, 200 Mooltanee Horse under Lieutenant Lind, and Brougham's Mountain-train battery, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chute of the 70th, with Colonel Nicholson as political officer.

But while the force is hastening on to Hotee Murdan, it is necessary to give a short account of the events which had called for its presence there.

The 55th N. I., originally cantoned at NOWSHERA, had, as has been already mentioned, been amongst the first corps to move. The prompt resolve of the Peshawur authorities on the 12th had been conveyed to Nowshera before morning. A shutur sowar (camel-mounted messenger) brought the orders for them to march by daylight to Hotee Murdan to relieve the Guides. It wanted only two hours of daylight, yet, by the admirable arrangements of the commissariat officer, Lieutenant Baggs,\* carriage was ready, the guards were relieved by the 10th Irregulars, and as the sun crested the neighbouring heights, the 55th crossed the Cabul river with a cheer. Two days after,

\* The number of camels required were as follows:—On the 13th of May, for the 55th N. I., 115; the next day, for H. M. 27th, 471; and two days after, for Brougham's mounted-train battery, 43, besides elephants and nearly 700 bearers. To provide some hundreds of camels at a few hours' notice is no easy matter, under the present economical system, which places a whole army at the mercy of *native contractors*. To what extent these contractors turned traitors in this mutiny may never be known. But how the Nowshera arrangements were made, the writer is able to explain from personal knowledge. Of the whole number of camels required for the Nowshera troops, about a hundred only were kept constantly at hand for any immediate want, the mass of them being sent out, under a small sepoy guard, to graze in the Eusofzaie valley, from sixteen to twenty miles off, and brought in periodically for inspection. The very day before the order came for the 55th to march, the camel-contractor had arrived at the station and called in all the camels to look at them. With the order for the 55th came a private hint to Lieutenant Baggs that the 27th Queen's might also be moved. He at once sent orders to retain all the camels at the river, on the plea that he also would come and see them. Thus, when the order for the 27th did come, all the camels were at hand.

two companies were sent back under Captain Cameron to take the station guards, while a squadron of the 10th Irregulars were marched out to supply the place of the Guide Cavalry. On the 15th, H. M. 27th Inniskillings had also turned their backs on Nowshera, under orders for Rawul Pindee ; and the next day Brougham's mounted battery was summoned up to Peshawur. Thus Nowshera was left with only two squadrons of the 10th Irregulars, two companies of the 55th N. I., and some thirty of the Inniskillings, who remained behind, under Lieutenant W. H. Davies, to guard a few of the worst cases of sick, and the women and children, till carriage could be procured to send them either to Rawul Pindee or Peshawur.

Besides the guards in the station there was one at Kyrabad, about sixteen miles off, on the right bank of the Indus, opposite to Attock, supplied by the 55th N. I. On this side, too, was posted the worthy Pathan, Futteh Khan Kuttuck, with his hastily-raised little band ; while the fort of Attock was already in the hands of the 5th Punjab Infantry, under Major Vaughan. How remarkable a combination was here ! The Indus, that had so many years separated the Afghan and the Sikh, flowed on with a Pathan guard on one bank, and a Punjabee regiment on the other, but both *eating the salt* of the Feringhee, and fighting against the traitor Hindostanee.

All remained quiet till the morning of the 21st, when a sepoy of the 55th N. I. began to "talk treason," and endeavoured to instigate the Pathans. This was

reported to Futteh Khan, who at once sent across to Major Vaughan, stating that the 55th guard were mutinous, and ought to be disarmed. Lieutenant Lind, then second in command of the 5th Punjabees, was soon across the river with a small detachment of his men ready to coerce them. Before resorting to extreme measures, he gallantly, and at great personal risk, advanced alone towards the mutinous sepoy to reason with them. The subahdar warned him off—bayonets were fixed and lowered for a charge; then Lieutenant Lind, seeing remonstrance hopeless, called up his men; but the 55th were soon hastening off on the road for Nowshera. They had not proceeded far when they overtook a small party of the 24th N. I., who were escorting some commissariat stores to Peshawur, and who quickly abandoned their charge and marched on with them.

Lieutenant Lind, finding pursuit of no avail, with great forethought sent off a messenger on horseback across country to warn Major Verner of the 10th Irregulars, then commanding at Nowshera; so that when the mutinous guard reached the entrance of that station, they found the 10th Irregulars drawn up across the road ready to oppose them; they were at once taken prisoners, disarmed, and led off towards the European main-guard. But on their way it was necessary to pass the lines of the 55th N. I.; on reaching these, some fifty of their brother sepoy rushed out to the rescue and fired a volley, over the heads of the Irregulars of course, who turned off the road and let the

prisoners escape. The sépoys, thus liberated, made for the *kotes* (bells of arms) and the regimental magazine, and soon supplied themselves with arms and ammunition. In spite of the efforts of Captain Cameron, who, at the peril of his life, went among them remonstrating and reproaching them, they began to scour the station in a mutinous defiant, manner. They could not have been less than 300 strong, for, besides the two full companies on duty, above 100 men had that very morning come in (on leave!) from Hotee Murdan. Against them were some 30 men of the 27th Inniskillings, most of them sickly and weak, left behind because too ill to be moved with the regiment, with above 300 ladies, women, and children, to be protected. However, under Lieutenant Davies of the 27th, resistance was soon planned. Selecting the barrack nearest the regimental magazine, so that both buildings might be defended at the same time, Lieutenant Davies threw out his handful of men in line, to present as good an appearance as possible; the scarlet coat of the English soldier always filling Jack Sepoy with goodly awe, and the cross-belts looking good for sixty rounds of ball-cartridge. On came the sepoy, shouting and yelling, armed and well supplied with ammunition, expecting to find the poor sickly soldiers on their cots, and the helpless women and children an easy prey—when lo! a line of armed Europeans, looking defiance, confronted them. The mutineers dropped a few long shots at random from a very safe distance, and then, though numbering from ten to one, thinking

discretion the better part of valour, sidled off. They then rushed down to the river, thinking to seize the bridge of boats and cross over, with the view doubtless of raising the whole regiment at Hotee Murdan. Here, however, they found themselves forestalled. Lieutenant F. S. Taylor, of the Engineers, the executive officer of the station, had at once sent off a messenger to Peshawur, and, anticipating such an attempt on the bridge, had with great promptness slipped out the centre boats where the stream was most rapid. The majority of the men, baffled at the river, returned to their lines and remained perfectly quiet all night; some few seized the loosened boats and attempted to cross; but of those who had the courage to face that stream, only one or two ever reached the other side. These hastened on with the tidings to their comrades at Hotee Murdan. The effect was instantaneous; the regiment had hitherto been apparently quiet, but now became excited, and the lives of the officers were in imminent danger. Colonel Spottiswoode, however, still confident of his own influence over his men, sent in for the rest of the detachment; that night (the 22d) they marched out under Captain Cameron, and joined headquarters the next morning. It was now evident that the whole corps was ripe for mutiny, though their demeanour towards their own officers was, with one or two exceptions, perfectly respectful; indeed, the officers of the 55th declared themselves to be more apprehensive of danger from the sowars of the 10th Irregular Cavalry than from their own men, while the

officers of the 10th returned the compliment. Thus matters remained for two days.

It was the messenger from Lieutenant Taylor who had brought the tidings to Peshawur about midnight of the 21st, while almost simultaneously arrived one from Lieutenant Home, Assistant-Commissioner, from Hotee Murdan itself, reporting the regiment to be in a desperate state. The first move was to order up Vaughan's Punjabees from Attock, to protect Nowshera, while the telegraph carried on the news next morning to Rawul Pindee. The left wing of the 27th Inniskillings had only arrived there a few hours, the right wing having already been sent back from Husan Abdal to Attock three days before. It was mid-day when the message reached Rawul Pindee, and by four o'clock P.M. three full companies under Captain Warren were again on the move. Mounted on camels, elephants, and spare gun-carriages, they made Husan Abdal that night, and the following afternoon, by the same means, pushed on for Attock, which they reached late at night, having thus accomplished nearly sixty miles in less than thirty hours. The right wing, now set free, at once crossed the Indus, and threw themselves by a forced march into Nowshera. Who shall attempt to describe the agonising feelings which goaded on those brave fellows over those sixteen miles, picturing to themselves their wives and children probably murdered in cold blood—or their heartfelt gratitude when they found them all quiet and safe within a barricaded barrack? Vaughan's Punjabees



were already there ; and that night (the 24th), taking with them the other two squadrons of the 10th Irregular Cavalry, they pushed on for Hotee Murdan to effect a junction with the Peshawur column, and then rescue the little garrison in the fort. They were at the appointed place by daylight ; but unfortunately the Peshawur body were somewhat delayed, and the mutineers, finding that a force was at hand to disarm, if not to punish them more summarily, saw the game was up, and made towards the hills. By the time Colonel Chute's column had arrived, the 55th had a clear start, and were carrying off, in orderly retreat, the regimental colours, treasure, and all the ball'd cartridge they could lay their hands on. A pursuit of all arms was ordered, but it was in vain to push on infantry already wearied by a long march, or to drag the guns over ground so broken and uneven. They attempted pursuit, but, like Mohareb's deer-hounds,

“ Far, far behind,  
Though at full stretch,  
With eager speed,  
Far, far behind.

But lo ! the falcon o'er his head  
Hovers with hostile wings,  
And buffets him with blinding strokes !” — *Thalaba*.

Never did falcon sweep down upon his antlered prey with nobler daring, than Nicholson with his handful of sowars\* hurled himself on the retiring columns. The rebels bore themselves bravely, resisted manfully ;

\* Only a few of his own civil sowars. Irregular cavalry were there, the 10th and 18th, but, traitors in heart, not a man did they cut down.

but the fiery zeal which spread from their gallant leader to every sowar at his side, bore all before it. Above 100 men were killed, 120 taken prisoners,\* and it was not till night was closing in, and after twenty hours in the saddle, that Nicholson sounded the retreat; the friendly night, and the treachery of the villagers (for which they afterwards paid dearly), saved the rebels for a time; but it was a short respite, as will be seen hereafter.†

\* Besides these, about 100 men, who were either too late or too panic-stricken to run, remained behind; but as they did not attempt to resist their mutinous comrades or join in the pursuit, they were at once disarmed, and eventually sent off to Attock, to work in irons on the new works at the fort. Besides these there were a dozen who behaved faithfully throughout, and rallied nobly round their officers, and their fearless loyalty was deservedly noticed by the brigadier; but it is feared that the greater number were involved in the subsequent destruction of the 51st, in whose lines they were quartered.

† We cannot close this account without a few words on the sad end of their kind, confiding colonel, Henry Spottiswoode. He had only been for a few months attached to the 55th N. I., but long enough to win for himself the respect and confidence of the officers and men of his new corps, by the same care and lively interest in their welfare, combined with a genuine kindness of heart, which had endeared him to all in the old 21st N. I., his former corps. The native officers and men had already learned to regard him with the most implicit confidence as their friend, and his influence over them was undoubtedly great, and his trust in them unwavering. So fully did he believe in their loyalty, that when tidings of the disturbance at Kyrabad reached him, he wrote to the officer commanding at Attock, complaining that the attempt to seize the guard had driven them into mutiny! And even after the disaffected, not to say mutinous, detachment had joined, he still wrote that he believed his regiment was *perfectly sound at heart*, and that he would "stake his own life on their staunchness." Alas! how fatally did he fulfil his pledge! A report reached them that a force was moving down from Peshawur. The native officers came to him; he could not deny it, or explain its object to their satisfaction. He felt that mutual confidence was at an end; they no longer trusted him, and he could no longer trust them; his moral courage failed him. A higher faith was wanting at that moment, and scarcely had the native officers left his presence, when he was a corpse by his

We must now return to the force before Hotee Murdan. The flying mutineers had been followed that night as far as it was possible over such ground, and with the troops at hand to keep up the pursuit. Cavalry there were certainly in numbers—two Irregular regiments, the 10th and the 18th—but the former were evidently as deeply-pledged traitors as the 55th, without the courage to avow themselves; while the 18th betrayed only less palpable faithlessness. Nicholson's few sowars and the Mooltanee Horse were all that really did any service; and they acquitted themselves nobly. But night closed in; the pursuit was given up, and the majority of the rebels for the time escaped.

But the duty of the Peshawur force was not yet over. The fort of Hotee Murdan was rescued; but the other forts of Aboozai, Shubkuddur, and Michnee were in danger. Here the 64th N. I. had been sent off at the first tidings of the outbreak; and although great trust was placed in the regiment of the "Khelat-i-Ghilzies," who held these forts, yet they were only a Poorbeah regiment themselves, and might be unable to resist the seditious influences of the 64th N. I. So the following morning Colonel Chute had his little column once more in motion; and leaving Vaughan's Punjabees (the 5th Punjab Infantry) to hold Hotee Murdan, he pushed on the rest of his force for these forts. At

own hand! His death, no doubt, hastened the mutiny. Many of the sepoys were heard to say, that "now their colonel had destroyed himself, they had no chance of being spared."

Aboozai, the first he reached, were four companies of the Khelat - i - Ghilzies, under Lieutenant Rowcroft. Here the work of disarming the detachment of the 64th was quietly effected ; and the force was moving on for Shubkuddur, where were four more companies, with the headquarters of the "Ghilzies," when that quiet little fort was suddenly thrown into commotion. An armed sepoy of the regiment had sprung forward, musket in hand, knocked down the sentry over the magazine, and shouted out to his comrades to arm, for "Nicholson Sahib is come to Aboozai, and will blow us all away from guns ; now is our time." Captain Mundy, the commandant of the regiment, was in his own quarters in the fort ; he heard the disturbance, and, seizing his pistol, rushed down to see the cause. On the steps he was met by some twenty sepoys, who forcibly held him back. His first thought was that the whole regiment had "gone," and he raised his pistol, resolved to sell his life as dearly as he could ; when some of them said to him, "No, Sahib, you shall not go near that man ; his musket is loaded." A jemadar, who had been in the act of cooking his dinner, rushed by for his musket, but as he passed the magazine he was shot dead by the mutineer. The musket being discharged, the faithful sepoys now released Captain Mundy, who went towards the man and twice tried to fire his pistol ; twice it missed fire ! The mutineer was beginning to reload, when Captain Mundy called out to some of the quarter-guard, ordered them to load and "fire." Not a man hesitated ;

the mutineer fell dead, pierced by four bullets. A roll-call was at once held, but no one was missing. There was clearly no sympathy with the mutineer. Bad spirits and traitors there probably were in the regiment, but the majority were good men and true, and the prompt, bold conduct of Mundy gave the bad no time to act, and carried all the good with him. As the men themselves said, "he had saved the regiment and their good name." The peril was imminent, not only that Captain Mundy, and Mrs Mundy, who was in the fort at the time, would have been shot down, or even that the magazine, had a single shot been fired into it, would have blown the whole fort into the air, but that, the "Ghilzies" having gone, nothing could have saved the country.\* Providentially all was averted, and the regiment bore itself so nobly throughout those months of danger that the General (Cotton) published an order, in which he expressly declared that "not the

\* The origin of this corps is not without interest. It formed the 35<sup>th</sup> Regiment of "Shah Soojah's Contingent," and as such distinguished itself in the Cabul campaign for the restoration of the old king. Its services were thus acknowledged in general orders of 4<sup>th</sup> October 1843:—That "in consideration of the valour, discipline, and fortitude manifested on many occasions, and especially in the defence of Khelat-i-Ghilzie, it shall continue embodied under its present commandant, Captain J. H. Craige, and be brought on the strength of the Bengal army as an extra regiment, and be denominated the 'Regiment of the Khelat-i-Ghilzies.'" As originally constituted, it had contained men of all nations and creeds; but at the time of the outbreak it had become as *Poorbeah's* in character as any regiment in the service, with only 140 Sikhs and Punjabees. Their loyalty at such a crisis was the more remarkable and praiseworthy. The men who shot the mutineer were at once promoted by General Cotton; as also were the senior subahdar and the next non-commissioned officer, and each received "The Order of British India" as a reward to the regiment for its good conduct.

slightest suspicion rested on the 'Ghilzies.'” Thus the fort of Shubkuddur was saved. Chute's force arrived the next day; the detachment of the 64th outside were disarmed, as also those at Michnee, and the force, its work accomplished, returned for a short time to Peshawur.

The Peshawur policy now was to retain the advantage already gained. One most important measure, resulting from the disarming the corps, deserves special notice. Here were some six hundred trained chargers, belonging to the dismounted troopers of the 5th Light Cavalry, now no longer required, and the question was how they could be most advantageously disposed of. To General Cotton is due the praise of having suggested an expedient. A circular was sent round to the European infantry regiments calling for “cavalry volunteers.” Many a man was there, who had exchanged from some cavalry corps bound for England, eager to be again in the saddle; many more ready to lay aside the musket for the sabre. They sprang forward at the call; and a few days saw Peshawur with an *impromptu* squadron of English light dragoons! Soon after, at the suggestion of Captain Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Peshawur division, a further call was made, and a light field-battery sprang into existence!

One or two grave lessons of statecraft were already learned which were doubly valuable in this early stage of the rebellion. First, the irregular cavalry were not to be trusted. The 10th Irregulars were perhaps

an unfortunate corps to be first tested. They had originally formed, like the 34th N.I., a part of the Bundelcund legion ; and there was no reason to hope that a better spirit of loyalty existed among them than had been displayed by their traitorous bhaibunds at Barrackpore. From the first the 10th had acted with very questionable loyalty : at Nowshera they had let the mutineers of the 55th escape ; at Hotee Murdan their language had been seditious and their manner insolent ; and when called on to join in the pursuit, they had in some instances openly sided with the mutineers—so openly that one or two of them were actually seen by Vaughan's men firing at the European officers, and were at once shot down ; one was tried by drum-head court-martial for threatening the life of Mr Horne, and shot. Nor did the detachment of the 18th Irregulars from Peshawur acquit themselves much more creditably. Colonel Nicholson complained loudly of their want of zeal in the pursuit ; though they did not lay themselves open to suspicion of active mutiny, they were clearly guilty of great apathy and lukewarmness. This lesson was not thrown away on the authorities, as will be seen.

The second lesson was more cheering, that the Punjab Irregulars *were stanch*. Vaughan's Infantry and the Mooltanee Horse behaved nobly ; the latter did right good service in the pursuit, and perhaps the greatest trial of the former corps was when the work of execution began on the field. The first six files of Vaughan's men were told off for a " firing party " to

shoot down the captured rebels : they never flinched or hesitated ; every man before them fell at the first round. This was a more severe test of their loyalty, and absence of sympathy with the mutineers, than any encounter in the heat of action. Highly was their conduct praised ; and their hearts were gladdened by a prompt present of 500 rupees from the Chief Commissioner.

Now followed the fuller fruits of this lesson. The frontier tribes were invited to enlist. It was a bold, some said a desperate, measure ; but its success has proved the wisdom of Sir John Lawrence, and the discernment of Edwardes and Nicholson ; and men who then half feared for the result of such a step, may now rejoice over the many more new regiments of the Punjab Irregular Force which strengthened our hand in time of need, and proved a safe and profitable channel for the martial zeal of the most desperate among these mountain tribes ; enlisting, at the same time, the interest and sympathy of the tribes themselves on the side of Government. Another motive, too, was at work in our favour ; the very atrocities perpetrated by the Poorbeahs at Meerut and Delhi aroused some sort of sympathy. These proud Pathans could point to many a case where English women and children had been in *their* power, yet not a hair of their heads was hurt. They, savage as they are, are *men* ; with men they will war to the death ; but, as one of them said openly to Sir John Lawrence, " Who can charge us with ever touching a helpless woman or defenceless child ?



No," said he, quoting the case of the Cabul captives, and the still more recent instance of Mrs G. Lawrence, "we would not do it—not for a prince's ransom."

Then the very features of the country, though apparently against us, proved in our hands a source of safety. The Punjab abounds with rivers; some crossed by bridges of boats, which are ever liable to be broken; others, the widest and most rapid, only to be crossed in ferry-boats, a slow and dangerous process—all impeding the movement of troops. Yet these natural enemies were converted into allies. Every river, from the Indus to the Sutlej, was guarded; every ferry-boat seized and drawn up high and dry, with perhaps a plank or two taken out; every bridge and ford in the hands of trusty police, and every traveller subjected to searching examination. Thus each river became a bar to the disguised traitor and the emissary of sedition from below, and no less so to the disaffected sepoy above, who, however longingly he might turn his eyes towards Delhi, felt the road there was now neither easy nor safe.

Again, the independent chiefs, who, happily for us, still retained their ancestral lands, though somewhat shorn of former power, when called on—and none were forgotten—maharajahs, rajahs, sirdars of every grade—responded nobly. Gholab-Singh of Cashmere, perhaps the least to be relied on, from his deathbed gave a sign of loyalty.\* He remembered, doubtless, that the power

\* There was a report that, on hearing about the outbreak, Gholab Singh had said, "Well, it will give the English some trouble, cost

which could raise him from a petty hill *raj* to the kingdom of Cashmere was too formidable to be trifled with even at such a crisis; and on being applied to, sent some lacs of rupees into the Government treasury, and was prepared to supply troops.

But to the south, nearer the scene of danger, lay other chiefs, less wealthy and less powerful than the Maharajah of Cashmere, but not less valuable in their noble co-operation—Puttiala, Jheind, and Nabha below the Sutlej, and Kupoorthula in the *Bist*, of whom full mention will be made in the next chapter. Every one was with us; and in their wake followed many minor chiefs. At Lahore was the old Sikh commander-in-chief, Rajah Tej Singh; at his call up sprang a *ressala* (troop) of cavalry; Sirdar Sumshere Singh, Sindhanwalla, added another, as also did a natural son of old General Ventura at Loodiana; while Jowahir Singh, nephew of Gholab Singh of Cashmere, though too poor to maintain any force, rallied round him 700 old retainers of his father, Rajah Dhyani Singh (so long the powerful prime-minister and favourite of Runjeet Singh), and placed them at the disposal of Government. It was clear that what remained of the old Sikh nobility, though crippled in resources and lowered in position, were yet ready to throw the weight of their influence into the scale of order. All this looked well

“them a good deal of money, but in a few months they will be all right again.” Jung Bahadoor, of Nepaul, is reported to have lifted up his hands and exclaimed, “What will the *Times* say?”

The Sikhs were clearly with us, from policy, if from no better motive.

The Punjabee Jats, though they are a fine manly race, and turn out good soldiers, are not constitutionally warlike, and seemed little concerned in the stirring events around, except when the chance of "head-money" for some fugitive sepoy lured them away from their fields. The harvest was providentially abundant, and they had ample occupation in storing it. A month later (ere the monsoon had set in, bringing with it the second seed-time) it might be otherwise, as many felt. At present in full employment, they gave no signs of excitement or disaffection.

These were like gleams of sunshine amid the gloom around. They cheered on the Chief Commissioner under that load of anxious labour that scarce knew rest, weighing down a body racked with paroxysms of pain. There sat the civilian, wielding (with General Reid's sanction) the military resources of the Punjab, calling in his own\* irregulars, rallying the native chiefs, inviting volunteers from the frontier, swaying the whole Punjab. Nor did he confine his thoughts within the limits of his own province; his mind could grasp the present crisis in all its imperial vastness; as his telegram of May 10th will show:—

*"All safe as yet in the Punjab, but the aspect of affairs most threatening. The whole native regular*

\* The Punjab Irregular Force were under the orders of the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab.

*army are ready to break out, and unless a blow be soon struck, the irregulars, as a body, will follow their example.*

*"Send for our troops from Persia. Intercept the force now on its way to China, and bring it to Calcutta. Every European soldier will be required to save the country if the whole of the native troops turn against us. This is the opinion of all leading minds here. Every precaution which foresight can dictate is being taken to hold our own independent of the natives."*

To him all eyes were turned ; and could they have seen him, as the writer of these pages was permitted to do, on that 18th of May, in council with those kindred spirits, Edwardes and Chamberlain, collected, energetic, cheerful, the most timid might have taken heart ; few indeed could have failed to imbibe somewhat of that calm indomitable spirit which sustained him as he looked in confidence on the "leading minds" beside him, and read hopefully the many signs of God's providence around.

## CHAPTER VII.

[MAY 1857.—PART III.]

THE PROTECTED STATES—UMBALLA—SIMLA—THE ARMY FORMING—THE SIEGE-TRAIN—KURNAL—THE ARMY MOVING—THE DEATH OF GENERAL ANSON.

THE first thought of Sir John Lawrence had been to insure the safety of the Punjab, the second was to *recover Delhi*. The whole European strength of the Punjab north of the Sutlej being required in the several stations, or absorbed in the Moveable Column he saw at a glance that Umballa, with the hill sanatoria of Kussowlie, Subathoo, and Dugshai, each with its European regiment, alone remained available.

So the telegraphic message of the fate of Delhi sent up to Sir John Lawrence brought back the following characteristic answer:—

“*May 13th.*

“I think that all the European regiments in the hills, and the Goorkha regiment at Jutogh, should at once be brought down to Umballa, and arrangements be made for securing that cantonment.

“In the mean time, if the Meerut force has not disarmed or destroyed the mutineers at that place, peremptory orders from the Commander-in-Chief should go down to do so. A large portion of the European

force from Meerut, with such native troops as can be trusted, should then march on Delhi, and a picked brigade from Umballa also go down by forced marches by Kurnal to Delhi, so that our troops can operate simultaneously from both sides of the Jumna. *The city of Delhi and the magazine should be recovered at once.*

“Get the Maharajah of Puttiala to send one regiment to Thaneysur and another to Loodiana.”

To understand this message and the general position of affairs at Umballa, it is necessary to take a brief review of the political state of the country around.

For many years the Jumna had formed the northern frontier of British India, and the Sutlej the southern boundary of the Sikh empire. The vast tract of land which lay between was then comparatively neutral ground; the southern and eastern parts of it chiefly held by small colonies of Sikhs from the Manjha country; the centre, occupied by indigenous clans called, in distinction, “Malwa” Sikhs, among whom the states of Puttiala, Jheend, Nabba, and Khytul, all branches of the Phulkeean *Misl*, were pre-eminent; \* to the westward lay spurious races of Mohammedanised Hindoos, Ranghurs, Doghurs, and others; while to the north, along the left bank of the Sutlej, were small colonies of Mohammedans under Pathan chiefs; to the extreme east, again, were scores of petty lordlings or

\* See Appendix E; containing the genealogies and the domestic history of the three former. Khytul had lapsed to Government in 1843.

landowners, chiefly Rajpoots, honoured by the title of *rajah* or *rana*. Such were the chief component parts of this country, generally known as the *Cis-Sutlej States*.

The advance of the English during the early part of this century was gradual, indeed cautious, and, politically speaking, compulsory. Without entering at any length into all the circumstances of the Mahratta war, the retreat of Holkar, the first negotiations with the Sikh court, prompted by the fear of a combined Russian and French invasion—all of which in turn, and in their degree, carried the British onward until they made frontier posts at Loodiana and Ferozepore, on the banks of the Sutlej itself—it is enough to state that, from various causes, the whole of these different states, great and small, had been brought more or less under the influence of the English Government. The policy of the Government of that day was to strengthen the British boundary by maintaining these different independent chiefs\* along its frontier, carefully providing that, with separate and rival interests, they should be so divided as to render combination impossible. In these days *annexation* was not dreamt of. *Protection* was what these native states sought, with the Lion of the Punjab on their border, and what the English, as the paramount power, were ready to give: such protec-

\* Lord Cornwallis, indeed, carried this policy so far as to create small jagheers; that of Ferozepore was conferred by Lord Lake on Ahmed Buksh in 1805 for his diplomatic services, out of the territories acquired by us west of the Jumna during the Mahratta wars. See SLEEMAN'S *Rambles and Recollections*, vol. ii. p. 211.

tion involved on our part only a pledge of support against an external foe, with the assertion of a right to depose or confiscate as a punishment for treachery or faithlessness ; while each state, in proportion to its extent and revenue, was bound to supply contingents of men and money whenever called upon. In fact, the principle of protection, thus carried out, was little else than an adaptation in the East of that principle which obtained, during the middle ages, in the larger kingdoms of Europe over their feudatory seignories.

The principle adhered to in our dealings with these states had been uniformly *protective*. During the troublous times and the momentous struggle which followed the death of Runjeet Singh, its operation was manifested in a variety of forms : at one time a rajah or a nawab was deposed for treachery, and a well-proved ally set up in his place ; at another time a state was confiscated wholly, or in part, on similar grounds, or lapsed to the English Government from failure of issue. One important change had also been introduced among the minor states or jageers.\* The original agreement to furnish contingents was in the case of these jageers considered unwise, as furnishing them with an excuse for keeping up a strong body of armed retainers, thus encouraging feuds among themselves, and raids into our territory ; and a commutation assessment† was substituted for such feudatory obligation of service.

\* In many instances the men now holding them were the lineal descendants of those who had won these estates by the sword, or had received them for services in the field.

† About 12 per cent on the revenue of the jageer.



Kurnal had been the original station, but some years ago was condemned as unhealthy, and Umballa was selected instead. Indeed, with our advances thrown out so far as Loodiana and Ferozepore, it became desirable also, as a military measure, to bring up our support, and a strong force has been ever since quartered at Umballa, which thenceforward became the military and civil centre station of this Sirhind, or Cis-Sutlej division.

Such, then, was the condition of this vast district of about 15,000 square miles. On the north-west, in the neighbourhood of Loodiana, lay the small state of Nabba; in the centre of this district, the princely domains of Puttiala, surrounded on every side by English territory, except to the south-west, where it touches on the sands of Sirsa and the Bikaner desert to the extent of nearly 3000 square miles, with a revenue of about twenty-five lakhs a-year; further to the south lay the smaller yet influential state of Jheend; while the city, adjoining the old abandoned cantonment of Kurnal, gave its title to a small principality under a Mohammedan chief. Besides these, though infinitely inferior to them in position and importance, were several petty Manjha Sikh states occupying the south-eastern tracts. These were individually of trifling importance, beyond what an inter-marriage with some of the larger Sikh states might give them, but collectively were capable of doing us good service, or grievously harassing us, in such a crisis as that which impended.

In the cantonment of UMBALLA our force was as

follows : H. M. 9th Lancers, under Colonel J. Hope Grant, C. B. ; two troops of horse-artillery, under Captains Frank Turner and E. K. Money ; the 4th Native Cavalry (lancers), under Colonel H. Clayton ; the 5th N. I., under Major F. Maitland ; and the 60th N. I., under Colonel R. Drought. Colonel Halifax commanded the brigade, and Sir H. W. Barnard, K.B. was general of the (Sirhind) division.

On the 10th of May, that memorable Sunday which saw many a home in Meerut blood-stained and desolate, the whole cantonment of Umballa was thrown into a state of alarm. Rumour spread that the three native regiments, the 4th Light Cavalry\* and the 5th and 60th N. I. had turned out without orders, and stood to their arms. General Barnard hastened to their lines, and found the infantry corps in open mutiny : some of the 5th N. I. had loaded, and were actually pointing their muskets at their officers. The general was in favour of at once calling down the artillery, and had given the order, but fortunately extreme measures were not necessary. The sepoy were gradually quieted by their own officers, and peace restored.†

\* The 4th Native Cavalry (lancers) are also said to have saddled their horses without orders as if ready to join ; but this is incorrect. Colonel Clayton, directly he heard what was taking place, galloped down the lines and gave the order to "saddle and mount;" they obeyed to a man, but order being restored among the N. I. regiments without any violent measures, they were not moved off their own parade-ground.

† Simultaneously with this movement in cantonments, the guard of the 5th N. I. over the civil treasury, some four miles off, turned out in a similar manner, but were also pacified.

How little do we dream of the dangers that are around us, or think of the secret, silent workings of a merciful Providence, which is effecting our escape from peril we wot not of! A few hours before, a deep-laid plot, one involving the lives of a large portion of the Christian residents, had been *unconsciously* counter-acted. The circumstances are as follows: The old church bungalow, which had been used for many years during the protracted erection of the church, stands in the middle of European lines—the 9th Lancer barracks on one side, and those of the artillery on the other; while the *new* church occupies an open space beyond the cavalry lines, with only a row of unfinished empty barracks separating them from the lines of the 60th and 5th N. I. Rumours had long been prevalent that the sepoys meditated an attack on the Europeans some day during divine service\* (a plan which their brethren have adopted with such fatal success in other stations), but the rumour was always cried down by the authorities, and the charge of “treason” lay on those who dared to doubt the fidelity of the “stanchest and most devoted army in the world.” However, as it has appeared, the danger was more real, and much nearer, than was at the time thought. It had been arranged that on that Sunday morning, May 10th, the service should be held in the new church, which had not yet been used since the day of its consecration (in an unfinished state) by the Bishop of Madras. The sepoys

\* It has *hitherto* been the custom in India for European troops to march to church without arms, having only their bayonets.

could easily see the opportunity which was here offered them. The lancers and artillerymen, without horses and guns, with the officers and their families, all collected together at a distance from the remaining European troops—and they mostly on guard or in hospital—would have been an easy prey ; a rush made on the church in the midst of the service, and the unsuspecting congregation would have been at their mercy ; surrounded by at least 1500 armed mutinous sepoys, they would probably have been shot down before they could offer any resistance, or help could arrive. Such, we have reason to believe, was the *plot*. *The day before*, it was decided that the church was not yet fit for use, and that divine service should be held as usual in the old church bungalow ; and so it appeared in the Saturday's station orders. The lancer barracks now intervened between the traitors and their victims ; they could not advance unnoticed. The guns, too, would be close at hand. Therefore the murderous plan was abandoned ; and the congregation, all unconscious what a danger had threatened, and had been so mercifully averted, worshipped God in undisturbed peace and safety. A few hours after, a sepoy of the 60th was *reported* for using mutinous language in the lines ; the officer of the company, Captain Brabazon, hastened down and ordered him into confinement ; the whole body threatened to rescue him, and an outbreak impended.\* But they had been already baffled and dis-

\* It is probable that a report of this flew like wildfire to the civil lines, and this may account for the guard there having risen simultaneously.

concerted that morning ; they lost heart, and gave in. The plot had been thus unconsciously counteracted, the *emeute* proved abortive, and Umballa was for the present safe.

It was on the afternoon of the following day, Monday the 11th, that the direful tidings came from Delhi. Captain Barnard, the general's aide-de-camp, was at once despatched to Simla to inform the Commander-in-Chief, and to urge on him to hasten down ; and as he passed through Kussowlie, he warned H. M. 75th to be ready to march at a moment's notice, should the order come to that effect. Unfortunately the telegraphic message was not fully credited at headquarters. The first suspicions of smouldering mutiny, when reported from Umballa, had been pronounced mysterious and exaggerated ; and now that those worst suspicions were more than realised, and the fanatic rebels had thrown off the mask, the unwelcome announcement—which so rudely dispelled the dream of fancied peace and security, the bright prospect of a season in the shooting-grounds of Cheenee, beyond the influence of the monsoons and mutinous sepoys—was not to be believed. Little, therefore, was done at headquarters to meet the emergency.

Mr Barnes, the Commissioner, was at Kussowlie. Mr Forsyth, the Deputy-Commissioner at Umballa, in the mean time, acting with great promptness and energy within his own province, summoned him down. To guard the treasure, the safety of the civil lines, and the town of Umballa, was Mr Forsyth's first care ; 100

Sikh police were placed on picket-duty day and night, and 200 more kept constantly under arms to be in readiness ; while a party of civil sowars were detached to Kurnal to watch that road, with orders to hasten back and report any advance of the rebels.

In compliance with the Chief Commissioner's instructions, he also sent at once a request to the Maharajah of Puttiala, begging him to come as near as possible to Umballa, on the confines of his own territory (a courtesy which native etiquette required) in order that Mr Barnes might communicate with him immediately on his arrival from Kussowlie. The Puttiala chief received the letter that night, and needed no second call : within eighteen hours of its being despatched he was encamped at Taysomlee, some eight miles from Umballa. There Mr Forsyth hastened to an interview, under special orders telegraphed from Sir John Lawrence. The rajah had with him only an escort of about 1000 men, horse and foot ; the rest of his troops were out, he said, collecting revenue, but he was quite ready to respond to *any* call Government might make on him. A short quarter of an hour's conference sufficed for all arrangements ; and the Maharajah immediately despatched a detachment under his brother, Kour Dhuleep Singh, to Thaneysur, a point close to the grand trunk-road between Umballa and Kurnal. The Maharajah himself waited at his camp near Umballa to see Mr Barnes, and also to have an interview with the Commander-in-Chief.

The Jheend rajah had been even more prompt ; he

was at Sungrwur, his chief residence, when news of the mutiny at Delhi reached him on the 12th May. That night he started off for Ghabdah, and gave orders for concentrating all his troops under his general, Khan Singh, having also sent into Umballa for instructions how to act. Here he was when he received a letter from Mr Barnes requesting him to proceed to Kurnal, which was quite unprotected, and on the high-road towards Delhi. His own territories were adjacent, from which he could draw for supplies and carriage. Captain M'Andrew, Assistant-Commissioner at Umballa, was deputed to act in concert with the rajah, and to precede the British army, clearing the road, and collecting supplies for its use. The post appointed for the rajah was 80 to 100 miles off, yet by forced marches, with little intermission, he made Thaneysur with his whole force on the evening of the 17th, and on the 18th pushed on for Kurnal, where he undertook the protection of the city and cantonments, and thus placed himself in the van of the advancing army.

Still no orders from army headquarters. On the 13th it became known that so little importance was there attached to the rumours of the outbreak, that only 250 men of H. M. 75th had been ordered down. Mr Plowden, one of the assistant-commissioners, was despatched to urge the instant advance of troops, carrying with him, in melancholy confirmation of the tidings from Delhi, *a letter from one of the fugitives*.

Mr Barnes was at Kussowlic when the tidings reached him; he only waited to provide the necessary carriage

for the 75th, and then hastened down by express to Umballa, which he reached on Wednesday night, and at once set himself to face the danger threatened. And it threatened at every point. Every hour had brought its tale of disorder. Beyond the Jumna all authority was at an end. The European officials were either murdered or flying for their lives; the jails had been forced, the treasure plundered, the smaller towns sacked, and out of a peaceful population seemed to have sprung up an army of marauders. All the southern districts bordering on the river, with a semi-Hindostanee population, felt the infection, and were thoroughly disorganised.

Mr Barnes, however, resolved at any sacrifice to keep down this rising disaffection, and to hold all on this side the river. Every available assistant at hand was despatched to some point of danger. Mr Levien to guard the banks of the river, where every ferry was closed, except those it was important to retain for communication, and they were strongly held by police and Puttiala troops. Mr Plowden had no sooner returned from Simla than he hastened off to Jugahdree with a small force to overawe that district. Lieutenant Parsons started for Khytul; and Captain McNeile, the Deputy-Commissioner of Thaneysur, after arranging for the safety of that station under a powerful body of Puttiala men, also took the field. Mr G. Ricketts was indefatigable at Loodiana; never flagging, ever cheerful, he carried all before him, and thus he kept in order the most turbulent city of the district.



Mr Forsyth was actively engaged at Umballa in facilitating the movement of the troops ; while Mr Barnes also remained there, imparting to each and all of his scattered assistants somewhat of his own vigour and energy, and in constant, hourly communication with headquarters, acting as the representative of the Chief Commissioner, and, above all, exercising an extraordinary influence with the native chiefs. Thus every effort was being made, every nerve strained. And it needed all that foresight and promptness could effect. The whole native community, from the moneyed banker to the petty tradesman, from the Government contractor to the common *coolie* (day-labourer), stood aloof : no help, no supplies were forthcoming ; every one seemed to be either paralysed, or waiting the issue ; yet with an air of quiet confidence and fearless determination did the civil authorities work on, each at his post.

When the Commander-in-Chief began to realise *the fact* that a portion of the Bengal army was in open revolt, and had inaugurated their reign of terror with wholesale carnage, he acted with some vigour. H. M. 75th, originally warned by Captain Barnard, now received an order to move down *en masse* ; and the 1st and 2d Fusiliers, from Dugshai and Subathoo, were ordered to follow with all speed. Major G. O. Jacob, of the 1st Fusiliers, chanced to be at Simla when the order was issued ; he rode down to Dugshai during the night, and at morning parade warned the corps that all should be ready to march that afternoon at three o'clock,—Colonel Welchman, commanding the regi-

ment, was on the sick-list, having only a few days before undergone a severe operation. The 2d Fusiliers received their orders at Subathoo at 10 A.M., and also started that afternoon under Captain A. Boyd; Colonel St G. Showers, who was on leave at Simla, overtaking the regiment at Umballa. Both corps made the distance, some sixty miles, in three marches.

A telegraphic message was also sent to Philour, ordering a siege-train (3d class) to be prepared and sent off without delay; \* and to guard against the message failing to reach from any injury to the wire, Captain Worthington of the Artillery, at that time on sick leave at Simla, was sent off express to carry the written order to Philour; while the Nusseree battalion (of Goorkhas) also received orders to march down from Jutogh to Philour, to escort the train. Now the note of preparation was sounded far and wide.

Yet it was not till the 16th that General Anson himself arrived from Simla at Umballa, and joined the force he had ordered to be concentrated there.

In the meanwhile, the state of Umballa itself was by no means satisfactory. "Alarm," says one who was there, "was the prevalent feeling; and conciliation of men with arms in their hands, and in a state of abso-

\* A report did float about the Punjab, the truth of which we have never heard denied, that one member of the Staff suggested that all European troops should concentrate on Philour, and, taking boat down the Sutlej, make for England as fast as possible; another, however—one who, alas! fell among the earliest victims of the rebellion—suggested that the Philour fort, with its large magazine, might be made available for a very different purpose. Hence the idea of a siege-train.

lute rebellion, the order of the day.”\* Of the disaffection of the two Native Infantry corps there was no doubt; yet there was wanting the energy to cope with it. The first suggestion was to move out a wing of each with the force, when it should advance, on the plea of giving both regiments an opportunity of proving their loyalty, but really with the hope of breaking up their combination. The regiments fully appreciated the motive, and respectfully declined; they would go entire, or *not at all*. And the point was conceded. However, a compromise was effected; the 5th N. I., who were believed to be the worst, were broken up into detachments, to neutralise in some measure their treachery. Two companies were sent off, with a squadron of the 4th Light Cavalry under Captain William Wyld, to Jugahdree, under the pretext of supporting Mr Spankie’s position at Saharunpore; while two companies were despatched to Roopur, under Captain Gardner of the 38th N. I., a Delhi refugee, with the ostensible object of watching the districts of Nalagurh and Balachore, where the population, a comparatively warlike class, threatened to become troublesome.

With the 60th N. I. another system was adopted. Colonel T. Seaton, C.B., of the 35th N. I., who was on leave at Simla, was selected, from his great experience and tact, to take command of this corps, with the hope that he would be able to keep them stanch; and with a view of showing confidence in them, the Commander-

\* HODSON’S *Twelve Years of a Soldier’s Life*, &c., p. 183.

in-Chief, the day after his arrival at Umballa, allowed them to be re-sworn to their colours, thus seeming to efface the remembrance of their doings on the 10th of May. The 4th Cavalry\* were looked on far more favourably, notwithstanding the disclosures made by the Sikh to Mr Forsyth, which involved them in the general charge of disaffection; and important duties, escort of stores, treasure, and ammunition from different points, were intrusted to them; and they had, the especial honour of forming the personal body-guard of the Commander-in-Chief, when he paid a state visit to the Maharaja of Puttiala.

But startling rumours were now coming in from Simla; the Goorkhas were in mutiny, and refused to march.

To understand all that had been passing there, the reader must be content to make one more digression, and pass for a while from the dust-laden, furnace-heated plains around Umballa to the clear cool air of the Himalayas.

A very few hours sufficed to throw a cloud over the bright joyous gaiety of Simla. The withdrawal of all European troops from the hill stations naturally filled with anxiety the minds of the many ladies who with their families had collected here for the approaching hot weather. Appalled as they already were at the reported atrocities perpetrated at Meerut and Delhi, they could but regard the unprotected, defenceless state in which they were now to be left, at the mercy of

\* See Appendix F.

the *budmashes* of a most ill-regulated bazaar, with feelings of harrowing alarm. The chaplain, the Rev. F. O. Mayne, had represented this to General Anson as he was riding out of Simla, entreating that a small force, if only one company, of Europeans might be sent up there to insure quiet and restore confidence ; but the Commander-in-Chief, who at first thought 250 men would be enough to send to Umballa, then declared he could not spare a man. "What, then, are the ladies to do?" "The best they can!" All eyes were then turned to General N. Penny, as the senior officer at Simla, and one who commanded general confidence and respect, and a gathering at once took place at his house, with a view of forming some plan for defending the place against attack. While they were assembled, the superintendent of the hill states, Lord W. Hay, entered, and directed their thoughts of danger from the bazaar vagabonds to the regiment of Goorkhas, quartered at Jutogh, some three or four miles off. This announcement threw a blank over the faces of all present ; their only hope had been in the few Goorkhas who might remain, and these were now said to be the source of their greatest danger. From this moment all was confusion and disorder ; in vain did General Penny endeavour to organise some system. Independent and often counter arrangements met him at every step.

To trace in their order the exploits of that Friday and Saturday, or arrive at the truth amid the thousand conflicting statements, would be wellnigh impossible ; and as being not absolutely necessary for the elucidation

tion of the narrative of subsequent events, we do not make the attempt; suffice it to say, it all resulted in, if not a "causeless panic," at least a "shameless flight."

The Goorkhas of the Nusseree battalion most certainly, on being ordered to march down to Philour to escort the siege-train, refused to move. They were told that the usual guards always left behind over the civil treasury were to be now withdrawn, and that even the guards over their own lines were not to be allowed, but the safety and honour of their wives and families were to be intrusted to the *chuprasses* (messengers) of the bazaar. Such an arrangement aroused the indignation and jealousy of the brave little hill-men; and Poorbeahs, who had found their way far too freely into the Goorkha ranks, were ready to turn this excitement to account. The men showed signs of disaffection, insulted their commandant, Major Bagot, demanded the arrears of pay, and refused to march unless certain terms were conceded. The report of what was passing at Jutogh soon flew to Simla, gathering strength as it came. "The officers and their families at Jutogh had been murdered, and the Goorkhas were marching in;" such were the tidings that spread through the station. What follows defies description.

That "banner with a strange device," *suave qui peut*, once hoisted, English valour knew no bounds. It overflowed and swept the leading officers and their families with resistless force down precipice and ravine, until it

stranded them on the heights of Dugshai, or the still higher fortified barracks of Kussowlee, or threw them into the arms of the neighbouring petty chiefs. Such were the doings of the Friday morning. There were ladies and children, the while, whose husbands were daring all in the plains, facing real mutiny and braving death in the midst of their own regiments,—and *they* were left to shift as best they might. On the church tower were watchmen posted to report the first signs of an advance from Jutogh by the tolling of the church-bell, at the hill near the Bank were the two port-guns loaded, and the port-fires lighted, ready to be used the instant the bell sounded, to peal forth the concerted signal to all to rally to the Bank as a rendezvous. The morning had passed, the leading fugitives were well away, when about two o'clock the bell tolled, the guns boomed forth their warning, and a general rush of ladies and children, and the few officers that remained, with the tradesmen and their families, was made for the Bank. Here they congregated, some 400 in number, of whom above 100 were able-bodied men ; barricades had been run up, muskets, stealthily removed from the Goorkha magazine, were distributed among the belligerents ; and General Penny and some of the officers who were left tried to organise a defence. Hours passed on—hours of agonising suspense—ladies trembling for their helpless babes, and groaning in heart for the probable fate of their absent husbands : hours were they in which they “verily tasted the bitterness of death.” At length it was reported that the Goorkhas were open

to reason. A deputation was sent to treat with them. Some of them, under Captain Sir E. Campbell of the 60th Rifles, fearlessly went to their lines; others remained half-way. The result was, that the Goorkhas demanded that the arms which they said had been stolen from them should be given back, their guards at the Treasury be restored, the Bank be given up into their charge—and it seemed now to be necessary to concede all. It was no hearty approving welcome with which the deputation were received on their return; but their word had been pledged, and every point was given up;—perhaps providentially so, for it is impossible to contemplate what might have been the issue.\*

Before daylight on Saturday morning a report came in that the Goorkhas had broken faith and were marching in. It was now hopeless to hold on, and a general flight was the result. To that flight no pen could do justice. Ladies toiling along on foot, vainly trying to persuade, entreat, threaten the bearers to hurry on with the *janpans* in which were their helpless children, while men were outbidding each other, and *outbidding ladies*, to secure bearers for their baggage. However, fatigue and suffering were, with two exceptions, the only evil consequences of the flight, and in due time places of safety were gained.

Nor was Simla the only place affected by the presence of the Goorkhas of the Nusseree battalion. A

\* And one whose wife and children were among the probable victims may well bless God for their preservation, though their safety was scarcely to be ascribed either to the courage or the tact of their defenders.



small guard of them were at Kussowlee, over the civil treasury ; and when they found the station wholly in their hands on the withdrawal of all except one company of H. M. 75th, and heard of the Simla doings, they seized the opportunity, forced the treasure-chest, helped themselves to their arrears of pay, to the amount of about 7000 rupees, and marched off for Jutogh. As soon as they were gone, the police plundered the remainder. The consternation of the few remaining residents of the station, chiefly ladies and children, was great. Lord W. Hay suggested that all should hasten up to Simla ; but Mr J. Taylor, the Assist.-Com. in charge, seeing how fatal such a step would be, remonstrated, and the danger passed off.

The detachment, however, on their way up to Simla, met the baggage of General Anson being carried down to Umballa, and, by way of giving vent to their hatred, burnt or destroyed nearly the whole of it. Captain Briggs, an officer who had been long employed in that neighbourhood on the great Thibet and Hindostan road, and thus gained considerable acquaintance and influence with the Goorkhas, was sent back by General Anson from Kussowlee to endeavour to bring the men to reason, and empowered to grant full pardon provided the corps would march ; and he succeeded. The regiment was induced to appoint representatives to confer on their imagined wrongs ; their principal demands were acceded to, their arrears paid up,\* and a general amnesty granted ; under shelter of which even

\* MR MONTGOMERY'S *Punjab Mutiny Report*, par. 45.

the Küssowlee guard were enabled to escape punishment.

At Simla quiet was restored after a few days, and families began to return, to find, despite the dire rumours of fires, plundering, and massacre—one officer declared he had seen his own house blazing!—to find that not a particle of furniture had been injured—ladies' jewellery, even to their silver thimbles on their work-tables, papers, drafts, &c., left on office desks—all untouched! Yet, with returning quiet, Simla had not restored confidence. For months it continued in a chronic state of panic. And no wonder: no wise precautions were taken; contingents indeed were called in from the surrounding chiefs, but were absorbed in guards over the official buildings and private residence of the Superintendent of the Hill States.

To resume the narrative of events. Umballa was now fast filling; the three European corps had arrived, each mustering about 800 strong. But difficulties were increasing: there was no accommodation for the men; there were not tents enough to cover one-half; they were huddled together as many as could be under canvass, and the rest doubled up in the 9th Lancer barracks. Then how to push them on to Delhi was the next difficulty. In fact, difficulties presented themselves on every side. Without any real military experience, General Anson found himself at the head of a native army in open mutiny, and a European army he was utterly incapable of managing. The native troops he had always despised; and had taken so little pains

to conceal his contempt for them, that he rarely, if ever, concluded an inspection of a native corps without taking away with him the muttered curses of "Jack Sepoy." The native army he had now condescended to attempt to conciliate by a general order,\* but it was all too late, and too weak to effect any good. Then, unfortunately, General Barnard could give but little help. He had only landed a few weeks in the country, and all his Crimean experience and popularity were of no avail with an army so differently organised. The medical departments demanded certain appliances before any force could take the field. The commissariat department was wholly unable to supply them; although sufficient to meet the demands of the station itself, it was utterly inadequate for the demands of such a force thrown suddenly upon it. There was no carriage at hand—neither camels, elephants, carts, or bearers. Colonel W. B. Thompson, one of the most experienced and effective officers of the department, frankly avowed his inability to meet the "indents." He declared himself ready to throw up his appointment rather than attempt it; he would sacrifice himself rather than sacrifice the army. In this perplexity the Commander-in-Chief found, as Lord Hardinge had done before him,

\* The following general order will show how little the crisis was comprehended at headquarters :—

"The Commander-in-Chief desires that officers commanding native regiments will instantly inform their men that it has never been intended that any cartridge which can be objected to should be used by them, and that they may rely upon the Commander-in-Chief's assurance that they will not be required to use objectionable cartridge now or hereafter."

that the commissariat department was not meant for such emergencies, and, like Lord Hardinge,\* he turned to the civil authorities of the district; and his call was as promptly responded to. An indent was sent in for 700 camels, 2000 *doolie*-bearers, and 200 carts; and in less than a week Mr Forsyth † had collected about 2000 camels, as many bearers, and 500 carts, besides the elephants, camels, and carts that flowed in in streams from the Puttiala rajah. Provisions, too, were collected in similar abundance, with the assurance that as much more as might be required was procurable. Then came the want of small-arm ammunition: there was

\* Lord Hardinge gave the following evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons on the 8th May 1853, Question 2029:—

“When the army entered the field, and had to move suddenly from Umballa to the Sutlej, of course we were not so prepared as we should have been if we had expected war a month beforehand. When I arrived at Umballa, having conferred with Lord Gough, I called for the Commissary-General, and he told me that, according to the usual preparations for the army, it would take a month or six weeks before the cattle necessary for carrying supplies about 150 miles, to Ferozepore, could be produced. I informed him that they must be ready in six days, and I sent for Major Broadfoot, who had served in the commissariat department, who was an officer of very great merit and ability, and who was the Governor-General's political agent for the frontier, and told him the difficulty we were in, and that, if we had not cattle to carry provisions forward, we must call upon the native powers, who were, under treaty, bound to deposit them where we required them, at such places and on such routes as the Commander-in-Chief might appoint. Major Broadfoot having received the routes from the Quartermaster-General, sat up the whole night, and next morning orders were despatched to the chiefs of the ‘Sikh protected states’ to furnish provisions, at the halting-places, for a march of six or seven days, from Umballa to the Sutlej; and under these arrangements, rapidly made, the army never suffered from want of provisions, though they may have suffered from want of time to cook them. This service was accomplished by the activity, the energy, and practical knowledge of that most able man, Major Broadfoot.

† See Appendix C.

one regiment with scarcely a round per man of ball ammunition ; a troop of artillery with barely shot and shell enough for a field-day. A call was immediately made on the Philour magazine. But Philour was nearly ninety miles off : this required time, and time involved men's lives.

Such was the state of things at Umballa. We now pass on to Philour.

The telegraphic message for the siege-train had reached the fort of Philour on the morning of the 17th, and within four days, by dint of unceasing labour day and night, all was ready. In the meanwhile a couple of lakhs of small-arm ammunition were at once despatched to Umballa in advance, for the use of the European troops, under a guard of the 3d N. I., who were relieved midway by some of the 4th Cavalry.

The siege-train consisted of six 18-pounders, four 8-inch howitzers, twelve 5½-inch mortars, five 9-pounder brass guns, one 24-pounder brass howitzer, and four 8-inch mortars, with 500 rounds for each gun, together with 100 extra rounds for every light field-piece already with the force, or under orders to join it. Besides this, there were also to be sent down, under the same escort, ten lakhs of small-arm ball ammunition for the infantry, with eighteen lakhs of percussion-caps, and about 3000 rounds of shot and shell for the field-batteries.

Exciting indeed were the duties in the magazine during these four days. The 3d N. I., cantoned outside, were known to be mutinous in heart, and report said they had sworn the siege-train should never reach

Delhi. The river Sutlej, too, rising every day from the melting snows above, threatened to sweep away the bridge of boats before the train could possibly be ready. All was expedition and anxiety ; almost hourly was the telegraph in request to allay the Commander-in-Chief's anxiety for the safety of the fort : at length, on the morning of the 21st, the Philour gate, which had been kept closed and guarded lest a spy or traitor should gain access, was thrown open, and the siege-train passed out in all its force.

Tidings had now arrived of the refusal of the Nusserree battalion to march. The 3d N. I., perhaps eager to clear their character from imputation, though more probably to get the train into their hands, volunteered : no time was to be lost, and under pretence of restored confidence they were allowed to escort it. Thus, at three o'clock in the morning, the train began its long and perilous march. The river had risen, and was still rising, and every hour was precious. Every precaution had been taken ; the water above had been dammed up or drained off, in some measure to lessen the strain on the bridge, which had also been strengthened by additional hawsers. There were Lieut. J. C. Griffith, the Commissary of Ordnance, and Mr Ricketts, the Deputy-Commissioner of Loodiana (who had collected 300 coolies to help), at either end of the bridge, watching and expediting the progress of the train. It crossed over slowly, but safely ; and in less than two hours after, the bridge had gone ! No sooner was the train fairly landed on the opposite bank than the 3d N. I. were

quietly and politely relieved of their charge, which was at once made over to a strong detachment of troops, horse and foot, belonging to the Rajah of Nabba, who had been requested by Mr Barnes, on the first news of the outbreak, to proceed to Loodiana. With this detachment a small party of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, under Lieutenant Campbell, was also associated, and under their united escort the siege-train proceeded onwards. Thus providentially was the train preserved from a twofold danger, the rising river and a rebel escort. Had the bridge broken before the train crossed, days and perhaps weeks would have been lost; and who can calculate the possible consequences of that delay? Had the 3d N. I. refused to let it cross—and it was wholly in their power—the danger might have been still greater. But, thanks to a disposing Providence, the bridge was crossed, and the rebellious designs of the escort thwarted! After delays and difficulties from unmanageable bullock-drivers and heavy sands, the train entered Loodiana at ten o'clock that night, having taken nearly twenty hours to accomplish a distance of seven miles. Here another danger threatened, but passed over. A violent dust-storm, followed by torrents of rain, came on; yet not a grain of powder was injured, though the whole camp was levelled with the ground. The road was now clear, and comparatively easy, and the train pushed on for Umballa.

Yet as one difficulty was surmounted, another seemed to arise, and the Commander-in-Chief lacked the energy or the experience to meet them vigorously. Hampered

by paucity of ammunition, hampered by the medical and commissariat departments, which would only move *en regle*, he found himself still more hampered by the two N. I. regiments whom he had forgiven but could not trust. In vain did the Chief Commissioner send message after message by telegraph entreating him to disarm and disband them: they had broken their part of the contract of service by refusing to march as ordered; that disobedience was an overt act of rebellion; on our side they were not to be trusted, and as open enemies, once sent adrift disarmed, they would be contemptible, and would be no welcome addition to the rebel ranks. Still there were voices raised in Umballa for the "poor calumniated sepoys." General Anson considered himself pledged; and they remained armed. Nor would he move till the expected siege-train arrived, failing to see that his very delay alone made a siege-train necessary. A bold stroke at the outset, and Delhi might have been taken unawares.

Here was one illustration of the evil of this delay. Kurnal had been the rallying-point for the Delhi fugitives; and while the ladies and children had been passed on without delay to Umballa, those of the Delhi authorities who had survived had made their stand here. Brigadier Graves and Mr Le Bas, representing respectively the military and civil authority of what was once the station of Delhi, here held on. The Nawab of Kurnal boldly threw in his lot with Government,\* and pledged himself to stand or fall with them

\* The Nawab of Kurnal came to Mr Le Bas and addressed him to



—a pledge he nobly kept. The Jheend Rajah too, had, as requested, thrown his forces on this point, to breast, if it might be, the tide of rebellion surging on-wards from below. But their position had become critical; the population around were turbulent and threatening, and there was no sign of succour from Umballa. A further retreat seemed to be inevitable. A few hours would have seen Kurnal abandoned—when the telegraphic message brought the welcome tidings that the advance had actually begun, and the first detachment of Europeans was moving on! It may seem a small matter whether Kurnal was held or abandoned, as the advancing European force might easily have retaken it; but they who swayed the Punjab knew otherwise. While Kurnal remained, English rule asserted itself. Had it gone, the whole country would have risen in revolt, the roads have been closed up, all communication cut off, Meerut isolated, and perhaps converted into a second Cawnpore. That telegraph message saved Kurnal, kept the road open, preserved Meerut for a base of future operations, and Saharunpore beyond as a granary for the avenging army.

The commissariat difficulty had been surmounted by the civil authorities. Mr Forsyth had right zealously

the following effect:—"Sir, I have spent a sleepless night in meditating on the state of affairs; I have decided to throw in my lot with yours. My sword, my purse, and my followers are at your disposal."

So well did he act up to the engagement thus made, that after the fall of Delhi a testimonial was put into his hand by Mr Le Bas, equally honourable to both.—*RAIKES' Notes on the Revolt*, p. 90.

taxed the resources of the district, as has been mentioned. Equally effective was Mr Barnes's appeal to the native chiefs. Puttiala poured in its carriage and provision of every kind; Jheend drew in along the road ample supplies for any force that might be collected. Still the Commander-in-Chief would not move. His military advisers discouraged the advance.\* In vain did Mr Barnes point out the danger of this delay; in vain did Sir John Lawrence entreat him to strike a blow—to recover Delhi and the magazine at any cost, if he would save the country: by lying by he was playing the enemy's game: our troops were losing heart, and the rebels gaining confidence: the delay was terrible! The Commander-in-Chief denied that there was any delay, and waited on still at Umballa.

Twelve years before, a somewhat similar force had moved out of this station. On the 10th December 1845, an express reached Umballa that the Sikhs had

\* The author, though satisfied, from information received from the spot, that such was the case, would have hesitated to mention this, had not Sir J. Lawrence given it official publicity:—

“The Chief Commissioner presumes that no officer would now deny that an immediate advance upon Delhi was the right course. But at that time such was not the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief's military advisers. His Excellency assured the Chief Commissioner that every officer whom he consulted was averse to this measure. The Chief Commissioner believes now (as he urged then) that, if our troops had not advanced from Umballa upon Delhi, the whole population between the Jumna and the Sutlej would have risen; and that the chiefs of Puttiala, Jheend, and Nabha, who performed such excellent service afterwards, would, even if they had stood by us, have been deserted by their own troops, or else would have been compelled by those troops to join the insurrection. But the advance of our troops towards Delhi, and the victory at Badlee Serai near that city on the 8th June, proved to the country that there was vitality in our cause and power on our side.”—CHIEF COMMISSIONER'S *Punjab Mutiny Report*, par. 5.

crossed the Sutlej the day before. By the 18th, Sir Hugh Gough, then Commander-in-Chief, with Lord Hardinge at his elbow, had hurled a force of 4000 Europeans on the van of the Sikh army, and gained the glorious victory of Moodkee. A similar period was now suffered to elapse after the Delhi massacre before a single European moved from Umballa ! And then they moved in dribblets. On the 18th a squadron of H. M. 9th Lancers and four companies of the Hon. Company's 1st Fusiliers with four guns ; on the 21st, the remainder of the 1st Fusiliers, with another squadron of lancers, and four more guns ; on the 23d, H.M. 75th, with the 60th N. I. in charge ; and on the 24th the Commander-in-Chief brought up the rear, consisting of six companies of the 2d Fusiliers and a squadron of the 4th. Light Cavalry, leaving behind in Umballa four companies of the 2d Fusiliers to protect cantonments.

After the utter loss of one week, it took another week to set the army fairly under weigh. The whole force that poured out of Umballa this week consisted of H. M. 9th Lancers, some 450 sabres, under Colonel J. Hope Grant, C.B. ; H. M. 75th, about 800 strong, under Colonel Herbert ; 1st Fusiliers, about the same strength, under Major Jacob ; six companies of the 2d Fusiliers, about 550, under Colonel St G. D. Showers ; Captain Turner's troop of horse-artillery ; Captain Money's troop (with the 9-pounders from the native battery, which had been ordered in from Noorpoor, instead of his own 6-pounders) ; one squadron of 4th Native

Cavalry, under Colonel Clayton ; and the 60th N. I. under Colonel T. Seaton, C.B.—the whole European force being about 450 cavalry, and rather more than 2000 infantry, with twelve light guns.

But it soon became apparent that the crowded barracks at Umballa during those days of delay had told upon the army. The germs of disease there sown quickly began to show themselves. The advance had scarcely reached Kurnal when cholera broke out, and claimed its victims among high and low. Among the first was General Anson himself. He reached Kurnal on the 25th ; the next day the telegraph reported his seizure, and summoned General Barnard from Umballa. On the 27th the Commander-in-Chief died, and General Barnard took command of the force. Alas ! how many “ a soldier good ” in the brave little band that hastened along that road panting for glory or revenge, was soon to follow him to “ that dark inn, the grave ! ”

Umballa had in the meanwhile been strengthened by troops from Puttiala. The Maharajah had placed 1000 men (700 infantry and 300 cavalry) at the service of Mr Barnes, for the express object of guarding cantonments against any rise of the neighbouring population. But rumours were coming in of trouble to the eastward. It was reported that two companies of the 5th N. I., sent out to Roopur in order to be out of harm's way, soon showed their mutinous spirit, and began to spread disaffection in the neighbourhood. Here lived a man named Mohur Singh, a Sikh sirdar, once *kardar* (or minister) to the ex-chief of Roopur, who

had been deposed after the Punjab campaign for collusion with the Sikhs. No sooner did the detachment of the 5th N. I. arrive at Roopur, than this man began to tamper with them ; and they needed but little encouragement. His influence soon showed itself. Captain Gardner, the officer commanding them, was openly insulted ; and when, on reporting their mutinous state, he received orders to arrest the malcontent sirdar and send him to Umballa for trial, the sepoy declared their intention to protect him, and swore he should never be taken prisoner. The detachment was then immediately recalled ; and after their departure Mohur Singh was seized by the police and sent in a prisoner to Umballa.

A singular coincidence, and one fraught with no ordinary danger, now occurred. The siege-train from Philour, and the Goorkhas from Simla, which they *were* to have escorted, *met at Umballa*. On the evening of the 27th, the advance party of the Nusseree battalion reached the camping-ground with the camp colours. Scarcely had they arrived, when some sepoy of the 5th N. I. found their way out and began to tamper with them. It was suggested that the Goorkhas had irrevocably ruined their character ; their *nām* (good name) was gone—they would never be trusted again ; so they might as well avow themselves, and make a bold stroke for Delhi. A more favourable opportunity could never offer. They were both (Goorkhas and the 5th N. I.) still armed ; the station was almost unprotected—a mere handful of Europeans ; the siege-train

at hand, very weakly guarded; nothing would be easier than to "rise," seize the train, and carry it off to the King of Delhi.

The man to whom this tempting offer was made was a faithful little Goorkha, and a prudent one. He at once replied that he could not answer for his comrades; but the men of the 5th N. I. had better come over in the morning when the regiment marched in, and sound them. He himself reported the circumstance to Major Bagot, the commanding officer, directly he reached the ground.

Major Bagot called up all whom he considered the more trustworthy of the native officers, and told them what had passed, and said he placed the honour of the regiment in their hands, calling on them to deliver up any man preaching treason in their lines. Several men of the 5th N. I. came into camp, and little knots were formed in different parts; yet the morning passed away, and no report came. At length Major Bagot called up his native officers and asked what was passing. They admitted that the 5th N. I. men were urging the Goorkhas to rise, but no plan had been suggested on which to base a charge of treason.

Happily the danger was known also in cantonments. Mr Barnes and Major Maitland (commanding the station as well as the 5th N. I.) had been in close consultation, and the result was that that afternoon the 5th N. I. were drawn up on their own parade-ground (while two companies of Europeans were also drawn up close by, though out of sight), and the order was given to lay

down their arms. They obeyed without any apparent hesitation.

That night the Goorkhas marched eastward into the Saharunpore district, the siege-train passed on towards Delhi, and the cloud which had for some hours hung over Umballa was quietly dispersed.

Thus ended the month of May.

## CHAPTER VIII.

[JUNE 1857.—PART I.]

THE ADDRESS OF SIR JOHN LAWRENCE TO THE SEPOYS—THE  
GENERAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY—AFFAIRS IN THE CITY OF  
DELHI—HURRIANAH—UMBALLA—LAHORE—THE MOVABLE  
COLUMN—UMRITSUR—JULLUNDHUR—THE OUTBREAK—THE  
PURSUIT—SUSSARA GHAT—LOODIANA.

THE month of June was ushered in with a manly  
address,—

“From the CHIEF COMMISSIONER of the PUNJAB to the  
HINDOSTANEE SOLDIERS of the BENGAL ARMY.

*“Dated 1st June 1857.*

“Sepoys,—You will have heard that many sepoy and sowars of the Bengal army have proved faithless to their salt at Meerut, at Delhi, and at Ferozepore. Many at the latter place have been already punished. An army has assembled, and is now close to Delhi, prepared to punish the mutineers and insurgents who have collected there.

“Sepoys,—I warn and advise you to prove faithful to your salt, faithful to the Government who have given your forefathers and you service for the last hundred years; faithful to that Government who, both in cantonments and in the



field, has been careful of your welfare and interests, and who, in your old age, has given you the means of living comfortably in your homes. Those who have studied history know well that no army has ever been more kindly treated than that of India.

"Those regiments which now remain faithful will receive the rewards due to their constancy; those soldiers who fall away now will lose their service for ever. It will be too late to lament hereafter when the time has passed by;—now is the opportunity of proving your loyalty and good faith. The British Government will never want for native soldiers. In a month it might raise 50,000 in the Punjab alone. If the '*Poorbeah*' sepoy neglects the present day, it will never return. There is ample force in the Punjab to crush all mutineers. The chiefs and people are loyal and obedient, and the latter only long to take your place in the army. All will unite to crush you. Moreover, the sepoy can have no conception of the power of England. Already from every quarter English soldiers are pouring into India.

"You know well enough that the British Government have never interfered with your religion. Those who tell you the contrary, say it for their own base purposes. The Hindoo temple and the Mohammedan mosque have both been respected by the English Government. It was but the other day that the Jumma Mosque at Lahore, which had cost lakhs of rupees, and which the Sikhs had converted into a magazine, was restored to the Mohammedans.

"Sepoys,—My advice is that you obey your officers. Seize all those among yourselves who endeavour to mislead you. Let not a few bad men be the cause of your disgrace. If you have the will, you can easily do this, and Government will consider it a test of your fidelity. Prove by your conduct that the loyalty of the sepoy of Hindostan has not degenerated from that of his ancestors.

"JOHN LAWRENCE, *Chief Commissioner.*"

It was a checkered prospect on which the new month opened.

Now and again a mail would slip through from the south, bringing the cheering news that beyond Meerut all seemed still safe. One day came Sir Henry Lawrence's noble address to the Lucknow troops, touching everywhere a chord of sympathy and emulation; then came Mr Colvin's speech to the Agra sepoy, followed by a proclamation\* which was received with amazement in the Punjab, and *boldly ignored* by men who, despite the Lieutenant-Governor's delegated authority, refused to have their hands tied, when only freedom of action, vigour, and stern justice, could save the country. The various letters and papers thus coming in reported all as yet quiet up to the end of May; but all excitement, and anxiety. Sir Henry Lawrence spoke as a man prepared for a struggle, come when it might; Mr Colvin as one who would avert the struggle at any price by conciliation. At Lucknow,

\* The proclamation ran as follows, dated Agra, May 25 :—

"All soldiers engaged in the late disturbances, who are desirous of going to their homes, and who give up their arms at the nearest civil or military Government post, and retire quietly, shall be permitted to do so unmolested.

"Many faithful soldiers have been drawn into resistance to Government only because they were in the ranks, and could not escape from them; or because they really thought their feelings of religion and honour injured by the measures of Government. This feeling was wholly a mistake; but it acted on men's minds. A proclamation now issued by the Governor-General in Council is perfectly explicit, and will remove all doubt on this point.

"Only evil-minded instigators in the disturbances, and those guilty of heinous crimes against private persons, shall be punished.

"All those who appear in arms against the Government, after this proclamation is known, shall be treated as open enemies."

cantonments were reported to be still occupied—so they were at Agra ; but in the civil lines all the Europeans were fortifying themselves in large native houses, and the fort was being got ready, while the whole country round was in commotion. At Allygurh all was still quiet ; and at Cawnpore, Sir Hugh Wheeler held his own.

All these items of news, bearing date to the end of May, tended to raise the hope, faint though it was, that the outbreak might still be partial, chiefly confined to the northern portion of the Doab, and that the prompt recovery of Delhi might yet restore peace. To that event all eyes in the Punjab were turned. The troops thirsted for it, and fretted at the delay. Timorous natives of every grade waited for it to decide their course, and augured ill from the delay.

Here appears on the scene one who was to perform no ordinary part in the opening drama. Lieutenant W. S. R. Hodson was a man whom the discriminating eye of Sir H. Lawrence had some years before singled out, and who had risen, by his general intelligence and personal gallantry, to the coveted post of officiating Commandant of the Guides. But having incurred the grave displeasure of the Punjab authorities, he had, in 1856, lost this appointment, and returned to his own regiment, the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, at Dugshai, with a wide-spread feeling of regret among all who knew Hodson—and who did not, at least by name?—that, whether justly or not, so much energy and prowess should be lost to the frontier, and be buried

in the comparative *idlesse* and dull routine of a European regiment at a hill station. So deeply did his commandant, Colonel Welchman, feel this, that he represented it in strong terms to the Commander-in-Chief; and when General Anson realised the impending crisis, he at once *appropriated* Hodson for special work—first to be *his* Assistant Quartermaster-General, for the purpose of organising a real Secret-intelligence department, for it at present existed only in name.

Within a very few hours, Hodson had the opportunity of giving proof of the wisdom of such a choice. Communication with Meerut was quite suspended, and it was of vital importance that the authorities there should be apprised of the Commander-in-Chief's plans, in order to effect a junction with the force proceeding from Umballa. But it was a work of great fatigue and no little peril. General Anson thought of Hodson; for at Umballa the general saying was, "If it can be done, Hodson is the man to do it." At Meerut, too, the hope lay in him. "One night," wrote an officer at Meerut,\* "on outlying picket, this subject (of restoring communication with Umballa) was discussed. I said, 'Hodson is at Umballa, I know, and I'll bet he will force his way through and open communications with the Commander-in-Chief and ourselves.'" Hodson had gone on to Kurnal, and at once offered to do it. General Anson telegraphed his consent; and within

\* This letter the author saw. It is also quoted in HODSON'S *Twelve Years, &c.*, at p. 199, with a few particulars of the adventure.

seventy-two hours Hodson telegraphed back to the Commander-in-Chief from Kurnal that he had forced his way,—a few Jheend horsemen for his escort, and one led horse for a relay,—delivered the message to General Hewitt, and brought back the papers which the Commander-in-Chief wanted ; and in four hours more he delivered them in person at Umballa!

In the meanwhile, the gallant Rajah of Jheend, with his little well-organised force of 800 men of all arms, attended by Captain M'Andrew, was pressing on as the vanguard of the army, collecting supplies as he went, taking point after point ; first occupying Paneeput, then Sursowlee, and then Raee.

The Maharajah of Puttiala, impatient to be himself also in the fore-front, was hardly persuaded to content himself with sending a small force of horse and foot under his kinsman General Purtab Singh, while he himself remained at Puttiala, nobly co-operating in the scarcely less important duties of protecting and preserving the peace about Thaneyсур and the surrounding district, guarding the main road from Kurnal to Philour, and, indeed, more or less covering the whole country between the Jumna and the Sutlej with a network of levies and police, altogether numbering about 5000 men, and throwing 1000 more into Umballa cantonments.\* To the south-east, again, were the many Manjha Sikh chiefs already mentioned. They rose to a man in favour of Government, gratified

\* His stipulated supply in time of peace is 100 sowars for civil duty at Umballa.

in the confidence placed in them. Mr Barnes's call on them for contingents was promptly met. Some who were inadvertently overlooked, others on whom no such claim lay, came forward, entreating to be allowed to take their share. These contingents, suddenly raised, with no discipline or training, would have been of little value in active service, but now proved invaluable in the character of police, strengthening the *thanas* (police stations), furnishing escorts, guarding roads, and suppressing every attempt at mutiny or even robbery. Some of these chieftains, too, placed themselves at the head of their little contingents, and did good service during those eventful days of misrule, presenting a perfect "non-conducting medium" between the Punjab and the turbulent districts across the Jumna.

Behind the *breakwater* thus thrown out by the Jheend and Puttiala forces to repel the billows of rebellion raging beyond, all was comparatively still water; here the detachments of troops from Umballa were moving on and forming up, preparing to throw their concentrated strength on Delhi.

One change had taken place in the advancing army. At the earnest remonstrance of the officers and men of the European regiments, the 60th N. I., the only native corps (besides a squadron of 4th Cavalry) in the force, were withdrawn, and sent off to Rohtuk to reoccupy that station. They were not to be trusted, and treachery within might have proved fatal to the whole force. Yet if the Europeans regarded the presence of

the 60th N. I. as dangerous, it may be doubted if the men of the 60th were not themselves in greater danger from the Europeans. Every day's advance brought maddening proofs of Poorbeah and Goojur atrocities. Fugitives, who had been providentially preserved from the Delhi fiends and Goojur monsters, were coming in—Dr Balfour and Miss Smith, Sir T. Metcalfe, Lieut. C. Thomason, and many more, each with their tales of suffering. In villages along the roadside were found trophies of robbery and murder; English ornaments and dresses. Villagers, even at the foot of the gallows, exultingly told of women defamed and murdered, and children butchered! What wonder if *revenge* were the ruling passion in many an English soldier's breast at such tales and such sights! What wonder if a Poorbeah regiment in the force were neither welcome nor safe!

The tidings from Delhi, too, were gloomy and saddening. Spies were thrown in by the Jheend Rajah, through whom it became known that the delay at Umballa, so fatal to the health of the troops, had not been without its opposite effect on the mutineers. In the city, the first burst of excitement and consequent disorganisation had gradually settled down. The rebels, emboldened by our delay in advancing, were beginning to think of making a stand and preparing for defence, strengthened as they were already by sowars from the Gwalior Contingent and other places. Mirza Aboo Bukr, the son of the late heir-apparent, had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Forces. Let-

ters had been sent by the King to all the native princes around, calling on them to rally round their "liege lord," and everything betokened a determined resistance. The Nawab of Jhujjur had openly joined them, and the Bullubgurh Chief was ready to play the traitor.

At this time occurred an incident demanding special notice. A letter from the King of Delhi was found one morning in the letter-box at the gate of the Puttiala chief's palace, calling on the Maharajah to rally round the "Imperial" standard. It ran as follows :—

"To him of noble rank and lordly dignity, our own devoted vassal, worthy of our confidence and favour, the union of benevolence and high-mindedness, NERINDER SINGH BAHADUR, the Maharajah of Puttiala.

*"Dated the 21st Ramazan.*

"My life is passing from my lips, come, then, that I may survive ;  
For if I cease to be, what will become of you ?

"Of the downfall of the present Government, and of the great revolutions in the course of development, which are at present being bruited about, you have heard from the papers. Relying upon your well-proved devotedness and loyalty towards this our favour-bestowing family, you are written to, that with all possible speed you present yourself at our court, resembling that of *Khusrau* (Cyrus), with a suitably equipped force.

"This matter admits of no delay, for in this extremity  
There is neither plan of attack nor way of escape.

"In such strait, therefore, it behoves you, as you desire the



increase of our power and our welfare, to obey this summons without delay."

The Maharajah—the grandson of Sahib Singh, on whom the *Sunnud* (royal patent) of Akhbar Shah (the father of the traitor King of Delhi) had, at the dictation of the British Government, conferred that title in 1817—no sooner received this letter from the "Lion's mouth" at his palace gate,\* than he at once, *with unhesitating loyalty*,† forwarded it to Mr Barnes for transmission to the Chief Commissioner—an act which set the seal to his allegiance.

At Umballa the aspect of affairs continued much the same, taxing the utmost caution and vigour to suppress the first signs of disaffection. The two companies of the 5th N. I. had come in from Roopur; five men concerned in the riot at Roopur were identified, and tried by a civil commission, and, with the sirdar Mohur Singh, were sentenced to death. Four native officers were tried by court-martial for the military offence of concealing mutiny, and were also capitally sentenced; the rest of the two companies were disarmed and disbanded. The station itself remained quiet, but the country was much disturbed. Small bands of Ferozepore fugitives passing through were screened by the

\* At the palace of the Maharajah of Puttiala is a box fixed against the outer gate, into which all letters, complaints, petitions, &c., are placed, and the contents daily laid before the Maharajah. In this box the letter from the King of Delhi was found.

† *Unhesitating loyalty* his was. The story—which appears in a work entitled *The Crisis in the Punjab*—of the Maharajah's taking two days to consider which course he should adopt, is at once refuted.

villagers, so that attempts made to cut them off by small parties from Umballa were always unsuccessful; they were never caught!

From the westward appalling rumours were coming in. The advance of the rebels on Rohtuk had lost us that treasury, though providentially Mr J. A. Loch and the other European residents were able to effect their escape into the Puttiala district, and thence came into Kurnal and Umballa. Reports came in that four of the rebel troopers had galloped on, carrying along the torch of rebellion, and that Hurrianah,\* that land of fertility, was in a blaze, and that every Christian in Hansi and Hissar had been massacred. This proved not to be literally true, for some few did escape; but the sacrifice of life, of every age and sex, was appalling; and the atrocities perpetrated in that district were scarcely less awful than those which Delhi itself had witnessed a fortnight before. Some sowars sent in by the Nawab of Dadree, at Mr J. Wedderburn's request, first caught the infection. The Eed † (May the 25th) had been allowed to pass over without any Mohammedan demonstration and uproar; but on the 29th they threw off all restraint. Carrying with them the 4th Irregular Cavalry, they opened the jail, released the prisoners, attacked the civilians in their very kutcheries. The *chuprasees*, and the sepoys of the Hurrianah Light Infantry, proving faithless, all fell easy victims. The rebellion at once spread through the whole district: a few hours saw Hansi, Hissar, and

\* Said to be called so from its verdure—*hurree* (green).

† A great Mohammedan festival.

Sirsee involved in one common ruin. The population around rose, and equalled in cold-blooded atrocities the Goojurs of the neighbouring district, hunting down and most barbarously ill-treating all who had succeeded in escaping from the treacherous sowars and sepoys. The Nawabs of Dadree and Runneea were believed to be deeply implicated. The Bikaneer rajah stood forth nobly, and sheltered all who could escape into his territory, and by him many lives were saved. To punish these rebels, and the still more inhuman Ranghur population, General Van Courtland, of Sikh repute, who had been in civil employ since the annexation, and was at the time at Ferozepore, was called on to raise a force. Readily did he desert the pen and the office-desk to resume the sword and saddle. His name acted like a charm: many an old Sikh who had laid aside the sword for the ploughshare now sprang forward at the call; and he who had held high command in the days of Runjeet Singh, found Sikhs again rallying to his standard, and was soon surrounded by a body of old trained soldiers.\* The Bikaneer rajah sent at once 500 men; and the Nawab of Bhawulpore was called on for a similar force, which he reluctantly and tardily supplied. General Van Courtland was soon in the field with a force sufficient to reconquer and hold that district.

At Lahore little had occurred since the morning of

\* Many of the fine old fellows knew perfectly the European drill, but only the *French* words of command, which told of the days when Runjeet had his forces trained by such men as Ventura, and Allard, and Avitabile.

the 13th May. The fort was safe, and strongly garrisoned by Europeans ; and the cantonment of Mean Meer retained the same appearance of quiet guardedness.

Only one change had taken place : the Sikh sepoy of the three N. I. corps, hurt at being involved in the common disgrace with their Poorbeah comrades, had respectfully remonstrated ; and Brigadier Corbett, at the suggestion of Mr D. F. McLeod,\* rejoicing to be able to show his confidence in their unshaken loyalty, drafted them out of their several regiments, formed them into a separate body, and restored to them their arms. Cheering was it to mark the happy look and buoyant step with which these men, fretting, as they had done with downcast air at the implied suspicion, now accepted these proofs of restored confidence,† and with ready zeal relieved the Europeans of some of their heavy and almost incessant guards. This, too, was followed by another important step. To show the fullest confidence in this class, an order was issued that *all Sikhs* belonging to regiments quartered south of Umballa, who were on leave north of the Sutlej, should present themselves at Lahore. Here they soon congregated, and at once became the nuclei of new regiments.

One cause of anxiety certainly remained : the 8th

\* *Punjab Mutiny Report*, para. 190.

† This was most striking. The author was passing through Lahore at the time, and was struck with the change. Shortly after, a further separation took place. The *Bhojporees*, natives of a district so called near Benares, were singled out and kept apart from the Poorbeahs.

Cavalry, though disarmed, were still mounted, and as such were a formidable body. The means, however, were now close at hand for giving the finishing-stroke to the bold measure of May the 13th ; for with the arrival of the Moveable Column, which was already within three marches, and was being hurried on, this cause of anxiety would be at once removed.

In its now reduced proportions, the Column entered Lahore on the morning of the 3d of June, consisting of H. M. 52d Light Infantry, under Colonel Campbell ; \* Major M. Dawes' troop of horse-artillery ; Captain G. Bouchier's company and light field-battery ; Major R. E. Knatchbull's native company and battery ; a wing of the 9th Light Cavalry, under Major W. Baker ; the 16th Irregular Cavalry, under Major W. W. Davidson ; a wing of the 17th Irregular Cavalry, under Captain P. R. Hockin ; and the 35th Light Infantry, under Colonel A. G. F. J. Younghusband.† The arrival of the column from above, and the 2d Punjab Cavalry, under Captain Nicholson, from Kohat, furnished the means of

\* When the order came for H. M. 52d Light Infantry and the Artillery to join the Moveable Column, Brigadier Brind had, on his own responsibility, held back 200 men of the 52d, and two guns of Dawes' troop, for the safety of the station of Sealkote, where the 46th N. I. and a wing of the 9th Cavalry still remained ; but a peremptory order came for them, and this little force was most reluctantly sent off by the brigadier, under Colonel Dennis of the 52d, to overtake the Column at Lahore. H. M. 24th Regiment and the Kumaon Battalion (Goor-khas) had crossed the Chenab and encamped at Wuzzeerabad, when, on the night of the 29th May, they were summoned back towards the frontier.

† The Moveable Column found temporary accommodation in the old disused lines which, in the days of "the Regency," had held the Army of Occupation.

completely disabling the disaffected troopers of the 8th Cavalry. This was effected in the following manner : by a slight change in the usual marching-order of the Column, as they entered Lahore, H. M. 52d were placed in front ; and it had been privately communicated to the officer commanding, that while the left wing and the rest of the Column halted at Annarkullee, the right wing was to march on to Mean Meer (six miles farther on), and take up ground at the central picket. It arrived in the dim twilight, and drew up alongside the picket, which consisted of two companies of H. M. 81st Foot, and four guns of the horse-artillery, and Nicholson's irregular cavalry. The 8th were then ordered out. Overawed by the presence of so large a European force close by, and the unsympathising Punjabees at their side, they sullenly obeyed the order to dismount. Many of the troopers maliciously let loose their horses, which, freed from all restraint, bore down on those of the irregulars, causing great confusion and some injury among the irregular sowars : Captain Nicholson himself was lamed by a severe kick in the *mêlée*. The feat, however, was achieved.

The column halted at Lahore for a week, and during that time was called on to witness and take part in, for the first time, a public execution, which for many weeks after was to be a painfully familiar scene. Two sepoys of the 35th Light Infantry were charged with using seditious language, and endeavouring to instigate their comrades to open mutiny. They were tried, and condemned to be blown away from guns. Three native

officers who reported their conduct, and bore witness against them, were deservedly rewarded. The execution took place on the 9th of June in the presence of the whole column. At its close, Brigadier-General Chamberlain addressed the 35th Light Infantry, in his own manly style, to the following effect :—

“Native Officers and Soldiers of the 35th Light Infantry,— You have just seen two men of your own regiment blown from guns. This is the punishment I will inflict on all traitors and mutineers, and your consciences will tell you what punishment they may expect hereafter. Those men have been blown from a gun, and not hung, because they were Brahmins, and I wished to save them from the pollution of the hangman's (sweeper's) touch, and thus prove to you that the British Government does not wish to injure your caste and religion. I call upon you to remember that each one of you has sworn to be obedient and faithful to your salt. Fulfil this sacred oath, and not a hair of your head shall be hurt. God forbid that I should have to take the life of another soldier; but, like you, I have sworn to be faithful and do my duty, and I will fulfil my vow by blowing away every man guilty of sedition and mutiny, as I have done to-day. Listen to no evil counsel, but do your duty as good soldiers. You all know full well that the reports about the cartridges are lies, propagated by traitors whose only desire is to rob and murder. These scoundrels, who profess to find cow's and pig's fat in the cartridges, no longer think them forbidden when they break into mutiny, and shoot down women and children. Subahdar Gyadeen Patuck, Subahdar Roostum Singh, and Havildar Gunga Deen Chowby, you have done well. I will bring your conduct to the notice of the Governor-General of India, who will reward your loyalty. Private Ramphul Sookul, you heard the mutinous and seditious language which

was spoken by the two sepoy, and on the court-martial you would not give evidence. You are false to your salt, and shall be punished.'

That night saw the column again on the move. Early the previous morning, the telegraph brought up from Jullundhur the announcement that the sepoy there had risen: some officers were wounded, and the mutineers were making for Philour. The tidings did not at first cause any great anxiety: on the contrary, it seemed a relief that they had gone, and the European force at Jullundhur would now be free to act. Their escape was thought impossible. With a European regiment and a troop of horse-artillery in the station, the Sutlej a few miles beyond, with the fort at Philour strongly garrisoned, and Rothney's 4th Sikhs on the left bank ready to dispute their passage, their destruction seemed inevitable. But the next day dispelled all such hopes. As soon as the telegraphic wire was repaired, which the rebels had cut, it brought up the saddening news that hours had been suffered to escape before the pursuit was attempted, that the mutineers had got clear away, and were broken up into bands in different directions, threatening to disturb the whole country.

It was this disastrous news which hurried off Chamberlain, and in two forced marches he brought the column into Umritsur. The great fear was, lest that city, with its vast population, ever ill at ease, and now likely to be emboldened by the Jullundhur outbreak, and incited by any stragglers moving upwards, might rise *en masse* and make an attack on Govindghur.



Providentially Umritsur, as has been already described, was "a city divided against itself" Mohammedan and Sikh rivalled each other in mutual hatred. Nevertheless, there was danger from either, if not from both. The Mohammedans, indeed, wanted a *leader*; he who *could* have raised every Mussulman in the Punjab, Sheik Imam-ooddeen, of Lahore and Cashmere notoriety, had died only a few months before. The Sikhs happened to be still more without a *head*, or perhaps an *aim*. Twelve years of subjection had seen all their leaders pass away. The last reputed scion of the house of Runjeet Singh had become a Christian and a Scottish laird. The last idol of their punchayuts, Tej Singh, who led them at Ferozeshah and Sobraon, now lived on, a decrepid old man, thankful for quiet, and safety, and a pension, in the palace of his gallant old uncle, Kooshayal Singh, "the jemadar." This Nestor of "the Khalsa" rarely visited his magnificent summer-house at Umritsur, or showed himself among the fanatic devotees at the shrine of Gooroo Ram Das. Shere Singh, the noblest and most beloved of their leaders in the Punjab campaign, was now a prisoner at Calcutta; while Bikrama Singh, the heir of all the honours of their warrior Gooroo Govind, the Bedee of Bedees,\* the high-priest of Sikhdom, was virtually a prisoner within the walls of his own holy city. † His enfeebled frame

\* The priestly family among the Sikhs; the lineal descendants of their founder, Baba Nanuck, who was of the Bedee caste.

† So complete was the state of confinement and surveillance considered necessary for the safety of this wily fanatic, that during these troublous times even the privilege, hitherto enjoyed, of *riding a little pony*, was withdrawn. He was daily required to pay a visit of cour-

and trembling hand mocked the fire that still flashed from that restless ambitious eye. Government had little now to fear from this old Calchas of the Sikh armies. All these things were negatively against an *emeute* at Umritsur. Still the Mohammedan retains his love of plunder, and his hatred of the Christian who now rules in the land his ancestors had conquered ; \* and the Sikh as little loves the power which, though it rescued them from Panchayut thralldom and misrule, and has given peace and security in the place of a suicidal war, has scattered his nationality to the winds : and it was felt that both might yet, in that hour of our danger, merge their fanatical rivalry and hatred, in the hope of destroying *the stranger* who had humbled both. *This* brought the column to Umritsur : and the morning of June 10th saw it in firm possession of the Ram Bagh, and encamped under the walls of the city.

But it is time to consider the actual events at Jullundur which had called for this move. The admirable arrangements so promptly adopted by Colonel Hartley, then commanding the brigade, and Captain Farrington, the Deputy-Commissioner, on the 12th May, have been already described. Little had occurred to disturb the peace thus secured. In the city, hard by, there

tesy—i. e. personally to report himself to the chief civilian of the station, F. Cooper, Esq. ; and on the occasion of one of these visits the author was *presented* to him.

\* A desperate conspiracy was indeed formed, in which some of the leading officials of the local court and a jemadar of police were implicated ; but, being purely Mohammedan, it was disclosed by some Sikhs.

had been occasional alarms ; the minds of the population not unnaturally swayed to and fro by each rumour that reached them. But the Kuppoothulla rajah was ever at hand ; his presence and council soon restored quiet and confidence. Of this Sikh chief it is impossible to speak too highly. "His conduct throughout," says Captain Farrington,\* "has been excellent ; he has shown himself fully worthy of the confidence that has been reposed in him. The promptness with which he took so decided a part in aid of good order had a good effect in the district. From the moment I called on him to aid, he came forward, and with his officials entered into the cause of Government most heartily. He and his brother, both at much personal inconvenience, remained here from the first for several months." To their personal influence and persuasions, allaying any symptoms of alarm or disturbance directly they manifested themselves, the peace of the town and district is greatly due.

But in cantonments the aspect of affairs was far less satisfactory. There was a semblance of quiet, and no open defiance of order : but a sullen and sometimes scarcely passive spirit of disaffection prevailed among the sepoy.† They complained that the precautions which had been adopted implied distrust, and with a charming air of injured innocence protested against

\* In a private letter to the author.

† There had been several fires in cantonments. The merchants and tradesmen of the Sudder Bazaar were beginning to move away their property into the city for safety, showing how little they trusted the sepoy.

suspicious being entertained of their fidelity. Colonel Hartley met these protestations with great tact. He had each corps paraded on its own ground; and taking Captain T. H. Sibley, the commissariat officer, as his interpreter, he addressed them separately, professing to give them full credit for stanchness, yet making them understand that he was ready for them at the first sign of mutiny. "So long as they remained quiet, not a hair of their heads should be touched," was his promise; but the warning implied was "death to the traitor." This frankness had for a time the desired effect. But changes in the command, and events, though in themselves comparatively trifling, soon began to disturb the seeming quiet.

The first bone of contention was the civil treasure. This was ordinarily kept under a sepoy guard at the kutcherry. Captain Farrington suggested its being moved into the quarter-guard of H. M. 8th Regiment; but his suggestion was overruled by the officers commanding the native corps, who objected that it would needlessly wound the feelings of their men. His only alternative was to place over it, as a check on the sepoy guard, a small body of the rajah's men, pending a reference to the Chief Commissioner. The reply of Sir John Lawrence was not long in coming, and required the immediate transfer of the treasure to the European guard; pointing out that "its loss would strengthen the enemy and be *really discreditable* to us." So it was brought into cantonments on the 16th of May. The next day Brigadier Johnstone, having

hurried down from Simla, resumed command. His first impulse was to disarm the whole of the native troops; and he was hardly dissuaded from it by the representation that Colonel Hartley had pledged himself that they should be untouched during good conduct; and they had since done nothing to forfeit that pledge. To *break faith* with them would have proved as impolitic as it would have been unworthy of our rule.

Having given way on this point, Brigadier Johnstone could then see nothing short of restoring full confidence to the sepoys. And, as a first step, influenced by their commanding officers, he (on the 18th) ordered that the whole civil treasure, amounting to 60,000 rupees, which two days before had been rescued from the sepoy guard, should—not be sent back to the kutcherry, but—be given up entirely into the hands of the native infantry regiments, half to each, and be placed in their regimental main-guards! Nor was even this humiliation enough. The wounded feelings of the “faithful” sepoys were to be still farther soothed. They were evidently not prepared for such condescension; they could not believe in its reality; they declared that false treasure chests must have been substituted; and, to satisfy themselves that there was no deception, they insisted on having the treasure counted over to them! And it was complied with!! The madness of such a step who could not see? Sir John Lawrence heard of it in amazement. General Reed instantly counter-ordered it. A telegraph message

was flashed down from Rawul Pindee ordering the treasure chests to be immediately restored to the European guard. But it was now too late. Nothing could have saved an outbreak. And the order, at the earnest suggestion of the Jullundhur civilians, was cancelled. The money remained with the native guards; but Captain Farrington took care it should grow "small by degrees and beautifully less." Every payment now made was drawn from this money; so that by the time the outbreak did take place, the amount had been so much reduced that the actual loss was inconsiderable—not equal to the arrears of pay due to the native corps.

This was the most important event which occurred at Jullundhur in the month of May, and has been detailed in full to show how the steps were leading on to the final outbreak. Other matters of less importance were also leading to the same result. Fires were revived; secret meetings were being held night after night; spies reported that the great mass of the native regiments were mutinous, and that "very soon blood would flow." At the Paymaster's office a further warning was given of the state of feeling. 'On the 2d of June, some writing in charcoal was discovered on the wall, pointing out three men, who were regarded with much confidence by the authorities, as persons of bad character.\* Major Hill, the Paymaster, himself ques-

\* The following is a translation: "Bikharee Singh, subahdar, son of Kabab Kās Chund; Hingan Khan, subahdar; Munoo Sing, havildar-major: regard these three men as devisers of evil counsel."

On the opposite wall the following was written: "These are very

tioned the guard of the 36th N. I. at the office as to the writer, but could elicit no information. He then reported the whole to the brigadier, who required the commanding officer of the corps to institute an inquiry; but nothing resulted. In fact, everything tended to show that the sepoys felt themselves to be masters, and in conscious strength had only to wait their own time and convenience to enter on the work of carnage and plunder. In the prompt disarming of the troops lay the only security against loss of life: this might now be effected easily, for the safety of the out-stations had been provided for—yet they were not disarmed: the brigadier, at first so eager for this step, now shrank from it. In vain did the Punjab authorities urge it. The officers commanding the native infantry regiments protested; and the sepoys remained armed.

Shall we altogether condemn officers who, having passed so many years among sepoys, and inheriting the faith in their devoted loyalty and affection handed down in the regiments from the days of Lake, Ochterlony, Hastings, and such generals—not to speak of the more recent testimony of men like Pollock and Nott—still insisted on the unshaken faithfulness of their men? The feeling was natural, indeed laudable, under ordinary circumstances; but, it may be asked, was there nothing in the present attitude of the Bengal army to

bad men" (then followed a term of abuse); "on the day that the event will occur they shall not escape—mind this. He who erases this writing will share the same fate." Two of these men remained firm and escaped, the third was said to have been carried away forcibly by the mutineers.

furnish more than sufficient reason for wavering in such a belief *now*? Every day brought tidings of defection in other regiments; not only Meerut and Delhi, but Hurrianah also; Ferozepore, too, close to their own doors; then Moradabad, Bareilly, the whole of Rohilkund, and other stations, had borne witness to the general disaffection of native regiments. And when so many had shown themselves to be false, who could say that his were true? The officers persisted, however, in professing to trust in their men, and won over the brigadier to their view. Both they and he soon had cause to rue such misplaced confidence.

Is it too much to say that if Brigadier Johnstone had acted with as much decision and promptness as the other Punjab generals, Jullundhur might have been as Lahore and Peshawur? Had he received the remonstrances of officers commanding native corps with the firmness of Brigadier Corbett at Lahore, or with the same disregard as General Nicholson, who never consulted them; or had he adopted the bold plan of General Cotton at Peshawur, who required the officers to prove their faith in their regiments, whose stanchness they were so loud in advocating, by sleeping in the sepoy lines, thus involving their own personal safety in the good conduct of their men; may it not be said that the catastrophe which at length befell Jullundhur might, in all human probability, have been averted?

Thus, however, matters continued, getting from bad to worse: fires were more frequent; the bearing of the



sepoys more defiant. Occasionally, indeed, they gave up men on the charge of using mutinous language—but never their own comrades.\* Major Lake, the Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej States (the Jullundhur division), who had been absent in the district at the time of the Meerut and Delhi massacres, had now returned to Jullundhur. Having, with his wonted energy and promptness, provided for the safety of Kangra and Hosheypore, and the rest of his division, he added the weight of his arguments and influence in favour of now † disarming these native regiments. At length the brigadier consented; a regular plan of operations was agreed upon. The time was most opportune; for in addition to the European force in cantonments, consisting of H. M. 8th (King's) Regiment and one troop of European artillery, with a troop of native horse

\* In one instance a man was brought up for going into the lines of the 36th and alarming the men (in a similar way another man had gone into the 61st); it was discovered that these men had both been sent by a pundit's brother to a man who read the "Bhagurut" to the men of the 61st. This pundit was tried, and sentenced to transportation for life; but his sentence was afterwards commuted to one year's imprisonment. Instead of being made over to a European guard, the man was placed in the quarter guard of the 61st N. I., with which regiment he was connected! What wonder that in the outbreak he was quickly released, and escaped?


† Major Lake had at first deprecated the disarming: for two reasons—first, because he feared that it might compromise the lives of the residents in the several small out-stations, where the native detachments might rise in revenge, and where there were no European troops to oppose them; and, secondly, because the whole European force at Jullundhur would be tied down watching the disarmed sepoys, as was necessarily the case at Lahore. When, however, matters became more serious, he urged it as being, with all its risks, the only course that held out any hope of safety.

artillery which had just arrived from Hosheypore, there were the 4th Sikhs, under Capt. O. Rothney, passing through the station, who were halted there purposely to aid in the disarming, while a small body of the 2d Punjab Cavalry, under Lieut. Charles Nicholson, were close at hand on their way from Lahore. With such a force in and around Jullundhur, resistance would have been fatal to the sepoys.

Everything was thus settled for the morning of June 6th (Saturday), when, the afternoon before, the brigadier again gave way, and the only course which could have saved Jullundhur from bloodshed was abandoned. The 4th Sikhs marched on, and left Jullundhur encircled and enveloped in deeper danger than ever.

Again the disarming was decided on to take place on the Sunday morning (June 7th); but Major Lake, the Commissioner, suggested that so unusual a parade might arouse suspicion; and it was again put off. It was scarcely possible that, amid so much vacillation, the secret should not ooze out and reach the ears of the sepoys. It evidently had done so; and they determined to anticipate the intended degradation. About eleven o'clock on Sunday night, the too common alarm of "fire!" was raised. Colonel Hartley's house was in flames. But the report of musket-shots in the direction of the native lines told of something more serious than the destruction of some luckless bungalow—an occurrence with which the residents of Jullundhur had by this time become tolerably familiarised. There was no doubt that at last the sepoys were "*up*."



$$\pi_{\mathcal{P}}: \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}_{\text{fin}}, \quad \pi_{\mathcal{P}}(f) = \{x \in \mathcal{P} : f(x) \neq 0\}$$


A general call to arms was sounded : officers hastened to their respective parades ; ladies with their families flocked to the artillery and European infantry barracks ; H. M. 8th soon turned out, and 200 of them were brought down by Colonel Longfield to the artillery lines ; the artillery officers and men were at their guns ; and all was ready for the impending crisis.

As far as can be gathered from the various and conflicting reports, the outbreak occurred in the following order : The cavalry, here, as elsewhere, headed the onslaught ; some few of them passed down to the rear of the 36th N. I. parade, towards the infantry barracks, where they suddenly fired off their carbines and pistols, and then rushed into the lines of the 36th N. I., declaring that the "*Gora log*" (the European soldiers) were coming down upon them. This feint was evidently preconcerted by the leading mutineers to raise the 36th *en masse*.\*

The troopers then galloped towards the artillery, and, approaching the guns of the native troop (Captain Smyth's), which were on the extreme right, called out to the *golundazes* (native gunners) to join them, and turn the guns on the officers. This appeal was promptly responded to by a volley of grape, followed rapidly by two or three rounds more, which brought down some of

, \* To complete the deception, it has been asserted that sepoys in *undress* (white) had been sent out to move along as skirmishers across the parade from the direction of the European lines ; for the summer dress of the European soldiers was *white drill*.

the leading mutineers and a couple of horses,\* besides wounding a considerable number, and sent the rest in quick retreat. At the same time another small body of cavalry and a considerable number of infantry came up near the guns along the front, and balls flew in thick among the officers and men ; but Brigadier Johnstone forbade them to return the fire, lest any should be really *stanch* ! A third party of troopers had ridden off at the first to the civil lines and the town, hoping to surprise or win over the Kuppurthulla rajah's men, who were on guard there ; but a challenge and threat of resistance showed them their mistake, and they returned to cantonments.

The officers had quickly assembled on the cavalry parade-ground. There Major Macmullen, an officer greatly respected by the men, who had only a few days before succeeded to the command of the regiment, was fearlessly endeavouring to restrain them. Seeing a trooper in the act of mounting, he tried to pull him off, when the wretch drew his pistol and fired, and the ball wounded Major Macmullen's left hand. Finding that remonstrances and reproaches alike failed to bring the men to order, he fell back on the quarter-guard, where he observed several troopers standing passive and apparently quiet. He at once ordered a "roll-call," and a few kind words of encouragement kept these men *stanch* for the night.

\* These were found dead the following morning ; the wounded they carried off with them. One of the poor wretches was brought into camp while the pursuing column were halting at Phugwarrah.

On the parade-ground of the 36th N. I. fell the first victim, Lieut. F. J. S. Bagshawe, the adjutant of the corps. He had rallied about one hundred men of the regiment around him, and was apparently bringing them to reason, when a trooper rode up and shot him. The wound was at once pronounced dangerous, yet hopes were entertained for him. However, with a constitution on which the Sutlej and Punjab campaigns had left effects even deeper than the wounds he received at Aliwal and Chillianwalla, he had not strength to rally. He lingered a few days, and died as humble and devout a Christian as he had lived a bold and brave soldier.\*

In the lines of the 61st a very different scene presented itself. Here the sepoys were knotted together in groups, some frantically calling down curses on their officers; others, more peacefully disposed, wavering what course to take. In the midst of a group of the latter stood Major J. C. Innes, with some of the other officers, endeavouring to keep the men stanch, when a body of their mutinous comrades, headed by some troopers, were seen moving down upon them. A havildar and some forty sepoys at once perceived the danger, surrounded the officers, and, falling back towards the quarter-guard, brought them off in safety. Here they dressed them in *chudders* (sheets) and turbans to disguise them, and then concealed them by making them sit on the ground and standing in a circle round them. A party of the mutineers from all the

\* Ensign Bates of the 36th was also wounded severely by a blunt sword, and his right arm was long disabled.

corps soon after entered the quarter-guard, and began breaking open the treasure-chest, in dangerous proximity to the concealed officers, when an old havildar, just pensioned, saved them by a clever device. Pretending to be afraid that the sepoys were going to hurt him as they crowded round, he warned them that, as they knew he had been invalided for rheumatism, he would *curse* any one that caused him pain. In superstitious dread, they quickly backed out, dragging the treasure-chest with them, and the door was closed behind them. The faithful sepoys then lifted their officers up through a trap-door to the roof of the quarter-guard; where, lying down under shelter of the parapet, they watched in safety the scene of confusion below. There were some wrangling over the division of the spoil, others filling pouches and haversacks with rupees, and all yelling out bloodthirsty fiendish execrations against the English. In this hidingplace Major Innes and the other officers remained till morning undisturbed.\*

That Major Innes should thus have been rescued by the faithful few of his regiment, is not to be wondered at. He had completed, within a few days, his twenty-ninth year of service among them, rising from ensign to commandant, and in every rank gaining their confidence and respect. During the whole of that period he had scarcely been for a single day absent from his corps.

All the men who aided this rescue of their officers were rewarded with promotion according to their ranks.

\* Of the 61st, the following officers were wounded: Captain Basden, Ensign Hawkins and Durnford. The latter died subsequently of fever.



The havildar received also a present of 200 rupees, and the old pensioner 150 rupees.

Nor were Major Innes's party the only persons who were found concealed, and similarly preserved through the dangers of that night. Mrs Fagan, the wife of Captain Fagan, the engineer officer, has been already mentioned as being, with her sister-in-law, Miss Fagan, the only lady who, from the first, would not sleep at the artillery barracks.\* She had not for a single night left her own house, though it was so isolated and remote from the barracks ; nor on this eventful night of the outbreak would she leave it. In the compound was the treasure-chest of the engineer's department, under a sepoy guard. On the first sounds of the firing, Mrs Fagan went out boldly to the havildar of the guard, and told him there were only women and children in the house, and, whatever might happen, she placed their lives in his hands. He said to her, "Go in, and shut all the doors and windows, and put out all the lights, and do not suffer a single person to enter the house, and I will answer for your safety with my life!" He could not save the Government treasure, which the guard under him plundered, but he fulfilled his pledge to her ; and on the following morning Mrs Fagan and her family were given up uninjured to the European patrolling party who had come in search of them. For this act the havildar received his well-merited promotion. The fearless Mrs Fagan—now, alas ! a

\* One other lady who evinced a similar courage was Mrs Bagshawe, the wife of Lieutenant Bagshawe.

widow\*—is a living witness to the effect of boldness and confidence even on mutinous sepoys !

The treasure-chest of the 36th N. I. was protected by the guard, brought into the artillery lines at ten o'clock the next day, with its contents of 10,000 rupees untouched. The subahdar of this guard, who had been mainly instrumental in preserving the treasure, and who had previously shown his fidelity by giving up men caught in the lines preaching treason, was rewarded with a first-class Order of Merit and 1000 rupees ; and all the rest of the guard who remained true were promoted. The paymaster's treasure-chest was also protected by its guard, who were rewarded with promotion.

On the following morning it was found that nearly 140 of the 36th of all ranks had remained true, and of the 61st about 80. Of these a considerable number were Sikhs. Several young Sikh recruits, however, had been compulsorily drawn off by their comrades ; but, taking advantage of a violent dust-storm which came on when the mutineers were only a few miles out of cantonments, these men slipped away, and crossing the Beas, made for their own homes in the *Manjha* country; here they were quickly discovered, and brought before the civil authorities at Umritsur, but having told their plain ingenuous tale, they were liberated. Early in the morning Major Macmullen ordered another

\* Captain Fagan was killed in the trenches at Delhi on the 12th September. In announcing his death, General Wilson describes him as "an officer who has earned the admiration of the whole force by his constant cheerfulness, energy, and high courage."

roll-call of the cavalry, when many more names appeared than on the previous night. These men were at once ordered to bring out their accoutrements for inspection : on many of them were found signs of blood and dust, betraying their owners as having taken part in the fray. These, about a dozen in number, were tried by drum-head court-martial, condemned, and shot. Some troopers also presented themselves at the regimental hospital and showed wounds—" *gráp lugga* " (grape-shot)—said they, and they shared the same fate.\*

The work of bloodshed and plunder scarcely lasted an hour and a half. By a little after twelve o'clock at night the mutineers had collected together on the main road, and began their march for Philour station. No sooner were they clear of the station, than Lieutenant Sankey (adjutant of the artillery division) proposed that the station should be patrolled, to keep down any tendency to looting on the part of camp-followers and bazaar *budmashes*. Taking with him a division of Major Oliphant's troop, with a few of the irregular cavalry under Lieutenant Probyn, and some of H. M. 8th, he traversed the station, accompanied by Major Lake ; thus reassuring the frightened denizens of the bazaar (who now began to tremble for their property), and restoring peace and confidence. Subsequently, when the pursuing column moved out of Jullundhur, the Kuppurthulla rajah supplied the necessary guards for the public buildings, and the district police were

\* Some post-office peons, also, were executed for robbing the post-office treasury.

brought in to protect private houses. "From the time the mutineers left," to use Captain Farrington's own words, "not a fire took place, nor was there a single robbery."

About three o'clock in the morning Brigadier Johnstone resolved on a pursuit; the column to consist of 200 of H. M. 8th, under Colonel Longfield, with six guns, four of the European, with two of the native troop, under Major H. A. Olpherts. Captain O. Farrington brought in 150 of the rajah's sowars, and a small body of mounted civil police, with which he accompanied the pursuing column. It was nearly seven o'clock before the force got clear of cantonments. There were some doubts as to the road taken by the mutineers—whether to Philour or Hosheyarpore; but the column had not proceeded far when they received reliable information that Philour had been the route. With six hours fair start, the mutineers were encamped on the parade-ground at Philour, fraternising with the 3d N. I., who had swelled their ranks, when the pursuing column was marching out of Jullundhur.

*Golden hours had been lost!* hours, too, of comparatively cool night and early dawn; while before them now were scorching, blasting hours, each more scorching and blasting than the last, under a June sun! On they went, however, eager to overtake the rebels, and murmuring only at the delay that had already taken place. They had only marched six miles, and reached Phugwarrah, where the signs of destruction and plundering which the mutineers had perpetrated on the

way incited them onward with renewed ardour, when the bugle *sounded a halt*. Here more time was lost, more golden hours fled by, with the only compensation that about noon Nicholson's 2d Punjab Cavalry, by a forced march, overtook them. As soon as these cavalry horses were a little rested, Capt. Farrington, seconded by Major Olpherts and Lieut. Nicholson, urged on the brigadier the necessity of immediate advance, if he wished to save Philour. At length a small force was allowed to advance, consisting of two guns of the European troop, with some sixty of the 8th King's on the gun-carriages, and the 2d Punjab Cavalry under Lieut. Nicholson. With these Major Olpherts pushed on to within three miles of Philour, where they learned from two Sikhs of the 3d N. I. that their regiment had at once joined the mutineers, and that Colonel Butler and all the officers had escaped into the fort. A messenger sent off to Colonel Butler brought back word that the mutineers, finding the bridge of boats broken, had gone to a ferry some four miles farther up the river, and were there crossing over, but very slowly, as they had only three boats.

After some time the brigadier came up with the main body of the column, and they then proceeded to the cantonments; but being utterly ignorant of the localities—not an officer of the force having ever been over the country—and Colonel Butler not sending out from the fort any officer of the 3d N. I. to guide them, the column took up their position for the night as they could, a short distance in front of the lines. There the

men began to prepare for a night's rest after the excitement of the previous night and the fatigues of that day, when, about ten o'clock, the sound of musketry, followed by heavy fire from a field-piece, dispelled all thoughts of sleep. Many a brave soldier, though jaded in body perhaps, and somewhat footsore, started up at the sound, and longed to take part in the victory, or the rescue, as it might be ; but, in ignorance of the country, and in *consideration* for the men, the brigadier refused to advance. What that firing was, and how it was brought about, involves a long though glorious tale ; and the reader must be content to trace back his steps in point of time, and learn the progress of events at another point.

Early in the morning the mutineers had reached Philour, where they found a welcome greeting from the 3d N. I. It is true that this corps had, in strange inconsistency, performed many acts of loyalty to the last. A detachment of them had escorted two lakhs of ammunition to Umballa a few days before the outbreak ; the whole regiment had volunteered to guard the siege-train to Delhi, when it became known that the Nusseeree battalion of Goorkhas at Jutogh had refused to march, and had conveyed it over the bridge of boats in perfect safety ; and one company, under Lieutenants Alexander and Chambers, had gone the whole way to Delhi, and remained true for some time. Yet many suspicious circumstances had occurred : fires had been frequent in the cantonment ; emissaries from the regiment had tried to tamper with the Kupparthulla

rajah's men; and many other symptoms of disaffection had shown themselves. Moreover, there were grave reasons for believing that, on the arrival of the 33d N. I. from Hosheyarpore, who were to relieve them to admit of their going to Ferozepore,\* they would have refused to march. That such a corps, therefore, would sympathise with the mutinous regiments from Jullundhur, and was really ready to receive them with open arms, there would be but little doubt. Yet the 3d N. I. behaved far more nobly, even in their mutiny, than many of the native regiments: all the officers were allowed to escape untouched to the fort. Indeed, the guards turned out and presented arms to Colonel Butler as he passed by on his way there! Nor was any of the injury which was perpetrated in cantonments believed to have been the work of the sepoy.

That morning Mr Thornton, a young civilian, had ridden over from Loodiana to Philour, some five miles distant, to pay the 3d N. I. The money had been made over to the pay-havildars in the fort, when a disturbance was suddenly heard in the lines, and Mr Thornton, seeing a party of sepoy moving in the direction of the bridge of boats, suspected mischief, and with great promptness made the havildars instantly give back the money, and then galloped off for the river. He reached the bank before the sepoy, crossed the bridge, and had it immediately cut away behind him.

\* With a view to their being brought within reach of European artillery and infantry.

He then galloped on to Loodiana, and reported what had happened. A message had in the mean time reached the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr George Ricketts, from Umballa,\* that the Jullundhur troops had risen, and were marching down on Philour; and that he must at once guard or destroy the bridge, and protect the fort at Loodiana. This fort is an old dilapidated building, only used for storing powder (of which 300,000 pounds were in at that time) and leather for artillery accoutrements, while the Philour fort contained the whole of the ordnance and made-up ammunition. The Loodiana fort was also guarded by a company of the 3d N. I., who had detached guards at the treasury and in the town.

It was clear that, despite Mr Thornton's promptness, tidings of the arrival of the Jullundhur mutineers at Philour had reached the Loodiana guard, for they at once seized the fort, closed the gates, and began dragging up and placing the few guns it contained along the rampart. The treasury was also seized, and held by the guard. The 4th Sikhs had that morning marched in from Phugwarrah, a distance of five-and-twenty miles, with orders to halt until the arrival of the 33d N. I. from Hosheyarpore, in order to overawe the latter corps, if, as was thought probable, they refused to evacuate Philour and march to Ferozepore.

The importance and the danger of Loodiana are thus described by Mr Montgomery: "It commands the high

\* This message was not official, but a private one from signaller to signaller. It had been originally sent to Philour fort, but no reply coming from the signaller there, it was flashed through to Umballa, and then sent back by express to Loodiana.



# SKETCH OF THE GHAT at which the

SEVENTEENTH INFANTRY CROSSED  
and were encountered

BY THE 4TH SIKHS UNDER LI WILLIAMS AND MR RICKETS C.S.  
on the Night of June 18th.

From memoirs by  
LIEUT WILLIAMS  
2225 1st Infantry Regiment

Parade Ground  
where the Highlanders  
Force were Encamped  
Tent  
Lines of the 4th



Reference  
Mutiny who could not cross  
of a mile broad  
of Mutiny who had crossed  
of mutiny covered with brush and  
ran on high smooth, open 180 yds from river



road from Delhi to the Punjab. It stands on the bank of the Sutlej at the head of the bridge of boats, connecting Hindostan with the Punjab proper. It is filled with a dissolute, lawless, mixed population of Cabul pensioners, Cashmere shawl-workers, Goojurs, Bowreahts, and other predatory races. There is a fort without Europeans to guard it, a city without regular troops to restrain it, a district traversed by roads in every direction, joining the seven commercial towns which form the emporia of its trade, and situated on a river which for months in the year is a mere network of fordable creeks, which could only be guarded by a cordon of regular troops." \* Such was Loodiana.

It was about noon when Mr Ricketts, having made such arrangements as he could for the safety of the station, ordered off three companies of the 4th Sikhs, under Lieut. G. A. Williams, the second in command, with a small force of the rajah of Nabba's men, consisting of 50 cavalry and 150 artillery, with two light field-pieces (one 6-pounder, drawn by horses, and a 9-pounder, by camels) to oppose the passage of the river—his great object being to resist the main body of mutineers in their attempt to cross, and thus throw them back into the hands of the force which he could not doubt would be in rapid pursuit from Jullundhur.

He himself galloped on ahead to the river's bank, crossed over in the Government ferry-boat, and ran up the opposite shore into the fort at Philour, to get what information he could ; but little or nothing was known

\* *Punjab Mutiny Report*, par. 28.

there, save that the rebels had been seen quietly eating their breakfast on the parade-ground, and appeared to have pushed upwards to one of the ferries, having discreetly kept out of the range of the fort guns. On his return, Mr Ricketts found Lieutenant Williams and his little party arrived at the bank. Here they learnt from a couple of villagers that the rebels were crossing at the *Lussara ghat* (or ferry), some four miles off. On they pushed ; and, what with heavy sand knee-deep, broken ground, and *nullahs* (ditches or natural drains), generally deep and not always dry, it was nearly ten o'clock at night before they had accomplished the distance. When they reached the spot indicated, not a watch-fire was to be seen, not a sound heard ; and they suspected treachery. However, on pushed Mr Ricketts and Lieut. Williams, at the head of the Sikhs, each firmly grasping the arm of a guide. Suddenly a "challenge," then a second, and third, told them they had indeed come on the lair of the rebels. Without noticing the challenge of the pickets, they pushed on *at a double*, when the sentries began to fire on them, and fall back on their supports. The guns were at once unlimbered ; but the horses attached to the 6-pounder took fright, became unmanageable, and bolted, dragging after them tumbrel and ammunition into the midst of the rebels, where they were soon cut to pieces. The 9-pounder, however, was safe, and quickly opened fire, sending a round of *grape* into the part where the rebels could be dimly seen in the clouded moonlight. They returned the fire with musketry, when the Sikhs rushed up into

line, and delivered two splendid volleys. Now, however, it was clear that the struggle was to be maintained by themselves alone, for at the first volley the Nabbarajah's cavalry and infantry bolted to a man. The gallant old commandant of the cavalry alone remained, and he bore himself bravely throughout, never, though wounded severely, leaving the post of danger. To make the following account of this heroic little adventure intelligible, a short account of the locality will be necessary. About three miles above Philour fort there is a ghat or ferry, formed by the projection of a neck of land into the river, while the opposite bank also curves outwardly, and through this contracted channel, not above a quarter of a mile wide, the stream, especially at this season, when greatly swollen by the melted snows, pours down in considerable force. Across this channel the mutineers, having contrived to seize three small boats, had during the day passed over about 1600 of their number, 400 still remaining on the right bank; some of whom were in the act of crossing when the Sikhs began the attack. The main body, as they crossed over, began to concentrate on the curve of the bank, which, being undulating and covered with low brushwood, afforded a good and safe bivouacking ground.

Directly the Sikhs opened fire, the rebels rose up and spread out, right and left, in the form of a crescent. Lieutenant Williams at once threw out his men, not above 100 strong, into skirmishing order, to prevent being out-flanked. The imperfect light greatly

favoured the Sikhs, for they could see the masses of the rebels, and direct their fire with tolerable accuracy and effect, while the return volleys did but little execution upon their own thin scattered line. Nobly was that solitary 9-pounder worked.\* At one moment a volley from the right showed the rebels in force on that quarter: the gun was instantly pointed there, and a charge poured into them. The next moment a volley would come in from the opposite side, when round swung the gun as quick as thought, repaying them with interest. This was Mr Ricketts' special charge; aided by the native officer and two or three gunners, he worked away incessantly—now loading, now spunging, now swinging it round; Lieut. Williams, too, ever and anon giving a helping-hand: but his chief duty lay more in moving about, and regulating his own gallant Sikhs.

For nearly two hours did they two, with that single gun and not above 100 Sikhs, hold their ground against three mutinous regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, and keep them at bay in that curve of the river's bank; hoping and hoping on that the pursuing force, attracted by their firing, would soon be on the rear. But no signs of succour came. At length the ammunition began to fail; the fire of the gun slackened, that of the musketry became weaker: the men, too, were fagged; the long march of the night before, and the

\* So rapid and well sustained was the fire, that the artillery officers with Brigadier Johnstone's column thought there must be two if not three guns at work.

fatigues of the afternoon, began to tell on them. Suddenly, about midnight, the moon burst out from behind a cloud, disclosing their position and the weakness of their numbers. The rebels saw their opportunity; the bugle sounded the "close up;" drawing in on every side, they poured in a murderous volley, to which the gallant Sikhs could reply but feebly. At this moment Lieutenant Williams,\* waving his sword to cheer on his little band to make one more effort, received a wound under the right arm-pit.† A Sikh caught him as he fell: Mr Ricketts instantly sprang to his side, and they carried him off to the rear, and, placing him on a camel, sent him into Loodiana. The struggle was now over: with their officer dangerously wounded, and their ammunition spent, it became hopeless to hold out longer; an orderly retreat was all that remained for them. This they effected admirably under the orders of Mr Ricketts, who himself brought off in safety the old gun that had done them such good service. Seizing the only two remaining camels, he harnessed them to the gun-carriage, and led them off the field. He passed the rest of the night looking to the wounds of the two brave officers of the Nabba's force (the commandants of the artillery and cavalry), who had so bravely stood by him throughout. The

\* Lieutenant Williams's escape up to this time had been most wonderful. He says, in writing to a friend, "A very gallant little Goorkha native officer, wearing the Order of British India, was shot dead close by me; my bugler was hit by my side at the beginning, yet I was preserved to the end.

† The ball broke a rib, and passed through the right lung.

following morning the little force marched back into camp.\*

How differently had that night been passed by the pursuing column! Many a soldier heart was there,—

“Like the war-horse, eager to rush on,  
Compelled to wait the signal blown.”

But no signal sounded. Distinctly was the firing heard—each flash reflected in the sky; but no advance was allowed. At length—we know why—the firing grew fainter in the distance, and gradually died away; and then sleep fell for a few hours on the Philour camping-ground.

Brigadier Johnstone had indeed ordered that at 3 A. M. a small advance party should move for Loodiana, consisting of two guns from Olphert's troop, an 8-inch mortar, taken in passing out of store in the Philour magazine, 100 men of H. M. 8th Foot, and a portion of the 2d Punjab Cavalry, under Captain Nicholson; the whole under command of Major Olpherts. The artillery portion and the cavalry were ready at daylight, and moved on to the bridge of boats to wait till the men of the 8th should come up; but some delay occurred in supplying their breakfast and other arrangements; and, consequently, the day was far advanced

\* The writer rejoices in being able to close his imperfect account of that night's adventure by mentioning that both Mr G. Ricketts and Lieutenant G. A. Williams received officially from the Governor-General in council the most flattering acknowledgments for their gallantry and good service.

The two native officers of the Nabba Rajah, Moosudda Singh, commandant of artillery, and Lall Singh, resaldar of cavalry, have also been liberally rewarded with khilluts and presents in money.



before the infantry reached the bridge, and the whole party were fairly on the move. Scarcely had they crossed the river, when a most urgent request for reinforcements from Mr Ricketts greeted them—the main body of the mutineers were moving down on the city of Loodiana. Soon came a melancholy confirmation of this : flames rose up in the heart of the city, and told too plainly that Loodiana was already in their hands.

To throw the small body which composed the advance on a force so strong as the mutineers were known to be, favoured too by a strong position, would have been madness. It was resolved, therefore, to halt till the rest of the column should come up. In the meanwhile the rebels had seized the city, the fort, and the treasury ; but they found themselves baffled at every point by the very greatness of their success. The fort was in their hands ; they had three guns planted on the bastion ; but they found that among the stores was neither shot nor shell ; and, moreover, for the 300,000 barrels of gunpowder which it contained they had no carriage, and to blow it all up would have proved far more fatal to themselves than to the pursuers. Then the treasury was also in their power ; but a patent iron safe and Bramah's lock defied all their powers to get at the coin. They, therefore, having done what damage they could with safety to themselves, forced the jail, liberated the prisoners, set fire to all the mission premises, cut up all the buff-leather accoutrements in the fort—then, finding all their efforts

to get at the treasure were fruitless, and that a column was really in pursuit, evacuated city and fort, and marched off *en route* for Delhi.

As soon as tidings reached the advanced party that the rebels had evacuated Loodiana, and were marching off, Major Olpherts, having sent information to Brigadier Johnstone, at once hastened on, and entered Loodiana about sunset. The remainder, under the brigadier, did not reach till eleven at night; a small party pushed on early next morning, with an addition of 300 of Rothney's Sikhs, and the men of H. M. 8th mounted on camels. But pursuit was now in vain. The rebels had got a fair start, and, being so lightly equipped, they kept it. Their escape, when their annihilation seemed so certain and easy, naturally called forth the indignant censures of all the Punjab authorities. The Chief Commissioner at once telegraphed an order to Brigadier Johnstone to leave only a small guard on cantonments, and to hasten on in pursuit even to Delhi, as the troops, now no longer needed at Jullundhur, would be valuable in camp. Thus may be said to have ended what was so well described officially as a "*miserable failure*."

To overtake the mutineers was now hopeless: they and their pursuers were only to meet again under the walls of Delhi.\*

\* The mutineers most discreetly avoided the Grand Trunk Road, thus keeping clear of Umballa, and of course rendering pursuit by artillery and infantry, along byways and over fields and ditches, more difficult. They also contrived to keep about twenty miles ahead. A force was sent from Umballa to intercept them, but they were perpe-

The work of destruction had gone on in the city of Loodiana with little check: the Sikhs under Rothney, notwithstanding his own gallantry, and the noble daring of Lieut. Yorke of the 3d N. I., were not strong enough to compete with such a body of mutineers, aided, moreover, by all the Mohammedans and other *budmashes* of this most turbulent city. The mission church, the school-house, the library, and also the book depot, with its thousands of volumes, valued at above 25,000 rupees, were soon in flames. The press escaped without much injury, beyond the wanton scattering about of all the type; the dwelling-houses were rifled, but not set on fire.\* It would appear, however, that the sepoys were not so much responsible for this wilful destruction of property as the Mohammedans, especially the Cashmerees, who had established a perfect colony in Loodiana, and were among the most turbulent of its citizens.

Retribution, however, was hard at hand, and fell most heavily on the most guilty. A few days after,

tually drawn off from the scent by the treachery of the villagers. The 400 men who had not crossed the Sutlej followed the course of the river up to Roopur, where they crossed, and made for Delhi along the foot of the hills, and through the Saharunpore district. Here they were encountered by the squadron of the 4th Light Cavalry (lancers), under Captain Wyld, on the 13th, who, despite the persuasions, reproaches, and threats of the rebels, actually cut their way through them, and remained true.

\* The following fact, communicated to the author by one of the Loodiana missionaries, is worthy of note, as proving the falseness of the statement that this class of persons were especially objects of hatred during the mutiny. After the church had been set on fire, a sepoy was heard to call out, "What are we doing this for? Our quarrel is not with the missionaries, but with Government." To this feeling, probably, it may be attributed that so much private property connected with the mission escaped, and no lives were lost.

the 1st Punjab Irregulars (infantry), better known as Coke's Rifles, marched in. By a masterly arrangement of Mr Ricketts, they were introduced into the city in the dead of the night, and spread noiselessly along the main streets. In the morning, Mr Ricketts himself entered, accompanied by a strong body of police, and demanded *that all arms should be at once given up*. Whatever thoughts of resistance might for a moment have risen in the minds of the people were quickly dispelled. Not only did the dreaded *burra Sahib*, with his police, confront them, but every street showed strange and not very prepossessing faces of the Beloochee riflemen, as if suddenly dropped down from the clouds. Taken by surprise and overawed, they made no attempt at resistance. Arms to an incredible number were brought out, of every form and country—blades of Damascus and Toledo,\* Afghan matchlocks and English rifles—and the city was thoroughly disarmed. The mastery was gained, and Mr Ricketts kept it, ruling with increased rigour, seizing and punishing the ringleaders, and levying a fine of 45,000 rupees on the city, which went some way to compensate the missionaries for the losses sustained.†

The mastery thus gained, nothing more occurred to disturb the peace of Loodiana.

\* Among others, a *genuine Andrea Ferrara*.

† Their loss was estimated at above 52,000 rupees. It is an interesting fact connected with the Loodiana outbreak, that many of the native Christians and others connected with the mission were preserved in the house of one of the still remaining Cabul princes who, to this day, find in Loodiana the shelter afforded years ago to the "old blind pensioner," Shah Soojah.

Nor were Jullundhur and Loodiana to be the only battle-field on which the month of June was to see a struggle between order and rebellion.

At Mooltan, too, a similar crisis also impended, but was averted.

The reader will remember how, on the 15th May, the energy and tact of Major Crawford Chamberlain triumphed over the traitorous sepoys of the 62d and 69th N. I.; he will remember the meeting at which "the apple of discord" was thrown into the midst of them, and the sepoys clearly understood that they might look for anything but sympathy from the 1st Irregular Cavalry, represented by the senior resaldar and the woordee-major; how, too, the meeting at mid-day was followed by the afternoon parade, at which the two boxes of suspected cartridges were brought out, examined, and pronounced by the sepoys themselves to be "clean," and thus the very ground of disaffection cut away from under their feet.

So matters had remained, or seemed to remain, *in statu quo*. The sepoys were quiet, but reports were daily brought in of a meditated outbreak; and the loss of Mooltan was too momentous a risk to be run. Two mutinous native corps, with arms in their hands, surrounded by a population among whom a single spark might kindle the flames of rebellion, was too great a danger: so Sir John Lawrence, rejoicing in the temporary quiet, resolved to maintain it on a surer basis. Captain Hughes's gallant advance from Asnee on his own responsibility only anticipated an order to that

effect from the Chief Commissioner, while the 2d Punjab Infantry ("Green's Rifles"), were also ordered in from Dhera Ghazee Khan.

Portions of these two corps reached Mooltan early in June, and were quartered at the *Amkhas*, a large enclosed garden, with a costly *baradurree* (summer-house), formerly the princely residence of *Dewans Sawun Mull* and *Moolraj*. Here they lay, close to the fort, and cut off by a distance of three and a half miles from the cantonments, so that they could have no intercourse with the sepoys.

It was felt to be a desperate *cast*. Of Green's Rifles, a frontier corps, there was no fear; Hughes's cavalry was not without a strong *Poorbeah* leaven, and *might* play false.\* A wing of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers were known to be pushing up from Scinde, but it was uncertain when they would reach Mooltan—it might be too late. So the order came on the 9th of June to disarm at all hazards; and the whole arrangements to be intrusted to Major Chamberlain. That night the *programme* was arranged by him and Major Hamilton, the cantonment authorities being left in utter ignorance of the contemplated step.

So signal was the success of this venture, that it deserves a full account. The position of the troops may be thus briefly described: the cantonment of Mooltan is a parallelogram, facing due west—on the right were the irregular cavalry lines, next to them

\* It was not an unnatural fear; but, happily, as it proved, a groundless one, and it has never failed.

came the 62d N. I., then the artillery, and the 69th on the left.\*

By gun-fire, on the morning of the 10th, an order from the Punjab Government was placed in the hands of Colonel Hicks, who commanded the station, to call a parade of all arms.† In the meanwhile Hughes's cavalry and Green's Rifles were moving down from the *amkhas*. Passing out between the fort and the city, they separated—the cavalry taking a road to the right, which brought them round on the grand parade, Green's Rifles the direct road into the centre of cantonments, by which they moved along under cover of the irregular cavalry lines, until they wheeled round, and were on the parade itself.

Nothing could be better timed. The cavalry having made the circuit in order to cut off the mutinous regiments, should they attempt to bolt and make for the city, found all quiet, moved on, took up their position as previously arranged, forming the centre; on their right formed up the 1st Irregular Cavalry, on their left a squadron of their own, which Captain Hughes had moved down into cantonments on the previous evening; behind, masked by this line of cavalry, were the guns, supported by the European Artillery (the reserve company), fusil in hand, with Green's Rifles on the left flank. The two native infantry corps were at the

\* The false position of the guns, between two native infantry regiments, was keenly felt, but irremediable at the time; it appeared as though nothing could save them.

† The ladies were all sent to drive about in the neighbourhood of the fort.

same time moved off their own parade-grounds, and were brought up in contiguous close columns, 200 yards in front of the cavalry and facing towards them.\* A general order was read. That over, Major Chamberlain demanded the arms of the 62d and 69th. At this moment Hughes's cavalry made a flank move to the left, the guns were unmasked, supported by cavalry, and Green's Rifles, and European artillerymen. To attempt a rush would have been madness—to hesitate, death. They piled arms! and a bloodless victory was gained. The *Kôtes* were searched, and all arms carried off to the fort. There, too, on a smaller scale, a similar success was achieved. Captain Tronson, with his Kuthar Mookhees and mounted police, disarmed the guard of the 69th, which had been left over the (empty) treasury.

Thus, at the very time when the Jullundhur mutineers were defying and escaping from a strong European force across the Sutlej, at Mooltan two native regiments were being disarmed in the presence of some sixty Europeans, supported by two† weak irregular

\* The 69th N. I. were at ball-practice when ordered to fall in. Their cartridges, therefore, were handy to them, and maybe some of their muskets were loaded. The delay in their coming to the grand parade was so great, it was thought they suspected what was coming. Subsequent inquiries, however, prove that, had they had an idea of what was about to be enacted, they would have mutinied then and there, and defended themselves in their lines. Had they done so, the 62d would have joined, and so perhaps would the horse-artillery; "but," says Major Chamberlain, in a private letter to the author, "we were ready for a day of it, for the European gunners would have worked the guns, and my own corps, Hughes's, and Green's, would have stood stanch, and then, with the guns in our hands, we should have felt quite equal to thrashing or annihilating both corps."

† Two hundred of the 1st Irregular Cavalry were out on furlough.



cavalry, and half an irregular infantry corps ! It was a triumph of no ordinary value. Its effect was instantaneous throughout the city. Money and jewels and property of all kinds, buried or concealed during the days of doubt and fear—fear of the sepoys themselves and the city budmashes, more than of Government—were soon brought to light again. Men who had slipped away, now began to return ; for slant looks and lukewarm salutes, the authorities were now met by smiles and greetings, and crowds of citizens pressed forward to offer loud congratulations !

That night there were several desertions from the 69th N. I. One of the deserters was caught, tried, and condemned to death. The night before he was to be hanged, he made some disclosures to Major Chamberlain, of such great importance, that he was reprieved. The “ execution parade,” however, took place, as ordered : the gallows ready, the troops all out, when several of the sepoys, expecting to see their comrade suffer, found themselves arrested ; and foremost amongst them was the arch-traitor of the station, the subahdar-major of the 69th N. I., who was quickly mounted on a horse of one of the 1st Irregular troopers, to be carried off to the fort. The horse reared and threw its traitor load. It was an evil omen, thought the crowd around ; and so it proved, for a few weeks after, the wretch suffered, with several others, the richly merited punishment for his treachery.

Thus Mooltan was still ours, and with it the Indus.

A single incident will convey some idea of the imminent peril from which the little community of Mooltan had escaped.

On the night of the 7th June, just before nine o'clock, the trusty woordie-major of the 1st Irregular Cavalry had come to Major Chamberlain's house, urging his sending away the ladies; one of the native doctors had learned from a native of the horse-artillery, who heard sépoys telling each other, that at nine o'clock there was to be a rise. It was subsequently discovered, that *on that very night*, at 9 P.M., this subahdar major and others *did* try at roll-call to fire the train. Having failed, he reported to the adjutant of the 69th, that "a screw was loose"—thus, as it were, making a safe game for himself! Major Chamberlain would not move his family, as he felt he could not secure the escape of the other ladies of the station. He relied on his men, who were all ready to act, and darkness he hoped would have favoured escape when the hour came. Happily the hour did not come, and here, as elsewhere, a merciful Providence intervened between the Christians and the fate prepared for them.

## CHAPTER IX.

[JUNE 1857.—PART II.]

PESHAWUR—THE FRONTIER—NEW LEVIES—EXECUTIONS—DRILLS  
—THE 10TH IRREGULARS DISARMED AND DISBANDED—THE  
55TH N. I. DESTROYED—OLD SIKH ARTILLERYMEN—MUZBEE  
SIKHS—NICHOLSON REMOVED TO THE COLUMN—THE 38D N. I.  
AND 86TH L. I. DISARMED AT PHILOUR—THE KOOLOO PRE-  
TENDER.

IN Peshawur, and along that frontier, the prospect was becoming clearer. When Nicholson, on the 21st of May, invited in his old friends the Pathan Khans of the Derajat, scarcely a man had responded to the call: they held aloof; they thought the days of Government were numbered, and would not commit themselves to so losing an alliance; they would not embark in a sinking ship. But with the disarming of four Hindostanee regiments on the morning of the 22d, the aspect of affairs had wholly changed, and crowds came in for service. Nicholson, ever prompt to act, eager to strike while the iron was hot, "flashed" down a request to Sir John Lawrence for permission to increase the strength of the present Punjab corps. It was as promptly granted; and enlisting became the order of the day. Men of all tribes and classes poured in; not

only Pathans of the Derajat, but tribes hitherto in more or less open hostility to us; Eusofzaies, Khut-tucks, and even Affreedees,\* might be seen flocking into Peshawur. Tribes under the ban now succumbed,† paid their fines, and sought service; the ban was removed, outlaws were pardoned, foes were converted into friends, or at least malcontents into mercenaries.

What though these new levies contained outlaws, desperadoes, escaped convicts, idle vagabonds—it was better to have them for us than against us; better to cut out a channel into which the war-loving spirit and the lawlessness of the mountaineer might flow profitably to ourselves, than to suffer it to gather along the frontier till it burst all bounds, overwhelmed the valley, and swamped our power. If a Pathan has one weakness more strongly developed than another, it is a love of plunder; that had been long pent up under our stricter rule, and now our new levies proved as a safety-valve by which it might be let off, or advantageously employed. “Delhi and *loot!*” was now the cry. The city of the Mogul, with its fabulous wealth and splendour, like an Eldorado of the 16th century, or a California of the present, drew off by hundreds the daring or the needy. Enlistment became a *furor*, every clan pressed in for service. Luckless the family that could produce no youthful scion for a place in the ranks of

\* Three hundred Affreedees came one day in a body for enlistment.

† One tribe, the Kookee Kheyl Affreedees, who were under fine and ban for the murder of Lieutenant Hands, alone excepted. They did not come till two months later. More of them hereafter.

the Feringhee, no candidate for the race which had Delhi for its goal.\*

All this worked admirably. An increase of 200, and then of 400, to each already existing Punjab regiment, had been first sanctioned by Sir John Lawrence. But, with recruits crowding in so fast, and swarms more eager to come, such a number could be supplied ten times over. New corps were necessary to receive the daily increasing surplus. A depot was formed. Drafts were sent off to strengthen the old corps, and new corps

\* Colonel Edwardes gives a graphic and amusing sketch of these enlistments, "Long before the time," he writes, "crowds of candidates for employment thronged the gateways, and overflowed into the garden; the jockeys of unconquerably vicious horses endeavoured to reduce them to a show of docility by galloping them furiously about till the critical moment of inspection came. At last, sick at heart from the receipt of a bad telegram from the provinces, but endeavouring to look happy, out I used to go, and face some hundreds of the chiefs and yeomen of the country, all eager to gather from the Commissioner Sahib's countenance how the 'King of Delhi' was getting on. Then the first horseman would be brought up. The beast perhaps would not move. The rider, the owner, and all the neighbours, would assail him with whips, sticks, stones, and Pushtoo reproaches that might have moved a rock; but nothing would do till the attempt was given up, and the brute's head turned the other way, when he went off at a gallop amid roars of laughter from the Pathans, who have the keenest perception of both fun and vice. No. 2 would make a shift to come up, but every man and boy in the crowd could see that he was lame on two or three legs. Then the argument began: and leg by leg, blemish by blemish, the animal was proved by a multitude of witnesses (who had known him for very many years) to be perfectly sound! And so the enlistment went on from day to day, affording immense occupation, profit, and amusement to the people, and answering a great many good ends. Now and then, an orderly of the Hindostanee Irregular Cavalry, admirably armed and mounted, would pass the spot, and mark his opinion of the 'levies' by a contemptuous smile. But, nevertheless, he told his comrades in the lines that the country people were all with the English, and that it was of no use to desert or to intrigue."

raised—the first under Captain Bartlett of the 21st N. I., and soon another, and another, and another, under Major Shakespeare of the 24th N. I., and Captains Brownlow and Thelwall of H. M. 24th Regiment.

As fast as Nicholson enlisted, up sprang the new corps, and ample work did they furnish for the officers, so wisely selected to command them.

But one regiment had already been raised from another source, which deserves especial mention. The plan adopted by Brigadier Corbett, at Lahore, of singling out the Sikhs and the Punjabees of the disarmed Poorbeah corps was here carried out on a larger scale.

Here were a body of men, trained and disciplined, having no sympathy with the traitorous designs of their disaffected Poorbeah comrades, but ever regarding them with jealousy; they still smarted under the constant complaint and taunt that they were not smart and cleanly soldiers, which had so long kept them out of the ranks of the Bengal army, and made their position, now they had been sparingly enlisted into it, far from pleasant, and they now bore with ill-concealed rage the indignity to which they had been subjected in having to share the suspicion and the disgrace of the Hindostanee. To single these men out, to show full trust in them by restoring their arms, and forming them into a separate corps, was to set the seal to their loyalty. It had been done at Lahore—it was resolved to do it here. All Sikhs and Punjabees of the Hindostanee corps\* were therefore

\* The regiment of Khelat-i-Ghilzies was originally included in this order; but Captain Fitzroy Mundy, their commandant, who had

collected together and formed under a separate regiment, and Captain G. Noble Cave, of the 21st N. I., selected to command and organise it.\*

It was a strange sight which Peshawur presented in that month of June. In ordinary years the body military throughout India—and even Peshawur was no exception—would sink into a state of coma with the approach of hot weather. With the first rays of the sun, every European whom urgent duty did not require to expose himself to its power would betake himself to the shelter of darkened rooms, punkhas, and tatties, till evening came, with its brief twilight of comparative cool. A station would look like a city of the dead. No sign of animation, beyond here and there a stray orderly leisurely carrying some letter from one office to another, or some sentry listlessly pacing along his beat. During those scorching months of summer brigades ordinarily cease, parades are scarcely known, and even drills little more than nominal. But now how great a change! During those memorable days of June 1857, Peshawur looked as it might have looked in the cold bracing days of the preceding January; for Peshawur had greater enemies now than even its blasting heat—such heat as is known nowhere else even in India, except, perhaps, at Attock, or Mooltan—it had greater

already tested their loyalty at Shubkuddur, earnestly protested against it, and was allowed to retain them, and, doubtless, this exception in their favour helped in no slight degree in maintaining the staunchness of the corps.

\* This corps was subsequently enrolled in the Punjab Irregular force, and is now the 16th Punjab Infantry.

dangers than apoplexy or *coup-de-soleil*. A bold front and fearless bearing were now greater safeguards than the gentler precaution of darkened rooms and iced drinks.

At the outbreak of the mutiny every man that could be spared had been pushed down. The European artillery had been weakened by the withdrawal of a troop and a battery, and the whole force reduced to its lowest possible strength to meet the exigencies of the Punjab. There remained the two infantry corps, H. M. 70th and 87th, and the 27th at Nowshera, a wing of which had also been brought up to Peshawur. But in the meanwhile the character of that force had undergone a wondrous change. A regiment of European light dragoons had sprung up as if by magic, out of the infantry corps, under Captain Fane of H. M. 87th. From the same source Captain Vivian Cox had formed a troop of European horse-artillery (the thought of Captain Wright, A.A.G. of the division), with European infantry volunteers replacing the native gunners, and horsed, too, from the dismounted 5th Light Cavalry. While Captain Stollard was metamorphosing a reserve company of European artillery, with more volunteers from the infantry regiments,\* into a first-rate horse-battery, with 9-pounders found in store in the magazine.

Thus, day after day, in spite of hot winds and dust-storms, Captain Fane was out manœuvring his light

\* Moreover, an order came out in the middle of June that ten men a-company of all European regiments should be instructed in gun-drill, especially with heavy guns.



dragoons, Captain Cox drilling his infantry volunteers to ride and work the guns, and Captain Stollard converting his foot-artillerymen into troopers ; while Captains Cave and Bartlett were no less zealous with their new regiments. Nor was it holiday-time for the other native corps : the 21st N. I. at Peshawur, and the regiment of Khelat-i-Ghilzies at the forts, still retaining their arms and their good name ; the 7th and 18th Irregular Cavalry regarded with little confidence, though allowed to retain their sabres and horses ; the four disarmed corps watched at every point ; all, armed and disarmed, had their work—guards for the armed, and parades for the disarmed.

Now, too, came the work of retribution. This began with the deserters of the 51st. The whole brigade turned out to witness the execution of the subahdar-major, and about a dozen of the non-commissioned native officers, who had been captured and brought in from the very Khyber. But this was only a beginning : it was followed by executions on a larger scale, and in a more harrowing form. First, and most terrible of such, was the destruction of the prisoners of the 55th N. I., who had been brought in from Hotee Murdan. They were all—120 in number—tried and condemned to be blown away from guns ; but it was thought that the claims of justice would be equally satisfied by a less perfect holocaust, and therefore only every third rebel was required to suffer the extreme sentence. This was on the 10th of June. On the parade-ground of H. M. 87th, which was the general scene of such executions,

and where the permanent gallows was erected, the whole force, European and native, were now brigaded. There were thousands of spectators ; they had poured in from the city and the mountains ; they openly said they did not believe we dared to destroy so many. Scarcely was the peril to Peshawur less on that day than it had been on the 22d of May. In that disarming, the monster of rebellion had been foiled ; in this execution it was manacled. Mind had triumphed over brute force. The natives now again learned that our strength lay not merely, or so much, in the number of our men, as in the *will* of our leaders.

Such a scene cannot be better described than in the words of an eyewitness :—

“The troops were drawn up on three sides of a square, the fourth side being occupied by ten guns. The European soldiers all had their firelocks loaded, and every officer had his revolver slung. The two field-batteries and the mountain guns were loaded with grape, and port-fires lighted. The forty mutineers were in one corner of the square in irons. The general came on parade, and was received with a salute of sixteen guns from the horse-battery. He then rode round the square, and ordered the sentence to be read. The first ten of the prisoners were then lashed to the guns, the artillery officer waved his sword ; you heard the roar of the guns, and above the smoke you saw legs, arms, and heads flying in all directions. There were four of these salvoes ; a sort of buzz went through the whole mass of the troops—a murmur of horror !”

The work of blood over, now came that of routine. The whole brigade marched past the general—European and native, armed and disarmed, faithful and traitor! The Pathan levies had that morning witnessed and wondered at the bearing of the European: they now saw, but could not comprehend, that of the Poorbeah. It perplexed them to see men declared to be mutinous thus passively obeying orders under officers for whose lives they were supposed to be thirsting. Knowing only of rebellion as an open resistance and defiance of authority, they would ask, "Can these men be really such desperate traitors as you say? If so, how do they obey orders at all? How do they thus march by, apparently unconcerned, without an effort to avenge their comrades?" Yet so it was! they were traitors, but they were cravens too; they knew well that every movement was watched, and that every European carried a loaded Enfield.

But perhaps a stranger sight still was presented in Peshawur that morning. While every available European was on that parade-ground, the station itself was in the hands of Affreedees and Afghans! A month before, not one of these men would have been permitted to bring a weapon across the frontier: all weapons—tulwar, matchlock, spear—would have been deposited at the frontier fort or thanaha, and even then not a man would have been allowed to remain in cantonments after sunset. Now, the cantonment was patrolled by hundreds of these mountaineers *armed to the teeth!* Loudly and fiercely did old officers con-

demn such confidence in these ruffians. Edwardes and Nicholson were "masters of their position:" they felt—none better—the enormity of the crisis; and they "knew their men." The Afghan or the Affreedee is an hereditary marauder; he is by natural instinct a horse-stealer; he could not even now pass a well-mounted officer without fixing his thievish-looking eye wistfully on the nag; at any other time not a horse would have been safe, but now higher game was in sight. Peshawur, with all its horses, was perfectly safe in their keeping, so long as Delhi was still besieged, and there was a chance of their being pushed down to take a part in the capture, and get a share of the spoil.\*

This execution was only one of many. But it stood pre-eminent among them all for the vastness of the scale, and for its effect on the native mind as a demonstration of power. Of the thousands who had witnessed it, few turned away unimpressed. Many an Englishman's heart, too, felt relieved of a great weight as he marched back to his lines; while the mass of the natives wondered at and respected our courage. The same scene was constantly being re-enacted: captured deserters or traitors were being hanged or blown away; and the disarmed sepoy marched past with little apparent sympathy for their comrades hanging on the gibbets before them, or their scattered limbs lying alongside, and each such day seemed to raise the

\* It was not till all excitement was over, in the end of the year, that horse-stealing was resumed.

European, while it lowered the Hindostanee, in the eyes of our new Afghan allies.

So frequent did these executions necessarily become, that in very familiarity even Englishmen of gentle spirit and merciful nature began to look on them with little concern. . When the excitement shall have subsided, and such acts have become history, some men perhaps will read of them with horror, as deeds of ruthless cruelty, unworthy of a Christian people. But no one who *has passed through them*, whatever be his temperament, will ever regard them otherwise than as acts, not only of retributive justice for violated faith and wronged confidence—for kindness and liberality requited by deliberate rebellion and cold-blooded murder—but as acts of stern necessity for the safety of those who were still alive. *Either their lives or ours* was the sad alternative. Mercy at such a moment would have been mistaken for weakness or fear, and all would have been lost ! It was in this spirit that stern justice was dealt to the rebels : there was nothing of harsh unfeeling cruelty, much less aught approaching to revenge, that prompted to the firm uncompromising course adopted at Lahore and Peshawur. There maybe, there must be, deep regret that so many poor wretches, traitors, fanatics, or dupes, should be doomed to so appalling a death ; but the names of Sir John Lawrence, Mr Montgomery, Colonel Edwardes, and such men, are the best guarantee that necessity required such a sacrifice of life,\* if the English still alive were to be preserved and India to be saved.

\* The author is by no means prepared to say that, in subsequent

Recruiting now received a further stimulus. "The Guides," in which were men of every mountain tribe, and "Coke's Rifles," teeming with Afghans and Beloochees, had reached Delhi, and were filling their *cummerbunds* \* from the plunder-laden bodies of dead rebels; for as every one, mistrustful of his neighbour, carried the proceeds of his plunder on his own person, he became, in his turn, a valuable prey. Back flew to Peshawur, and along the frontier, glowing reports of spoil, so grateful to a Pathan's ear: soon followed the more substantial remittance, and many a mountain fastness rejoiced in wealth before unknown. The spoil which a Hindostanee regiment had carried off from some plundered treasury found its way to the very Khyber, and helped to cement more closely the new alliance.

Such was the brighter side of this strange picture. But it had its dark side too. Across the border, beyond the neighbouring tribes who were so eagerly enlisting, were others to whom the same influences did not reach; fanatics under the sway of the Akhoond, and Afghans brooding over traditions that Peshawur was a few years ago the pride and boast of the Douranee empire, and still writhing under the remembrance of the Cabul retribution. From such quarters rumours were ever and again coming in of grave import, ru-

periods of the rebellion, there were not some instances in which, in all the excitement of a pursuit or an alarm, there was not, perhaps, a needless haste in punishing, and the friend and foe, or the innocent and guilty, were confounded; but for such acts the authorities cannot be held responsible.

\* Waistbands, in which a native generally ties up his money.

mours of gatherings in the mountains, of Syuds raising the green flag of the Prophet, of Moollas preaching in the Khyber "death to the Feringhee," of *horses being shod* in Cabul for a descent on Peshawur.\*

There was Ajhoon Khan, too, a noted outlaw, long regarded as the firebrand of the frontier, scarcely less formidable than the Akhoond himself: he had been screening himself, beyond the reach of English law, in the wild fastnesses of the Sitana country when the outbreak occurred; yet, as it was subsequently discovered, keeping up a link in treason with the men of the 55th and 64th N. I., and the 10th Irregular Cavalry. He now left his Sitana retreat, and moving in closer to the frontier took up his quarters at Prantjar, a district noted for a turbulent fanatic population. This move brooded further danger to Peshawur; for the spark once kindled here, the flame would soon have enveloped the whole frontier in a blaze of rebellion.

However, the Syuds and the Moollas preached in vain; the Akhoond and his fanatic subjects plotted in vain. Daily was Peshawur becoming stronger. Under free enlisting and ceaseless discipline, bold punishment of treason, liberal rewards for good service, Peshawur looked defiance to the fanatic without, and overawed the traitor within.

\* The preliminary and sure sign of a contemplated *raid*, admirably described by Masson, vol. i. p. 122:—

"An express messenger arrived from Peshawur, and the news he brought at once threw the camp into bustle and confusion. The horses were immediately ordered to be shod, and the noisy *nālbands* (blacksmiths) became very busy with their hammers and horse-shoes."

Towards the close of the month, an incident occurred which threw the whole station into a state of excitement. In the dead of night heavy firing was heard in the city. The impression at once was that the city was "up;" all arms turned out; off flew the ladies to the Residency, the rallying-point for all non-combatants; the forts were all on the *qui vive*; and an attack from the fanatic multitude was momentarily expected. Gradually the tumult abated; the day dawned, and all was quiet; and then it was discovered that a rich native oil-seller had been celebrating a *shaddee* (marriage)! The noise had been caused by the firing of small cannon, the explosion of *bans* (rockets), the beating of *nagdras* (native kettle-drums), and the shouts of a feasted and half-drunken rabble doing honour to the hospitality of the little bride's father. But at such a time, when Englishmen's nerves were on the stretch of anxiety, and the native mind on the verge of rebellion, it was pronounced a high crime\* to trifle with the feelings of either. A sound flogging inflicted on the giver of the feast taught the Peshawurees that during such critical times marriages, if they must be held, must be conducted more quietly.

Nor was the month of June to close without another demonstration of this increased power. All the three irregular cavalry corps, the 10th at Nowshera, and the 7th and 18th at Peshawur, had been suspected; but it

\* Among the *tradita* of a bygone rule at Peshawur was discovered a law made by *Avitable*, that no fireworks should be discharged in the city. The discovery of this long obsolete law was most opportune, and its revival in the present instance proved most salutary.



was felt that the 10th were more desperately and dangerously mutinous at heart than either of the other two. The state of the Peshawur brigade, however, and of the frontier, had rendered any decisive measures hitherto unsafe. No force could be spared to move down; and probably the order for them to march up would have been defied. It had been deemed enough to watch the corps, and wait till the time might come for punishing them. That time had now arrived. The brigade had risen up, as it were, with a strength before unknown; the frontier was comparatively quiet; new levies were passing down to strengthen the reliable troops already there, and all promised favourably for the venture; and, to lessen the risk, one squadron had been brought up to Peshawur. A court of inquiry into the conduct of the regiment was held at Peshawur on the 23d. It was remembered that they had released the prisoners of the 55th on the 21st of May, and that the squadron at Hotee Murdan had been loud and seditious in their threats;\* and that, in pursuit of the 55th, the whole regiment had played false. Nor was it forgotten that, amid the piles of intercepted correspondence, were letters disclosing, besides other treasonable matter, a deep conspiracy between this corps and the Swattees. Their fate was now sealed; and their commandant, Major Verner, was selected to carry to them their death-warrant.

\* One sowar had threatened that he would *roast and eat* Mr Horne, the Assistant-Commissioner, who was encamped near the fort; for which threat the worthy was tried by drum-head court-martial, and shot a few days after.

It was late at night on the 29th of June when Colonel Williamson, of the 27th Inniskillings, commanding the station of Nowshera, received the order : the next morning the three squadrons of the 10th Irregulars were to be disarmed, deprived of their horses, their property confiscated, and themselves marched out of cantonments, escorted over the Indus, and then turned adrift. Captain Wyld's corps, the 5th Punjabees, were at Nowshera at the time ; and Lieutenant Lind, with some Mooltanee horse, on his way through to Delhi, would march in in the morning ; and it was understood that the other squadron, which was at Peshawur, would be simultaneously dealt with in the same manner. Captain Wyld was speedily summoned into consultation, and suggested the plan of operations. The position of cantonments is as follows : on the extreme east lay the barracks of the 27th Inniskillings, at the other end the lines of the 10th Irregulars, and between them the lines of the late 55th N. I., now occupied by Wyld's Punjabees, and those of Brougham's mountain battery, now empty.

The *role* of the morning's proceedings was briefly this : a general parade of all three regiments (the cavalry *without horses*) was to be held on the 55th N. I. parade-ground, as being most central, to hear a general order read. Wyld was to have 200 of his men concealed in the rear of their lines, and 100 of the 27th similarly placed under Lieutenant White ; so that, as soon as the 10th moved out of their lines to the parade, these men might march quietly along the rear, under

cover of the vacant lines of Brougham's mountain battery, suddenly present themselves in the lines of the 10th, master the few guards left behind, should any resistance be offered, seize the horses, and take possession of the lines, so that not a man should escape to alarm the regiment. Such was the plan laid down. The night was far advanced before the party broke up. The few remaining hours were spent in preparing for the respective parts in the morning's drama. Hours were they of anxious care, lest the traitors should suspect what was in store for them, and slip away in the dark, or refuse to march to the parade, and a struggle ensue, and perhaps blood be shed and life sacrificed.

The day dawned, the bugle sounded for a general parade: the Punjabees were first on the ground, the 10th Irregulars came next, *on foot*, and took up ground to the right of the Punjabees; then came the Inniskillings, and, as they drew up, a slight movement was noticed among the cavalry—some fell out a few paces, and talked excitedly. However, order was soon restored, and the line was formed, the sowars between the Inniskillings and the Punjabees.

Colonel Williamson now gave the order, "10th Irregulars will lay down their arms;" along the line came the clank of the sabres and scabbards: "10th Irregulars, advance." The order was obeyed. The rear company of the 27th moved quickly along behind, picked up the arms, piled them in carts ready at hand, and escorted them off to the main-guard. In the meanwhile the rest of the Inniskillings were wheeled

round right shoulders forward, the Punjabees making a similar movement on the left, and the men of the 10th found themselves surrounded ! Having thus hemmed them in, Colonel Williamson called on the interpreter, Lieutenant Babbage (of the 55th N. I.), to read the order received from Peshawur. The traitors now found they were to be disarmed, deprived of their horses, and every fraction of their property *confiscated to Government*. Surprise, amazement, anger, fury, flashed from their eyes. To be disarmed was degradation enough ; but to be deprived of their horses (which, in the case of irregular cavalry corps, are the private property of the troopers), to be stripped of everything—money, clothes, and all they possessed in the world, confiscated—was a condition they never contemplated. But they had played at treason, and they were now to suffer its consequences ! They were caught in a trap ; it was in vain to beat themselves against the bars ; it were madness to rush on the bayonets that glistened on every side. They ground their teeth in impotent frenzy, and were marched off to their lines, to find them in the hands of the concealed party, who had surprised the guards, and quietly taken possession without a struggle.

Now came the work of confiscation : every hut, every wall and roof was examined, every crack and cranny searched ; the Punjabees revelling in the opportunity of crushing the Poorbeahs, and at the same time, no doubt, enriching themselves at their expense. The sowars were stripped of their uniforms ; their waistbands, turbans—all searched ; money, jewels, everything

“ taken charge of ; ” and then, with only their *pugeries* (turbans), *chupkans* (jackets), and pantaloons, they were marched out that night under charge of Lind’s Mooltanees (who had been at hand all the morning unnoticed, a few yards in the rear, ready to act if need required), and were thus escorted to the Indus, there to await the arrival of their comrades from Peshawur.

There, too, matters had been as quietly and successfully managed. The squadron had not been brought into cantonments, but were encamped on the road-side under the walls of the fort. A dismounted parade was ordered for the same morning (the old *ruse*), to hear a general order read. The fort guards were at the time in the act of being relieved, and were, consequently, just double their usual strength ; and a small body of artillery, with an escort of European infantry, were (of course *accidentally*) just coming along at walking exercise a little way off. The men were drawn up on the opposite side of the road to their camp ; the general order was read by Captain Wale, the adjutant ; the artillery in the meanwhile moved slowly on till they came between the men and their camp, when they halted. Small bodies of Mooltanee and Affreedee Horse, too, were manœuvring about, and taking up imaginary positions between the city and cantonments. The first intimation the traitors had of the real state of things, was their discovering that the artillery had cut them off from their camp, and that their horses were in the hands of the infantry ! Resistance was hopeless ; they made none, but gave themselves up with the best grace they could,

and were made over to a small body of Mooltanees, and marched off that night to join their brethren at Attock.

Here came a further search ; and on the persons of the women and children were found jewels and money to a vast amount. All was taken from them ; they were crossed over the Indus in boats, received four rupees each as a *viaticum*, and sent adrift to find their way as best they could to their homes, with a warning that they were watched, and any attempt at disturbance would seal their doom. Thus, happily, was removed a load of anxiety which for one long month had weighed on the Peshawur authorities. The example was not without its effect. The sepoy of the line, in being disarmed and disbanded, lost only pay and pension ; the irregular trooper found that in his case it involved confiscation and beggary. This was too high a price to pay, even for the luxury of mutiny.

The 10th Irregular Cavalry had proved traitors in the affair of the 55th N. I. at Hotee Murdan, and they had paid thus dearly for their treachery. But what had become of their friends for whom they had suffered ? We left the 55th N. I. in quick retreat over the Eusofzai Hills, and will now follow them to their fate.

Their very position was fatal to them. A glance at the map will show the reader how completely they were shut in. At Attock, lying due south, the two rivers, the Loondee, or Cabul river, from the west, and the Indus from the east, effect a junction. The former,

a most rapid and dangerous stream, now rendered still more rapid and dangerous by the melted snow, shut them in from the south-west; while the Indus presented a no less formidable barrier on the other side, for though comparatively a wide sluggish stream, its shoals and quicksands rendered it unfordable. Now, moreover, the prompt judgment of Major John Becher, Deputy Commissioner of Hazara, had made it doubly impassable. At the first tidings of the outbreak all the ferries had been secured, every boat dragged up high and dry on the Hazara side, and the ferrymen, their "occupation gone," readily converted into a river police, who took their place among the new levies, and jealously guarded their own bank. Thus to the east, west, and south, did Nature shut them in, and equally so to the north. From the Loondee to the Indus, resting on either, stretched an amphitheatre of hills, abrupt and barren, inhabited by unfriendly and almost savage races, from whom the Poorbeah could hope for little sympathy or shelter. Hemmed in by such natural barriers, escape was wellnigh impossible. Many of the mutineers were captured by the inhabitants as they straggled along, footsore and famished, among the inhospitable mountains, and were brought into Peshawur for the "head-money," or were summarily disposed of for the treasure on their persons.

A considerable number of them, however, made good their retreat in a compact body, and forced their way through the Eusofzai Hills into the Swat valley, whither we will follow them. They had, it appeared,

for some time been in league with the Swatees, and made sure of protection and a welcome in that valley. *But times had changed there!* The Swat valley is inhabited by a warlike and fanatic race of Mohammedans, ruled by a Moulvie of Moulvies, a patriarch or pope of the Mohammedans of this part of Asia, called the *Akhoond* of Swat. The steady advance of the English northward had caused the Swatees to fear lest their own valley should in time fall to the apparently resistless conquerors. At the suggestion of the Akhoond, they had elected a *badshah* or king, upon whom they conferred all the civil and military power, hoping the better to resist the expected aggression of the English. These Swatees are among our most formidable neighbours on the frontier. Intrigues, it is now known, had been long carried on between them and our sepoy regiments in that neighbourhood (especially with this regiment, the 55th N. I.), and they were prepared to take advantage of the great crisis which they knew to be impending: sounding the tocsin of war, they would have roused to arms all the neighbouring Mohammedans, and poured down on Peshawur, the moment the troubles began from below.

On the 11th May, the very day of the Delhi massacre, this *Badshah*, *Syud Akhbar*, died! Strife at once sprang up—one party to place his son on the throne, the other to get rid of the office altogether; so that all the energy and fanaticism of the Swatees was suddenly absorbed in an internal feud. They found themselves too busy at home to think of attacking the



English, and left Peshawur in peace! Nor had they any sympathy or succour now left for the traitors of the 55th N. I. "Tempora mutantur et nos mutamur in illis."

The newly-appointed Badshah, Syud Akhbar, was dead; his son claimed the throne, and was supported by a large body of his countrymen; while a formidable faction demanded a return to the old regime. The Swatees, therefore, distracted and weakened by this feud among themselves, were only too glad to be free of their mutinous allies; who, in their turn, finding so cold a welcome, and a far more simple hardy fare than suited their hitherto easy pampered existence, were scarcely less eager to get away. They, however, found this no easy task; many a sleek Brahmin was made a *compulsory Mohammedan*,\* doomed to servile offices in their Musjids; others were sold for slaves; rumour has it that one fat old subahdar fetched four annas (sixpence). Between five and six hundred of them, however, carrying with them the blessing and commendatory letters of the Swat patriarch, the Akhoond, to the Swat colonies in Ullye, Mundyar, and Koonsh, made a desperate effort to cross one of the higher fords of the Indus, and so escape through Hazara into Cashmere, thinking to find safety among the Maharajah's troops, where were many of their Poorbeah brethren. How they fared, we will show.

Major J. Becher had only a mountain-train of six

\* Some of the Delhi emperors used to amuse themselves with enforcing wholesale conversions. Aurungzebe is said to have on one occasion refused to eat till they had brought him two maunds' weight of *jedaos*, the sacred thread worn by Brahmins.

guns, and seven companies of the 2d Sikhs, under Captain Hardinge, three companies having at the commencement of the outbreak been despatched to Murree for the protection of that sanatorium, from which the Kumaon battalion (Goorkhas), and every European fit for service at the depot, had been withdrawn. Directly tidings reached him of the approach of the sepoys, he called on the independent chiefs of Ullye and Mundyar, who had both on more than one occasion experienced his friendly mediation in some domestic difficulties, to hold the mountain-passes against a body of "traitors to their salt." He raised the whole district of Koonsh, Swatees though they were. Further to the east lay the valley of Khagan: its chiefs had been for many years in disgrace, and only a few months before received into favour; they now came forward and entreated to be permitted to prove their loyalty against the Hindostanee rebels. This offer was frankly accepted, and the vale of Khagan closed its passes against them, should they succeed in penetrating so far. Major Becher himself took up a position at Dodeeal, where the last of the Koonsh passes opens out on the table-land on Hazara, having called up from Abbottabad three companies of the 2d Sikhs, under Captain Hardinge, and three of the mountain-guns, leaving Lieutenant Boulderson, the Assistant Commissioner, to hold Abbottabad itself with the remainder of the Sikhs and the new levies. However, the mutineers never got out of the hills. When they succeeded in crossing the Indus on rafts of skins at a ghat far up in the mountains, they found the whole country

in arms. They had to fight every inch of the way. Every gorge presented a barrier; every overhanging precipice and hill-side was alive with mountaineers, who attacked them with matchlocks and stones. Thus in every pass their numbers were lessened, every gorge was strewn with corpses, every mountain-torrent swept off its victims, and the survivors struggled on disheartened and famished. They struggled on, and entered the Khagan valley or glen. Here the same reception awaited them. The proud Syuds disputed their passage. And at last, in desperation, they surrendered. Their number now dwindled down to little more than 150.\* A very few, however, pushed on still, and escaped into Cashmere, where they were soon caught and delivered up. Thus, what with the Swatees, the Kohistanees, the Syuds of Khagan, the Hazara levies, and the troops of Golab Singh, scarcely a man escaped to show that the 55th N. I. had ever been.

We have dwelt at some length on the mutiny and the fate of this regiment, as being the first to experience "the way in which mutiny was crushed in the Punjab." Its failure gave sorry comfort and encouragement to other corps that were as mutinous at heart, and only waited their opportunity.

Before closing our account of the frontier doings, allusion must be made to a scheme which emanated

\* Altogether about 200 men were taken alive, who were either captured, or gave themselves up. All these were tried by courts-martial, sometimes composed exclusively of native officers of the 2d Sikhs and local levies, and sentenced to death, and executed by the Hazara authorities.

from Peshawur, and which, embracing the whole Punjab, at length made itself felt under the walls of Delhi—the employment of *Muzbee Sikhs*.

No sooner had General Barnard, on the 8th of June, recovered the Flag-staff Tower, as the sequel of the action of Budlee Serai, and planted his guns along the ridge, than he began to feel the want of gunners. Constantly did the telegraph *flash up* the demand, “Send down more artillerymen.” But they were not forthcoming. One reserve company was pushed down from Lahore, another from Peshawur, and a third from Ferozepore—all that could be spared. At this juncture Sir John Lawrence remembered the old Sikh gunners. They had been all disbanded, and had settled down in peace, if not in contentment, to their fields and trades. It was probable that many of them might still be alive, and fit for service; and the call on them to work our guns at Delhi might cement still more strongly the sympathy already evinced towards us by the Sikh population. A call was made, and many a brave old Sikh, who had pointed the guns of the Khalsa against us with such desperate effect at Ferozeshuhur and Sobraon, at Chillianwalla and Goojerat, now sprang forward to work them for us against the walls of Delhi. It seemed like sweet revenge on the city of the Mogul for the cold-blooded murder of their Gooroo Tegh Bahadoor by Aurungzebe.

Yet they were not very numerous—not enough to meet the demands of the besieging army. Then it was that Colonel Edwardes, ever ready in resource, thought

of a class little known and generally despised, yet whose physical power and spirit of endurance would render them invaluable in such a crisis—the Muzbee Sikhs. A few words respecting these may not be out of place here.\* They were originally Hindoos of the Sweeper caste. When Govind Singh, the warrior Gooroo of the Sikhs, resolved on destroying all caste distinctions among his followers, this hitherto despised class saw the door opened for themselves to the "baptism of the sword," and though perhaps never admitted to the higher ranks of the Sikh community, they held a recognised position among their co-religionists; perhaps the more so that the body of the murdered Tegh Bahadour had been brought away from Delhi by men of that caste. Of this class hundreds were to be found in all parts of the Punjab at the annexation; and although unwilling to enter into our ranks, where the demon caste still held fatal rule, they were ready to avail themselves of the field for labour opened before them in the extensive public works which were soon covering the Punjab, more especially on the different canals in the course of formation in the Doabs. Here they were employed in hundreds, when the mutiny broke out and put a stop to all such works. Thus thrown out of employment, these men were living idle, congregated at the heads of the several Doabs till the chance of labour should return. When the call was made upon them, they eagerly seized the opportunity, came forward for

\* For fuller account of these Muzbee Sikhs, see Cunningham's *History of the Sikhs*, p. 75.

service, and were drafted off in large numbers to Delhi, where they might be seen during the weary weeks of the siege nobly braving danger and enduring privation. They dug trenches, raised batteries, and even sometimes worked the guns, and throughout did good and faithful service.\*

The reader must now turn his back on Peshawur, and follow the career of one who had taken a scarcely second part in its doings, alternately the terror and the idol of the frontier. John Nicholson had been summoned from Peshawur in the middle of June to take command of the Moveable Column, which, as has been already said, owed its existence to a suggestion of his own.

On the death of Colonel Chester, at Budlee Serai, Brigadier Chamberlain had been offered the appointment of Adjutant-General of the Army. It was probably not without some reluctance that he laid down the sword to take up the pen. The vacancy thus caused was filled by Colonel Nicholson,† with the

\* A large number of them have been since formed into "Pioneer Corps," a work for which they are invaluable, and are now called the 24th Punjabees, a corps which has attracted so much attention from the many converts to Christianity.

† His name, it will be remembered, had been one of the three originally recommended to General Anson for this command. Sir John Lawrence had now proposed Nicholson or Chamberlain for the vacant Adjutant-Generalship; General Reid selected Chamberlain, and appointed Nicholson to the column.

Let Colonel Edwardes bear testimony to the worth of his brother in arms and in council :—

"I only knocked down the *walls* of the *Bunnoo Forts*, John Nicholson has since reduced the *people* (the most ignorant, depraved, and bloodthirsty in the Punjab) to such a state of good order and respect

similar rank of Brigadier-General. Hastening down from Peshawur, he took command on the 21st of June, on which day the column had marched into Jullundhur. His first act was characteristic. The column was in no very satisfactory state. The 35th Light Infantry, still armed, were evidently ripe for mutiny, and had been kept under only by the strictest surveillance. Of the 33d N.I., who had been ordered in to join them,

for the laws, that in the last year of his charge not only was there no murder, burglary, or highway robbery, but not an *attempt* at any of these crimes.

"The Bunnoochees, reflecting on their own metamorphosis in the village gatherings under the vines, by the streams they once delighted so to fight for, have come to the conclusion that 'the good Mohammedans' of historic ages must have been 'just like Nikkul Seyn' (Nicholson)! They emphatically approve him as every inch a *hakim* (ruler)—and so he is. It is difficult to describe him; he must be seen. Lord Dalhousie—no mean judge—perhaps best summed up his high military and administrative qualities when he called him 'a tower of strength.' I can only say that I think him equally fit to be Commissioner of a Division or General of an Army. Of the strength of his personal character, I will only tell two anecdotes.

"1. If you visit either the battle-field of Goojerat or Chillianwalla, the country people begin their narrative of the battles thus, 'Nikkul Seyn stood just *there*!'

"2. A brotherhood of fakeers in Huzara abandoned all forms of Asiatic monachism, and commenced the worship of Nikkul Seyn; which they still continue! Repeatedly they have met John Nicholson since, and fallen at his feet as their Gooroo (religious or spiritual guide). He has flogged them on every occasion, and sometimes imprisoned them; but the sect of the Nikkul Seynees remains as devoted as ever. '*Sanguis martyrorum est semen ecclesiarum.*'

"On the last whipping John Nicholson released them on the condition that they would transfer their adoration to John Becher; but, arrive at their monastery in Huzara, they once more resumed the worship of the relentless Nikkul Seyn."—Given in RAIKES'S *Notes on the Mutiny*.

Little did Colonel Edwardes think, when he wrote these words in April 1857, that in two short months "John Nicholson" would be the General of the Punjab Column, and within six months the hope, the hero, and the grief of Delhi!

little could be expected. They had retained their arms at Hosheyarpore, but there were grave suspicions, though Colonel Sandeman, their commandant, professed, and in his conduct showed, fearless reliance in them.\* This corps was now on its way to join the column; and as the two together might prove too strong, Nicholson resolved on disarming them both. It was a master-stroke, and it demands a full description. The column moved out of Jullundhur on the 23d.

“On for Delhi!” was the cry,—a rumour industriously confirmed, as it tended to allay all suspicion of Nicholson’s ulterior object. It was arranged that the 33d N. I. were to join the column at Phugwarrah, one march on the road towards Philour. They came in about midnight on the 24th, just as the column itself was moving off the ground, and naturally fell in in rear of the 35th Light Infantry—a plan which, though apparently accidental, had been carefully preconcerted by the General. The column then marched in the following order:—Dawes’s troop, Bouchier’s battery, H. M. 52d Light Infantry—the 35th N. Light Infantry, the 33d N. I., and the wing of the 9th Cavalry in the rear to bring up the baggage. Captain Farrington, the Deputy-Commissioner, whose local knowledge of the district rendered his presence of great importance, accompanied the General as aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Roberts, of the artillery, as Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General. Being both in the secret, they rode on over-night to Philour, to examine whether the

\* Mrs Sandeman and family remained at the station throughout.



ground immediately in front of the fort would admit of the disarming taking place there, it being a great object, if possible, to bring the two regiments within the range of the fort guns. Other precautions had also to be taken ; and all were so taken as to give colouring to the belief that an onward move was contemplated. The bridge of boats was examined, on the plea of some anxiety being felt lest it should give way before the column could cross ; and additional waggons were collected, apparently with the view of expediting the journey.

Censures were rife, both in the camp and in the fort. Nicholson was condemned in no qualified terms for dreaming of taking two such corps to Delhi, where not a man could be trusted. The morning dawned, Nicholson was already on the ground ; he had ridden on ahead to reconnoitre for himself, and decided that the space near the fort was too small for the purpose, and the advantage of being under the fort guns was of necessity foregone. The usual camping-ground was the only alternative. The plan of operations was at once resolved on. As the column arrived on the ground, they filed off on the right of the road. The artillery and the 52d Queen's, having designedly pushed on, were some way in advance, and were in position, the guns at intervals, with the Europeans distributed between, before the rest arrived. Across the road stood a *serai*, the usual accompaniment of every camping-ground. As the 35th N. I. came near, they were ordered to turn off to the left, and go round the rear of the *serai*, which concealed the Europeans from them

till they wheeled up, left shoulders forward, and came face to face with the 52d Light Infantry and the guns, about 300 yards off (a good distance for grape). The 52d were lying along on the ground, resting ; the gunners had dismounted ; the camp was being pitched, as usual, in the rear. There was nothing to cause suspicion. The 35th Light Infantry were now ordered to form up in close column. The men of the 52d rose up, unpiled arms, and stood "at attention." The gunners remounted. Colonel Younghusband, commanding the 35th Light Infantry, was called forward by the General, and told that the men *must give up their arms!* Expecting probably they were about to hear some general order read, they were completely taken by surprise and overawed, and laid down their arms. The 33d N. I., fatigued with the double march, had not yet come up ; and by the time they reached the ground, the arms of the 35th had been all stowed away safely in the carts so conveniently at hand. They also obeyed the order as submissively as the 35th had done,\* and all the arms were at once carried off to the fort, and the day's work was concluded.

\* The turn events took really proved *most favourable*, though this delay of the 33d N. I. at the time caused great anxiety. Had the 35th N. I. resisted, and the guns once opened fire, the 33d would have taken alarm, and probably all their officers would have fallen victims. The wing of the 9th Cavalry, close behind them, would have joined, and the consequence might have been a deadly struggle. To wait, however, till the 33d should come, involved a greater risk, that the 35th, if kept waiting, might suspect the object, and break out ; whereas, taking them by surprise, having had no means as yet of consulting with the 33d for any combined action, with a powerful body of Europeans and guns facing them, the probability was, they would be over-

By this masterly arrangement some 1500 mutinous sepoys were quietly disarmed in presence of about 800 Europeans and a dozen guns—not a shot fired, or a drop of blood shed! Every precaution, however, had been taken to meet any emergency that might arise. The artillery were ready to open at the first sign of resistance, and the first shot fired was to have been the signal for Mr Ricketts, who was at the bridge, to cut it away and stop the passage of the river; and the fate of the rebels would have been far different from that of their Jullundhur brethren a fortnight before.\* All this was mercifully averted. The tact of General Nicholson triumphed. Nor was this success without its effect on the natives around who witnessed it. “You have to-day drawn the fangs of 1500 snakes,” said an old Sikh to Captain Farrington; “truly your *ikhbal* (good fortune) is great.”

Before passing out of the Jullundhur Doab in our record of the events of June, it may not be amiss to introduce a short allusion to a danger which at this time was threatening to disturb the peace of the district from another quarter; one which might have raised the whole of the Rajpoot clans of the neighbouring hills in

awed and succumb. Most providentially, such was the result; and the 33d, on coming up and finding their comrades disarmed, had no inducement to resist.

\* “Well do I remember, as, leaning over one of my guns, the coolness with which he (Nicholson) gave every order; his last was, ‘If they bolt, you follow as hard as you can; the bridge will have been destroyed, and we shall have a second Sobraon on a small scale.’” — BOURCHIER'S *Eight Months' Campaign*, p. 11.

a general outbreak. The Poorbeah sepoy had been generally regarded as the chief object of suspicion ; the *jat* agricultural population of the Punjab, in their peaceful indifference or antipathy to the Poorbeah, were regarded as our chief guarantee for the peace of the country. The Rajpoot races along the lower Himalayan range, however much they might resent the loss of independence and power under the British rule, were not regarded with much anxiety. Many causes had combined to engender a more peaceful character among them ; and the *Kshutreea* \* element was gradually disappearing in the isolated nature of their position. Comparatively few in number, and split up into petty states, their mutual jealousies rendered any combined action very improbable, and seditious conspiracy next to impossible. Moreover, Gholab Singh, the Maharajah of Cashmere, the recognised head of all Rajpoots north of the Ravee, had taken his stand, with money and men, on the side of Government. With the Jumowal Dogras thus pledged, and their own chief, the *Kutoch* Rajah of Kangra, believed to be friendly, there seemed little cause to anticipate any seditious movement from that quarter. Nor, perhaps, was the conspiracy to which we are about to allude so much an endeavour to exterminate the English, as a desire to recover their own power and position in the general scramble that would follow their extermination, which they were led to believe was at hand. The watchfulness and activity of Major Hay, a retired officer in civil employ at Kooloo, by a timely

\* The soldier class among the Hindoos.

discovery of the plot, alone averted the danger. To him it was entirely due that the conspiracy was detected, and the chief conspirators caught, convicted, and punished.

The circumstances are briefly as follows :—The district of Kooloo is a very Bœotia in a Himalayan Thesaly. Over its bucolic denizens a high Rajpoot family has ruled in unbroken line for several centuries.\* About five-and-thirty years ago, however, the succession was disputed, and a rival claim asserted, which at the time involved the state in civil war, and also led indirectly to the conspiracy we have now to record.

At that time one Brikham Singh was Rajah of Kooloo, and on his death bequeathed his throne to his son, Jeet Singh. A brother of Brikham Singh's, by name Kishen Singh, being a man of ambitious and turbulent spirit, instigated, too, by one Ghyru Bunghalia, a Rajpoot, who was his confidential friend, laid claim to the *guddee* (throne), on the ground that Jeet Singh was illegitimate. He appealed to the Kangra Rajah, who in an evil hour supported his claim, and supplied him with matchlocks and horsemen. With these Kishen Singh made war on his nephew, but was defeated, taken prisoner, and incarcerated. His wife, however, and the friendly Ghyru, resolved at once to anticipate the probable death of Kishen Singh, which would leave Jeet Singh in undisputed possession of the throne, by pretending that she was about to give birth to a child. After a short time, an infant, *the child of Ghyru*, was surreptitiously introduced into Kishen Singh's house

\* They claim to be offshoots from the pure Kutoches of Kangra.

for a consideration of 500 rupees ; his wife was declared to have given birth to a son, and the event was duly notified to the neighbouring rajahs. It was also communicated to Kishen Singh in his prison ; but, instead of rejoicing, like a worthy Rajpoot, at the birth of a son, he repudiated the unexpected honour, saying that it was no child of his. Two days after, he was found dead in his prison ; and when, shortly afterwards, Ghyrū demanded the 500 rupees, the price of the child, he was put out of the way by the two brothers of Kishen Singh's wife.

This child was called *Purtāb Singh*. The youth began active life as a sowar or trooper, in the service of Sirdar Lehna Singh, through whose influence he hoped to have his pretensions to the Kooloo Raj recognised. His supposititious origin was, however, too generally known, and his claim was always rejected, though he was permitted to use the title of *Meean*, or Prince. He was engaged in the Sikh Campaign of 1845-46, and was supposed to have been killed. On such belief, a small money-pension and some land were settled on his widow, with the title of Ranee.

In 1855, after a lapse of ten years, there appeared in the village of Tiramli, a *faqir*, declaring himself to be the long missing Purtāb Singh, and claiming his jageer. The wife at first declared she could not identify him ; but at length, by the persuasion of her brother, one Beer Singh, she consented to acknowledge this man as her long-lost husband. He then took up his abode in Sheoraj, and began to gather around him a small re-

tinue, and even to collect revenue from some Kooloo villages. Armed also with some papers which he contrived to get from the Ranee, giving him a semblance of a claim to the Kooloo *guddee*, he renewed his attempts to have his pretensions recognised, but in vain; and the Deputy-Commissioner at Kangra warned him that an armed retinue and extravagant mode of life did not suit his position, and he would be only tolerated on condition he lived peaceably.

From that time he had not attempted by any overt act to violate this condition. But the general excitement caused by the Poorbeah mutiny seemed to afford an opportunity too favourable to be lost. He could not resist the temptation. His emissaries were soon out in all parts of the neighbouring villages, but the people of Sheoraj were first to be raised. He sent letters appealing to them on his hereditary claim to their fealty, as well as to their religious antipathy to the English. He declared that in Delhi, Simla, and Lahore, every European had been massacred. He bade the people rise quickly and come armed, for that now or never was their time. As if confident of success, he called upon one Soorut Ram, whose father had been an old vizeer of the Kooloo Rajah's, to take his hereditary place beside the heir of the Kooloo throne. Happily all this seditious correspondence was intercepted by the promptness of Major Hay, who had long been suspecting this pretender. On the 1st of June these letters were placed in Major Hay's hands, and in a few days Purtáb Singh was a prisoner.

It may perhaps be a question whether this man originated this conspiracy, or was not rather the tool of others, who remained concealed behind the dignity of their position, and put him forth as the firebrand to kindle the flames of sedition throughout that country, ready themselves to step in and reap the fruits of the intrigue. There is little doubt however, that, wherever it originated, it had drawn within its influence several of the neighbouring chiefs, and the whole district was in danger—a danger which was only averted by the timely discovery. This pretender and Beer Singh, brother-in-law of the impersonated Purtâb Singh, were at the time near Sultanpore. They were both arrested and sent off at once to Kangra for trial. Many others of whose complicity there was no doubt, were subsequently seized, and suffered, according to their degrees of guilt, the punishment they so richly deserved. The pretended Purtâb Singh and Beer Singh were hanged, all their property confiscated, their houses left in ruins, as monuments of the fruitlessness of rebellion, and warnings of the rebels' end. All who had been proved by intercepted documents and confessions to have taken part in these treasonable designs, or to have been privy to them, were sentenced to different periods of imprisonment. Thus was peace restored to Kooloo. The faithful among the Rajpoots were confirmed in their fidelity—the disaffected warned of the danger of conspiring against a Government quick in detecting and powerful in punishing treason.



## CHAPTER X.

[JUNE 1857.—PART III.]

THE ADVANCE OF THE ARMY—THE MEERUT BRIGADE—THE BATTLE OF THE HINDON—THE TWO FORCES JOIN AT ALIPORE—THE BATTLE OF BUDLEE SERAI—THE CAPTURE OF THE RIDGE—METCALFE HOUSE SEIZED—AN ASSAULT PLANNED AND ABANDONED—RUJJUB ALI, AND THE SECRET INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT UNDER HODSON—THE REAR-ATTACK OF THE 19TH—THE CENTENARY OF PLASSY—THE SUBZEE MUNDEE FICQUET—REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE—BRIGADIER CHAMBERLAIN ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

THE advancing army has been lost sight of since it passed beyond Kurnaul, under the command of Sir H. Barnard, who succeeded on the death of General Anson.

Rumours had come up to Umballa about the end of May, that the mutineers, after having committed appalling atrocities and ransacked the city, had carried off the plunder and dispersed quietly to their homes. Such a course they might once have contemplated ; but our delay to advance they interpreted into weakness and fear, and took courage, and so held on revelling and rioting in the city ; at first apparently without plan or ulterior purpose, but by the time tidings reached them that a force was actually moving down, they had so far

gained confidence as to resolve on organising resistance. Delhi was to be their stronghold ; and here,

“Beneath an impious faith which sanctifies  
To them all deeds of wickedness and blood,—  
Yea, and halloes to them on—here are they met.” \*

Before describing the further advance of the Umballa force, it will be necessary to notice at some length events which were passing at Meerut. General Anson, having acceded to the wishes of Sir John Lawrence, and at length consented to move upon Delhi, wrote to General Hewitt, commanding the Meerut division, informing him of his proposed plan, and asking for reinforcements from the Meerut brigade. “I propose,” he said, writing on the 23d of May, “to advance with the column from Kurnaul towards Delhi on the 1st of June, and be opposite to Bhagput on the 5th. At this last place I should wish to be joined by the force from Meerut.” Before this day arrived, as the reader knows, General Anson had died of cholera, and his command had passed into other hands : but his orders had been carried out at Meerut.

On the night of the 27th of May, the little brigade moved out under Colonel Archdale Wilson, composed of half a troop of horse-artillery under Major Henry Tombs ; a company of foot-artillery and light field-battery under Major E. W. S. Scott, with Lieutenant-Colonel Murray Mackenzie commanding the artillery brigade ; two squadrons of H. M. 6th Dragoon Guards (Carabineers), under Colonel W. N. Custance ; a wing

\* *Roderick the Goth.*

of H. M. 60th Rifles (1st battalion), under Colonel J. Jones; two companies of native sappers, with fifty troopers of the 4th Irregulars. Mr H. H. Greathed accompanied the force as commissioner and political agent, under orders from the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces at Agra. Three marches were accomplished without obstacle or appearance of opposition; and on the morning of the 30th they encamped at Ghazee-oo-deen-Nuggur, on the banks of the Hindon, a tributary stream of the Jumna, which here crosses the main road between Meerut and Delhi, and is spanned by an iron suspension-bridge. This most important point may be regarded as the key of the Doab. Here the rebels had come out in full force, and had strongly intrenched themselves with the intention of disputing our advance; yet so carefully had they concealed their position, that no suspicion was entertained of their proximity till late in the day. About four o'clock in the afternoon, two cavalry videttes galloped in and reported that the mutineers were advancing in force, accompanied by heavy guns; a few minutes after, an 18-pound round-shot rolled into camp.\* In a few moments the whole force had turned out; and then began the first struggle with our rebel army.

The plan of attack and the result are thus described by Brigadier Wilson:—

“I immediately sent off a company of Her Majesty's

\* It took off one leg of each of two palkee-bearers who were sitting at the tent-door of the Carabineers' hospital.—ROTTON'S *Siege of Delhi*, p. 24.

60th Royal Rifles, with another in support, to hold the iron bridge, which is the key of my position, and I detached the four guns of Major Tombs's troop, supported by a squadron of Carabineers right along the bank of the Hindon river.

"The insurgents opened upon these advanced parties with heavy guns. I ordered two more companies of the 60th to support their advance, and brought up four guns of Major Scott's battery, the sappers, and a troop of Carabineers to their support, leaving two guns and a troop of Carabineers to protect the camp.

"The first few rounds from the insurgents' guns were admirably aimed, plunging through our camp; but they were ably replied to by our two 18-pounders, in position under Lieutenant Light, and Major Tombs's troop, most admirably led by Lieutenant-Colonel M. Mackenzie, who, raking them in the flank with his 6-pounders, first made their fire unsteady, and in a short time silenced the heavy guns.

"On remarking the unsteadiness of their fire, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Jones to advance his Rifles and attack. This was done in a most spirited manner. They drove the enemy from the guns; but in the act of taking possession of two heavy pieces on the causeway, close to the toll-house, I regret to say that Captain Andrews and four of his men were blown up by the explosion of an ammunition-waggon, fired by one of the mutineers.

"The insurgents were now in full retreat, leaving in our hands ordnance, ammunition, and stores."

The retreat, however, was so rapid, that only five guns were captured, the rebels carrying off all the rest. Short and decisive as the engagement was, the rebels fought well : it was the first time they encountered their late masters, and the sepoys crossed bayonets manfully, and the cavalry charged our guns gallantly ; but their courage soon failed them, and some 700 Europeans (for the Meerut force scarcely numbered more) drove ten times their own number out of an intrenched position with comparatively little loss ; the casualties being—Captain Andrews, of the Rifles, killed, and Lieutenant de Bourbel, of the Carabiniers, wounded, with thirty rank and file killed and wounded.

But the struggle was not all over. On their return to Delhi the rebels were greeted with reproaches and taunts, and then sent back again with promise of high reward to retrieve their honour. By noon the following day the struggle was renewed. It was Whitsunday. In the early morning, the dead of the day before had been committed to their graves, and before evening more were to be added to the number.\* In the morning, about nine o'clock, there had been a false alarm ; about twelve o'clock the alarm again sounded, then the "assembly," and a sharp cannonade proved that this time it was in earnest. The village which they had

\* The Rev. J. E. W. Rotton, one of the Meerut chaplains, who accompanied the brigade and remained with the army throughout the whole siege, thus describes this burial-place :—"A babool-tree a little in the rear, and a mile-stone a little above, and situated on the main road between Meerut and Delhi, mark the spot."—P. 28.

so strongly occupied the day before, had been cleared out and burnt by the gallant Rifles ; so this time they took up a position at a more respectful distance, on some high ground about a mile beyond the advanced picquet ; they occupied a village to the left, and from this height they opened with their heavy guns.\* Out went Tombs's guns, supported by a squadron of Carabineers. Lieutenant Light took up his position on the bank of the river with two 18-pounders, with two guns of Scott's battery and a troop of Carabineers in support ; while the 60th Rifles, leaving one company to protect the camp, held the bridge. For nearly two hours it was almost entirely an artillery action. At length the order was given for the Rifles to advance ; the village on the left was soon cleared out ; the fire of the enemy's guns began to slacken ; the advance became general ; the rebels retired steadily for some distance, and were followed up from point to point ; then, pouring in a salvo of grape, they limbered up their guns and sounded the retreat ; and when the ridge was crowned, they could be seen beyond in full scamper for Delhi. But pursuit was impossible ; the heat of the sun had disabled the force far more than the grape of the enemy, who were consequently enabled to carry off all their guns. The loss was comparatively small, though it included one whom Brigadier Wilson described as an "invaluable officer and a great loss," Lieutenant H. G. Perkins of the Horse-artillery. Assistant-Surgeon S. Moore of the Carabineers was severely

\* GREATHED'S *Letters*, p. 8.

wounded in the head, and Ensign W. H. Napier of the Rifles, both of whom died of their wounds a few days after.\* Young Napier seemed to inherit that heroism which attaches, as it were, to the name he bore. As he lay on his cot disabled for life (even had he been spared) for a soldier's career by the loss of his leg, this seemed to be his one subject of regret, as he repeated, with tears many and bitter, "I shall never lead the Rifles again."†

In reporting the exploits of the day, Brigadier Wilson makes special mention of "Lieut. Elliot, of the artillery, who supported the Rifles with two guns of Major Scott's battery in the most steady and determined manner; Lieut. Light also did admirable service with his 18-pounders. The sappers and miners under Lieutenant Maunsell, brought up in support of Lieut. Elliot's guns, performed most efficient service."

Now came a halt of four days, during which the little force was strengthened by the arrival of 100 more of the Rifles, whom the Brigadier had sent for from Meerut, and the Sirmooree battalion of Goorkhas under Major C. Reid, who were withdrawn from Allygurrh — to prove an invaluable addition to the little army at Delhi.

On the 4th of June they turned their backs on Ghazee-oo-deen-Nuggur and the Hindon, having first rendered the bridge impassable, without having seen

\* Captain Johnson, staff-officer, was also slightly contused. The total of the day's casualties was nine killed (three died of sun-stroke) and twelve wounded.

† Rorror's *Siege of Delhi*, p. 33.

anything more of the rebels since the 31st. On the 6th they crossed the Jumna at Bhagput, and on the 7th effected a junction with the Umballa force under Major-General Sir H. W. Barnard at Alipore, one march from Delhi, and the Meerut Brigade was merged into the Delhi Field-force. This force now consisted of sixteen horse-artillery guns, six horse-battery guns, H. M. 9th Lancers, two squadrons of Carabineers, six companies of the 60th Rifles, H. M. 75th Foot, H. C. 1st Fusiliers, six companies H. C. 2d Fusiliers, the Sirmoor Battalion, and a portion (about 150 men) of the sappers and miners which had not mutinied : in round numbers, there were 600 cavalry and 2400 infantry, with 22 field-guns. Besides the above, the siege-train was close behind, consisting of eight 18-pounder guns, four 8-inch howitzers, four 8-inch mortars, and a 5½-inch mortar, with a weak company of European artillery, and 100 European artillery recruits.

On the morning of the 7th occurred an incident which furnished another illustration of the value of Lieutenant Hodson in the force. The evening before there had been grave doubts and differences among the Staff as to the real position which the rebels had taken up to dispute our advance on Delhi. The camp was then at Alipore, covered by a strong advance-guard of all arms, with a breastwork thrown up across the road, and a couple of guns, loaded with grape, and port-fires burning. As the day dawned, a small cloud of dust was noticed ahead on the road from Delhi : all were on the alert ; on it came, nearer and nearer ;



it was evidently cavalry. It was within three hundred yards—a few yards more, and the guns would have opened upon them—when the foremost of the party turned off sharp to the right, followed by about a dozen sowars. It was an Englishman—it was Hodson! He had been out to examine for himself the position of the rebels, and solve the doubts of the evening before; had he had a few of his old trusty “Guides,” he would (he said) have gone up to the very walls of Delhi; having only a few of the Jheend Rajah’s sowars for his escort, he was obliged to content himself with a reconnoissance—a very careful one—of their advanced position, and a gallop through the old cantonments; and on his report was the attack for the following morning planned.\*

A further clearance of suspected Hindostanees was now made; a squadron of the 4th Cavalry under Colonel Clayton, which had accompanied the force from Umballa, and a wing of the 9th Irregular Cavalry, which had escorted the siege-train from Philour, were ordered out to watch some villages near the Jumna, where report said parties of rebels were collecting; the real object being, that on the day of action the force might not be embarrassed by treachery in its own ranks.†

\* Hodson in his own letters barely alludes to this exploit, p. 196. Mr Greathed merely says, “Captain Hodson has reconnoitred up to the Delhi race-course,” p. 25. For the particulars of the incident the author is indebted to Lieutenant Hunter, who was in charge of the guns.

† NORMAN’S *Narrative*.

Already had several changes taken place in the leading commands. Brigadier Hallifax had died of congestion of the brain, and Colonel St. G. Showers had succeeded to the command of the 1st Infantry Brigade. Colonel Mowat, commanding the artillery, had been carried off by cholera, and the command had been taken by Colonel Murray Mackenzie, of the Meerut force.

All was now preparation for the coming struggle. Hodson reported that the rebels had taken up a very formidable position at an enclosed building called Budlee Serai, about five miles on this side of the city, with a broad and deep *jheel* protecting their right from the possibility of a flank attack, while the main road by which the advance must be made ran between the Serai and the *jheel*; on their left, low marshy ground for miles, with the Nujjufghur *jheel* Canal running parallel to the road, as completely protecting that flank; so that an attack in front was the only course open. Such were the natural advantages of their position, which they had not been slow to take advantage of and to improve upon. About one hundred and fifty yards in front of the Serai stood, on high ground, two ruined summer-houses, one on either side; here they had established a couple of batteries and mounted some light field-pieces; while in support, along the front of the Serai, they had planted several heavy pieces to sweep the whole of the open ground; and to give full effect to their guns, they had placed at intervals large *gumlaks* (earthen jars) painted white to enable them more ac-

curately to mark the distances and to regulate the elevation of their guns. To such an extent had they turned to good account the time which our delay in advancing had given them.

The plan of attack may be briefly thus described:—The infantry were to be divided into two brigades: the first, commanded by Colonel St G. Showers, consisted of nine companies of H. M. 75th Foot under Colonel Herbert; the 1st Bengal Fusiliers under Colonel Welchman,\* with Major Scott's battery; one squadron of Carabineers and a party of sappers (with intrenching tools) under Lieutenant Chesney of the Bengal Engineers. The second brigade, under Brigadier Graves, comprised six companies of the 60th Rifles under Colonel J. Jones, six companies of the 2d Bengal Fusiliers under Captain A. Boyd, the Sirmoor Battalion of Goorkhas under Major C. Reid, with Captain Money's troop of horse-artillery, and a squadron of the 9th Lancers, accompanied by a party of sappers under Lieutenant Salkeld of the Engineers. The cavalry brigade, under Colonel J. Hope Grant, C.B., comprised three squadrons of the 9th Lancers under Lieutenant-Colonel Yule, and about fifty Jheend Horse under Lieutenant Hodson, with Tombs's and Turner's troops of horse-artillery.

\* Colonel Welchman had but partially recovered from the effects of the severe operation he had undergone; but on the morning of the 5th he made his appearance in camp. "His gallant spirit," writes one who records the doings of the 1st Fusiliers before Delhi, in *Blackwood* for January 1858, "urged the old soldier on to leave his family and pleasant home, for fatigues and dangers at the head of his corps."

The entire force brought into the field may be calculated at, in round numbers, 170 cavalry and 1900 infantry, with fourteen guns in the two infantry brigades, and in that under Brigadier Hope Grant, about 350 cavalry and ten guns ; \* while there remained behind, as a rear-guard, and to protect the siege-train, a squadron of the 6th Carabineers, a company of the 2d Bengal Fusiliers, two guns of Major Scott's battery, and the Jheend Rajah's contingent.

The position taken up by the rebels precluded the possibility of a flank attack, but there was reason to believe that the country beyond became more open, and would admit of an attack in reverse. This part was assigned to the cavalry brigade ; and while it was still dark, Brigadier Hope Grant moved off his cavalry and guns, with the view of making a detour and presenting himself on the left rear of the enemy simultaneously with the infantry brigades on his front.

Soon after two o'clock in the morning the whole force was on the move. A march of five miles brought them close upon the enemy's position ; the day was just breaking, and lights were seen in the enemy's camp. While our guns were in the act of advancing, the enemy forestalled them and opened fire. The second brigade were still two miles in the rear when they heard the booming of the cannon ; for, through some mismanagement, store-carts and cattle had so blocked up the road as to obstruct their march. But, once clear of these *impedimenta*, they pushed on at

\* NORMAN'S *Narrative*.

the double, and soon formed up in their position. In the meanwhile the heavy guns of the enemy—for our light field-pieces could do little towards silencing the 18 and 24-pounders they had brought out from the magazine—were playing with deadly effect on the advancing column. To add to the discomfiture, somebody, no one knows who, called out to “prepare for cavalry,” and the 75th formed into square; so the round-shot was ploughed murderously through their closed ranks. Brigadier Showers saw the mistake, but there was no time to remedy it; so, galloping to their front, he led them up, in square as they were, to the batteries. On they sprang with an English cheer, and the 1st Fusiliers nobly came up in support, and the guns were mastered. Brigadier Graves had by this time brought up his column, and by a slight flank-movement, leading his men under heavy fire up to their knees in water, completed the capture.

Now appeared the long-looked-for cavalry brigade. They had met with more difficulties and obstacles than they anticipated, but they arrived just in time to see the batteries taken, and by a dashing and murderous charge upon the retreating rebels completed the rout. The whole affair had scarcely lasted an hour; yet it was no easy victory. Here, as on the Hindon, the rebels fought well; the training we had given them now told fatally against us; they worked the guns with fatal accuracy, for they had previously studied the distances; but it was the charge of the Europeans

which took them by surprise, and then so rapid was the rush, that their guns, placed on high ground, could not be lowered in time, and charge after charge of round shot and grape passed almost harmlessly overhead. At their guns, too, they fought desperately—still more so inside the Serai; hand to hand they fought, for they knew there was no quarter for them; and they sold their lives dearly. It was said that of those who came out of Delhi *a thousand* never returned; they must have lost in killed and wounded between 400 and 500, and at least as many more had already tasted enough of the fruits of mutiny, and slunk off to their homes.

About half a mile beyond, at Azadpore, the road divided, the right branch leading to the city, that on the left into cantonments; so judiciously had the rebels taken up their first position in advance of this division of the roads. Here a halt was sounded. About a couple of miles beyond rose *the ridge* where the rebels had apparently taken up another strong position. Again was heard the old cry for delay, as if there had not been already delay enough! Happily the torpedo touch was withstood. Everything was in favour of advance; the rebels were driven from their vantage-ground, while our men, despite a long march and a hard fight, forgot their fatigue in the flush of success. The next morning would have found the rebels rallied and reorganised, with a strong position along the ridge still stronger, while our men, as yet uninured to such exposure and fatigue, with their ardour cooled down,

would perhaps be less ready for such another effort. Happily the voices for delay were drowned in the general call for an advance. A short halt sufficed, and on they pushed again.

Our force was altogether too small for a combined attack in front of the whole length of the ridge, so it was resolved to make a double flank attack on either end, and to effect a junction in the centre. So two columns were formed. Brigadier Graves's brigade, with the addition of Captain Money's troop of horse-artillery, took the left road towards the cantonments, while Brigadier Showers led his brigade, to which were added the rest of the artillery and cavalry, to the right, along the road to the city; Major C. Reid at the same time spread out his gallant little Goorkhas as far as he could over the intermediate ground, and advanced to attack the rebels in front. At the Flagstaff Tower, the extreme end of their position on our left, the rebels had established a battery with three guns, from which they opened a heavy cannonade on Brigadier Graves's column, having laid their guns especially to command the bridge by which the column must cross the canal. This bridge had been partially destroyed, but fortunately enough was left for the guns to pass over. The bridge crossed, the column opened out and pushed along through the cantonments, the enemy's guns playing incessantly upon them, though with little effect. On through the huts of the sepoy lines, through the streets of ruined bungalows of officers,\* they came

\* NORMAN'S *Narrative*.

within a few hundred yards of the battery; here Money's troop moved to the front, opened fire, and almost immediately silenced their guns; the Rifles and 2d Fusiliers wheeled round on the left, took the battery in flank, and the rebels "bolted," leaving all the guns in our hands. On the evening of May 11th, Brigadier Graves had been the last to turn his back on the Flagstaff Tower, that scene of agonising suspense and suffering, and now, accompanied by Sir H. Barnard, he was among the first to enter it again, recaptured by his column.

During this time Brigadier Showers, accompanied by Brigadier-General Wilson, had been fighting their way along the right. The rebels, though in fast retreat, maintained a harassing fire under cover of the walls and gardens which lined the road, and in the by-lanes of the Subzee Munde subburb. Gallantly they forced their way, clearing all before them, capturing an 18-pounder gun on the way, mounted the ridge at their extreme right, and at Hindoo Rao's house met Brigadier Graves's column, which, after mastering the battery at the Tower, had fought their way along the crest.

It was scarcely yet 9 o'clock in the day; two battles had been fought and won, and the ridge was in our possession—that ridge where for three long months of heat, and rain, and sickness, with an endurance and perseverance to which history can scarce produce a parallel, a handful of Englishmen held their own against a force more than ten times their number;



and at last triumphed. But it had not been a bloodless victory; first to fall was Colonel Chester, the Adjutant-General of the army; the first shot fired by the enemy at Budlee Serai had robbed the army of one who, to use the words of General Barnard, "was esteemed by all for every qualification that can adorn the soldier." The same shot that killed Colonel Chester also mortally wounded Captain C. W. Russell (54th N. I.), his orderly officer: Captain J. W. Delamain (56th N. I.), also orderly officer, and Lieutenant A. Harrison (H. M. 75th), were killed. Among the wounded, the artillery and H. M. 75th suffered the most severely; of the former, Lieutenants A. Light, C. Hunter, and R. Hare were slightly wounded, and Lieutenant A. H. Davidson severely injured by the blowing-up of a tumbril from the enemy's fire on the ridge. Of H. M. 75th, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, Captain R. Dawson, Lieutenant J. R. S. Fitzgerald, Lieutenant and Adjutant R. Barter, Lieutenant C. R. Rivers, Ensign E. M. Pym, and Assistant-Surgeon Lithgow, were wounded: the only other officers wounded were Captain Greville and Lieutenant N. Ellis, 1st Bengal Fusiliers; the losses in the ranks were 47 killed and 144 wounded. The total number of guns captured was twenty-six; of these, thirteen were captured at the Serai, one in the Subzee Munde, and the rest on the ridge.

In reporting this victory General Barnard thus gracefully acknowledges the assistance of Brigadier-General Wilson, that his "cool judgment entitles him

to an equal share of any merit that may be given to the officer in command."\*

But the day's work was not yet over : the rebels did not seem disposed to allow an undisputed possession of the ridge ; they had already mounted several heavy pieces on the city bastions, and, moreover, had run up two 24-pounder batteries outside the walls ; the magazines supplied them with heavy pieces without number, and it was evident that they had trained artillerymen to work as many guns as they could conveniently bring to bear upon us. By 2 o'clock in the day a heavy cannonade was opened on the ridge. The troops who, on the capture of the ridge, had moved down into the cantonment where the camp was to be pitched, to get a little food and rest after their morning's work, before even their tents were pitched, were again turned out to meet an attack on our right flank, where some guns were brought out to play upon our camp ; but the Rifles soon repulsed the attack—some of the 75th captured and brought in one of the guns—and by 5 o'clock the camp was again quiet, with the exception of the cannonade, which continued incessantly from the city walls.

Thus ended the 8th June.

The points taken up along the ridge were the Flag-staff Tower on the left, which was held by a strong infantry picquet ; Hindoo Rao's house on the right, strongly held by the Sirmooree Goorkhas and two companies of the 60th Rifles ; another infantry picquet

\* See Appendix H.

at a large mosque lying about midway between; while on the rear of the right flank a mound, commanding the Subzee Mundee suburb, was held by a strong picquet with guns and cavalry; and the canal, which ran along our rear and left flank, was patrolled by cavalry picquets.

Major-General Reed, who, on the death of General Anson, had been appointed provisional commander-in-chief, had moved down from Rawul Pindee in order to take personal command of the force, but only reached Alipore on the morning of the 8th, just as the army was moving out. The fatigue of so long and rapid a journey (nearly 500 miles) at the hottest season of the year told on a frame already shaken by disease, and he found himself so much broken in health as to be unequal to the command, which he therefore left in the hands of Sir H. Barnard, his advice being freely sought and given in all matters of moment.\*

The morning of the 9th witnessed the arrival in camp of a regiment which, for a single corps, was the greatest acquisition during the whole siege.

Soon after midnight on the 12th May, the Guides, then at Hotee Murdan, close to Peshawur, received orders to march by daylight to join the Moveable Column. The morning of the 13th saw them at Attock on the Indus (thirty miles off), a subsequent order having come that they were not to wait for the column, but to push on at once for Delhi. It was a

\* NORMAN'S *Narrative*. See Appendix I.

march of 580 miles—fifty-eight regular marches. Three days they had halted on the road by special order, and on the twenty-fourth morning after starting—that is, in twenty-one forced marches—they were at Delhi! Twenty-seven miles a-day for three weeks is probably the most rapid march of infantry on record. On the morning of the 9th June they marched into camp, three troops of cavalry and six companies of infantry under Captain H. Daly (1st Bombay Fusiliers); and within three hours they were in action.

The cannonade had been going on all morning; but in the course of the afternoon the rebels moved out of the Lahore Gate in force, and made a desperate advance on our right flank. So desperate was the attack that the Guides were called out in support. Their long march, instead of wearying them, seemed to have given them fresh vigour. Not content with repelling the attack, they pushed on in pursuit through the Subzee Mundee, through Kissengunge, up to the very walls of the city. But dearly did they pay for their triumph: Daly and Hawes were wounded, and poor Quentin Battye, commanding the cavalry, received a mortal wound, from which he died the following day, closing a bright though brief career with a noble soldier's death. "Now I have a chance of seeing service," was his joyous exclamation,\* as he turned his back on Nowshera on the 13th May; three weeks after, he had fought his first and last fight, and he fell covered with glory. The brave boy died with a

\* Addressed to the Author as they shook hands for the last time.

smile on his lip, and a Latin quotation on his tongue, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori."\*

Offensive operations were now beginning in earnest; along the edge of the garden in front of Hindoo Rao's house a battery was run up, and our heaviest guns put in position to reply in some degree to the enemy's fire, which was almost incessant; but the distance (between 1200 and 1500 yards) was too great for our guns to do much damage. However, the enemy's fire was to some extent kept down, and the guns on the Moree bastion occasionally silenced.

On the 10th and 11th the attack on our position at Hindoo Rao's house was renewed, but repulsed without much loss. On the latter morning the camp was rather taken by surprise by the arrival of the officers of the 60th N. I., bringing with them another tale of Poorbeah treachery. This corps had been detached from the army at Kurnaul, and sent off to Rohtuk. It appears that for some days they had remained quiet. This, coupled with their own protestations, Colonel T. Seaton, who now commanded them, was willing to accept as a proof of their returning loyalty—it might more justly be attributed to the fact that, being out of reach of the ordinary post, no letter had come into their camp for some days. On the morning of the 9th a mail-bag was brought in; there were several letters for the sepoys, which, with misplaced confidence, were at once given to them. They now learned that the 5th N. I., whom they had left behind

\* HODSON'S *Twelve Years of a Soldier's Life*, p. 202.

at Umballah, had been disarmed. This piece of news turned the scale; they resolved that night to break out and murder their officers. One of the officer's servants overheard them discussing the plot, and hastened off to put his master on his guard, on his way warning all the *syces* to have their masters' horses saddled. The officers were all sitting in the mess-tent, wholly unconscious of the danger, when the servant rushed in to warn them, and at the same moment firing was heard, and bullets came dropping through the tent. To their surprise and delight they found their horses ready saddled; they mounted and galloped off, followed by volleys from the *sépoys*, but not one was touched, except the serjeant-major, slightly.

However, they were not yet "out of the wood." Another danger awaited them. After a hard ride all night, they found themselves soon after daybreak close to a large village; here they pulled up and rode in leisurely. The Goojur villagers, seeing them coming, had turned out armed with matchlocks, spears, and clubs, to oppose them. "What is your regiment?" called out one of the leaders. Colonel Seaton, who was riding in front, replied, with great presence of mind, "A European regiment." "Where is it?" "Coming up close behind." This saved them! To have betrayed themselves as belonging to the 60th N. I. would have sealed their fate. So the Goojurs having no wish for the speedy revenge of a European regiment close at hand, let them pass on unharmed. Once clear of the village and out of sight, the officers

were again at full speed, and scarcely drew rein until they were safe in camp, content to have lost every particle of property so that they saved their lives.

The rebels had now three times attacked our right flank, and failed. On the morning of the 12th they made a still more desperate attack on our left. The Flagstaff Tower was, in this direction, the extreme point of our position, as originally taken up on the 8th; just beyond it the ridge was broken by a gorge cut through the hill, by which the direct road led from the city to the cantonments. A battery established at the Flagstaff Tower effectually commanded this road, and rendered any advance of the rebels through the gorge impossible; beyond this the ridge sloped away down to the deep sandy bank of the river. But between our extreme left and the city lay that once princely mansion and domain, "Metcalf House and grounds." That estate, on which the late Sir Theophilus Metcalfe had so lavishly displayed his taste, had been among the first scenes of Goojur demolition after the memorable 11th of May. Impossible as it may seem, those pleasure-grounds and gardens, so rich in choice trees and flowers, had once been the site of a Goojur village in all its primitive filth; and the sons of those petty holders who had sold their little plots to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, cherished a fierce resolve that they would some day recover the land of their fathers—of which the *burra sahib* \* had become fairly possessed. With

\* Literally "the great man;" the common title of the chief civilian of a district.

the outbreak their day of vengeance came. They stripped the roof of all its massive and valuable timber, carried off all the doors and windows—everything which they could among themselves bring into use or convert into money; they demolished the costly marble statues, and the unnumbered smaller articles of *vertu*; and then, with consistent Goth-like ruthlessness, tore up and piled in the centres of the rooms the volumes of that far-famed library, believed to be without its equal in India, and, this done, set fire to the whole building.

Such had been the fate of Metcalfe House; the Goojurs had wreaked their vengeance, and then abandoned the charred and still smouldering pile. And now the sepoys had taken possession and established a battery in the grounds. So formidable was their position there, that on the 11th the possibility of dislodging them had been discussed in council; but it had been decided that, with so weak a force, the risk would be too great.

As the day broke on the morning of the 12th, the danger of this position was fully realised. The undulations in the grounds, and the ravines which traverse it, furnished cover, of which the rebels had taken advantage to steal up within 300 or 400 yards of the Flagstaff Battery: the breaking day disclosed them advancing in formidable array with guns in front; and another body, having turned the ridge on the river bank, were seen forcing their way into the rear of our camp. The guards at that moment were being relieved; two companies of the 2d Fusiliers were relieving the same number of H. M. 75th at the Flagstaff Battery,



and but for this accidental accession of strength the battery must have been lost. Captain Knox, commanding the detachment of the 75th, seemed to imagine that the sepoy were coming to lay down their arms, and refused to let the men fire ; so the rebels came up within fifty yards, and then sent in a withering volley. Captain Knox himself was killed ; and the gunners, several of whom were wounded, seemed bewildered, and for a few moments the guns were in danger. But the sounds of musketry had roused the camp ; supports were pushed up, and the battery quickly cleared of the rebels. In the mean time, the party that had crept round the ridge to the rear had not been idle ; so far had they advanced into camp that the bullets fell into the regimental hospitals ; and so little had danger been expected from this point, that they were forcing their way into camp without obstruction, when Captain A. Boyd of the 2d Fusiliers rallied all the rest of his men that were in camp, about 100 in all, brought them round the old sepoy lines, and fell on the flank of the rebels, who quickly beat a retreat. At every point they were repulsed. Nor was this all ; their retreat of that day lost them more than even the 500 reported to have been killed—it lost them Metcalfe House itself ! In the ardour of the pursuit, in which Rifles, Fusiliers, 75th, and Guides all vied with each other, they followed the rebels through the Metcalfe grounds, house, garden, stables, up to the very walls of Delhi. The success of that morning gave them what the council the evening before had pronounced too hazardous to attempt. From

this day Metcalfe House was ours ; it became our advanced position on the left ; 150 men held a mound on the right, which commanded the road from the Cashmere Gate ; 150 more held the stables close on the river bank, while a smaller picquet occupied an out-house midway between these two points.\* In vain did the rebels pour in their shot and shell from the Cashmere bastion and Selimghur ; the engineers were at hand to repair the damage and to strengthen the defences ; and the left flank was never again turned during the rest of the siege.

The 12th June is memorable in the records of the siege of Delhi for another event which demands especial notice. "It was at once evident," says Lieut. Norman in his narrative, "that our artillery and engineer means were insufficient to take Delhi, the guns of the rebels being infinitely superior in numbers and calibre to our own, and well served ; while to make regular approaches was quite impossible, the sappers being few in number, and so large a proportion of the infantry being at all times required for the defence of our position, that no men could be spared for working parties." So, under a general consciousness that our means were altogether insufficient for a regular siege, the possibility of taking the city by a *coup-de-main* came to be discussed. Nor were there wanting enterprising young spirits to plan an assault. The leaders in this gallant though desperate project were Lieutenants W. Wilberforce Greathed, George T. Chesney,

\* NORMAN'S *Narrative*.

and F. R. Maunsell, all of the Bengal Engineers, with Lieut. W. Hodson—"four subalterns" to use the words of the latter, "called upon to suggest a means of carrying out so vitally important an enterprise as this—one on which the safety of the empire depended!" The plan may be thus described: The whole effective strength of the infantry, guards and picquets included, were to move out in the dead of night, while the camp was to be left solely under guard of the cavalry; two of the gates were to be blown in by powder-bags, and the force, in two columns, to throw themselves on the slumbering city and seize possession of the main-guard and the palace. It was a desperate venture—all to be staked on the single throw; no reserves, not even supports to fall back upon in case of failure. But why should it fail? the venturesome few who were concerned felt sure of success. The gallant Rifles, foremost in gallantry and danger, were already close to the walls; the picquets were being moved off guard to fall in with their respective regiments—when the order passed through camp that the assault was abandoned.

The reason for this sudden change of purpose demands explanation.

Brigadier Graves was the field-officer of the day. About eleven o'clock that night he received verbal orders that the Europeans on picquet along the height were to move off, without being relieved, for special duty, with a vague hint that a night-assault was in contemplation. On reaching the Flagstaff picquet, he found the native guards in the act of relief, and unable

to believe that it was intended to leave that important position, with its two guns, in the charge of natives only, he galloped down to the General's tent for further instructions. Here he heard that they were on the point of assaulting, and that every European infantry soldier was required. Now the Brigadier probably knew more of the actual strength of Delhi than any other soldier in the force—he had commanded the brigade at the time of the outbreak ; and when asked his opinion as to the chance of success, he replied, “ You may certainly take the city by surprise, but whether you are strong enough to hold it is another matter.” This made the General falter in his plan : some of the young officers who were to take a leading part now came in and found him wavering ; the Brigadier's remark had so shaken his purpose that, in spite of entreaty and remonstrance, he withdrew the consent which, if truth be told, he had never very heartily given to the project, and the assault was abandoned. The Rifles, already under the walls, and the advancing columns, were recalled into camp.

Such were the real circumstances of an affair the blame of which has pretty generally, though scarcely with justice, been thrown on Brigadier Graves. It must be allowed that at no period during the siege was the chance of success by assault so great as now. The enemy were cowed ; defeat had followed upon defeat : on the 8th they had lost the Budlee Serai, and been driven off the ridge ; on each succeeding day their attempts to turn our flank, first on the right and then

on the left, had failed ; that very morning they had lost Metcalfe House. Then, again, the surprise would have been complete—not a rumour of the attempt had reached them. All this was in our favour, and made up in the aggregate the chance of success. But it was a *chance*, and, at best, a desperate one. That the venturous spirits who planned and were eager to lead it should at the moment have felt the disappointment keenly, and have inveighed bitterly against the caution which robbed them of their hope of success, cannot be wondered at ; but calmer reflection will probably have made them ready to concur in the opinion of one who had no lack of zeal, that “there are few who do not now feel that the accident which hindered this attempt was one of those happy interpositions on our behalf, of which we had such numbers to be thankful for. Defeat, or even a partial success, would have been ruin, and complete success would not have achieved for us the results subsequently obtained, or, as far as can be seen, would it have prevented a single massacre, most of which, indeed, had already taken place.” \*

\* NORMAN'S *Narrative*. Nor was Lieutenant Norman alone in this view. A young Engineer officer, writing under the *nomme de guerre* of “Felix,” whose admirable account of the siege, originally published in the *Lahore Chronicle*, is inserted in Lieut. Norman's *Narrative*, writes as follows :—

“Whether the city might or might not have been carried by a *coup-de-main*, it is needless now to inquire. But judging from the resistance we afterwards experienced in the actual assault, when we had been greatly reinforced in men and guns, it appears to me fortunate that the attempt was not made. The strength of the place was never supposed to consist in the strength of its actual defences, though these were much undervalued ; but every city, even without fortifications, is, from its very nature, strongly defensible, unless it can be effectually

The assault abandoned, it became clear that the siege must now be begun more systematically ; and steps were at once taken for strengthening our position at all points. Hindoo Rao's house, the key of our position on the right, was intrusted to Major Reid with his gallant Goorkhas, strengthened by two companies of the 60th Rifles, with the rest of the regiment encamped within easy distance for summoning up supports when necessary. An additional battery was run up beyond, so as to sweep the road which led up from Kissengunge, and to pour in a plentiful supply of shot and shell into that suburb whenever the rebels showed signs of an intention to take up a formidable position there ; while immediately in the rear of Hindoo Rao's house the gallant Major Tombs had his guns, to keep in awe the Subzee Mundee suburb ; all the guards and picquets for these points being supplied from Hindoo Rao's house. In front of the old Observatory, which stands on the ridge a little to the left of Hindoo Rao's, another battery was run up to play on the Moree bastion, and also to take in flank any body of mutineers that might venture up the face of the ridge. The Mosque battery was increased, and additional picquets thrown out right and left ; and the

surrounded or bombarded ; and within Delhi the enemy possessed a magazine containing upwards of two hundred guns and an almost inexhaustible supply of ammunition ; while their numbers were certainly never less than double those of the besiegers. Few will doubt, then, that the General in command exercised a sound discretion in refusing to allow a handful of troops, unaided by siege-guns, to attack such a place, knowing, as he did, what disastrous results must follow a failure."

guards in the Metcalfe grounds maintained at their full strength; while regular communication was kept up by mounted patrols during the night between the Metcalfe mound and the Flagstaff Tower.

Such was the position into which the force now gradually settled down. Brigadiers Showers and Graves commanded the two infantry brigades, James Brind commanded the artillery, and Hope Grant the cavalry; while Majors Reid and Tombs were our "watch-dogs"—and were "never caught napping"—on our left front; and Hodson kept an argus eye on the left flank and the rear.\*

Nor were Hodson's services confined to an occasional dashing ride, or to the daily training of his young regiment,† which General Anson, the day after his Meerut adventure, authorised him to raise: even more valuable was he in organising the secret-intelligence department, for which the late Commander-in-Chief had originally selected him. In the midst of that hornets' nest of sedition was living a man whom Hodson had known in former days at Lahore as the confidential Meer Moonshee of Sir Henry Lawrence, named *Rujjub Ali*. The old acquaintance now stood him in good stead. Hodson at once communicated with him, and the old meulvie gave a genial response; and with a

\* GREATHED'S *Letters*, p. 173.

† Allusion has been made at p. 178 to the ready co-operation of the old Sikh rajahs in the neighbourhood of Lahore, Tej Singh, Shumshere Singh, and others, in raising *ressulus* of horse. These, as soon as raised, were sent down to Delhi, and formed the nucleus of "Hodson's Horse."

fidelity and a zeal which it is impossible to over-estimate in that crisis, did this man, rigid Mohammedan though he was, daily forward from the very heart of the city—in a quill, a *chupattee*, a sole of a shoe, the fold of a turban, or the matted hair of a Sikh—anywhere or anyhow, so as to escape detection—a slip of paper containing the news of all that was passing in the city which it behoved us to know ; and so great was his tact that not a shadow of a suspicion rested upon him. Like the two ends of an electric wire were Rujjub Ali in the city and Hodson in camp ; through them passed daily the most authentic intelligence of the rebel plans and movements.

To resume the thread of the narrative. The rebels did not give much time for brooding over the disappointment caused by the abandonment of the assault. The 60th N. I. mutineers had found their way from Rohtuk, and, to give proof of their zeal, “thought fit to signalise their arrival at Delhi by an attack upon our position.”\* They were, of course, repulsed with heavy loss, and had the cool effrontery to ask for mercy at the hands of their own officers, whom they now met face to face, and whom three days before they had attempted to murder in cold blood ! In this encounter the Guides bore the brunt and suffered severely, having another of their officers, the adjutant, Lieutenant Kennedy, wounded, and several of their men killed.

On the 14th there was comparative quiet, with the exception of the booming of the heavy guns, which con-

\* HODSON'S *Twelve Years*, p. 205.



tinued with little intermission. Strange to say, they were indebted to our magazine for the inexhaustible store of guns and ammunition with which they plied us; and we were indebted to them for our heaviest pieces—the 24-pounders we had captured at Budlee Serai; and now our only chance of using them (for we had no ammunition of that size) was by picking up their round-shot of that calibre, and firing it back to them.

On the 15th June the value of our new position at Metcalfe House was proved. The rebels made an attempt to work round along the sand, the river being very low; but the picquet of H. M. 75th at the stables proved too much for them, and they gave up the attempt, not without heavy loss. There was also another attack, though not a very severe one, on Hindoo Rao's house, which was repulsed by the gallant Goorkhas.

On the 17th, the cannonading was more than usually severe, apparently with a view of drawing off attention from a battery of heavy guns which the rebels were constructing on a mound close to the Eedgah, in order to enfilade our position on the ridge. One gun was already in position, and opened fire, which our own battery was too weak in metal to silence. This battery, if allowed to be completed, would have been a most dangerous neighbour, so the General resolved upon capturing it. Two columns were formed, one under Major Tombs, consisting of two companies of Rifles, four companies 1st Fusiliers, thirty Guide cavalry, twenty sappers and miners, and four of his

own guns; the other, under Major Reid, comprising his own Goorkhas, four companies of the Rifles, and four companies of the 1st Fusiliers. Tombs moved round from camp on the enemy's left, while Reid took the direct road from Hindoo Rao's to Kissengunge, and came round upon their right. The battery was soon mastered, the adjoining village burnt to the ground, a magazine which the rebels had formed there blown up, the gates of three serais close by, into which the rebels had gone for shelter, were forced, every Pandy inside bayoneted, and the one gun borne off in triumph. This was effected with comparatively little loss—three men killed and fourteen wounded, among the latter Major Tombs himself slightly (having had two horses shot under him),\* and Captain E. Brown, of the 1st Fusiliers, dangerously; while the loss of the enemy could have been scarcely less than three hundred killed.

These repeated failures were already beginning to tell upon the rebels. The condition of the city (so said Rujjub Ali) was far from encouraging. It is true, the Jullundhur mutineers were coming, and the Nusserabad brigade was reported to be at hand; but the imperial treasury was very low, the plunder of the city was nearly exhausted, the Hindoo merchants—those shawl-workers and silversmiths of world-wide fame—were remonstrating loudly against the rapacity of the sepoy mob, and sitting in *dhurma* (lamentation).

\* This made five horses that, from the commencement of the campaign up to that date, Major Tombs had already had shot under him.

over the treasures they had contrived to hide ; while the troops were vehemently demanding pay, and none was forthcoming ; desertions were occurring daily ; and vague rumours floated about that an avenging force was moving up from Agra. Indeed, so cheerless was the prospect, what with difficulties inside the wall and defeats without, that by way of keeping up the spirits of the rebels, it was found desirable to propagate a report that six hundred sepoy and *two European regiments* were on their way from the Punjab, to pay their respects to the King of Delhi !

About this time the Nusserabad brigade arrived, comprising the 15th and 30th N. I. and a company of artillery, bringing with them guns that told of noble service in a better cause—bearing the mural crown and inscription which told of the gallantry of the now rebel troops when forming part of the illustrious garrison of Jellalabad. Emboldened by these reinforcements, or, it may be, in a spirit of reckless desperation, the rebels gave to the 19th and 20th June a melancholy prominence in the records of the siege ; those two days witnessed a struggle which, if not the most severe, was the most critical that little band of heroes had to encounter during those weary months.

Soon after mid-day on the 19th they were seen pouring out in great numbers from the Lahore Gate, giving confirmation to the report which our spies had brought in, that they intended a desperate attack on our position. All arms were soon turned out, and ready at every point.

But, instead of advancing, as usual, on Subzee Munde and our right batteries, the rebels were noticed to be moving off through Kissengunge, and were soon lost sight of in the ruins and gardens beyond. After waiting for some hours for their reappearing, the troops were all recalled to camp late in the afternoon, having been many hours under arms. Scarcely had they turned in, when the alarm again sounded; the rebels had worked round, and presented themselves within a mile and a half of our rear, and the whole camp was again under arms.

The rear was the especial charge of the cavalry; and a few minutes saw Brigadier Hope Grant throwing out a squadron of his 9th Lancers, under Captain Head, and six guns, two of Major Scott's, two of Captain Money's, and two of Captain Turner's (the latter under Lieutenant Bishop); these moved out to the right; on the left Colonel Yule was the meanwhile bringing two more squadrons of Lancers under Captain Anson and Lieutenant Jones, one troop of the Carabineers under Lieutenant Ellis, the Guide Cavalry under Captain Daly, with six more guns under Major Tombs and Major Turner.

The enemy, supposed to be about 3000 in number, had taken up a strong position, and were well supplied with guns, with which they opened a sharp cannonade on the advance of the cavalry. So long as the daylight lasted, all went well; the steady fire of our guns, and the dashing charges of the cavalry, made up for the smallness of numbers, for there were

scarcely 250 sabres and 12 guns; and the enemy were compelled to beat a retreat. But as it became dusk, their superior numbers began to tell in their favour, and they gained courage enough to renew the attack with considerable vigour. A small body of infantry had now come up in support, some of the Rifles and Fusiliers, not 300 in all, yet all that could be spared without imperilling our several batteries in the event of the attack being general, as was threatened. When they came on the scene, they found the cavalry and guns driven back in confusion. The rebels had turned their flank, and got possession of two of the guns; Colonel Yule, the gallant and good, had fallen at the head of his Lancers, Captain Daly, of the Guides, had been brought off severely wounded, and there had been several other casualties. The darkness increased the confusion. However, the infantry sprang forward in a rush, cut a passage through the rebels, who were crowding on, recovered the two guns, and soon cleared the ground. The rebels now fell back, baffled as usual, though nearer to success than they had yet been; and by nine o'clock at night the troops were once more quietly in camp.

But the morning saw the struggle renewed. By daylight, Brigadier Hope Grant was again on the ground, which he found abandoned; and the dead men and horses lying about showed that the rebels had suffered severely. Hardly had he returned to camp to report all clear, when the enemy again made their appearance, pushed on their guns, and opened

fire, pitching some of their round-shot into the very centre of the camp. General Wilson now turned out every available man, and having daylight in our favour the engagement was soon brought to a successful termination. The rebels were driven in quick retreat over the canal, and then stole off by a prudently wide circuit into Delhi, having suffered heavy loss, amounting, it was believed, to above 500 killed and wounded. Our own casualty-roll was very heavy, including nearly 100 in all. Among the killed were Colonel Yule, of the 9th Lancers; Lieutenant Humphreys (20th N. I.), attached to 60th Rifles; and Lieutenant Alexander (3d N. I.), who had come to Delhi with magazine stores, and volunteered to accompany the troops into action.

"The officers wounded were Colonel A. Becher, Quartermaster-General, severely; Captain Daly, Commandant of Guide Corps, severely; Captain Williams, 60th Rifles, severely; Lieutenant Bishop, Horse-Artillery, slightly; and Lieutenants M'Gill and Dundas, 60th Rifles, and Ensign Phillipps (11th N. I.), attached to 60th Rifles, slightly.

"Brigadier Hope Grant had his horse shot under him, and was only saved by the devotion of two men of his own regiment, and his two orderly sowars of the 4th Irregular Cavalry."\*

Had a simultaneous attack been made in front, the result would probably have been still more serious. Such was their original plan; but there was a split

\* NORMAN'S *Narrative*.

between the old and new mutineers. The newly arrived Nusserabad men taunted the older portion of the rebel force with cowardice for not having long before cleared the ridge; so now they were left to fight alone, the other brigades refusing to attack the batteries while they were pressing on the rear.

"The employment of portions of troops and batteries," writes Lieutenant Norman, "as well as of regiments instead of whole troops, batteries, or corps, was an evil which, owing to our numerical weakness and necessarily large force always on picquet duty, was often obliged to be tolerated. In fact, from our proximity to the enemy, when an attack took place, the first and most important object was always to bring up such troops as were most ready at hand, and could without danger be spared.

"To render it less easy to make attacks in the rear, which might have led to a stoppage of our communications with the Punjab, a battery for two 18-pounders was constructed behind the camp, and armed, and the rear picquet of cavalry and infantry were posted at it.

"Prior to these, three 18-pounders had been placed in battery on the mound to the right of the camp, to check any attack from the side of the Subzee Mundee suburb. An infantry picquet had been here all along, and a cavalry picquet on the ground below, together with two horse-artillery guns."

Before the 20th was over, tidings came in of disaster at Baghput. Hodson's dashing ride into Meerut in the end of May secured the possession of the Baghput

bridge over the Jumna, which was thenceforward held by a body of Jheend Horse under Captain M'Andrew. The importance of this position was evident, as giving command of the only direct line of communication between the camp and Meerut. In the beginning of June, Mr John S. Campbell, who had had a providential escape from Moradabad into Meerut, was sent out to take civil charge of the Baghput district. He had several times written into camp for reinforcements, as reports were constantly reaching him of a meditated attack from the city, which the little force at the bridge could hardly hope to withstand. But important as it was to keep up this communication, a greater importance was attached to the Kurnal route; for Kurnal and Umballah were the real base of operations, and the Punjab beyond, their main storehouse. So the wants of Baghput were regarded as of secondary moment, and were not attended to. On the 19th the rumour of a coming attack was revived, and Captain M'Andrew resolved on retiring. Campbell remonstrated, protested against an act which was cowardly as well as impolitic—but in vain.\* The Jheend force were withdrawn, the bridge abandoned, the boats left to the enemy, and all without a single rebel having come in sight! The whole affair was deplorable, and most severely censured by the authorities.† A few

\* As the party were retiring, one man was seen to rush back to the nearest boat and bring off something in his hand—it was Fagan of the artillery. What treasure has he rescued? A Bible—the gift of his mother in the days of his boyhood!

† HODSON'S *Twelve Years*, p. 226.



days after the evil was remedied by Hodson, who recovered the bridge, repaired the boats, some of which had in the meanwhile been destroyed by the rebels; and a second time opened communication with Meerut.

The reader will remember the successful escape of the mutineers of Jullundhur and Philour, and the order from Sir John Lawrence that Brigadier Johnstone should at once push on every available European to Delhi. The mutineers had got a start and kept it, and the 21st saw them pouring into the city—the 6th Light Cavalry, the 3d, 36th, and 61st N. I. Reinforcements were also coming into camp from Umballa—about 100 men of H. M. 75th, the same number of the 1st Fusiliers, the three companies of the 2d Fusiliers that had been left at Umballa, some 220 men, with the 4th Sikhs under Captain Rothney, 400 strong. These marched into camp two days after,—a truly opportune arrival, for everything had tended to indicate a coming struggle.

The 23d June was the centenary of the Battle of Plassey; it was also the *Ruth Juttra*, a high festival of the Hindoos; then there was a new moon, a glorious omen for Mohammedans: so far the heavens seemed propitious; then native prophecy was enlisted in the cause; *shlokes*, fresh coined from the mint of some fanatic Pundit's brain, were put forth as uttered years before, and only just discovered, to assure the sepōys that victory was at hand, that the hundred years of English rule would that day be wound up with the

utter annihilation of their race. *Bang*, too, was profusely supplied.

So our reinforcements, as they marched in that morning, were greeted with a roaring cannonade from every bastion, and several advanced batteries in the suburbs, and they found the whole force under arms, and the struggle already begun. To guard against the possibility of surprise, the General had turned them out by half-past two in the morning, but it was nearly five o'clock before the attack began in earnest. The rebels advanced through the Subzee Munde, on the rear of Hindoo Rao's, while some guns they had planted near the *Eed Ghar* were enfilading the battery with deadly effect.\* Here the Rifles and Goorkhas held their own in gallant style. Another body of the rebels pushed up to attack the mound battery further to the right rear, where detachments of the 1st and 2d Fusiliers kept them in check.

But our batteries were altogether too weak to silence even their new batteries, while their heavier pieces from the bastions murderously raked the crest of the ridge. Four times had the rebels advanced, and as often been repulsed; but little was really gained by this skirmish of musketry. Brigadier Showers, who had been at the advance-battery the whole day, sent

\* "The detail, with two light guns on picket at Hindoo Rao's (9-pounders of Major Scott's battery), under command of Lieutenant Minto Elliot, were in a most exposed position throughout the affair, and suffered from the fire of heavy artillery in front and flank; one gun was disabled, and no less than fourteen of the horses put hors-de-combat."—NORMAN'S *Narrative*.

up an earnest request to the General that a regular clearance of the Subzee Mundee might be made. General Barnard consented, and a column was formed; and now the real work of the day began. The enemy's strongest point appeared to be a small temple in the main street of the Subzee Mundee, called the *Sammy House*, where, under cover of a high enclosure, they kept up an incessant fire of musketry, so severe that it became scarcely possible to work the guns in the battery. This temple was to be cleared at any cost. On the right column advanced, consisting of the 1st and second Fusiliers, through a perfect shower of shot and shell. English pluck was irresistible, and the British bayonet triumphed. The slaughter in the *Sammy House*, and in the enclosure around, was terrific. On pushed the Fusiliers, now strengthened by their new arrivals and the 4th Sikhs, who, in spite of a march of twenty-two miles that morning, were pushed out in support; and the whole suburb was cleared out. Our battery-guns were able to play on the rebels as they retreated into the city; but it was impossible to prevent their carrying off their guns. The loss was not so severe as might have been expected from the desperate nature of the struggle. Lieutenant Jackson of the 2d Fusiliers was killed while gallantly leading his company, and Colonel Welchman had just taken possession of the Subzee Mundee, with the 1st Fusiliers, when he was compelled to retire, severely wounded in the arm; and Captain Jones of the Rifles was also severely wounded; while 38 men were killed and

118 wounded. The loss on the part of the enemy, judging from the state of the gardens and lanes, must have been very severe. But the sun was the most deadly enemy that day. It is thus described by one who experienced it:—"When I arrived at Hindoo Rao's, I found every one exhausted and done up. There were the 1st Fusiliers and some Rifles all done up. I went on to the new advanced battery; it was crowded with worn-out men; the artillerymen, likewise done up, had ceased firing; another party of Rifles in a similar state in another position; 120 men of the 2d Fusiliers, who had marched 23 miles that morning, and had had no breakfast, were lying down exhausted; three weak companies of Goorkhas were out as skirmishers; but they, too, were exhausted, and the remainder were resting under a rock. The heat was terrific, and the thermometer must have been at least 140 degrees, with a hot wind blowing, and a frightful glare." Of ten officers in a single regiment, the 2d Fusiliers, five were struck down by *coup-de-soleil*. In another, the 1st Fusiliers, one was struck down, and six more brought in disabled by the sun.

The result of the day's fight was the capture of the *Sammy House*. Here, and at a serai on the opposite side the road, was now established a strong European picquet. With an uninterrupted view along the grand trunk road up to the Lahore Gate itself, it effectually closed the Subzee Mundee from being the scene of further ambuscades, rendering a longer circuit necessary for all future attacks on our rear. The Sammy

House and serai were 300 yards from the right battery, at Hindoo Rao's ridge, but engineering zeal and ready resources soon remedied this difficulty; a line of breastworks running up the ridge in a short time connected these picquets with the battery, and rendered communication with them comparatively safe. Not that the Sammy House, with all the precautions and contrivances, was a favourite outpost; it was a constant mark for the enemy's guns; and though it was far too valuable, when once it was captured, to be given up, it was not held without severe loss.

Such was the result of the centenary of Plassey. Prophecy would not be fulfilled; *bang* failed to give the needful courage; the new moon proved fickle; and instead of being driven from our batteries, and annihilated, we gained an important advanced position, by which our right flank, our weakest point, was incalculably protected and strengthened. More reinforcements now came in; a wing of H. M. 8th, about 350 strong, under Colonel Hartley; about 100 reserve artillerymen from Lahore; a detachment of newly-raised Sikh artillerymen and sappers, with Olphert's battery; and a wing of 2d Punjab Cavalry, under Lieutenant Charles Nicholson, in advance. The effective force before Delhi now amounted in round numbers to 6600 men of all arms. The hospitals, which had been already crowded with wounded and sick, were now considerably thinned. One detachment had been already sent to Meerut, and a larger number were now despatched *via* Kurnal to Umballa.

After the struggle of the 23d, no very severe attack was made by the rebels during the final week; the failure of that day, when all promised so well, thoroughly disheartened them. Every day, indeed, the alarm sounded, but nothing of importance took place until the 27th, when, in the dim twilight of the morning, an attack was made on the Metcalfe picquet; but this was soon repulsed; then followed a feeble attack on the right, which was equally unsuccessful, though the loss amounted to thirteen killed and forty-eight wounded; among the latter, Lieutenant Harris of the 2d Fusiliers.

The night before, our rear had been made more secure by the destruction of two bridges across the canal, about three miles off. This was successfully accomplished by a small body of sappers under Lieutenant Maunsell, with 100 Sikhs and 50 Guides. This step rendered a still wider circuit necessary, should the rebels feel disposed to renew the attempt on our rear. The only other advance of the rebels during this month was on the 30th. They felt the value of our new Subzee Mundee picquet, and now made a desperate struggle to drive us out, but were repulsed with heavy loss; our gallant little band having to lament the death of a brave young officer, Lieutenant Yorke, attached to the 4th Sikhs, who fell mortally wounded; while Lieutenant Packe, with the same corps, received a severe wound. The entire loss of the day was eight men killed and thirty-six wounded.

"In the course of this day," says Lieutenant Norman, "it was reported that the enemy were again about to construct a battery near the Eedgah, so Brigadier Showers was sent in that direction on a 'reconnoissance,' with six horse-artillery guns under Major Olpherts, a troop of the Carabineers, and a troop 9th Lancers, a wing of H. M. 75th Regiment, and the 1st Fusiliers. The serai in which the battery was supposed to be in course of construction was empty, but in an adjoining house was found a quantity of saltpetre, together with a number of intrenching tools and sand-bags, which were destroyed or brought away."

One important addition had been just made to the staff, which gave hope of more vigour and firmness in the siege. Brigadier N. Chamberlain had been appointed to fill the vacancy caused by the lamented death of Colonel Chester, as Adjutant-General of the army. The first suggestion of the Chief Commissioner had been to leave Chamberlain with the Punjab Moveable Column, where he was so valuable, and to send down Colonel Nicholson to the camp; with the alternative of making Chamberlain Adjutant-General, and placing Nicholson, as his successor, with the Column. One, he felt, was necessary at Delhi as the mainspring of the siege operations, the other at the head of the Column, as the military executive in the Punjab; and, to effect this, all questions of seniority and such like considerations must, at such a crisis, be made to yield to the demands of the service.

So John Nicholson, a regimental captain, went to the Column with rank of Brigadier-General, and Neville Chamberlain, as Adjutant-General of the army, arrived in camp, on the 24th, bringing with him Lieutenant Alexander Taylor of the Engineers.

Thus closed the first three weeks of the memorable siege of Delhi.



## APPENDIX.

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NOTE A, page 3.

### PERSIAN PROCLAMATION FOUND IN THE SHAHZADA'S TENT AT MOHUMRAH.

" WHEREAS the British Government, through the power acquired by the conquest of India and the advantages thereby gained, has framed its politics, and has pursued a course of aggression, to the end that all the East should be added to its dominion; and for the purpose of accomplishing this, and advancing the performance of it, the British Government attempted the conquest of Afghanistan; and although it was overwhelmed by a complete repulse in this attempt, nevertheless it caused great destruction and mischief in the countries of Afghanistan, and took possession of Lahore, Peshawur, and several other dependencies of that country; and this is the proceeding and politic of this Government to obtain complete dominion in Persia: they try to prohibit the intercourse with the Sirdars of Afghanistan, who are our neighbours and co-religionists, and have always been our allies; and this is with a view to open to themselves a road to Persian soil, so that, whenever they wish, they could advance their troops from every side into Afghanistan and all the countries bordering on Persia; and, even if they found they possessed the power, to reduce the Government of Persia to the state of the Rajahs of Hindostan, and to destroy the

religion of Islam in Persia, in like manner as the religion of the Mussulman of India. And in order to carry out this design, the British have commenced invading the kingdom of Persia; they have occupied themselves in deceiving the vulgar, and through deceit and bad faith, and an improper mode of proceeding, whilst our Government have never resented it, and presuming upon our supposed weakness, they have carried their ill practice and bad faith to such an extent that they have tried to seduce persons in the employ of the Persian Government to enter the service of their embassy, and also endeavoured to bring princes and Moonshees of the kingdom under their authority; and they have employed stratagems and artifices, so that, by false pretences and improper proceedings, they have tried to bring to pass that which they desire, and by degrees all their machinations have come to light. Unexpectedly they brought troops to the soil of a power of Islam, and having thus gained a footing, took possession of one of the forts of Islam which was on the sea-shore, and was only held by a small number of troops as its fixed garrison, and thus no army being present they occupied it, and when they saw that if they advanced from the sea-shore they would flounder about like fish on dry land, they have stuck there, for they knew that if they advanced the blows of the sharp swords of the heroes of Islam would not leave breath in the soul of one of them.

“But his Majesty the Shah-in-shah has taken advantage of this breach of faith of the British Government to make manifest his royal will and pleasure; and his orders have gone forth that countless armies are to be assembled on the boundaries of every country; and victorious troops have been directed towards the frontiers to drive out the enemies of the faith, and scatter the rubbish and dirt along the shores, for ‘God giveth the victory to whom he pleases;’ and now, in obedience to the words of the Prophet, ‘To him who doeth injury unto you, do ye injury unto him in like manner as he does injury to you.’ Let all the people of Heran consider it incumbent upon them to follow the precept, ‘Slay, in the name of God, those who wish to slay you;’ and let the old and the young, the small and the great, the wise and the ignorant, the ryot and the sepoy, all without exception, arise

in the defence of the orthodox faith of the Prophet, and, having girt up the waist of valour, adorn their persons with arms and weapons; and let the ullema and preachers call upon the people in the mosques and public assemblies, and in the pulpits, to give in a jahâd in the cause of God; and thus shall the Ghazis in the cause of the faith have a just title to the promises contained in the words of the Prophet, 'Verily we are of those who fought in the cause of God.'

"But whereas the victorious army of the State have not drawn the sword upon the enemy, we have not permitted the eager multitudes to leave their homes; and in the direction of Fars, we have appointed the Ameer Ul Umra Mirza Mahomed Khan Kasheekchi Bashi, and Meer Allie Khan Shooja Ool Moolk, and several other generals and commanders, with 25,000 men; and in the direction of Mohumerah, the Prince Nawab Shusham Ool Dowla, with 20,000 fine troops; and in the direction of Kirman, Goolam Hussum Khan, Tipahdar, and Jaffer Koola Khan Meer, Pun-i-jah, with regiments and cavalry of Karache Daghi, and Azerbiyham and Kirmani, to the number of 20,000 men; and in the direction of Cutch and Meekram, towards Scinde, and from the direction of Affghanistan, the Nawab Ahsham Ool Sultanut, with 30,000 men and 40 guns, abundantly supplied and equipped, and the Affghan Sirdars—viz. Sirdar Sultan Ahmed Khan, Sirdar Shah Doolah Khan, Sirdar Sultan Ali Khan, and Sirdar Mahomed Allum Khan, who have been appointed by his Majesty, have been ordered towards India; and they are hopeful that, by the blessing of Divine aid, they may be victorious.

"And it is necessary that the Affghan tribes and the inhabitants of that country who are co-religionists of the Persians, and who possess the same *kuran* and *kibla* and laws of the Prophet, should also take part in the jahâd, and extend the hand of brotherhood, and, on receiving these glad tidings, act according to the words of the Prophet: 'Verily all true believers are brothers,' and 'also, make manifest the decree of God.' 'Verily the Almighty will weigh the wicked in different scales from the pure;' and for the purpose of settling the quarrel, it is necessary that not only a small number of true believers should stand forth in the defence of the faith, but that the whole should answer our call; and this should

also be made known to all the people of Affghanistan, that the Persian Government has no intention of extending its conquests in that direction, except to the Government of Candahar, which should be given over to Sirdar Rahim Dil Khan, and the family of Sirdar Kohun Dil Khan and the governor of Cabool and its dependencies should be vested in its chiefs, and they should join in the jahâd against the enemies of Islam, and be of the number of those to whom the Prophet sayeth, 'The grace of God dwelleth in those who fight in jahâd.' And we are hopeful that, after the publication of this proclamation, Dost Mahomed Khan, Ameer of Cabool, who always was desirous that the Persian armies should extend their conquests to Affghanistan, and who wished to be strengthened by their alliance, should also unite with us against this tribe of wanderers from the path of righteousness, and that he should become one of the leaders of the faithful in this jahâd, and that he should become a *Ghazi* in Hindostan, for he cannot wish for the friendship of a tribe of whom the Prophet sayeth, 'Verily they do not love you, and neither do ye love them;' nor can he wish to sell his faith for a worldly price. And this proclamation is published for the information of all true believers; and please God the followers of Islam in India and Scinde will also unite with us and take vengeance upon that tribe (the British) for all the injuries which the holy faith has suffered from them, and will not withhold any sacrifices in the holy cause."—*Bombay Telegraph and Courier*, April 14.

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NOTE B, page 4.

TRANSLATION of a PETITION from MUHAMMAD<sup>6</sup> DARWESH to his Honour the LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR, North-Western Provinces.

"Nourisher of the poor! May your prosperity continue! Your highness! the arrangements for the despatch of letters from the king of Delhi to the king of Persia, through

the Pir-zada Hasan Askari, have been stated in a former petition, and must have come to your knowledge. I, who am a mendicant of itinerant habits, have since learned for a certainty, that two men with letters from the king of Delhi, through the said Hasan Askari, proceeded about three or four months ago towards Constantinople, in company with a caravan going to Mecca. Hasan Askari has now assured the king of Delhi that he has certain information that the prince royal of Persia has fully taken possession of and occupied Bushire, and that he has entirely expelled the Christians, or rather has not left one alive there, and has taken many of them prisoners; and that very soon indeed the Persian army will advance by the way of Candahar and Cabul towards Delhi. He told the king also, that his Majesty was altogether too careless about corresponding with the king of Persia. The king then gave Hasan Askari twenty gold mohurs, and requested him speedily to despatch letters to Persia, and directed him to give the gold mohurs to the man who should take the letters, for the expenses of his journey. Hasan Askari accordingly took the money, and returned to his house, and has prepared four men to carry the letters, making them assume the coloured garments of religious mendicants, and it is reported that they will leave for Persia in a day or two. The petitioner has not been able to ascertain their names. In the palace, but more especially in the portion of it constituting the personal apartments of the king, the subject of conversation, night and day, is the early arrival of the Persians. Hasan Askari has, moreover, impressed the king with the belief that he has learned, through a divine revelation, that the dominion of the king of Persia will, to a certainty, extend to Delhi, or rather over the whole of Hindostan, and that the splendour of the sovereignty of Delhi will again revive, as the sovereign of Persia will bestow the crown on the king. Throughout the palace, but particularly to the king, this belief has been the cause of great rejoicing, so much so that prayers are offered, and vows are made, while, at the same time, Hasan Askari has entered upon the daily performance, at an hour and a half before sunset, of a course of propitiatory ceremonies, to expedite the arrival of the Persians, and the expulsion of the Christians.

It has been arranged that, every Thursday, several trays of victuals, wheat-meal, oil, money in copper coin, and cloth, should be sent by the king in aid of these ceremonies; and they are accordingly brought to Hasan Askari. Some of the higher functionaries of the Government, drawn into a faith in this man by his frauds and deceptions, are in the habit of visiting his house, and consider his words and actions entitled to the greatest reliance. Where would be the use in my naming these traitors? May the Almighty God confound the enemies of the Government! Your petitioner keeps learning these matters from certain of his friends who have admittance to the presence of the king of Delhi, and who are, moreover, in the habit of visiting Hasan Askari also. Actuated by good-will, I have communicated the above particulars. It rests in the province of the ever-enduring Government to make necessary and effectual arrangements.—*Petition of the well-wisher Muhammad Darwesh. Dated 24th March 1857. Seal of Fakir Muhammad Darwesh.*"

The envelope in which this letter was contained bore the Delhi post-office stamp, proving that it was posted at Delhi on the 25th March 1857, and another stamp of the Agra post-office, proving that it was duly received there on the 27th of March 1857. The Judge-Advocate explained that this important document was found among the papers of the late Mr Colvin, Lieutenant-Governor at Agra. At the king's trial the truth of every fact stated in this letter was corroborated, yet the warning thus given had not been heeded.

#### COMPLICITY OF THE KING OF DELHI.

Mukund Lal, Secretary to the king of Delhi, made the following important statement at the trial:—

"The king of Delhi has for some two years been disaffected against the Government, and was disposed not to respect his obligations to the English. The particulars are as follows: When Mirza Haidar Shikoh, and Mirza Murid, sons of Mirza Khan Baksh, son of Mirza Sulaiman Shikoh, came here from Lucknow, they, in concert with Hasan Askari, ar-

ranged and suggested to the king that he should have a letter prepared and despatched to the king of Persia. This letter, they suggested, should represent that the English had made the king a prisoner, and had put a stop to all those marks of respect to which, as king, he was entitled, and had suspended the appointment of an heir-apparent. It was farther to represent that his wishes, in reference to the appointment of any particular son as heir-apparent were not attended to. Under these circumstances, the letter was to request that such an understanding might be established, that mutual interchanges of visits and letters might be the result. Sidi Kambar, who was one of the king's special armed retainers, was presented with one hundred rupees, through Mahbub Ali Khan, for the expenses of his journey, and was despatched in the direction of Persia, with a letter that had been prepared in the king's private secretarial office. After this, Mirza Haidar and his brother returned to Lucknow; and having despatched his brother, Mirza Najaf, a distant relation of the king, with Mirza Bulaki, son of Mirza Musharrafa-ud-din, son of Mirza Agha Jan, to Persia, reported the same to the king in writing. It is now about three years since some infantry soldiers, stationed at Delhi, became the disciples of the king through Mirza Ali, whose duty it was to receive and present all petitions, and also through Hamid Khan Jemadar; and on that occasion the king gave each of them a document, detailing the names and order of those who had preceded him in the direct line, disciples to each other, himself included, together with a napkin dyed pink, as an emblem of his blessing. The agent of the Lieutenant-Governor, hearing of this occurrence, inquired regarding it, and for the future prohibited the king's making any more men of the army his disciples. It may be said that, from that day, a sort of understanding was established between the army and the king."

Sir Thomas Metcalfe also gave valuable testimony in corroboration :—

"A sidi of the king, who was in constant attendance at the palace, secretly urged a risaldar of the 14th irregular cavalry to leave our service, and to take service with the king, telling him, as an inducement to do so, that before the hot weather

was over, the Russians would have come to India, and the government of the English be at an end. The risaldar communicated this to me; his name is Everett. He speaks English, and is partly of European extraction. He also informed me that, about six months before, the king had sent an emissary to Russia."

Major Abbott, commanding the 74th N.I. at Delhi, thus officially states his opinion, writing to the A. A. G., Meerut, on the 13th May, immediately on his escape from Delhi:—

"From all I could glean, there is not the slightest doubt that this insurrection has been originated and matured in the palace of the king of Delhi, and that with his full knowledge and sanction, in the mad attempt to establish himself in the sovereignty of this country. It is well known that he has called on the neighbouring States to co-operate with him in thus trying to subvert the existing government."

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#### NOTE C, page 14.

After reciting the facts, as already stated, the General Order for the disbandment of the 19th Regiment proceeded:—

"The men of the 19th Regiment have refused obedience to their European officers. They have seized arms with violence. They have assembled in a body to resist the authority of their Commander.

"The regiment has been guilty of open and defiant mutiny.

"It is no excuse for this offence to say (as has been said in the before-mentioned petition of the Native Officers and men of the regiment), that they were afraid for their religion, and that they apprehended violence to themselves.

"It is no atonement of it to declare (as they have therein declared), that they are ready to fight for their Government in the field, when they have disobeyed and insulted that Government in the persons of its officers, and have expressed no contrition for their heavy offences.



"Neither the 19th Regiment, nor any regiment in the service of the Government of India, nor any Sepoy, Hindoo, or Musulman, has reason to pretend that the Government has shown, directly or indirectly, a desire to interfere with the religion of its troops.

"It has been the unvarying rule of the Government of India to treat the religious feelings of all its servants, of every creed, with careful respect; and to representations or complaints put forward in a dutiful and becoming spirit, whether upon this, or upon any other subject, it has never turned a deaf ear.

"But the Government of India expects to receive, in return for this treatment, the confidence of those who serve it.

"From its soldiers, of every rank and race, it will, at all times, and in all circumstances, enforce unhesitating obedience. They have sworn to give it, and the Governor-General in Council will never cease to exact it. To no men who prefer complaints with arms in their hands will he ever listen.

"Had the Sepoys of the 19th Regiment confided in their Government, and believed their commanding officer, instead of crediting the idle stories with which false and evil-minded men have deceived them, their religious scruples would still have remained inviolate, and themselves would still be, as they have hitherto been, faithful soldiers, trusted by the State, and laying up for future years all the rewards of a long and honourable service.

"But the Governor-General in Council can no longer have any confidence in this regiment, which has disgraced its name, and has lost all claim to consideration and indulgence.

"It is therefore the order of the Governor-General in Council, that the 19th Regiment N.I. be now disbanded; that the native commissioned and non-commissioned officers and privates be discharged from the army of Bengal; that this be done at the head-quarters of the Presidency division in the presence of every available corps within two days' march of the station; that the regiment be paraded for the purpose; and that each man, after being deprived of his arms, shall receive his arrears of pay, and be required to withdraw from the cantonment.

"The European officers of the regiment will remain at Bar-

rackpore until orders for their disposal shall be received from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

"This order is to be read at the head of every regiment, troop, and company in the service."

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NOTE D, page 42.

Colonel H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General of the army, in an official communication to Government—Sir Henry Lawrence, in the pages of the *Calcutta Review*—Colonel Sleeman, in his *Journey through Oude*, among others, had sounded the warning-note of impending danger; and the following extracts, from official correspondence, will show that Government had received still more direct intimation of the effect produced upon the mind of the Sepoys by the introduction of the new cartridge :—

"On the 22d January 1857, Captain J. A. Wright, of the 70th N.I., attached to the Dum-Dum Rifle Depot, reported, for the information of the Commandant of the Depot, 'There appears to be a very unpleasant feeling existing among the native soldiers, who are here for instruction, regarding the grease used in preparing the cartridges; some evil-disposed person having spread a report, that it consists of a mixture of the fat of pigs and cows.

"Some of the depot men, in conversing with me on the subject last night, said that the report had spread throughout India, and when they go to their homes their friends will refuse to eat with them. I assured them (believing it to be the case) that the grease used is composed of mutton fat and wax; to which they replied, 'It may be so, but our friends will not believe it: let us obtain the ingredients from the bazaar, and make it up ourselves; we shall then know what is used, and be able to assure our fellow-soldiers and others that there is nothing in it prohibited by our caste.'"

In passing on Captain Wright's letter, Major Bontein, com-

manding the depot, writes: "I have received the accompanying report from Brevet Captain Wright, one of the officers attached to the depot of musketry under my command :—

"A rumour of this nature has attracted my attention for some days previously, but I was willing to believe it a mere idle prejudice, which would not assume any form of consequence. Captain Wright's statement, however, and my subsequent inquiry, have convinced me that the case is of sufficient importance to require a reference to a higher authority.

"I, last evening, paraded all the native portion of the depot, and called for any complaints that the men might wish to prefer; at least two-thirds of the detachment immediately stepped to the front, including all the native commissioned officers. In a manner perfectly respectful, they very distinctly stated their objection to the present method of preparing cartridges for the new rifle musket: the mixture employed for greasing cartridges was opposed to their religious feeling, and, as a remedy, they begged to suggest the employment of wax and oil in such proportion as, in their opinion, would answer the purpose required."

General Hearsey, in forwarding this communication to Government, and seconding the suggestion, says :—

"This foolish report must have been invented and circulated by some evil-disposed persons, possibly the Kulassies, or other workmen employed in that arsenal; and though no doubt totally groundless, still it will be now most difficult to eradicate this impression from the minds of the native soldiers, who are always suspiciously disposed when any change of this sort affecting themselves is introduced.

"I would accordingly beg leave to recommend, for the consideration and orders of Government, that the officer commanding the Rifle Depot may be authorised to adopt the necessary measures in view to obtaining from the bazaar whatever ingredients may be required for the preparation of the bullet-patch, which the sepoys themselves may be allowed to make up."

This recommendation was adopted by Government, and a change ordered in the manner of loading, the sepoy tearing instead of biting the cartridge.

However, on the 11th of February, General Hearsey again

wrote :—"We have at Barrackpore been dwelling upon a mine ready for explosion. I have been watching the feeling of the sepoys here for some time. Their minds have been misled by some designing scoundrels, who have managed to make them believe that their religious prejudices, their caste, is to be interfered with by Government; 'that they are to be forced to turn Christians.'

"Any reasonable person would doubt, after the experience we have had, that such an absurd notion could possess them; but, nevertheless, it is a fact, and it will take time to dispossess their minds of this stupid idea."

Still matters grew from bad to worse, until an application was made that the Rifle Depot at Dum-Dum might be given up.

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#### NOTE E, page 182.

#### MALWA SIKHS.

The great change effected by Govind Singh, the 10th Gooroo, who converted the Sikhs from a community of contemplative religionists, such as their founder, Gooroo Nanuk, designed them to be, into a nation of warriors, is well known. The martial spirit thus aroused, lacking only some head or centre of action to render it most formidable, formed itself into clans or confederacies called *Misls*\* under their several chiefs, or "sirdars." These were twelve in number, named generally after the then head of each clan. Eleven of these confederacies lay to the north of the Sutlej, occupying what is called the Manja country; on the south the Sikhs also formed a numerous body, at the head of whom was a sirdar named "Phool."

\* The term *Misl* is generally supposed to be derived from an Arabic word signifying "equal" or "alike;" but Cunningham (page 114) observes that there is another Arabic word—*Muslulud* (spelt, indeed, with another *s* than that in *Misl*), which means "armed men," or "warlike people." The word *Misl* is also in common use in another sense, as a file of papers, or anything serried or placed in ranks.

From him the whole body of these Malwa Sikhs\* took their title, and the misl into which they confederated was called the *Phoolkean Misl*. This Phool was a Jut yeoman, the elder of six brothers, all of whom were men of mark and influence. Tradition reports him to have been intelligent and warlike, and, what even in a Sikh is deemed almost more honourable, a lover of beggars (Jogees and Faqirs). One of these, Permasheree Poorie, especially took up his abode with him and acted as his adviser. On the advice of this counsellor, he built a small town called Gurhee Phool. He had two sons, Tullōkâ and Rāmoo, both of whom resembled their father in intelligence and love for mendicants. Tradition says that Phool was rewarded for his Jogee-loving spirit, by an insight into many great mysteries; among others the power of throwing himself into a "trance." The indulgence in this gift, however, at last cost him his life, for one day, whilst in a state of trance, his sons Tullōkâ and Rāmoo, imagining him to be dead, took him and burnt his body.

Phool had also another wife by whom he had sons, but the claim of these to share in his property was set aside by *Tullōkâ* and *Rāmoo*. The descendants of this younger branch are still living at Mougah Kahee, and are called the Chota Gurheeahs. Our history, however, lies with the descendants of Tullōkâ and Rāmoo, from whom, as will be shown, are descended the three houses of *Puttiala*, *Jheend*, and *Nabha*. The history of which is remarkable, as showing the progress of three descendants of a Jut yeoman, rising, in less than a century and a half, from the ancestral occupation of peasants to independent princes.

### *Puttiala.*

Rāmoo, on taking the Pahul,† assumed the name of Ram Singh. He had four sons, between whom his property was divided; of these the eldest was named Alah, who was really the founder of this house. Alah erected a fort in Bur-

\* The original Cis-Sutlej Sikhs are said to be called *Malwa* Sikhs, either from the fact that the clan originally emigrated from Malwa in Central India, or from a fancied resemblance between that country and the tract they here occupy.

† On becoming a Sikh.

nalla, where still remains a town of some importance, and founded another town which he called after himself, Put-i-alah, meaning "the abode of Alah," now called *Puttiala*. He had three sons, Loll Singh, Sheothan, and Sirdool Singh, the latter of whom had a son called Unmeer Singh. Alah Singh lived to a great age; and in the year 1762, when Al mud Shah, Dowanee, invaded Hindostan, the Pathans of Rajkote\* endeavoured to bring about the destruction of his family by false charges; an attempt which eventually redounded to his advancement. He was soon received into power, honoured with a *Khillut* (dress of honour), and had the title of *Rajah*, with a talooqa (estate), conferred upon him. When in the following year Lahen, a Pathan, who had been appointed Governor of Sirhind, was murdered by the Sikhs, Alah Singh succeeded him. On his death, two years after, his property was divided between his two grandsons, Umer Singh and Himut Singh. Himut Singh seized Puttiala; but in 1770 Umer Singh attacked his brother, defeated him, and retook it. Umer Singh now entered on a course of conquest in which he laid the foundation of the future important Raj or Principality of Puttiala. He overran the Delhi province, taking Buttinda, Futheabad, Sirsa, Runeen, Lolpore, and Rohtuck; he also attacked several of the Manja Sikhs, who having crossed the Sutlej, had possessed themselves of land on its southern bank. Ah mud Shah, in his last invasion of Hindostan, recognised the value of Umer Singh's influence, and bestowed upon him the title of "Maharajah," with the office of military commander in Sirhind.† He died in 1781, leaving his son, Saheb Singh, a minor, to succeed him under the regency of his mother. The Puttiala power now suffered much; several petty states that had been subjugated by the warlike Umer Singh recovered their independence under the feeble administration which followed. Runjeet Singh, too, was now riding on the top of the tide of conquest, and had

\* The whole southern bank of the Sutlej had been for generations in the hands of Puttain and other Mussulman chiefs as feudatories of the King of Delhi. With the decline of the Mogul power these states were also dying of inanition, and were only resuscitated for a short time by the advent of Ah mud Shah.

† CUNNINGHAM'S *Sikhs*, p. 120.

begun his aggressive course on the south of the Sutlej. Saheb Singh was compelled to win the Maharajah's favour by presents, until, with the advance of the English in 1809, before the political influence of Metcalfe, and the military power of Ochterlony, "the Lion of the Punjab," was obliged to draw in his claws, and Saheb Singh threw himself under the protection of the English. In 1814 he rendered good service to Ochterlony in the Nepaul campaign, and in the following year he received the title of "Maharajah" from the English in the name of the pensioned-puppet King of Delhi. On his death he was succeeded by his son Kurm Singh, quite a child, during whose minority his mother held the reins of government, as she had in reality done during the greater part of Saheb Singh's life. In the year 1845 Kurm Singh died, when Ner Inder Sing, the present rajah, succeeded to the *gudhee*. His noble support and co-operation during the troubles which threatened the English Government in 1857 have become history.

### *Jheend.*

The Jheend family is also a branch of the Phoolkeian Misl. Of the history of the earlier chiefs of this branch we have been unable to obtain any authentic details. Tullōkâ, the son of Phool and brother of Rāmoo, had two sons, Chynsook Singh and Goordut Singh. The former of these had a son, Goojput Singh, and a grandson, Bhag Singh, who were recognised, in succession, as the heads of this branch. Bhag Singh seems to have been the founder of the power which at one time attached to this family. For faithful service rendered in the beginning of this century, the talooqa (estate) of Khurkhowda, Bursat, and Boanah, were conferred on him by the British Government; while Loodiana, Morinda, Busseen, and Jundeahlee, were given to him by Runjeet Singh. His son, Futteh Singh, also received Moodkee, Phugwarah, Tulwundee; but on his death the greater part of these estates were confiscated, and Sungeet Singh, the son of Futteh Singh, was reduced to his own ancestral patrimony of Jheend. Dying in the year 1834 without issue, this estate lapsed to the British. There was, however, a great grandson of Goojput Singh, in a junior line, named *Suroop Singh*,

living at Budrookhan, who put in a claim as heir to the estate of his childless kinsman. His claim was admitted; Jheend Suffeedo, Sungroor, and Balah-Wallee, were formed into a principality, and conferred on him. This Suroop Singh is the present rajah of Jheend. The intelligence and far-seeing policy which always marked his civil government, are only to be exceeded by the ready devotion and manly daring with which he supported the cause of the English during the whole of the late crisis.

### *Nabha.*

Of the ancestors of the Nabha house still less is known. Juswunth, the fifth in descent from Phool, appears to have been the first of any note. In the year 1810 Juswunth Singh received the title of rajah at the recommendation of Ochterlony. Hisolon, Deo Inder Singh, was a somewhat remarkable character: under the influence of a crafty Brahmin, who resided with him as his adviser, he deluded himself into the idea that he possessed the gift of prophecy, and would, moreover, soon become "master of the world." His bearing towards his subjects was most outrageous. Among other things, he was not content with the ordinary marks of respect with which an Asiatic inferior approaches his lord; he demanded the most abject prostrations, making men lie down with their chests on the ground when entering his presence. Unfortunately for him, he did not confine himself to such comparatively harmless fancies and freaks, but took it into his head to deal in treason with the Sikh sirdars across the Sutlej during the troubles of 1845. At the close of the campaign in the beginning of 1846 he paid the penalty for his folly; he was deposed, with a pension of 50,000 Rs. a-year; a fourth of the country he had held was confiscated, and his son, Bherpoor Singh, appointed to succeed him. The zealous and constant devotion of Bherpoor Singh, the present rajah, to the English cause during the late troubles, had been scarcely second to that of his kinsman of Jheend.





## NOTE F, page 195.

Of the 4th Native Cavalry a more detailed mention should be made, as their conduct is so utterly inexplicable. Though at that time surrounded by traitors, and sorely tried on several occasions from being distrusted, they gave remarkable marks of loyalty. On the evening of the 12th of May, when the tidings of the outbreak at Meerut at first arrived, one squadron was detached under Captain Dumbleton to bring in the treasure from Thaneysur, which was under guard of a company of the 5th N. I. On arriving, they found that the suspicions of their trustworthiness had preceded them. Captain M'Neile, in civil charge of Thaneysur, refused to give up the treasure to them, and ordered them back to Umballa. A small party, however, consisting of a havildar and twelve troopers, remained, and, conjointly with the guard of the 5th N. I., escorted the treasure towards Umballa. Scarcely had they got half-way, when suspicion again met them. The Puttiala troops ordered by Mr Forsyth to Thaneysur met them on the road, and wanted to take the treasure from them. The troopers and sepoy refused to be so ignominiously relieved of their charge, and halted, forming round the treasure, till further instructions. The order then came that the men of the 4th Cavalry and 5th N. I. should retain charge; and they brought it safely into cantonments. In other quarters, small parties of this corps were also proving their fidelity: forty troopers, under Captain Russell, were sent out towards Philour, to receive charge of a large quantity of ammunition ordered in from the magazine, which was being escorted by some of the 3d N. I. and a few of the Nabba Rajah's men. This duty they performed with equal fidelity. Also, when the European corps were ordered down from the hills, the tents and commissariat stores for their use were sent out to the camping-grounds under a guard from the 4th Cavalry. These men were reported by the Europeans to have behaved admirably, and to have rendered every assistance in their power. Other acts might be mentioned.

Here are *three*, in which, within the first week after the

Meerut and Delhi massacre, while the excitement of the native mind was at its height, three separate detachments of this corps received charge respectively of treasure, ammunition, and stores, destined for the use of European troops against their Poorbeah brethren, and performed their duty readily and faithfully. Yet, as after-discoveries proved, these men were *already pledged to treason*. In the palace of the King of Delhi were found papers personally implicating some of the very native officers of these three detachments; among others, an address of hearty congratulation on the successful issue of the mutiny. In fact, strange as it may appear, these men were as much traitors at heart as any corps in the service.

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NOTE FF, page 203.

Three days after, the following Circular was issued, and subsequently the annexed General Order:—

*Adjutant-General's Office, Headquarters.*

SIMLA, May 14, 1857.

SIR,—The Commander-in-chief desires that all firing for drill or target practice purposes shall be suspended until further orders.

It is to be thoroughly explained to the men, that the sole object of this Order is to soothe their minds, now so excited, and also to remove the possibility of their being supposed by their comrades at other stations, or by the people at their homes, to be using any objectionable cartridges.

I have, &c.,

C. CHESTER, Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

*General Orders by the Commander-in-Chief.*

HEADQUARTERS, UMBALLA, May 19, 1857.

The Commander-in-Chief, on May 14, issued a General Order, informing the Native army that it had never been the intention of the Government to force them to use any cartridges which could be objected to, and that they never would be required to do so, either now or hereafter.

His object in publishing that Order was to allay the excitement which had been raised in their minds, although he felt that there was no cause for it.

He hopes that this may have been the case; but he still perceives that the very name of new cartridges causes agitation; and he has been informed that some of those sepoys who entertain the strongest attachment and loyalty to the Government, and are ready at any moment to obey its orders, would still be under the impression that their families would not believe that they were not in some way or other contaminated by its use. The rifle introduced into the British army is an improvement upon the old musket, and much more effective; but it would not be of the same advantage in the hands of the Native army, if it were to be used with reluctance.

Notwithstanding, therefore, that the Government have affirmed that the cartridge is perfectly harmless, the Commander-in-Chief is satisfied that they would not desire to persist in its adoption if the feelings of the sepoys can be thoroughly calmed by its abolition.

His Excellency, therefore, has determined that the new rifle-cartridge, and every new cartridge, shall be discontinued; and that, in future, ball ammunition shall be made up by each regiment for its own use, by a proper establishment entertained for this purpose.

The Commander-in-Chief solemnly assures the army that no interference with their castes or religion was ever contemplated, and as solemnly he pledges his word and honour that none shall ever be exercised.

He announces this to the Native army in the full confidence that all will now perform their duty, free from anxiety or

care, and be prepared to stand and shed the last drop of their blood, as they have formerly done, by the side of the British troops, and in defence of their country.

By order,

C. CHESTER, Colonel,  
Adjutant-General of the Army.

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NOTE G, page 204.

This is the only statement, as originally made in the "Poor-beah Mutiny" Chapters in *Blackwood's Magazine*, the correctness of which has been called in question. Colonel Thomson addressed the author in the month of November, complaining of "the unfairness, even if the facts had been as stated, of his publishing anything defamatory to a public department, without, at least, giving that department the opportunity of confirming or explaining" the statement.

First, then, for *the facts*.—Colonel Thomson officially places it on record that the returns of the executive commissariat officer show that only 243 camels and 28 carts were supplied, and that "as to the number of bearers, it is immaterial, as one and all deserted before the advance columns reached Kurnâl."

Mr Forsyth, the deputy-commissioner of Umballa, reports officially, and his statement is published by Mr Montgomery in the Punjab Mutiny Report, paragraph 40 :—

"As soon as it was determined by the Commander-in-Chief that an onward move should be made, a sudden difficulty arose in the want of carriage. The Deputy Commissary General having officially declared his inability to meet the wants of the army, the civil authorities were called upon to supply the demand. At Umballa there has ever been a difficulty to furnish carriage of any kind—the carts being of a very inferior description. However, such as they were, they had to be pressed into service; and in the course of a week, after the utmost exertions, 500 carts, 2000 camels, and 2000 coolies were made over to the commissariat department. 30,000

maunds of grain were likewise collected and stored, for the army, in the town of Umballa."

The author, therefore, feels fully justified in repeating the statement as originally made.

Secondly, for the grave charge of "unfairness of publishing anything defamatory to a public department, without at least giving that department an opportunity of confirming or explaining" the statement.—The author feels called on to state that (as he believes) the *ipsissima verba*, at any rate the substance and the exact figures, as printed in *Blackwood's Magazine*, had been sent down to Delhi, and submitted by a mutual friend in the commissariat department to Colonel Thomson, who returned the MSS. without any remark at all on the inaccuracy of the statement, and with only a slight comment on the allusion to Major Broadfoot, that he "promised Lord Hardinge everything and supplied nothing;" whereas the commissariat department never promises what it cannot perform.

So it will be seen that the author really did give every opportunity to the department of "confirming or explaining," and, indeed, of preventing, the statement going forth, if it were so "incorrect, and utterly without foundation;" but the officer most concerned himself thought it undeserving of notice, until some months after it appeared in print, and when an important change was on the point of taking place in the department.

Having, as he hopes, satisfactorily answered these two objections, the author desires to avoid being misunderstood as to the spirit in which his remarks on the commissariat department were made. The shortcomings—if so strong a word is allowable—of that department should be always judged of in connection with the *system* which has pervaded it. The department is, under its present state, wholly in the hands, and therefore at the mercy, of the native contractors. Its officers have not the power, which the civilians possess, of drawing upon the resources of the district; and, therefore, Colonel Thomson's authority was limited to his own contractors, &c., who stood aloof in the hour of need, while Mr Forsyth was in a position to *command* the carriage and coolies of his district.

Another circumstance must not be lost sight of. Colonel Thomson had before him the example of his namesake, whose zeal and devotion in the same department, during the Cabul campaign, were rewarded with some years of suspension—for such were virtually his position during the time he was doomed to the pleasing work of “making up his accounts,” as if that disaster had not swept away all trace of accounts—followed in the end by supercession. That campaign had taught its lesson to another person in the same department. *Lalla Jotee Persaud*, whose wondrous resources had been taxed to the utmost to supply that army with provisions, and who had no doubt rated his services at their full value—this is a failing with natives generally—and made his claims on Government accordingly, had found himself compelled, in return for his co-operation, to appeal to the law courts for payment; and when the mutiny broke out, his zealous loyalty (of which so much was said) in sending supplies into the Agra Fort was regulated by the discretion which experience had taught him. He insisted on *being paid beforehand* for every maund of grain he provided.\*

That the commissariat officers at Umballa should have listened to the voice of prudence, and have refused to go beyond the length of their official tether, with such a warning before their eyes, is scarcely to be wondered at, or condemned. To Colonel Thomson's effectiveness and zeal in working the commissariat machinery, while it would run in its own track, the siege of Delhi bears ample testimony. *Never, perhaps, was army better provisioned.*

\* This statement is made on the assurance of one who was best informed of all in that garrison.

## NOTE H, page 326.

GENERAL SIR H. BARNARD'S DESPATCH AFTER THE  
BATTLE OF BUDLEE SERAI.

*Major-General Sir H. Barnard to the Adjutant-General  
of the Army.*

DELHI CANTONMENTS, June 8.

SIR,—The forces under my command marched from Allipore at 1 A.M. this morning, and on reaching Budlee Serai found the enemy strongly posted in an intrenched position, which I have the satisfaction to inform you was carried after an engagement of about three-quarters of an hour, and proceeded to take up our present position, which we found to be over disputed ground the whole way, and finally, in a well-defended line of defence, from the signal-tower to Hindoo Rao's house. Our troops behaved with the greatest gallantry and persevering endurance, and, after facing a very determined resistance, drove the enemy within the walls of Delhi: all this was accomplished by 9 o'clock in the morning. Our loss has been comparatively trifling, only one officer being killed; but I regret to say that officer is Colonel Chester, Adjutant-General of the Army, who was esteemed by all for every qualification that can adorn the soldier. I have not been able to ascertain the particulars of our loss, or our capture of guns; but I fear I cannot estimate the former under forty to fifty killed, the number of guns taken to be about sixteen or eighteen. I do not in this hurried despatch attempt to recommend any one; but I cannot pass over the assistance I received from Brigadier-General Wilson, whose cool judgment entitles him to an equal share of any merit that may be given to the officer in command. From the Brigadier-General and staff of the army attached to me from the divisional staff I received every support; and from my personal staff, Captain Barnard and Lieutenant Turnbull, the most daring devotion. The conduct of the Goorkha bat-



talion, the Sappers, and other native troops employed, was most praiseworthy; they vied with their European comrades in forward daring. The troops of the native contingents did equally good service, including those of the Jheend Rajah; and I cannot close this without especial mention of many gentlemen attached to the army in civil capacities, who not only accompanied us into the field, but did every service the extended nature of our position rendered prominent in keeping up mutual communication.

I hope to send you a fuller detail to-morrow. Our siege train is up, and I hope to open on the town without a moment's delay.

P.S.—I find the captured guns amount to twenty-six, and I desire to add to this, in justice to myself, special notice of the assistance I received from Colonel Congreve, C.B., Acting Adjutant-General of Her Majesty's Forces in India; Colonel Becher, Quartermaster-General of the Army; and Colonel the Hon. R. Curzon, Military Secretary to the late Commander-in-Chief, who never left me; Captain Norman, Assistant-Adjutant-General of the Army, and on whom the important duties of Adjutant-General devolved on the death of Colonel Chester; and Colonel Young, Judge-Advocate-General of the Army, who accompanied me during the whole of the action.

*Major-General Sir H. Barnard to the Adjutant-General  
of the Army.*

DELHI CANTONMENT, June 11.

SIR,—I have the honour to report, for the information of General Reed, commanding the Forces, that the enemy attacked the position occupied by the troops under my command this morning in force. The troops acted throughout with gallantry and coolness, and the affair ended in the total repulse of the enemy, who have retreated to the city. At about a quarter to 5 A.M. the attack first began. On my ascertaining that both flanks were being attacked, the usual supports were not only sent up to the position on the heights, but the whole of the troops under my command were

speedily under arms, and marched up to reinforce the picquets and to drive back the enemy. This was first accomplished on the left, the enemy falling back under the fire of the troops, and, after being beaten back from the right, they came on again for a second attack, under cover of the thickly-wooded gardens near the Subjee Munde. The 1st Bengal European Fusileers were sent against them, under the command of Major Jacob, and succeeded most gallantly in not only driving the enemy back, but pursued them, skirmishing all through the thickly-wooded gardens of the Subjee Munde. It was about half-past 7 A.M. when the troops began to be recalled, and the assembly first sounded for the skirmishers.

In comparison with the strength of the attack our loss was small, and I trust to be able to send in without delay the official returns of the killed and wounded. I have heard as yet of only one casualty among the officers, Captain Knox, 75th Regiment, who was killed when reinforcing the picquet at the Flag-staff Tower, and while driving back the enemy. The loss to the enemy must have been considerable, and, although difficult to estimate, could not have been less than 250.

*Major-General Sir H. Barnard to the Adjutant-General  
of the Army.*

DELHI, June 12.

SIR,—With reference to my hurried despatch of the 8th inst., I have now the honour, for the information of the General commanding the Forces, to submit a more detailed account of the action of Budlee Serai, and seizure of the position on the ridge above the cantonments of Delhi, necessary to hold with regard to ultimate operations against that city.

Having been joined by the force under Brigadier-General Wilson, I broke up the camp at Allipore without delay, and on ascertaining that the enemy had made preparations to oppose our advance, and had occupied a fortified position at Budlee Serai, made the following disposition of the

forces :—Brigadier-General Grant, C.B., with the force, was to gain the opposite side of the canal, and recross it below and in rear of the enemy's position, so soon as he heard the action commence, with a view of taking the enemy in flank. The 1st Brigade, under Brigadier-General Showers, was to act on the right side of the main trunk road, along which the column was to advance, and the 2d Brigade, under Brigadier-General Graves, was to take the left ; the heavy guns were to remain in position on the road, the rest of the artillery to act on either side. As soon as our advanced picquet met the enemy, these brigades deployed, leaving the main road clear. The enemy soon opened a very heavy fire upon us, and, finding that our light field-pieces did not silence their battery, and that we were losing men fast, I called upon the 75th Regiment to make a dashing charge and take the place at the point of the bayonet. This service was done with the most heroic gallantry ; and to Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert, and every officer, non-commissioned officer, and man of the 75th Regiment my thanks are most especially due. The 1st Europeans supported the attack ; and on the 2d Brigade coming up and threatening their right, and Brigadier-General Grant showing the head of his column and guns on their left rear, the enemy abandoned the position entirely, leaving his guns on the ground. The action lasted nearly one hour, and, I regret to say, cost many valuable lives.

Although the men were much exhausted, I determined to push on, under the impression that, if I halted, a similar difficulty might be opposed to me the following day in gaining the requisite position, and on the road separating, it became desirable to act in two columns, sending one along the main trunk road, and taking the other to the left through the cantonments. To Brigadier-General Wilson, supported by Brigadier-General Showers' Brigade, I confided the conduct of this column, which had to fight its way through gardens with high walls and other obstacles the whole way : and, taking the 2d Brigade, with Brigadier-General Graves, with myself, I proceeded to the left. I soon found that the enemy had posted himself strongly on the ridge over the cantonments, with guns in position, and under the range of which we soon found ourselves, upon which I determined on

a rapid flank movement to the left, in the hope of gaining the ridge under cover of the cantonments, and taking the position in flank.

This was happily successful ; the enemy got their guns hastily into a position to meet me ; and Brigadier-General Graves's Brigade, consisting of the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, supported by the 2d Europeans, under Captain Boyd, advanced gallantly, supported by Captain Money's troop of Horse Artillery, and carried the position ; and the enemy, finding himself taken in flank and rear, abandoned his guns, and we swept the whole ridge from the Flag-staff to Hindoo Rao's house, where I had the satisfaction of meeting Brigadier-General Wilson ; and, the object of the day having been thus effected, the force was at once placed in position before Delhi.

I have already mentioned to the Commander-in-Chief the names of officers to whom I am indebted, and whom I desire in justice to call to his notice, and to whose names I beg to add those of Major Ewart, Deputy-Assistant-Adjutant-General ; Captain Shute, Assistant-Quartermaster-General ; and Captain Maisey, Deputy-Judge-Advocate-General, and beg to state that I fully concur in the merit of those recommended by my Brigadiers.

W. H. BARNARD, Major-General,  
Commanding Field Force.

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NOTE I, page 327.

GENERAL REED'S OFFICIAL REPORT ON HIS ASSUMING  
COMMAND BEFORE DELHI.

*The Assistant Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary  
to the Government of India.*

DELHI, June 13.

SIR,—In continuation of letter of the 27th ult., to your address, from the late Adjutant-General of the Army, reporting the death of the Commander-in-Chief on that day, I

am now desired by Major-General T. Reed, C.B., commanding the forces in Bengal, to request that you will inform the Governor-General in Council that the Major-General having left Rawul Pindie on the 28th ult., reached the camp of the force under Major-General Sir H. Barnard, K.C.B., at Alleepore, one march from Delhi, about 1 a.m. of the 8th inst., when the troops were on the point of moving to drive in the posts of the mutineers outside Delhi.

2. Sir H. Barnard had been joined on the previous day by Brigadier A. Wilson with troops from Meerut, and on the 6th inst. by the siege-train with its escort.

3. I beg to enclose copies of the Major-General's two reports of the successful operations of this day, and am only to add that Major-General Reed entirely approves of the whole of the dispositions made, and cordially concurs in the approbation bestowed on the officers and troops engaged, and particularly on those who are more especially mentioned.

4. The Commander of the Forces, I am to state, was unable, from severe sickness and fatigue, to accompany the troops, and in no way interfered with the arrangements of Sir H. Barnard, who was attended in the field by the headquarters' staff.

5. Major-General Reed desires to express his deep regret at the loss of the Adjutant-General of the Army, Colonel C. Chester, who was killed by a cannon-shot in the first advance on the enemy's heavy battery at Budlee Serai. The loss of this officer at the present juncture is deeply deplored by the Commander of the Forces.

6. Since the arrival of the troops at Delhi, several affairs have taken place, in all of which the troops engaged have greatly distinguished themselves. The most important of these occurred yesterday morning, when our position was attacked in great force, and the enemy completely repulsed, with much loss.

7. The Guide Corps, under Captain Daly, arrived on the morning of the 9th inst., having marched from Murdan, in Eusufzaie, a distance of 580 miles, in twenty-two days.

8. The engineer and artillery portions of the force have been actively employed in throwing up batteries, and in maintaining a fire on the city. The mutineers have mounted

a very formidable artillery, and their practice is excellent, and usually well sustained; but the Major-General trusts ere long we shall be enabled to strike a decisive blow at the place.

I have, &c.,

W. H. NORMAN, Lieutenant.

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NOTE, page 347.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR H. BARNARD, K.C.B., COMMANDING  
FIELD-FORCE, TO THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY.

CAMP BEFORE DELHI, *June 23.*

SIR,—I have the honour to submit, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, the report of Brigadier Grant, C.B., of the affair of the 19th instant.

These repeated attacks upon our position, with the small force we have to repel them, are rendered most harassing by the uncertainty of the point on which it is to be threatened, it being always doubtful whether it is to be confined to one, and can only be successfully repulsed by the untiring and unflinching gallantry of the small bodies who can alone be directed against the enemy, and I can assure you that under no circumstances did officers and men merit greater praise.

I have to deplore the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Yule, 9th Lancers, an officer of great merit, and Lieutenant Alexander, of the 3d Native Infantry, a young officer of much promise; also, that Colonel Belcher, Quartermaster-General, and Captain Daly, of the Guides, were wounded, and that I shall be deprived for some time of the services of these officers—an irreparable loss at this moment.

The Native Irregular Cavalry man mentioned by Brigadier Grant, C.B., has been rewarded by the Order of Merit, which carries the highest pension, and I would venture to recommend Privates Hancock and Purcell, 9th Lancers, for the Victoria Cross.

My thanks are due to Brigadier Grant, C.B., who, on this as on all occasions, evinces the highest qualifications for a cavalry officer.

Our loss, I regret to say, was severe; but, taking the great superiority of the enemy in number into consideration, I am only thankful it should not have been greater.

I enclose a return of casualties.

I have, &c.,

H. BARNARD.

BRIGADIER J. H. GRANT, C.B., COMMANDING CAVALRY  
BRIGADE OF THE FIELD-FORCE, TO THE DEPUTY-ASSIST-  
ANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF DIVISION.

CAMP, DELHI, *June 22.*

SIR,—On the afternoon of the 19th instant, information was brought in that the camp was to be attacked in the rear.

The safety of the camp being under my direction, I immediately proceeded with a squadron of her Majesty's 9th Lancers, two guns of Major Scott's, two of Captain Money's, and two of Major Turner's, under command of Lieutenant Bishop, to prevent the near approach of the enemy to our camp. When this force got to the right of the Ochterlony gardens, a heavy fire of artillery was opened upon it, to which our guns replied. The troops from camp now began to arrive, and the action became general.

The enemy had taken up a position about half a mile in rear of the Ochterlony gardens, and thence opened a very severe fire of round shot, grape, and canister. I advanced our guns right up to them, and our artillery replied to their fire with the greatest spirit.

As long as it was light, we succeeded in driving the rebels back, but in the dusk of the evening the enemy, who were in great numbers, very nearly succeeded in turning our flank, and for some time two guns were in great jeopardy.

It now became very dark, but I succeeded, with Lieutenant Martin, of the 9th Lancers, in getting a few men together, and we charged into the enemy.

The guns, I am happy to say, were saved ; but a waggon of Major Scott's battery was blown up. I must not fail to mention the excellent conduct of a sowar of the 4th Irregular Cavalry and two men of the 9th Lancers, Privates Thomas Hancock and John Purcell, who, when my horse was shot down, remained by me throughout. One of these men and the sowar offered me their horses, and I was dragged out by the sowar's horse. Private Hancock was severely wounded, and Private Purcell's horse was killed under him. The sowar's name is Roopur Khan.

Our fire reopened, and the enemy were driven back to the town.

On the left flank, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, under Colonel Yule, one troop of the Carabineers, under Lieutenant Ellis, and the Guide Corps, under Captain Daly, proceeded in support of Major Tombs's and Major Turner's guns. The former proceeded with the Guide Corps, the latter with the 9th Lancers, in support to the left of the Ochterlony gardens, and both opened fire.

A squadron of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Anson, then charged down the road ; and the third squadron, under Lieutenant Jones, with Colonel Yule, followed in support. Colonel Yule, I regret to say, fell at this time, having received a shot in his leg, and was killed by the enemy. He is a severe loss to the 9th Lancers.

The Guide Corps, under Captain Daly, gallantly charged twice ; and I regret to say this excellent officer was severely wounded in the shoulder, but the enemy were beaten, and retired to the town.

The following morning I was ordered by the Major-General commanding to take a force out on the same ground, and drive the enemy away, if any were still left. I proceeded, but found only a strong picket of the enemy, which was easily driven back, and we captured a gun and two waggons, which they had left the night previous.

I beg to bring to the immediate notice of Major-General Sir H. Barnard the names of the officers who had command of guns and squadrons. Major Scott, Captain Money, and Lieutenant Bishop commanded the guns on the right, and nothing could be better than the way in which they brought



their guns forward, and opened them on the enemy, fearless of danger; also Captain Head, who was on the right, and Captain Anson and Lieutenant Jones, who commanded squadrons on the left. The conduct of all has been most favourably reported to me. Major Turner's and Major Tombs's names, I presume, will be mentioned by Brigadier Wilson, and it would be needless my saying anything in their favour.

I beg also to bring the name of Captain Daly before Sir Henry, a most gallant and excellent officer.

I regret to say the loss in the 9th Lancers was severe—five men killed and eight wounded, and thirty-one horses killed, wounded, and missing.

I have, &c.,

J. H. GRANT.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.